Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

12-9-2016

Pseudotransformational Leadership, Leadership Styles, and
Emotional Intelligence: A Comparative Case Study of Lon Nol and
Pol Pot
Hok Roth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Roth, Hok, "Pseudotransformational Leadership, Leadership Styles, and Emotional Intelligence: A
Comparative Case Study of Lon Nol and Pol Pot" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 3677.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/3677

This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

Pseudotransformational leadership, leadership styles, and emotional intelligence:
a comparative case study of Lon Nol and Pol Pot

By
TITLE PAGE
Hok Roth

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Public Policy and Administration
in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Mississippi State, Mississippi
December 2016

Copyright by
COPYRIGHT PAGE
Hok Roth
2016

Pseudotransformational leadership, leadership styles, and emotional intelligence:
a comparative case study of Lon Nol and Pol Pot
By
APPROVAL PAGE
Hok Roth
Approved:
____________________________________
Gerald A. Emison
(Director of Dissertation)
___________________________________
Dragan Stanisevski
(Committee Member)
___________________________________
Brian D. Shoup
(Committee Member)
___________________________________
P. Edward French
(Committee Member / Graduate Coordinator)
___________________________________
Rick Travis
Interim Dean
College of Arts & Sciences

Name: Hok Roth
Date of Degree: December 9, 2016

ABSTRACT

Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Public Policy and Administration
Major Professor: Gerald A. Emison
Title of Study:

Pseudotransformational leadership, leadership styles, and emotional
intelligence: a comparative case study of Lon Nol and Pol Pot

Pages in Study: 408
Candidate for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
The purpose of this dissertation is to help explain how and why two revolutionary
national leaders of Cambodia–Lon Nol and Pol Pot, particularly the latter–had
spectacular failures and became pseudotransformational leaders. It aims to build a
proposition or theory that revolutionary leaders in the public sector, particularly of
undemocratic regimes, tend to become pseudotransformational leaders when a) they lack
certain components of emotional intelligence (EI) and/or b) adopt certain leadership
styles and use them inappropriately. The author used a mixed methods comparative case
study with the quantitative method nested in the qualitative one. He collected empirical
data from a quantitative questionnaire survey and qualitative individual interviews and
other print and audio-visual data from various primary sources, including the
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), as well as from secondary sources such as books and
articles. The author administered the survey to a sample of over 400 Cambodian
participants from different socio-economic and political backgrounds and sectors and
conducted individual in-depth interviews with 38 participants selected from the sample.

Overall, this study’s findings tend to support the proposed theory, albeit with
some limitations. In the main, both Lon Nol and Pol Pot were coercive and authoritative
leaders. Only Pol Pot was a pacesetting leader. Both leaders severely lacked emotional
intelligence, especially the domain of self-awareness. This dissertation makes some
contribution to the existing literature on leadership in general and bad leadership in
particular and, more specifically, on the two leaders’ leadership qualities, in that it
proposes a linkage between leadership ineffectiveness or failures and lack of emotional
intelligence and improper use of leadership styles. The practical implications or lessons
drawn from the dissertation include the following. First, a national leader’s distance or
isolation from the masses can undermine her or his emotional intelligence and/or
leadership effectiveness. Second, national/public interest should take precedence over the
leader’s other interests and partisan politics. Third, a leadership team of friends or cronies
is, more often than not, harmful to quality decision/policy making and administration
because it tends to foster groupthink.
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INTRODUCTION
“He who is not heartless (ruthless) cannot be a king (or ruler).”
–an oft-mentioned Cambodian saying
“The sufferings of a monarch’s subjects are his or her sufferings.”
–an well-known aphorism by Jayavarman VII, Cambodia’s legendary king
“Metta (Loving Kindness), Karuna (Compassion), Mudita (Sympathetic Joy), and
Upekkha (Equanimity).”
–the oft-invoked Four Brahma Viharas or Sublime Moods in Buddhism (quoted
in Humphreys (1993, pp. 106-111)
Some or all of the statements above are likely to have influenced or even
confounded two of Cambodia’s top national leaders while in office, namely Lon Nol, the
prime minister and later president of the Khmer1 Republic and Pol Pot, the prime minister
of Democratic Kampuchea2.
Cambodia is now a peaceful country in Southeast Asia that follows a
constitutional monarchy. But not until 1999 did Cambodia achieve more or less full peace
for the first time after some three decades of civil war when the last remnants of the Pol
Pot-led Khmer Rouge (or Red Khmer) resistance faction had defected to the Royal

1
2

“Khmer” is the term used by local Cambodians for “Cambodian.”
“Kampuchea” is the direct transliteration of the Cambodian word for “Cambodia.”

1

Government of Cambodia, which controlled more than 90 percent of Cambodia’s
territory.
Since 1953, the country has undergone six different regimes or forms of
government, two of which are to be discussed in depth in this work, namely the USbacked republican regime led by Lon Nol from October 1970 to April 16, 1975 and the
China-backed communist regime led by Pol Pot between April 17, 1975 and January 6,
1979. The first regime was called the Khmer Republic and the second Democratic
Kampuchea (DK). Both were revolutionary regimes but of different types. Lon Nol and
Pol Pot were contemporaries, although the former died 13 years before the later did. Lon
Nol led to the fall of Cambodia and to the rise of Pol Pot, who became the clandestine
chairman of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and then Prime Minister of DK.
Statement of the Problem and Significance of the Study
There is a real (if not urgent) need for an in-depth analysis of the leadership,
failures in particular, of the two national leaders: Lon Nol and Pol Pot. The rationale for
this is as follows.
Despite the increasing amount of scholarship of leadership–which almost
invariably and subconsciously refers to good leadership–bad leaders both at the
organizational, sub-national and national levels are numerous. Kellerman (2004, p. xv)
points out that “[b]ad leadership is a phenomenon so ubiquitous it’s a wonder that our
shelves are not heavy with books on the subject.” More striking is Kellerman’s assertion
in her latest book The End of Leadership about the performance of what she termed “the
leadership industry” that “[b]ottom line: while the leadership industry has been thriving –
growing and prospering beyond anyone’s early imaginings –leaders by and large are
2

performing poorly, worse in many ways than before, miserably disappointing in any case
to those among us who once believed the experts held the keys to the kingdom” (2012, p.
xv).
A rising number of bad leaders in the private, public, nonprofit, and even religious
sectors, particularly the Roman Catholic Church (Kellerman, 2004) have been exposed
thanks to increasingly more powerful investigative and social media, especially in the
past two decades. Widely publicized bad leaders include the late President Richard Nixon
of the United States, the late President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, the late President
Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, former president Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt and Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, former Chairman and CEO of the
collapsed energy giant Enron. When commenting on leaders and human beings in
general, Isaac Asimov, a world renowned and prolific science-fiction author said, “It’s
almost not necessary for us to do good; it’s only necessary for us to stop doing evil, for
goodness’ sake” (quoted in Moyers, 1989, p. 278). Speaking of a need to study the
negative side of great men, Carl Jung (1946), the famed Swiss founder of analytical
psychology said “Biographies should show people in their undershirts. Goethe had his
weaknesses, and Calvin was often cruel. Considerations of this kind reveal the true
greatness of a man. This way of looking at things is better than false hero worship!”
(quoted in Whitney, M., 1985).
As Einarsen, Asland, & Sokgstad, 2007: 208) state “understanding and preventing
destructive leadership may be as important, or even more important, than understanding
and enhancing positive aspects of leadership.” Similarly, another study on bad leadership
can be as important, if not more important, than another study on good leadership.
3

Confirming some existing reasons and/or identifying additional reasons why certain
leaders exercise bad or failed leadership and helping people, particularly leaders, to avoid
or stop doing evil are the central themes of this research study.
Although there is no scarcity of revolutions throughout recorded human history,
most notably the American and French Revolutions, revolutions as well as revolutionary
leaders have been on the rise in recent years prompted by the Arab Spring in Tunisia,
followed by revolutions or uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Commenting on the
leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, founding father and former prime minister of Singapore in
Time Magazine, Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, wrote “The mark of a
great leader is to take his country from where it is to where it has never been” (Kissinger,
p. 112). Ironically, both Lon Nol and Pol Pot, especially the latter, took their own country
of Cambodia to where it had never been before in its history and the history of the world,
namely “Day of Spectacular Failure” and “Year Zero” as termed by Ponchaud (1978)
respectively. As history has shown, there is no guarantee that a revolutionary regime or
government, even if democratically elected later, will perform better than the regime or
government it has toppled and replaced. It can even perform much worse, as change can
turn bad or worse. Or it can fail altogether. Change, especially transformational or
revolutionary, is not always progress or positive, particularly when it is imposed or
dictated by a leader or leaders.
Failed revolutions, particularly in Third World nations, are more numerous than
successful revolutions (Foran, 2005).Thus the people of a nation where revolution has
recently occurred have reasons to be weary and/or wary of revolutions and revolutionary
leaders. There is a possibility that a revolution is followed by a counter-revolution, which
4

is in turn followed by another (counter)-revolution, as was the case with Cambodia –
where three revolutions took place during the period of less than 10 years. It is, therefore
valuable to shed some light on how and/or why revolutionary leaders can fail or merely
become pseudotransformational leaders. As William E. Lipsky (1976, quoted in
Goodwin, 2001, p. 3) wrote “… Research in the field should begin to examine “failed
revolutions” and “revolutions that never took place” as well as successful ones to
determine the revolutionary element or elements.”
As for Cambodia, even over 40 years and 36 years after Lon Nol and Pol Pot
respectively were toppled from power, unanswered questions still linger among a
majority of Cambodian people concerning their leadership qualities, particularly their
failures. Three questions stand out: (1) How and why did the two leaders lead their
country–for which they, especially Pol Pot, claimed to have sacrificed their lives–to
destructions of historic proportions? (2) Were they responsible and accountable for these
destructions? and (3) How could these seemingly gentlemen, especially Pol Pot–who was
considered by most of his followers to be charismatic, self-controlled, elegant, and kindly
and “regarded almost as a saint” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 5) even by interviewee #363–turn
out to be so evil while in power? Dith Pran, who was an assistant to journalist Sydney
Schanberg of The New York Times and whose harrowing life under the Khmer Rouge rule
was the subject of the award-winning film The Killing Fields, poignantly asked “I still
don’t understand why the Khmer Rouge did this to the Cambodian people. Why did their
ideas about Communism have to be so brutally different from other Communist countries

3

The interviewee gave Pol Pot a near-perfect score for EI.

5

and movements? I wouldn’t have blamed them so much if they’d killed generals or
cabinet members, but innocent children…?” [ellipsis in original] (in Greenfield and
Locke, 1984, p. 122).
The on-going Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), better
known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KTR), a hybrid Cambodia-UN court established in
2006 to prosecute surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders for genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, is intended to partly answer the second question. Thus far, the
ECCC’s Trial Chamber has convicted three former senior Khmer Rouge leaders: Kaing
Guek Eav (alias Duch), chief of Tuol Sleng Prison in July 2010 and Nuon Chea,
president of DK’s People’s Assembly and Khieu Samphan, president of DK’s State
Presidium and head of state in August, 2014. Both Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were
each given a life sentence in their first mini-trial called “Case 002/01” for “crimes against
humanity of extermination (encompassing murder), political persecution, and other
inhumane acts (comprising forced transfer, enforced disappearances and attacks against
human dignity) committed within the territory of Cambodia between 17 April 1975 and
December 1977” (ECCC, 2014, p. 19). Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan’s second mintrial called “Case 002/02” for charges of genocide and other related crimes started,
stalled, and resumed owing to the boycott of both defendants’ defense teams, whose
proposed motion that all the Trial Chamber’s current judges be replaced has been
rejected. This mini-trial is still under way. The Tribunal’s Supreme Court upheld Duch’s
conviction but increased his sentence to life imprisonment. This trial has been hampered
by financial woes and the declining health of these octogenarian leaders. One of them,
Ieng Thirith, DK’s minister of social action, had been declared mentally unfit for the trial
6

in November 2011 and died in August 2015; and another defendant, Ieng Sary, her
husband and DK’s foreign minister, died on March 14, 2013 at age 87, as reported in the
media. Because Pol Pot died in April 1998, eight years before the establishment of the
tribunal, legally speaking, this tribunal cannot try him in absentia and issue a verdict or
judgment about whether or not he as Brother Number One (DK’s prime minister) was
largely or partly responsible for the crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge era. It is
noteworthy that Pol Pot –along with Ieng Sary, DK’s foreign minister– was tried in
absentia and “condemned to death” by a tribunal established by the government of the
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (a former name of Cambodia) in 1979 (Chandler,
1999a, p. 160) and charged with treason and “denounced as the mass murderer of his own
people” in a “people’s tribunal” in the Cambodian jungle in 1997 (pp. 181-182). But the
death sentences were never executed, as Pol Pot had never been captured by the
government and Ieng Sary had defected to the government and been pardoned by the late
King Father Norodom Sihanouk in 1996 (Koopmans, 2005).
During the span of more than 44 years, Cambodia has had relatively few national
leaders (president/prime minister): Lon Nol for five years, Pol Pot for nearly four years,
Pen Sovann for roughly one year, Chan Sy for almost four years, Prince Norodom
Ranariddh for about four years, and Hun Sen for 31 years since 1985 (Hun Sen was
Ranariddh’s co-prime minister most of those four years.) Because Lon Nol and Pol Pot
are still relatively fresh in the memory of most Cambodians (the surviving national
leaders included)–rendered even more vivid by the on-going tribunal–the attitudes,
behaviors, and actions of these two leaders still have significant impacts on Cambodia’s
present and future. Theary Seng, a Khmer Rouge survivor and Cambodian American
7

lawyer, wrote in her 2005 memoir after her meeting with Khieu Samphan prior to his
arrest that “I told him how the ghosts of the Khmer Rouge era continued to haunt every
Cambodian individually and the country as a whole, and how closure was needed for a
brighter future” (Seng, 2005, p. 252). Regarding Pol Pot’s ideology, she wrote that its
effects “continue to sear the hearts and minds of all Cambodians” (p. 73). In recent years,
Lon Nol has made headlines both in Cambodia and the US, when the Cambodian
government and the US government differ on whether the former is obligated to pay off
the debt of some 400 million US dollars owed by the Lon Nol regime to the latter. It can
be said that Cambodia was prostrated by the regimes of these two leaders and that her
recent past remains unsettled.
The nightmare or the holocaust of the Pol Pot regime is regularly conjured up by
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP),
especially in every national and local election campaign since 1993 and certainly in the
campaign for the national election on July 28, 2013. In a keynote speech in a ceremony to
celebrate the 34th anniversary of CPP’s victory over the Khmer Rouge regime, Heng
Samrin, CPP’s Honorary President and President of Cambodia’s National Assembly said,
“Democracy and human rights in Cambodia have been rebuilt alongside the rebirth of
Cambodian people after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, and it continues to improve, and
activities have been strengthened over the past 34 years of development” (Neou, 2013).
The CPP’s website as of September 12, 2016 has an image of 37th anniversary of 7
January, the day it “liberated” Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge and the slogan “Only
with the victory on 7 January, we have been alive till today”. More importantly, in June
2013, the CPP-controlled National Assembly hastily drafted and passed a law that
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criminalizes the denial of crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge regime, apparently
as a result of an allegedly recorded statement by Kem Sokha, the-then acting president of
the newly-merged opposition party (Cambodia National Rescue Party) denying the
existence of S-21 or Tuol Sleng, DK’s most notorious prison, now a genocide museum.
The CPP has done so in order to claim that they are the only political party capable of
preventing the return or repeat of the Khmer Rouge or a holocaust and that they have
been hugely successful in developing Cambodia. This has possibly intensified the
impacts of the Pol Pot regime on people’s perceptions of good and bad leadership.
Without sufficient knowledge based on sound scientific research into the leadership of
these leaders, these perceptions are and will still be mainly influenced by opinions and
hearsays not by facts. By contrast, with this kind of knowledge, these perceptions will be
based more on facts, which in turn will help to deepen people’s awareness of good, and
perhaps bad, leadership. Ultimately, it is hoped that this awareness can help Cambodian
voters make better informed decisions when electing their local representatives and
national leaders.
Moreover, similar to some other developing countries, Cambodia can be
categorized as a leader-dependent country largely because monarchs, who are revered as
demigods or semi-divines, have for the most part been its rulers or heads of state. Only
between March 18, 1970 and 1992 was Cambodia not ruled by a monarch but by
commoners including Lon Nol and Pol Pot. Without a greater understanding of the
leadership effectiveness of its past leaders, Pol Pot and Lon Nol in this case, it might
prove difficult to improve the effectiveness of the nation’s public management and/or
administration. Better understanding of Pol Pot’s leadership effectiveness may be able to
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contribute in a certain way to putting an end to what Youk Chhang, Director of
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), called a “history of horrors”; Pol Pot’s
death, Youk Chhang argued, did not “bring a closure” to this dark history (Youk Chhang,
2000, p. 1).
In summary, these two cases are likely to satisfy Yin’s both conditions of the
significance of “the exemplary case study”: They, particularly Pol Pot, are “unusual and
of general public interest” and “the underlying issues are nationally important –either in
theoretical terms or in policy or pratical terms” (Yin, 2009, p. 185).
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The theoretical framework or theory to be mentioned in the next chapter has been
formulated due to gaps in the overall leadership literature and in the literature of the link
between emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness. Therefore, this section 1)
highlights a lack of research in negative, undesirable, or failed leadership, 2) summarizes
characteristics of pseudotransformational leadership, revolutionary government and
leadership, 3) points out a lacuna in the existing literature about Lon Nol and Pol Pot, and
4) examines in considerable details emotional intelligence, its purported correlation with
leadership effectiveness as well as leadership styles and leadership effectiveness.
Leadership in the mainstream sense
A great deal has been researched, discussed, and written about leadership, which
essentially connotes “good leadership” and “leadership success” after James MacGregor
Burns’ seminal 1978 book Leadership–which according to Van Wart (2011, p. 8), has
“unusually heavy ethical overtones.” Burns (2003, p. 2) writes that “[w]e don’t call for
good leadership – we expect, or at least hope, that it will be good. ‘Bad’ leadership
implies no leadership. I contend that there is nothing neutral about leadership; it is valued
as a moral necessity” [emphasis in original]. Having admitted he had come to concur
with Burns, Bass (1998) coined the term “pseudotransformational leadership” for
personalized transformational leadership. He also argues that “[i]t makes more sense to
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regard leadership with harmful means and ends as false leadership, also keeping in mind
that such leadership may be attempted, successful, or unsuccessful, and effective or
ineffective whether or not it aims to do good” (Bass, 2008, p. 234). Further, much less
literature exists about public-sector leadership than private-sector leadership and much of
the former has been drawn from the latter (Van Wart, 2005, 2008, 2011). Warren Bennis,
another prominent leadership author who wrote a book titled Why Leaders Can’t Lead in
1989 and the leadership classic On Becoming a Leader, in Kellerman’s (2004, p. 9)
words, also “generally assumes that to become a leader is to become a good leader.” A
leader cannot be devoid of integrity, which is a component of character, among other
things (Bennis, 2009). “Timeless leadership is always about character, and is always
about authenticity” Bennis wrote (2009, p. xxviii).
Many approaches to (good) leadership have been developed; but only two are
discussed here as they are directly relevant to this dissertation. One of the oldest and most
familiar approaches is the trait approach, which was out of favor but then has regained
interest in recent decades (e.g. Kellerman, 2004; Rowe, 2007; Bass, 2008; Northouse,
2012; Van Wart, 2011). Kellerman asserts that “it’s silly to pretend that traits don’t
matter [in leadership]… And average people who exercise leadership still exceed the
average numbers of their groups in traits such as intelligence (however defined) …, and
adaptability” (p. 19). She goes on to state that “… the trait approach to leadership is a
relatively simple way of understanding why people behave the way they do. Moreover,
whether a leader has or lacks a particular trait is likely to tell us a fair amount about
how and why good, or bad, leadership was exercised” (p. 19) [emphasis added].

12

This approach focuses on the qualities and characteristics of great leaders in the
social and political realms. The trait approach, which “is alive and well” (Northouse,
2013, p. 20), has returned to the emphasis on the essential role of traits in leadership
effectiveness (e.g., Rowe, 2007 and Northouse, 2013). In its earlier stages, these qualities
and characteristics were considered to be mostly innate. But more recently, they are
claimed or found to be learnable as well. A long list of leaders’ traits have been
developed by various authors including Stogdill (1948), Mann (1959), Kirkpatrick and
Locke (1990), and Zaccaro, Kemp, and Bader (2004), all cited in Northouse (2010). The
most central of these traits include intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity,
and sociability (Northouse, 2013). Emotional intelligence, which will be discussed in
depth below, has been classified as a trait by Bass & Bass (2008) and Northouse (2010),
although, as will be pointed out later, the original authors of this type of intelligence do
not seem to agree with this classification.
The style approach emphasizes the behavior of leaders –what they do and how
they act. Unlike the trait approach, which focuses on the leader’s personality
characteristics, the style approach stresses the leader’s behavior (Northouse, 2010); the
latter emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with the former. The leader’s behaviors fall
into two categories: task behaviors and relationship behaviors. Two notable and perhaps
earliest series of studies on leadership styles or behaviors are the Ohio State Studies and
the University of Michigan Studies. The first series of studies came up with two general
kinds of leader behaviors: initiating structure and consideration (Stogdill, 1974, cited in
Northouse, 2010). Initiating structure is concerned with task behaviors such as organizing
work, defining roles and responsibilities, planning, whereas consideration has to do with
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relationship behaviors like building respect and confidence between leaders and
subordinates. The second series resulted in two types of leader behaviors: employee
orientation and production orientation. The first type is very similar to consideration, as it
emphasizes how leaders form strong human relationships with their followers. The
second type, as the term suggests, entails “leadership behaviors that stress the technical
and production aspects of a job” (p. 71). Directly relevant to this proposed study is the set
of leadership styles reported by Daniel Goleman (2001b), which are to be discussed after
emotional intelligence.
Negative leadership
While extensive literature exists about good leadership, little research or literature
exists for bad leadership or leadership failures. As Kellerman (2004: 6) reports “For
whatever reasons, most students of politics shy away from the subject of bad leadership
and especially from really bad leaders, such as Stalin and Pol Pot.” Similarly, Lilla states
that “tyranny as such is simply not an issue or a recognized term of analysis,” regardless
of the greatness and obviousness of its impact (quoted in Kellerman, 2004, p. 6). The
author found 6 works that address this form of leadership.
Kellerman (2004), a leadership authority at Harvard University who appears to
have been the first author to write about or term the so-called “bad leadership,” argues
that:
… To deny bad leadership equivalence in the conversation and curriculum is
misguided, tantamount to a medical school that would claim to teach health while
ignoring disease. Some might argue that the differences are merely semantic–that
although Burns and Bennis equate the word leadership with good leadership, the
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rest of us are free to define leadership as we see fit. But words matter. Inevitably,
the fact that the overwhelming majority of leadership experts use leadership to
imply good leadership affects how we think about a subject that is far more
complex, and frightening, than this dewy-eyed view would suggest [emphasis in
original]. (pp. 11-12)
The literature of good leadership is far more abundant than the literature of bad
leadership not because political theorists have focused on good leadership for most of
modern history but because there has been an exponential growth of “good leadership”
study and research for the past half century or so. As Kellerman (2004: 6) points out, the
bias towards the study of good leadership is a recent phenomenon; for example, both the
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States were created mainly
to “contain leaders,” as bad leadership could possibly become “entrenched” without these
documents. “The American political system is the product of revolutionaries familiar
with, and therefore wary of, bad leadership” (p. 6).
Kellerman proposes seven types of bad leadership: “incompetent,” “rigid,”
“intemperate,” “callous,” “corrupt,” “insular” (with Clinton as her example), and “evil”
(with Pol Pot & Hitler as her prime examples). These types have been included in this
study and will be described and discussed in depth in Chapter III. She classified bad
leadership into two categories: ineffective leadership which is associated with means and
unethical leadership which is associated with ends. Leaders can be both ineffective and
unethical. “For reasons that include missing traits, weak skills, strategies badly
conceived, and tactics badly employed, ineffective leadership falls short of its intention”
(p. 33). “Unethical leadership fails to distinguish between right and wrong. Because
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common codes of decency and good conduct are in some way violated, the leadership
process is defiled” (p. 34).
While recognizing but not exploring the psychological origin of individual
behavior (bad behavior in particular) she argues that leaders “behave badly” because of
the context in which they operate, their followers who lure them to “go astray” (p. 18),
and, “in the main,” because of “who they are and what they want” (p. 19). The third
reason is concerned with traits and character. Traits are subject to change. Character is
not; it is “fundamental and fixed” (p. 21). One’s character reflects one’s “moral compass”
(p. 21). Similarly, a Cambodian old saying goes “One’s character reflects one’s family
background or pedigree”
Lipman-Blumen (2005) coined the term “toxic leadership” to refer leadership that
is fraught with vices including arrogance and hubris, lack of social inhibition,
abusiveness, document falsification, malevolence, and masked intentions. She noted that
there are plenty of such leaders because others, particularly their followers, tolerate or
even admire them. Finally, Einarsen, Asland, & Skogstad (2007) proposed a definition
and conceptual model of destructive leadership behavior. Their definition of destructive
leadership behavior is “the systematic and repeated behavior by a leader, supervisor or
manager that violates the legitimate interest of the organization by undermining and/or
sabotaging the organization's goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the
motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of his/her subordinates” and their model
consists of three categories of destructive leadership: “tyrannical, derailed, and
supportive–disloyal leadership behavior” (p. 207).
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Without terming or implying bad or failed leadership, in Why Leaders Can’t
Lead, Bennis contended that the leaders he observed could not lead mainly because they
were “doing the wrong thing well” (p. 18). In other words, these leaders managed rather
than led. To him, leadership is doing the right thing; management is doing things right.
He further argued that “American organizations… are underled and overmanaged” (p.
18); ineffective leaders fail to manage attention, meaning, trust, and their own self (p.
19). Two decades later, Bennis wrote that it is worth discussing “bad leadership” or
“failed leadership” for two reasons: bad and good leadership can be equally informative
and bad leadership is abundant (Bennnis & Biederman, 2009, p. 261).
Literature about Pol Pot and Lon Nol
There are only few book-length biographies and brief biographical entries of Pol
Pot in encyclopedias. The most recent and shortest biography is by John Allen published
in 2006 and the longest and perhaps the most authoritative biography is by Philip Short
(2004), a veteran journalist and the only Pol Pot author who actually met him, in 1977
(Short, 2005). Another authoritative work is a political biography of Pol Pot by David
Chandler (1999a), a Khmer-speaking historian, who said that he admired Short’s book
(ECCC, 2012a). This is understandable given the fact that Pol Pot is a very enigmatic
leader, as Chandler (1999a) maintains that “except for Nuon Chea [Pol Pot’s lieutenant],
Pol Pot was the least accessible Cambodian leader since World War II” (p. 150). No
book-length biography, especially scholarly ones, has been written about Lon Nol. The
best data available about him is found in four works by four different authors: La
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Republique Khmere, a doctoral thesis by Ros Chantrabot4 (1978), a Cambodian who
lived under both Sihanouk’s and Lon Nol’s rule; Khmers Stand Up!, a Monash University
paper which is based to a certain extent on the first, by Justin Corfield (1994); Sideshow:
Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia by William Shawcross (1986),
considered by Norodom Sihanouk (1980, p. 119) to be “one of the most informed
commentators on Cambodia”; and The Coup against Marshal Lon Nol5, a series of nonscholarly writings published in The Rasmey Kampuchea Daily during 1997-1998,
Cambodia’s leading Khmer-language newspaper since 1991, by Chhang Song6, the
Khmer Republic’s last Minister of Information and a senator from Cambodia’s ruling
party (CPP) until the late 1990s. The first two works deal with the history of the Khmer
Republic focusing on why it failed. The third, as its title indicates, addresses the roles of
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon in Cambodia’s
tragedy. The fourth, which is generally favorable to Lon Nol, addresses a plot to depose
the Marshal and his time in exile in the United States. All the four works shed some
valuable light on Lon Nol’s leadership and other personal details. Little other literature
exists about Pol Pot, especially his leadership. Literature about Lon Nol is even much
more limited still. Overall, there is somewhat scant literature about the leadership of these

In Khmer names, family names come first, followed by middle and first (given) names. To avoid
disrespect and to accurately identify them, either the full names (if short) or only the first names of
Cambodian authors are mentioned here. However, this does not apply to those Cambodian authors who
wrote their names in the reverse order, in which case either only their family names or their full names are
used.
5
His newspaper writings were bound and repaginated by the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCam).
6
He, together with other two CPP senators, were dismissed from both the Senate and the party in 1999. He
retired in California and many years later became an adviser to the CPP-controlled government.
4
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two leaders. Above all, no literature exists that proposes, tests, and/or confirms the
theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation.
Kellerman (2004), who classified Pol Pot as evil, points out the absence of indepth analysis of Pol Pot: “How murderous leaders like Pol Pot get others to follow them
remains a puzzle that only in-depth analyses of individual cases can begin to solve. But
one fact applies nearly across the board: Evil leaders typically acquire their most loyal
followers early on, before the onset of the murder and mayhem” (p.195). What Chandler
wrote in 1999 about the writings about Pol Pot seems to remain true now: “Much of what
has been written about Pol Pot since his time in power has been reckless and
intemperate” (1999a, p. 4).
(Pseudo)transformational leadership
Burns (1978) distinguishes between “transactional leadership” and “transforming
leadership” the former referring the give-and-take leadership between a leader and his or
her follower and the latter denoting the relationship between a leader and a follower that
transforms them both to a new level. “[Transforming] leadership occurs when one or
more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one
another to higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns, 1978, p. 20). Transactional
leaders are a lot more prevalent than transformational leaders. They are the “broker type”
of leaders who are definitely “indispensible” and some ninety percent of political leaders
in the US exercise transactional leadership (Burns, in Moyers, 1989, p. 194).
Transactional leaders and transformational leaders can be called “eventful” political
leaders and “event-making” political leaders respectively, according to Hook (1943, cited
in Bass, 2008, p. 41). In other words, whereas the eventful leader goes along with the
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course of history, the event-making leader acts to make history (Bass & Bass, 2008) or to
change its course. Bass’s (1998 & 2008) model of transformational leadership has these
components: charismatic leadership or idealized influence, inspirational motivation,
intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. A few examples of
transformational leaders are Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr. of America,
Winston Churchill of Great Britain, and Mahatma Gandhi of India.
Transforming or transformational leadership is not about incremental change,
“change in measured and often reluctant doses,” (Burns, 2003, p. 24) or “first order of
change” (Bass, 1985: 4)–which is the concern of transactional leadership–but about
dramatic change or “transformation” (Burns, p. 24) or “higher order or change” (Bass, p.
4) in an organization or even society. “In broad social and political terms, transformation
means basic alterations in entire systems–revolutions that replace one structure of power
with another” (Burns, p. 24) and “large changes in attitudes, beliefs, values, and needs”
(Bass, p. 4). These transformations can be both quantitative and qualitative.
Lon Nol and Pol Pot can be classified as transformational leaders. Lon Nol
transformed Cambodia from millennia of monarchical rule into the first-ever Western
republican rule. Pol Pot transformed his own country with thousand years of history and
with advanced civilization into a primitive agrarian society–literally a hell on earth. His
regime, DK, “believed the transformation of Cambodia to be both a necessity for and a
guarantee of its independence. It would eventually destroy it” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 4). But
for Burns, as alluded to earlier, they cannot be even called leaders; rather, they are power
wielders. However, Bass (1998 & 2008) would classify such leaders as
pseudotransformational leaders. Pseudotransformational leaders are “personalized”
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transformational leaders characterized by inauthentic behavior, hypocrisy,
untrustworthiness, “fantasies of power and success,” impression management, grandiose
visions, potential lack of sense of responsibilities, and most notably by the belief that
“they are doing the right thing by “killing with kindness” or saving a village by
destroying it” (Bass, 2008, p. 233). “The truly transformational leaders … transcend their
own self-interests,” but pseudotransformational leaders “cater, in the long run, to their
own self-interests” (Bass, 1998, p. 15). Bass and Steidlmeier (2004, p. 175) categorize
Pol Pot as a pseudotransformational or an “inauthentic transformational” leader mainly in
terms of ethics, character, and authenticity.
Emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness
Background and existence of emotion, emotional labor, and emotional intelligence
The role of emotion in life and work has been recognized for decades if not
centuries, but this role is often viewed as negative. For example, according to Young
(1943), emotion is an “acute disturbance of the individual as a whole” (quoted in Salovey
& Mayer, 1990: 185). Likewise, emotional intelligence had or still has a relegated status
as compared with other traditional forms of intelligence or IQ, which stresses mental
acuity. Before the Christian era, Publilius Syrus wrote, “Rule your feeling, lest your
feelings rule you” (quoted in Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 185). More specifically, unlike
other disciplines (e.g. sociology, psychology, nursing, education, feminist economics)
where the “caritas function” or caring receives rich treatment, mainstream public
administration, for the most part, neglects this function (Guy, Newman & Mastracci,
2008, p. 39). This is so despite the fact that understanding the “practice of public
administration” necessitates a “framework of caring” because the field of public
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administration focuses almost exclusively on “twin values of rationality and efficiency”
or the “how” of government as opposed to the “what” of government (namely
responsiveness) (p. 38).
This led to the perception that emotion and leadership effectiveness cannot be
positively linked or mixed, which was reinforced by Niccolo Machiavelli, who was
pessimistic about human nature, but thought conflict has virtues (Burns, 2003, p. 188), in
his classic book The Prince first published in 1513. The Prince is a book on
leadership/rulership, on “the uses and abuses of power” (Burns, 1978, p. 16), or on
“power politics” and “[t]he “hero” of The Prince, it must be remembered, is a ruthless
despot,” in one of its translators’ words, Daniel Donno in his introduction to the book
(Machiavelli, 2003, pp. 223-225). Likewise, Kellerman (2004, p. 5) concurs that
Machiavelli’s advice is for leaders to be “ruthless.” Explaining why some leaders were
able to keep their states safe and secure even in times of war and why others were not
even in times of peace, even though both types of leaders used cruelty and “treachery,”
Machiavelli wrote “I believe this is explained by proper and improper use of cruelty. It
can be said to be properly used (if one may speak favorably of what is bad) when one
resorts to it at one stroke out of a need for safety and does not thereafter insist upon it, but
seeks instead to replace it with measures that are of the greatest possible use to his
subjects” (p. 702).
“Burns (1978) refers to the Machiavellian type of ruler as a “single-minded power
wielder” rather than a leader (p. 14). Machiavelli placed emphasis on the leader’s need to
restrain followers through the leader’s use of power (Kellerman, 2004). Burns (1978)
even contends that The Prince “must be a product of the devil” (p. 444) and that
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Machiavellianism at its core promotes the notion of treating “other persons, other leaders,
as things” (p. 446) [emphasis in original]. Donno reminds its readers of placing the book
within its historical context. Yet, more than five hundred years after its first publication,
its advice is still heeded and its techniques applied by public and private-sector managers
and leaders around the world. In Bass’s (2008) words, “Machiavelli’s treatises The
Prince … and The Discourses … are still widely read today by leaders, managers, and
executives… The guile and political tricks Machiavelli observed firsthand were included
in his advice to a prince, Cesare Borgia, a dictator” (p. 160). In its praise for The Art of
War by Sun Tzu, USA Today stated “The Art of War soon could join Machiavelli’s The
Prince as required reading in the executive suite” (Sun Tzu, 2005). And Burns (1978:
444) confirms that “… The Prince still stands as the most famous –and infamous–of
books of practical advice to leaders on how to win and wield power.”
Scholarly literature about the value of emotion dates back to the middle of the
20th century. For example, Katz’s (1955 & 1974) three-skill approach to leadership
covers technical skill, conceptual skill, and human skill. Human skill, whose primary
concern is working with people, overlaps to a notable extent with the current models of
emotional intelligence; it enables a person to be “aware of his own attitudes, assumptions,
and beliefs about other individuals and groups” and “to see the usefulness and limitations
of these feelings” (1974, p. 91). Similarly, the concept of “emotional labor” is considered
to have originated from the work of sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1983), who defines it
as “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display;”
“[it] is sold for a wage and therefore has exchange value” (Hochschild, 1983, quoted in
Guy et al., 2008: 6).
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However, it was not until 1990 when the term “emotional intelligence” (EI or EQ)
was coined and its concept expounded by Peter Salovey and John Mayer in their
landmark article titled “Emotional Intelligence” in the journal Imagination, Cognition
and Personality. Moreover, only in 1995 did the term emotional intelligence become
popular when Daniel Goleman published his best-selling book Emotional Intelligence
(Mayer, 2001). “[I]t took Goleman’s book to catapult the idea of emotional intelligence
(EQ) into the mainstream” (Butler-Bowdon, 2003, p. 155). Goleman later expanded and
linked EI to leadership and termed it “emotionally intelligent leadership” (Cherniss &
Goleman, 2001). Since then, there has been a remarkable surge in research in the
academia and writing in both the media and popular literature. Using EBSCOhost
Discovery Service, the author found 40062 results for ‘emotional intelligence,’ 17997
peer-reviewed journal articles about EI, 4226 works about EI and leadership, and 40
works about EI and leadership in the public sector, and 346 results about transformational
leadership and EI.
Robert Sternberg, an authority on intelligence, wrote that “[t]here is some,
although still tentative, evidence for the existence of emotional intelligence” (2004, p.
434). And Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Cherkasskiy (2011, p. 539) claim that
“[e]motional intelligence predicts specific outcomes in limited but important domains of
social interaction.” According to Northouse (2012, p. 28), “[a]s a leadership ability or
trait, emotional intelligence appears to be an important construct.” Moreover, Goleman
(1995) claims that EI accounts for much of life success. In his own words, EI “can be as
powerful, and at times more powerful, than IQ” (p. 34) and provides “an advantage in
any domain of life, whether … or picking up the unspoken rules that govern success in
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organizational politics” (p. 36). In his foreword to the book The Emotionally Intelligent
Workplace edited by Cherniss and Goleman, Warren Bennis, a leadership authority,
wrote “[e]motional intelligence (EI), more than any other asset, more than IQ or technical
expertise, is the most important overall success factor in careers. And the higher one’s
position in an organization, the more important EI is; EI accounts for 85 to 90 percent of
the success of organizational leaders” (Cherniss & Goleman, 2001, p. xv). Bennis argued
that George W. Bush was more successful in the 2000 presidential elections than was Al
Gore –who had a sharper mind and who probably won the debates in terms of arguments
and language competence–thanks to Bush’s display of “more emotional intelligence” (p.
xv). Bill Clinton, a very successful (or at least popular) US president based on his
approval rating of around 70% upon leaving office and considered by Zakaria (2011) a
‘gifted political player’ and a ‘legendary leader,’ has been somewhat widely quoted as
saying “I feel your pain” during the 1992 presidential election campaign. This is a show
of empathy. Even though Goleman later moderated his claim about the value of EI, he
still gives it a significantly greater value, particularly for leadership at top levels, than do
other authors, particularly the original authors of EI and their colleagues, namely Mayer,
Salovey, Caruso, and Cherkasskiy.
EI abilities – rather than IQ or technical skills – emerge as the “discriminating”
competency that best predicts who among a group of very smart people will lead
most ably. If you scan the competencies that organizations around the world have
independently determined identify their star leaders, you discover that indicators
of IQ and technical skill drop toward the bottom of the list the higher the position.
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(IQ and technical expertise are much stronger predictors of excellence in lowerrung jobs). (Goleman, 2011b, p. 97)
This preceding paragraph and the subsequent ones indicate that EI is a new
research area that is promising and controversial; this area lies at “the intersection of
personality and intelligence” (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004: 240). The
controversy concerns much less whether it exists or it whether can be measured than what
it is and how it can be measured accurately. What follows addresses three dominant
models and definitions of EI, 3 main EI measures, and its correlation with leadership.
Three dominant models, definitions, and measures of EI
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that although a majority of EI
authors concur that there are at least three dominant models or perspectives of EI [e.g.
Goleman, Goleman, 2001, 2011a, 2011b], Salovey, Mayer and Caruso, the authors of the
ability model –which will be elaborated below – argue that there are only two principal
models: the “ability models,” which include theirs, and the “mixed models,” which
include Goleman’s and Bar-On’s models. Furthermore, they are on the verge of arguing
that these mixed models of emotional intelligence are simply not emotional intelligence.
In their own words, “there are models labeled “emotional intelligence” but that include
many nonintelligence qualities and traits that, to our mind, more clearly belong to other
areas of personality” (Salovey et al., 2011, p. 533). They go on to assert that
There is an increasing call to “weed out” those conceptualizations that do not
make sense to be called emotional intelligence. Alternatively, they can be
transplanted in the soil of personality psychology, where they better belong.
Current research suggests that mental ability models of emotional intelligence can
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be described as a standard intelligence, and they empirically meet the criteria for a
standard intelligence. (Salovey et al., 2011, p. 545)
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation per se to argue about the preferred
number of EI models and whether or not the mixed models of EI are “real” EI models.
The author agrees with Bass, who in the chapter Traits of Leadership of his 2008 book
regarded EI as a “complex trait” as well as a “state of mind” (Bass & Bass, 2008: 1070)
and who called the Salovey-Mayer-Caruso model and the Goleman model the ‘ability
model’ and the ‘competency model’ respectively. This is somewhat consistent with
Goleman, who thinks there are three dominant models, namely the two aforementioned
models and Bar-On’s model –which can be tentatively called the “well-being model.” He
wrote
There are now three main models of EI, with dozens of variations... That of Peter
Salovey and John Mayer rests firmly in the tradition of intelligence shaped by the
original work on IQ a century ago. The model put forth by Reuven Bar-On grew
from his research on well-being. And my own model focuses at the behavioral
level, on performance at work and in organizational leadership, melding EI theory
with decades of research on modeling the competencies that set star performers
apart from average. (Goleman, 2011b, p. 92)
EI model of Peter Salovey, John Mayer and David Caruso or the ability model
In their original 1990 article, Salovey and Mayer defined EI as the “ability to
monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to
use this information to guide one’s own thinking and actions” [original emphasis] (p.
189). Their refined definition of EI is “ability to perceive and express emotion, assimilate
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emotion in thought, understand and reason with emotion, and regulate emotion in the self
and others” [emphasis in original] (Salovey et al, 2000: 396 and Salovey et al., 2011, p.
532). This model has four branches progressing from the most basic to the most advanced
levels (Salovey et al., 2011, p. 532). The first branch, “perception and expression of
emotion,” includes a skill of recognizing and expressing emotions in own feelings and
thoughts and in other people, language. The second branch, “assimilating emotion in
thought,” is concerned with the use of emotions to “prioritize thinking in productive
ways.” The third branch, “understanding and analyzing emotion,” includes skills of
labeling emotions, including complex ones, and understanding relationships. The final
and fourth branch, “reflective regulation of thought,” entails an ability to “reflectively
monitor and regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth.”
This ability model of EI uses the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence
Test (MSCEIT) developed by the three authors in their laboratory. It is comprised of 141
5-point-scale items that tests 1) perceiving emotions, 2) using emotions to facilitate
thought, 3) understanding emotions, and 4) managing emotions. The feature of this
measure, like that of a conventional IQ test, is that anyone who wants to know their level
of emotional intelligence needs to take the test.
EI model of Daniel Goleman or the competency model
Goleman (1998) defined emotional intelligence as “the capacity for recognizing
our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing
emotions well in our relationships” [emphasis in original] (p. 317). Goleman’s original EI
model (1995) had five basic domains: self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation,
empathy, and social skill; but his latest model (2011a & b), which is adapated from
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Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (2002), has only four domains such as self-awareness,
self-management, social awareness, and relationship management, the first two of which
are called self-management skills and the last two social management skills. Each of
these domains has several competencies or components. Self-awareness includes
emotional self-awareness, accurate self-assessment, and self-confidence. Selfmanagement includes self-control, transparency, adaptability, achievement, initiative,
and optimism. Social awareness consists of empathy, organizational awareness, and
service. Lastly, the competency of relationship management include inspiration,
influence, developing others, change catalyst, conflict management, and teamwork and
collaboration.
For the competency model, the original measure of EI is Goleman’s Emotional
Competency Framework developed in 1998, later modified and renamed the Emotional
Competency Inventory (ECI) by Boyatzis, Goleman, and Rhee (2000), according to
Gowing (2001). The latest measure is the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory
(ESCI) created in 2007 by Goleman and Boyatzis in collaboration with the Hay Group.
The ESCI is a 360-degree test that has 110 six-point-scale items regarding twenty
emotional and social competencies within the four domains of self-awareness, selfmanagement, social awareness, and relationship management. This instrument is to be
taken by the individual leader herself, her subordinates, peers, and superiors. The
individual who takes the ESCI self-rates his emotional and social competencies. The
leader’s subordinates, peers, and supervisors rate her emotional and social intelligence
based on their observations of and interactions with her in the workplace.
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EI model of Reuven Bar-On or the well-being model
According to Salovey et al. (2011), Bar-On's (1997) model of EI aimed to answer
the question “Why are some individuals more able to succeed in life than others?” (p.
536). Bar-On (2000) prefers to call “emotional and social intelligence” rather than just
emotional intelligence, although he labeled his measurement as the “Emotional Quotient
Inventory” more commonly known as the EQ-i. Bar-On (2000, p. 373) defines emotional
and social intelligence as an “array of emotional, personal, and social abilities that affect
one’s overall ability to effectively cope with daily demands and pressures.” This model of
EI comprises such key components as self-regard, interpersonal relationship, impulse
control, problem solving, emotional self-awareness, flexibility, reality testing, stress
tolerance, assertiveness, and empathy (Bar-On, 2000, p. 371 and Gowing, 2001, pp. 109111).
The self-report EQ-i –the first measure of emotional intelligence that Bar-On
started to develop in the early 1980s–contains 133 short items based on a 5-point scale.
He emphasized that the EQ-i aims to gauge “emotionally and socially competent
behavior that provides an estimate of one’s emotional and social intelligence” and “not
personality traits or cognitive ability” (Bar-On, 2000, p. 364).
Emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness/performance
Using Mayer et al.’s ability model of EI, George (2000) theorized that there may
be a “particularly important role” of EI in leadership effectiveness (p. 1039). Harms and
Crede (2010) employed a meta-analysis to investigate claims that there is significant
correlation between emotional intelligence and transformational leadership and other
leadership behaviors. On the basis of 62 independent samples, they found an overall
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correlation coefficient of 0.59 when the ratings of both EI and leadership behaviors came
from the same source like self, subordinates, peers, or superiors. But when the ratings of
these constructs were drawn from different sources, the correlation coefficient dropped to
0.12. Interestingly enough, trait-based EI measures showed higher correlations than
ability-based measures. More research on emotional intelligence in needed as Northouse
2013, p. 28) writes “[a]s more research is conducted on emotional intelligence, the
intricacies of how emotional intelligence relates to leadership will be better understood.”
Leadership styles and leadership effectiveness
Goleman (2001b) reported six leadership styles that get results. The styles were
identified by the consulting firm Hay/McBer that had studied a sample of 3871
executives drawn from a database of over 20,000 business executives around the world
(p. 55). These styles, which were included in the qualitative survey and interview
questionnaire of this study, are coercive, authoritative, affiliative, democratic,
pacesetting, and coaching. The coercive leader “demands immediate compliance.” The
authoritative leader “mobilizes people toward a vision.” The affiliative leader “creates
harmony and builds emotional bonds.” The democratic leader “forges consensus through
participation.” The pacesetting leader “sets high standards for performance.” And finally,
the coaching leader “develops people for the future” (p. 60).
Three main points Goleman stressed are: (1) leaders should have a repertoire of
leadership styles at their disposal so that they can appropriately select different styles for
different situations, (2) these six styles have emerged from different components of EI,
and (3) each leadership style has impact on or correlation with an organization’s climate
and its performance. For example, the coercive style has negative overall impact on the
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climate and performance; the authoritative style has the “most strongly positive” overall
impact on its climate and performance; and there is a positive relationship between the
democratic leadership style and its climate as well as performance (p. 60).
Revolutionary government and leadership
Skocpol (1979) distinguishes between “social revolutions” and “political
revolutions.” Social revolutions are “rapid, basic transformation of a society’s state and
class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based
revolts from below” (p. 4). Social revolutions, unlike other types of “conflicts and
transformative processes,” necessarily involve both political and social transformation (p.
4). By contrast, political revolutions are those that “transform state structures but not
social structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict” (p. 4).
As will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, the Khmer Rouge/Pol Pot regime was a
social revolution and the Lon Nol regime was more of a political revolution. Nonetheless,
both regimes were revolutionary governments defined by Colgan (2012) as those
governments “that transform the existing social, political, and economic relationships of
the state by overthrowing or rejecting the principal existing institutions of society;” and
such governments, of necessity, are governed by “new leadership” (p. 446).
In a study on more than 30 revolutions in the Third World, including Vietnam but
excluding Cambodia, between 1910 and 2005, Foran (2005) proposes a theory of
reversed or failed revolution that “revolutionaries fall from power when political
fragmentation and polarization, economic difficulties, and outside intervention occur
together in a mutually reinforcing fashion” (p. 203). The reversal or failure of revolutions
occurs when they remain subjected to “dependent development,” when their institutions
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are “open and democratic,” when “the revolutionary political cultures” that brought them
to power weaken as a result of internal disagreements, and “when the world-systemic
window that opened to permit their coming to power closes” (pp. 202-203). The author
points out that the four factors combined are sufficient to cause reversed revolutions
irrespective of the presence or absence of an “economic downturn” (p. 203). Specifically,
Mabbett and Chandler (19995) contend that the unwillingness and inability of a large
number of Cambodians to implement Pol Pot’s revolution was an important reason for its
failure.
Burns (1978) was perhaps one of the first authors to propose a framework for
revolutionary leadership which he subsumed under transforming leadership. He
contended that the “pure” form of revolution rarely exists. Neither does the revolutionary
leader “who helps initiate a revolution, lasts through the whole revolutionary cycle of
struggle, victory, and consolidation of power, and directs the process of social
transformation” (p. 202). By contrast, a new dataset on revolutionary governments and
leaders that involves 7,553 observations of 169 states and covers the period 1945-2004
shows that revolutionary leaders are more likely to stay in office longer than nonrevolutionary leaders; they are also more likely to be younger and “more prone to
international conflicts” and more importantly to “lead more autocratic governments while
in office” (Colgan, 2012, pp. 444, 457). As will be discussed in more details later, both
Lon Nol and Pol Pot are revolutionary leaders; however, the former stayed in power for a
much shorter period, slightly more than five years, than the later. Colgan classified Pol
Pot as a revolutionary leader (or a leader of a revolutionary government) on a basis of
change in polity that was also durable. Pol Pot lasted from the 1950s to early 1979, by
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which time he had transformed Cambodia from a somewhat thriving country in Asia into
a near primitive agrarian country. He even survived as a guerrilla leader until 1998. To
reiterate, in Burns’ conception of leadership in general and transforming leadership in
particular, a leader cannot be unethical. Such a leader is a power-wielder at best. Thus,
for Burns, neither Lon Nol nor Pol Pot would be classified as a revolutionary leader.
However, the author of this paper argues that they are both revolutionary leaders, albeit
of a negative type.
Burns listed some requirements for success for revolutionary leaders including
absolute commitment to the cause and ability to demonstrate that dedication through
“imprisonment, exile, persecution, and continual hardship;” the willingness to respond to
“the wants and needs and aspirations of the populace;” ability to deal with conflict that is
“more extreme” than conflict other types of leaders face; and finally, formation and
maintenance of “a powerful sense of mission, of end-values, of transcending purpose”
(pp. 202-203).
Lastly, according to Rejai & Phillips (1988, cited in Bass, 2008), revolutionary
leaders tended to renounce their religion to become atheists, which appears to be true
with Pol Pot –under whose rule, monasteries were closed and monks defrocked– and their
view of human nature was optimistic but their attitudes towards their country were
volatile. Perhaps because EI is a relatively new concept, no study or theory has been
found that suggests a link between failed revolutionary leadership and a lack of EI. This
is the gap that this study attempts to fill.
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METHODOLOGY
Theoretical Framework
This case study research aims to build a theory or proposition that: Revolutionary
leaders in the public sector, particularly of undemocratic regimes, tend to become
pseudotransformational leaders when (a) they lack certain components of Emotional
Intelligence (EI) and/or (b) adopt certain leadership styles and use them inappropriately.
Because this theory focuses on individuals’ behavior and personality, according to
Yin (2009, p. 37), it would be most appropriate to call it an individual theory despite the
fact that these individuals interacted with groups, organizations, and other societies or
nations during their rules. Heeding Stake’s assertion that a case is “not a problem or a
hypothesis,” no attempt is made to develop any hypothesis for these two cases (Stake,
1995, p. 128). As such, this case study is more exploratory than explanatory and
definitely not confirmatory.
A possible rival theory/alternative proposition is: That revolutionary leaders in
the public sector, particularly of undemocratic regimes, can become
pseudotransformational leaders simply when they lack technical skills and/or conceptual
skills and when there are national situations or extra-national (foreign) interventions or
circumstances beyond their control.
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Research Objectives and Questions
The objectives of this research are to (1) explain/describe/discover how and why
Lon Nol and Pol Pot performed their respective leadership roles that led to disastrous
outcomes and to (2) document the commonalities and differences between their types of
bad leadership, their levels of EI competencies, and their leadership styles. This is a
comparative case study to be conducted among local Cambodians and Cambodians
overseas in various segments of society (including the unemployed) and of different
occupations in the public (both civilian and military), private, and non-profit sectors, a
number of whom play some leadership roles or functions. Therefore, in-depth analyses
of these two leaders’ leadership qualities can help uncover some mysteries behind their
traits and actions and the interactions between these traits and actions with the different
nuanced contexts within which they operated as well as offer valuable lessons for current
and future public leaders in similar contexts or situations. Or, it is hoped that this case
study can provide a form of generalization called “analytic generalization” by Yin (2009
& 2012) about revolutionary and failed leaders in other situations. Conversely, this study
does not aim to provide a “statistical generalization,” i.e. generalizations from a sample to
the population, which is the ultimate goal of surveys and other quantitative methods (Yin,
2009 & 2012).
This way, the findings of this research study will add to the current literature on
leadership, particularly “pseudotransformational leadership” (Bass, 1998 & 2008) and
“bad leadership” (Kellerman, 2004), certain styles, characters, and behaviors of these two
apparently bad leaders so that the causes of these leadership disasters may be prevented
and the number of bad or failed leaders can be minimized in Cambodia and other
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countries in the future. The findings of this study will also contribute to the existing body
of literature of both leaders, particularly Lon Nol, about whom comparatively little
literature exists.
The central research question is “Why and how did these two revolutionary
leaders become pseudotransformational leaders?”And the sub-research questions are:
1.

What were their (perceived) levels of EI capabilities and competencies?
Why did they lack certain EI capabilities or competencies?

2.

What were their (perceived) dominant leadership/decision-making styles?
How did they use their leadership styles? How were their leadership styles
shaped?

The author made a deliberate decision not to attempt to discover the definitive or
ranked causes or independent variables for the leaders’ failed/pseudotransformational
leadership because the attempt would likely be futile. The task would be too resourceintensive. More importantly, even if the required resources were available to the author,
the task would still be too formidable. Leadership is the “X factor in historic causation,”
contends James Macgregor Burns (2003, p. 22), called “the noted political scientist”
(Hollander, 2004, p. 698), a “historian” (e.g. Sorenson & Goethals, 2004, p. 873), and “a
towering figure in leadership studies” (Hicks, 2004, p. 1218). He points out that:
[T]he variables in the process of causation … are too complex and variegated to
lend themselves to simplistic explanations or monocausal analyses. Explanations
of single actions taken in isolation, such as an assassination, might be relatively
easy and perhaps valid, but events such as war or social transformations
inevitably involve a wide array of complex causes that our conventional
intellectual resources have been incapable of analyzing. (Burns, 2003, p. 21)
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Similarly, the historian John Lewis Gaddis, recounting a political science
conference he had attended whose topic was case studies, wrote “historians don’t think in
terms of independent and dependent variables. We assume the interdependency of
variables as we trace their interconnections through time” (Gaddis, 2002, p. 53).
More specifically, Philip Short (2004, p. 445), an author of Pol Pot, wrote “It is
too simple, too comforting, to blame Khmer Rouge atrocities on the peculiar feudal
culture of an exotic tropical land, just as it is to attribute them to the individual perversity
of a handful of warped leaders.”
These statements are pertinent to this case study, as it is in part historical.
Delimitations and limitations
The participants may have somewhat diminished memory of events that happened
several decades ago and their political orientations/tendencies can influence their
perceptions about the two leaders’ qualities. Some of the views and perceptions collected
about these two leaders’ leadership belong to the Cambodian public, not the two leaders’
supervisors, peers, or direct subordinates. Both Lon Nol and Pol Pot were the top leaders.
Some of Pol Pot’s close subordinates died and others are currently on trial at the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal. The participants’ assessment of the leaders can be said to be indirect and
more subjective than objective. But this tends be the nature of leadership evaluation, as
Kellerman (2004) wrote “… our assessment of a coach or leader… is bound to be
subjective, personal, and value-driven” (p. 31). To help minimize this effect, the author
adopted as the principal source of data statements and comments available from historical
archives and secondary sources about the two leaders by individuals who knew (or know)
them.
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Research design and strategy
Research design
A mixed methods research design has been selected for this study largely because
of the aforesaid purposes of the proposed study and the uniqueness of the two cases.
Also, “historical case studies” are often used in research on revolutions (Colgan, 2012, p.
445). This design is, therefore, more postpositivist than positivist. The mixed methods
design for case studies, which is more often than not superior to either the quantitative
and qualitative design alone, is not the same as using different methods in separate
studies and then synthesizing them later. Instead, the two methods are integrated into a
single study, answer the same research questions, gather “complimentary data,” and
“conduct counterpart analyses” (Yin, 2009, p. 63). Mixed methods research, in general,
not just for case study, is gaining popularity because it capitalizes upon the strengths of
both the quantitative and qualitative methods and minimizes their weaknesses, because
research is more complex and interdisciplinary, and because it provides “more insight”
(Creswell, 2009, p. 203).
The characteristics of qualitative research compiled by Creswell (2009, pp. 175176), some of which are described here, largely (although not wholly) apply to this
study’s predominantly qualitative mixed methods design. First is natural setting. The
author went to Cambodia, where both leaders had lived and exercised their leadership and
where the selected participants had experienced the two leaders’ leadership and still live
its consequences. The researcher had face-to-face interaction with the participants in their
offices or in other natural settings. Second is the researcher as key instrument. The
researcher, with the help of his research assistants, gathered data mainly through
39

individual interviews using his own interview protocol, examining documents and
archival records, although a quantitative survey was administered first. Third are
participants’ meanings. The researcher focuses on learning as much as possible about the
meanings the participants attach to this leadership issue and will strive to refrain from
injecting his view or meaning about this issue. Fourth is interpretive. The investigator
interpreted what he had heard and read and understood and this interpretation is
inevitably connected with or influenced by his “own backgrounds, history, contexts, and
prior understandings” (p. 175). The researcher, the participants, and the readers all made
interpretations, thus resulting in multiple perspectives of the issue. Last is holistic
account. This study aims to have in-depth analyses of these two complex cases with
regard to the leadership phenomenon, i.e. leadership failure. To this end, the researcher
reported multiple views, sought the various factors involved, and drew “the larger picture
that emerges” (p. 176).
Research strategy
The comparative case study, which is also called a multiple-case study (Stake,
1995 & Yin, 2009) and collective case study (Stake, 1995 & 2005) is a deliberate strategy
of inquiry for this study. This collective case design is frequently favored over singlecase designs because it increases the likelihood of doing a good case study (Yin, 2009)
and because it will bring about “better understanding, and perhaps better theorizing,
about a still larger collection of cases” (Stake, 2005, p. 446). Similarly, Luton (2010,
p.127) argues that “[m]ultiple cases can also be included in a study to provide 1) support
for generalizing from the study, 2) a comparative basis, or 3) an informative contrast.”
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The researcher has an intrinsic interest in these two cases because of their
uniqueness and intrigue as well as seeks to give “insight” (Stake, 2005, p. 445) into this
issue of leadership failures or “in-depth understanding of the cases or a comparison” of
these two cases (Creswell, 2007, p. 74). This case study is, therefore, both intrinsic and
instrumental. The study mainly asked “how” and “why” questions, which case study
research can answer best (Yin, 2009). The researcher had no control over the leadership
events.
There is a widespread use of case studies in the social sciences and organizational
studies, leadership in particular (Klenke, 2008), chiefly because of the context-based and
individualized nature of leadership. Lan and Anders (2000, cited in McNabb, 2008),
found the case study to be the preferred method among nearly all qualitative methods
used in the articles they examined. Two notable examples of leadership case studies are:
Weed’s (1993) study of a single case of the charisma and leadership failure of the
founder of Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) and Currie, Lockett, Suhomlinova’s
(2009) study of the case of public secondary schools in England with regard to leadership
and organizational change.
Moreover, the case study design fits well with this study because it gives greater
emphasis to “the particular more than the ordinary,” which is a common goal of case
study research, by addressing simultaneously, among other things, “the nature of the
case,” “its historical background,” “its physical setting,” and economic, political, and
legal contexts (Stake, 2005, p. 447). In his revision of a misunderstanding about case
study research that “general theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more
valuable than concrete (context-dependent case knowledge”, Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 304)
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wrote “Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs.
Concrete case knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search for predictive
theories and universals” [emphasis in original]. Case studies have such strengths as
“depth,” “high conceptual validity,” “understanding of context and process,”
“understanding of what causes a phenomenon, linking causes and outcomes,” and
“fostering new hypotheses and new research questions” (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 314).
Finally, case study research is not merely about the in-depth study of a unique or
common case or set of cases; it also aims to provide lessons that may be applicable to
other similar individuals, institutions, or contexts. As Lang and Heiss (1994, quoted in
McNabb, 2008) state that
The basic rationale for a case study is that there are processes and interactions …
which cannot be studied effectively except as they interact and function within the
entity itself. Thus, if we learn how these processes interact in one person or
organization, we will know more about how the processes as factors in
themselves and perhaps apply these (what we have learned) to other similar type
persons or organizations. (p. 288)

Researcher’s role and background
Nothing is further from the truth than to claim that the researcher has no biases,
particularly unintentional ones. These biases are shaped by his own values and personal
background like gender, history, culture, socioeconomic status (Creswell, 2009), and
even his educational background, which may influence his interpretation.
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The researcher tends to have a male perspective of leadership. But because the
two selected leaders are male, this is unlikely a problem. He personally suffered under
and from the two regimes (the Khmer Republic and particularly Democratic Kampuchea)
ruled by these two leaders respectively. At around age 5, he lost his father, three siblings,
and most of his aunts and uncles and most of their family members to Democratic
Kampuchea. As a consequence, the researcher may have a negative perception of these
two leaders’ leadership qualities, especially Pol Pot’s. With most of his higher education
based in countries where Western thought prevails (Australia and the United States) and a
considerable amount of his learning about leadership is from Western authors, his
leadership philosophy has been influenced to some extent by Western thought or
conception of leadership. Therefore, his leadership philosophy may differ to a certain
extent from those of certain participants, particularly those without the influence of
Western thought and education. This will influence the nature and wording of his
questions. Nevertheless, the researcher made every effort to minimize his biases in his
interpretation and to ask questions from a Cambodian perspective. These biases can be
reduced by the fact that Goleman’s model of emotional intelligence is based to a
considerable extent on, or at least similar to, Buddhist philosophy. Even more important
are the author’s chief intentions to learn and appreciate as much as possible about these
two cases, their issues, contexts, and history and to shed some light on them. His ultimate
goal is to help make a difference (no matter how small) in Cambodia and the world.
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Data collection and recording
Selection of cases
Unlike in quantitative research, random sampling or a selection of a large number
of cases, sites and/or participants is neither a priority nor desirability in qualitative
research or case study research; instead, purposeful sampling or selection is more
appropriate and thus desirable (e.g. Stake, 2005; Creswell, 2007 & 2009; Klenke, 2008;
Yin, 2009; and Luton, 2010). As Stake (2005: 451) wrote “for qualitative fieldwork, we
draw a purposive sample, building in variety and acknowledging opportunities for
intensive study.”
The two cases–Lon Nol and Pol Pot–were selected because of the importance of
“balance and variety” and the even greater importance of “the opportunity to learn” from
these two cases (Stake, 2005: 451). The fact that they belonged to the same nation that is
generally culturally homogenous can render more convenient and reliable a comparison
of their leadership qualities. Yin (2009: 29) mentions case studies of “certain types of
leaders,” which is another chief reason for choosing Lon Nol and Pol Pot. They are likely
sub-types of bad or failed leadership. The two leaders were contemporaries, although Lon
Nol died 13 years before Pol Pot did. The regime or government of the former
immediately preceded that of the latter. The fall of the government of the former directly
resulted in the rise of the government of the latter. Both leaders were of the same type or
category of leadership: negative transformational leadership or “pseudotransformational
leadership” as coined by Bass (1998). They were both revolutionaries, as will be
elaborated later. However, they had diametrical political ideologies: Lon Nol had a
capitalist worldview, while Pol Pot had a communist worldview. They “represented
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opposite and extreme ends of the political spectrum” (Becker, 1998a, p. 121). The
former’s primary professional background was military, whereas the latter’s was
political. Their regimes were also markedly different.
Perhaps more importantly, these two leaders, particularly Pol Pot, have been
selected because a detailed study such as this case study can cast some light on their
respective life and career. Chandler, the author of arguably the most authoritative
political biography of Pol Pot, acknowledged that it is very challenging “to make sense of
his life” considering the “disjunction between his genteel charisma and the death toll of
his regime” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 5). He wrote that “Pol Pot defies analysis” (p. 5);
“…there is still something elusive about him that makes a biographical inquiry
unsatisfactory and incomplete” (p. 6). This impression of elusiveness Pol Pot might have
“preferred to leave” (p. 6).
Finally, it seems to be more reliable to examine the effectiveness of leaders
considerably long after they are out of power. As Fareed Zakaria (2011), a political
scientist and CNN anchor, concluded “My point is, we cannot really tell the quality of a
leader judged from the noise of the present. We need time and perspective.” In a similar
vein, asserting that time may be the “toughest and subtlest evaluator” of leadership, Van
Wart (2008) wrote, “What effect will a leader have in the long term? Will one’s
contribution be so significant as to be associated with a level of development or an era of
the organization? … Generally only the most dedicated and passionate are concerned
with excelling at this level of evaluation” (pp. 472-473). These two cases are very good
examples of failed leadership whose effects are still felt today and will likely be felt in
decades to come.
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Definition of units of analysis
According to Yin (2012, p. 6), “[t]he case serves as the main unit of analysis in a
case study” [emphasis original]. In this present case study, both the cases and primary
units of analysis are Lon Nol and Pol Pot. The secondary units of analysis are their levels
of emotional intelligence and leadership styles.
Lon Nol was born at Prey Chraing commune, Ka[m]chai Mea district, Prey Veng
province, Cambodia on November 13, 1913 (Corfield & Summers, 2003) and died in
Fullerton, California, USA on November 17, 1985 (Kerr, 1985). He was a soldier and
politician and was the architect of a coup that toppled then-Prince Norodom Sihanouk in
early 1970 and later declared himself the President of the Republic. Allying himself with
the United States and South Vietnam, he broke Cambodia’s neutrality. Mainly due to his
weak leadership, the poor disciple of his armed forces, and rampant corruption within his
government while fighting against the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot, he lost the war to the
Khmer Rouge (Short, 2004 and Chandler, 2008).
Pol Pot, a revolutionary name, was born Saloth Sar in Prek Sbauv village,
Kompong Svay district, Kompong Thom province, Cambodia (Kiernan, 2004, p. 25) in
January1925, “according to his own account” (Corfield & Summers, 2003, p. 334) and
considered his “preferred” date of birth (Chandler, 1999a, p. 8), or May 1928 based on
Ministry of Education records (Corfield & Summers, 2003 & Kiernan, 2004). He died in
the jungle of Cambodia on April 15, 1998. He rose to power after having studied and
joined a communist group in France. Sometime after he had joined the Cambodian
Communist Party, Saloth Sar adopted Pol Pot as his nom de guerre and kept his own
identity secret until 1976, about one year after he violently seized power from Lon Nol.
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During his brutal rule, individual rights were destroyed and at least 1.7 million out of
Cambodia’s then-population of 7 million perished from mass killing, starvation, forced
labor, diseases. He was ousted from power by a break-away faction of his Cambodian
Communist Party with the support of Vietnamese troops in 1979; but he continued his
resistance movement in the jungle until a few months prior to his death (Chandler, 2008).
Lon Nol became a national leader, commander-in-chief of the Royal Khmer
Armed Forces, with the abbreviation FARK in French, in 1960 and prime minister of
Cambodia in 1966 (Corfield & Summers, 2002). Pol Pot was prime minister (or at least
the real power wielder behind the scene) of Cambodia between April 1975 and January 6,
1979 and the top leader of the Khmer Rouge guerrilla after he was deposed by a former
Khmer Rouge faction with the support of Vietnamese troops until a few months before
his death.
However, this study focuses mainly upon the leadership of Lon Nol as prime
minister and then president of the Khmer Republic (or the Lon Nol regime, to be more
precise, because the Khmer Republic was not declared until October 9, 1970) during
March 1970- April 1975 and on the leadership of Pol Pot as prime minister of
Democratic Kampuchea during April 1975-early January 1979. Their leadership prior to
and after these periods is briefly discussed merely to make the context of their leadership
clearer.
Selection of participants and sites
According to Luton (2010), three types of sampling are frequently used for
qualitative interviewing, particularly in public administration: purposive, snowball, and
convenience. Likewise, Creswell (2009, p. 217) states that purposeful sampling is used in
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qualitative research in order for people to be selected “who have experienced the central
phenomenon,” which in this case is the leadership of Lon Nol and Pol Pot and its impact.
Purposive sampling was used in this study for selecting survey respondents, interviewees
and sites. The overarching reason is that this study deals with a technical or even
academic concept of leadership quality and effectiveness and with leaders who are
already dead. Participants need to meet certain criteria, particularly (a) being reasonably
educated, (b) possessing some level of understanding and knowledge of leadership, (c)
having diverse political and professional backgrounds, and (d), preferably but not
necessarily, holding or having held some leadership positions. The minimum age of
target participants is 30 years. But, a large majority of them are at least 40 years of age
and lived under the two regimes between 1970 and 1979.
For the quantitative survey, 400 participants who met these requirements were
sampled from Cambodia, the United States, and Australia. Locations in Cambodia
include Phnom Penh–the capital city–and 14 major provinces of Cambodia such as: Prey
Veng, the birthplace of Lon Nol; Kompong Thom–where Pol Pot was born; Rattanak
Kiri, where Pol Pot launched his communist resistance movement; Odar Meanchey, the
former strongholds of the Khmer Rouge; Siem Reap; Kompong Speu; Preah Sihanouk;
Kratie; Stoeung Treng; Kompong Cham; Pousat; Kompong Chhnang; Svay Rieng; and
finally Kandal, a province adjacent to Phnom Penh.
Thirty-eighth participants were selected from the original sample for individual
in-depth interviews. Most of these participants were current and former political/senior
public administrative leaders, mid-level public administrative leaders, low-level leaders,
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university lecturers/high school teachers. Some participants were from the private and
non-profit sectors. A few participants were retirees.
Selection of measures
As described in the literature review, different EI measures have been used like
self-report, evaluation and observation by superiors, peers, and followers. The ability
model of EI solely requires individuals to take the MSCEIT test. Similarly, according to
Van Wart (2011), leadership evaluation can be in the forms of self-evaluation, selfreflection, peer evaluation, evaluation by supervisors and subordinates. Unfortunately,
none of these measures or forms of evaluation is applicable to this study. The two leaders
are long dead. They were top leaders while in office. Very few people who were their
leaders in earlier periods or their peers and followers while in office survive. To
complicate the matter further, these people are too difficult to access. They include the
late King Norodom Sihanouk –who was staying in China at the time of this project’s
fieldwork, whom Lon Nol toppled through a coup, and who passed away on October 15,
2012 –and the four most senior Khmer Rouge leaders, Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Khieu
Samphan, and Ieng Thirith –Pol Pot’s direct reports –who were standing trial at the KTR.
Nonetheless, the types of measure and evaluators adopted for this study are
reliable enough for the investigator to draw some valid inferences or conclusions about
their EI levels and leadership styles for the following reasons. Both the survey and
interviews aim to collect the public’s perceptions, views, or opinions about these leaders’
leadership traits, character, and effectiveness. While acknowledging that a leader’s bad
behavior is influenced by the context in which s/he operates and by her followers,
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Kellerman (2004: 19) argued that “in the main, leaders behave badly because of who they
are and what they want,” that is their traits and character.
Although very few of these participants had actually met either Lon Nol or Pol
Pot or both, they must have seen them in photographs and/or films, learned about them at
school and from the media for much of their lives, or experienced the leaders’ regimes or
their consequences. The public and their perceptions do matter, and often a great deal, as
far as evaluation of national leaders is concerned, particularly in the tradition of
qualitative research, and more specifically hermeneutics. For instance, Kincheloe and
McLaren (2005) argued that “[n]ot only is all research merely an act of interpretation,
but, hermeneutics contends, perception itself is an act of interpretation” (p. 311). In the
words of Van Wart (2011, p. 472), “Leadership evaluation is done by superiors of the
authorized body to whom the leader reports, which in some cases is simply the voting
public.” Furthermore, the reliability of the data to be collected has been enhanced by the
multiple sources of data and the mixed method design. Therefore, the overall reliability
and validity of the collected data will be adequate. Even if this is not the case, this study
is still legitimate because it aims to build a theory that can and should be tested by other
studies that employ either the case study design, experimental, or other more robust
designs.
In sum, this study’s data collection and measurement tools and techniques as well
as participants serve its purpose and research design, which is the predominantly
qualitative mixed methods design.
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Types of data
Four types of data were collected: quantitative questionnaire survey, individual
in-depth interviews, documents, and audio-visual materials. Although somewhat similar
in some aspects of content, the first two types of data/instruments differ in several key
respects, as can be seen in Appendixes A & B. First, the survey questionnaire contains far
more numerous items than does the interview protocol, as it aims to introduce some key
concepts of EI and types of leadership. Second, the survey questionnaire has multiplechoice and Likert-scale items, whereas the interview protocol has open-ended questions.
In other words, the survey focuses on what and how much while the protocol focuses on
how and why, delving into the complex (often nonlinear) interrelationships between and
among many factors. In this way, each survey respondent will have more time to provide
answers to the survey questions, learn key concepts, and if selected, to elaborate on their
answers at the interview stage.
Hard copies of the survey questionnaire and the consent form, most of which were
in Khmer, were distributed in person by both the researcher and his research assistants to
some 350 potential respondents to complete. Three hundred ten people responded. Only
291 responses are valid. Another 200 potential participants were invited via email to
participate in an online survey in English run by SurveyMonkey. The consent form was
attached with the email. One hundred three people participated in the online survey and
all the 103 responses are valid. The total response rate was 80%. The interview protocol
was used by the investigator for individual interviews. For both confidentiality and
convenience reasons, only one online survey respondent was selected for an interview.
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The author is well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of each form of data
most of which have been compiled by Creswell (2009: 179-180), which are briefly
described here. Although distinct from each other in terms of the types of questions they
ask, qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys have strengths and weaknesses.
Surveys save resources such as time, money, and efforts. Surveys often have a low
turnout rate. If a survey is conducted alone, some of the answers it produces might not be
comprehensible. Interviews are useful when the researcher cannot directly observe
participants and because participants can give historical information. In interviews, the
researcher can control the line of questioning. The disadvantages of interviews are as
follows. They provide information filtered through the interviewees’ views; they are
conducted in a “designated place rather than in the natural field setting”; interviewees’
responses may be biased by the researcher’s presence; and they may disadvantage those
participants who are not “articulate and perceptive” (p. 179).
Documents–which include public documents like meeting minutes, newspapers,
archival records, and private documents such as diaries, journals, or letters–have the
following merits. The researcher can “obtain the language and words of participants” (p.
180); they are an “obtrusive source of information” which the researcher can access at his
convenient time; they contain thoughtful data because a lot attention was given to
compiling them; and finally, they save the researcher’s time and money in transcribing
them. Documents also have disadvantages. Some information is classified and thus
inaccessible to the public or private individuals; the documents are usually kept at hardto-find places; they can require optical scanning for computer entry; the documents may
be incomplete, inauthentic, and/or inaccurate. The main sources of documents for this
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study are the Documentation of Cambodia (DC-Cam), a very useful resource center
concerning both the Lon Nol and the Khmer Rouge regimes, especially the later, that is
helping the UN-Cambodia tribunal for surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders (ECCC),
documents at the ECCC itself, including the testimony of the defendants, plaintiffs, and
witnesses; the National Library of Cambodia; and the National Archives of Cambodia.
Articles from local and international newspapers in both Khmer and English such as The
Koh Santepheap Daily, Rasmey Kampuchea Daily, The Phnom Penh Post, The Cambodia
Daily, and the defunct Far Eastern Economic Review, and The New York Times were also
collected in hard copies or online.
Audio-visual materials –which in this study will include mainly photographs,
videotapes, and film–“may be an obtrusive method of collecting data;” enable
participants to “directly share their reality;” they are creative because they capture
attention in a visual manner (p. 180); and they can provide some indications about the
levels of certain EI components of these leaders. With regard to their shortcomings,
documents may be hard to interpret, may not be available to public or private access.
These materials were borrowed, collected, or purchased from these resource centers or on
the open market.
Operationalization of concepts and variables
The author has adopted the definitions of concepts and variables from various
sources: bad leadership from Kellerman (2004); leadership skills from Katz (1974); EI
competencies from Goleman (2011), which had been adapted from Goleman, Boyatzis, &
McKee (2002); and leadership styles from Goleman (2001b), which had been adapted
from the Hay/McBer Group. As shown in Appendix B, except for Katz’s leadership skills
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whose definitions were not provided in the survey questionnaire, the definitions of these
concepts and variables had been quoted verbatim or slightly adapted for the
questionnaire.
Bad leadership
As mentioned in Chapter II, Kellerman’s (2004) notion of bad leadership consists
of seven types, including both ineffective and unethical leadership. One vital note needs
to be made here: Kellerman’s bad leadership covers both leaders and, in her own words
“at least some followers” (p. 40); but given the limited scope of this dissertation, bad
leadership as used herein covers only leaders.
Incompetent leadership–the leader … lack[s] the will or skill (or both) to
sustain effective action. With regard to at least one important
leadership challenge, they do not create positive change. (p. 40)
Rigid leadership–the leader … [is] stiff and unyielding. Although they
may be competent, they are unable or unwilling to adapt to new
ideas, new information, or changing times. (p. 41)
Intemperate leadership–the leader … lack[s] self-control and is aided and
abetted by followers who are unwilling or unable effectively to
intervene. (p. 42)
Callous leadership–the leader …[is] uncaring or unkind. Ignored or
discounted are the needs, wants, and whishes of most members of
the group or organization, especially subordinates. (p. 43)
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Corrupt leadership–the leader … lie[s], cheat[s], or steal[s]. To a degree
that exceeds the norm, they put self-interest ahead of the public
interest. (p. 44)
Insular leadership–the leader … minimize[s] or disregard[s] the health
and welfare of “the other” –that is, those outside the group or
organization for which they are directly responsible. (p. 45)
Evil leadership–the leader … commit[s] atrocities. They use pain as an
instrument of power. The harm done to men, women, and children
can be physical, psychological, or both. (p. 46)
Katz’s “three-skill approach”
In his article originally published in 1955 and republished in 1974, Katz proposed
what he termed a “three-skill approach,” which is comprised of technical skills, human
skill, and conceptual skill. These three skills are distinct, although not unrelated.
Technical skill “implies an understanding of, and proficiency in, a specific
kind of activity, particularly one involving methods, processes,
procedures, or techniques… [It] involves specialized knowledge,
analytical ability within that specialty, and facility in the use of the
tools and techniques of the specific discipline.” (p. 91)
Human skill “is the executive's ability to work effectively as a group
member and to build cooperative effort within the team he leads.
… so human skill is primarily concerned with working with
people. This skill is demonstrated in the way the individual
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perceives (and recognizes the perceptions of) his superiors, equals,
and subordinates, and in the way he behaves subsequently.” (p. 91)
Conceptual skill “involves the ability to see the enterprise as a whole; it
includes recognizing how the various functions of the organization
depend on one another, and how changes in any one part affect all
the others; and it extends to visualizing the relationship of the
individual business to the industry, the community, and the
political, social, and economic forces of the nation as a whole.” (p.
93)
Emotional intelligence competencies
Because these competencies are somewhat broad, Goleman et al. (2002) and
Goleman (2011b) call them “leadership competencies” not emotional intelligence
competencies. However, the author prefers to call them “emotional intelligence
competencies” of leaders in order to acknowledge the existence of other leadership
competencies or capabilities that are not related to emotional intelligence.
Self-awareness
Emotional self-awareness. Leaders high in emotional self awareness are
attuned to their inner signals, recognizing how their feelings affect
them and their job performance. They are attuned to their guiding
values and can often intuit the best course of action, seeing the big
picture in a complex situation. Emotionally self-aware leaders can
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be candid and authentic, able to speak openly about their emotions
or with conviction about their guiding vision.
Accurate self-assessment. Leaders with high self-awareness typically
know their limitations and strengths, and exhibit a sense of humor
about themselves. They exhibit a gracefulness in learning where
they need to improve, and welcome constructive criticism and
feedback. Accurate self-assessment lets a leader know when to ask
for help and where to focus in cultivating new leadership strengths.
Self-confidence. Knowing their abilities with accuracy allows leaders to
play to their strengths. Self-confident leaders can welcome a
difficult assignment. Such leaders often have a sense of presence, a
self-assurance that lets them stand out in a group.
Self-management
Self-control. Leaders with emotional self-control find ways to manage
their disturbing emotions and impulses, and even to channel them
in useful ways. A hallmark of self-control is the leader who stays
calm and clear-headed under high stress or during a crisis-or who
remains unflappable even when confronted by a trying situation.
Transparency. Leaders who are transparent live their values.
Transparency - an authentic openness to others about one’s
feelings, beliefs, and actions - allows integrity. Such leaders openly
admit mistakes or faults, and confront unethical behavior in others
rather than turn a blind eye.
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Adaptability. Leaders who are adaptable can juggle multiple demands
without losing their focus or energy, and are comfortable with the
inevitable ambiguities of organizational life. Such leaders can be
flexible in adapting to new challenges, nimble in adjusting to fluid
change, and limber in their thinking in the face of new data or
realities.
Achievement. Leaders with strength in achievement have high personal
standards that drive them to constantly seek performance
improvements-both for themselves and those they lead. They are
pragmatic, setting measurable but challenging goals, and are able
to calculate risk so that their goals are worthy but attainable. A
hallmark of achievement is in continually learning - and teaching
ways to do better.
Initiative. Leaders who have a sense of efficacy-that they have what it
takes to control their own destiny-excel in initiative. They seize
opportunities-or create them rather than simply waiting. Such a
leader does not hesitate to cut through red tape, or even bend the
rules, when necessary to create better possibilities for the future.
Optimism. A leader who is optimistic can roll with the punches, seeing an
opportunity rather than a threat in a setback. Such leaders see
others positively, expecting the best of them. And their “glass halffull” outlook leads them to expect that changes in the future will be
for the better.
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Social awareness
Empathy. Leaders with empathy are able to attune to a wide range of
emotional signals, letting them sense the felt, but unspoken,
emotions in a person or group. Such leaders listen attentively and
can grasp the other person’s perspective. Empathy makes a leader
able to get along well with people of diverse backgrounds or from
other cultures.
Organizational awareness. A leader with a keen social awareness can be
politically astute, able to detect crucial social networks and read
key power relationships. Such leaders can understand the political
forces at work in an organization, as well as the guiding values and
unspoken rules that operate among people there.
Service. Leaders high in the service competence foster an emotional
climate so that people directly in touch with the customer or client
will keep the relationship on the right track. Such leaders monitor
customer or client satisfaction carefully to ensure they are getting
what they need. They also make themselves available as needed.
Relationship management
Inspiration. Leaders who inspire both create resonance and move people
with a compelling vision or shared mission. Such leaders embody
what they ask of others, and are able to articulate a shared mission
in a way that inspires others to follow. They offer a sense of
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common purpose beyond the day-to-day tasks, making work
exciting.
Influence. Indicators of a leader’s powers of influence range from finding
just the right appeal for a given listener to knowing how to
initiative. Leaders adept in influence are persuasive and engaging
when they address a group
Developing others. Leaders who are adept at cultivating people’s abilities
show a genuine interest in those they are helping along,
understanding their goals, strengths, and weaknesses. Such leaders
can give timely and constructive feedback and are natural mentors
or coaches.
Change catalyst. Leaders who can catalyze change are able to recognize
the need for the change, challenge the status quo, and champion
the new order. They can be strong advocates for the change even in
the face of opposition, making the argument for it compellingly.
They also find practical ways to overcome barriers to change.
Conflict management. Leaders who manage conflicts best are able to
draw out all parties, understand the differing perspectives, and then
find a common ideal that everyone can endorse. They surface the
conflict, acknowledge the feelings and views of all sides, and then
redirect the energy toward a shared ideal.
Teamwork and collaboration. Leaders who are able team players generate
an atmosphere of friendly collegiality and are themselves models
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of respect, helpfulness, and cooperation. They draw others into
active, enthusiastic commitment to the collective effort, and build
spirit and identity. They spend time forging and cementing close
relationships beyond mere work obligations. [Emphasis added]
(Goleman, 2011b, Loc7 1628-1691)
Leadership styles
Coercive style. A leadership style in which “the leader demands
immediate compliance…The phrase to describe this style is ‘Do
what I tell you.’”
Authoritative style. A leadership style in which “the leader mobilizes
people toward a vision. The phrase to describe this style is ‘Come
with me.’”
Affiliative style. A leadership style in which “the leader creates harmony
and builds emotional bonds. The phrase to describe this style is
‘People come first.’”
Democratic style. A leadership style in which “the leader forges consensus
through participation. The phrase to describe this style is ‘What do
you think?’”
Peacesetting style. A leadership style in which “he leader sets high
standards for performance. The phrase to describe this style is ‘Do
as I do, now.’”

7

Loc stands for Kindle location.
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Coaching style. A leadership style in which “he leader develops people for
the future. The phrase to describe this style is ‘Try this.
(quoted in Goleman, 2001b, p. 60)
Data collection and recording procedures
The following describes the steps in collecting all four types of data. Note that
these steps were not necessarily exhaustive or linear. Some steps were also iterative.
1.

Obtained approval from the Mississippi State University’s Institutional
Review Board for the use of human subjects.

2.

Phoned or emailed potential participants to make appointments and
selected interview sites.

3.

Designed and piloted a survey questionnaire among 50 people.

4.

Revised or dropped certain survey questions.

5.

Distributed survey questionnaires to a sample of 500 participants in person
and via email in two waves.

6.

Collected back the questionnaires.

7.

Designed an interview protocol.

8.

Conducted semi-structured individual in-depth interviews with 38
participants, audiotaped them, if allowed, and took notes of the interviews

9.

Listened to and transcribed the relevant portions of certain interviews
immediately after they had been completed.

10.

Contacted and obtained permission from the gatekeeper of each resource
center.

11.

Copied, borrowed, and/or purchased documents.

12.

Sorted and classified documents.

13.

Examined biographies of Pol Pot and Lon Nol (if available)

14.

Collected audio-visual materials such as photographs, videotapes, films,
and recordings from the resource centers and other sources

15.

Classified audio-visual materials
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Data analysis and interpretation procedures
Quantitative data analysis and interpretation
The procedure for quantitative data analysis and interpretation is relatively
straightforward or simple. Simple descriptive statistics (in this case, means and standard
deviation), which was found to be commonly used in public administration research, was
adopted for the quantitative data (McNabb, 2008). The statistical program Stata is used
for this analysis.
Qualitative data analysis and interpretation
The procedures for analyzing and interpreting data in this study were based on
McNabb’s nine-step process for analyzing qualitative data. Because these nine steps had
been originally developed for Grounded Theory, only Steps 1 to 7 were included in this
study. The data analysis software called NVivo had been adopted for this study but it
was partly used. The data was mostly analyzed manually. Although these steps were
given in the following order, they could be both circular and reiterative. Each step is
summarized as follows:
Step 1: Preliminary analysis for patterns and themes. All four types of data
collected was structured and ordered so that they could become
information. Different small bits and pieces of data were formed
into larger “wholes” (Miles & Huberman, cited in McNabb, 2008).
The researcher sorted and re-sorted to develop patterns and
construct meaning and definition from them. The researcher did
this step carefully and quite slowly in order to come up with
patterns that had adequate evidence. In other words, patterns that
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the researcher initially identified might not be patterns at all after
some more review or consideration.
Step 2: Open coding for clustering and structure. The researcher
categorized or clustered similar data according to each EI
component and each leadership style.
Step 3: Comparative analysis for similarities and contrasts. Since this is a
comparative case study, this step is vitally important. The
comparison and contrast occur not only between these two cases
but also among data within each case. The researcher identifed bits
of data that share characteristics and put them into proper
categorical codes and then teased out anomalies in that data.
McNabb (2008) maintains that “Anomalies are the distinct
characteristics that are central to the research problem; finding
distinctive differences in data is like a prospector finding the
mother lode” (p. 363).
Step 4: Analysis for unbundling of early constructs. The researcher
reexamined early categorical constructs to see if any of them could
be logically or intuitively broken into sub-categories or factors.
This step is important because in the first 3 steps, which is mainly
about bundling, the researcher might have put too many chunks or
subcategories of data into one main category.
Step 5: Axial coding to clarify themes and constructs. With axial coding,
the researcher reintroduced order and structure into the data that he
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has initially coded by placing them all into these six specified
categories: (1) conditions, (2) phenomena, (3) context, (4)
intervening conditions, (5) actions/strategies, and (6)
consequences. These categories were originally for Grounded
Theory. Nevertheless, they are also perfectly appropriate for this
comparative case study because it deals with all these categories.
Step 6: Reiterative analysis to identify relationships. Now that themes and
categories had been identified, the researcher examined which
categories or themes had some kind of relationship with other
categories of themes. The researcher used arrows to show the
directions of relationships between boxes of categories and themes.
Step 7: Selective recoding of major themes. In short, in this final stage, the
researcher reconsidered some major themes to see if they could be
recoded and reworded in preparation for the final narrative.
Strategy for validating findings
In order to help validate the findings of this study, the researcher used the mixed
methods design and collected various forms of qualitative data from a wide variety of
sources.
Ethical issues
The participants were informed of all the potential costs/harms and benefits of the
study from the outset; and written informed consent was obtained from them.
Fortunately, the harms that can result from their participation in this study are relatively
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minimal because both the leaders (cases) are dead (Lon Nol died in 1985 and Pol Pot in
1998). Also, because they were notorious leaders, particularly Pol Pot, who had led
Cambodia to a spectacular downfall, few Cambodians still support them and most speak
openly and freely against them. This openness and freedom is caused in large measures
by the widely-publicized UN-Cambodia Khmer Rouge Tribunal, which since 2007 has
indicted and conducted trials against surviving top leaders of the Khmer Rouge (Pol Potled) regime. This study will therefore unlikely compromise their personal safety or
security.
Participation in this study was voluntary. Furthermore, participants could end
their participation in the study at any time. Finally, confidentiality has been and will be
strictly kept. For example, to help maintain confidentiality, all identifying information
was removed from the report. Permission was obtained from participants to audiotape
their interviews.
Reporting structure
To conform to the mixed methods design reporting convention, especially with
case study research, both quantitative and qualitative data will be reported and discussed
in an integrative manner in a narrative form in Chapters IV, V, and VI. These chapters
are organized according to categories and themes. The categories and themes of these
chapters are distinct, but some of their content overlaps. When overlap occurs, the
content will be briefly mentioned in one or more chapters and then treated extensively in
only one other chapter, mainly Chapter VI.
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LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND FACTORS FOR MEDIOCRE/FAILED
LEADERSHIP
Leadership effectiveness
The survey respondents were asked to choose one of the three categories of
leadership: successful, mediocre, and failed leadership. No definition of each leadership
category was given; each respondent assessed each leader on the basis of what they
thought constituted each leadership category.
As Table 4.1 shows, a tiny minority of the respondent thought the leaders were
successful (2.60% for Lon Nol and 4.32% for Pol Pot). More respondents thought Lon
Nol was a mediocre leader (27.08% for Lon Nol and 5.84% for Pol Pot). A significant
number of respondents considered both Lon Nol (70.31%) and Pol Pot (89.85%) failed
leaders. There were 19.54% more respondents who thought Pol Pot was a failed leader.
Table 4.1

Leadership performance
N

Percentage

LN

PP

LN

PP

Successful leader

10

17

2.60

4.32

Mediocre leader

104

23

27.08

5.84

Failed leader

270

354

70.31

89.85

384

394

100

100

Total
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Even though it might not be known what criteria the respondents used to assess
the leaders’ performance or effectiveness, there is consensus, as the figures show, that
both were failed leaders and both the quantitative qualitative data presented in the
subsequent chapters substantiate this assumption. In this section, it should suffice to raise
two assertions that they failed as leaders because (1) the revolutionary
regimes/governments they had presided over failed and because (2) they did not make
good on their promises; in other words, their performance fell far short of the
expectations they raised or the expectations the Cambodian people had of them once they
took power.
Both Lon Nol and Pol Pot must be held accountable, to a certain extent, for the
failure or collapse of their respective regime because they were the highest-ranking
leaders in their respective governments. Pin Yathay & Man even wrote of “Lon Nol’s
failure” (2000, p. 74). As for Pol Pot, Chandler (1999a, p. 187) wrote, “[he] must be held
responsible for what happened in Cambodia after April 1975.” Despite the evidence to be
laid out subsequently that undergirds their accountability, they themselves did not admit
it; neither have their staunch supporters. In an interview with a journalist almost 14
months in exile, “Lon Nol defended his record as Cambodia’s leader” throughout the
Republic period (Leslie, 1976). “Personally, I have never failed my responsibility under
fire. … I stayed five years without breaking. … The biggest regret for me is that I wasn’t
there [when Phnom Penh fell],” he said [editing original] (Leslie, 1976). As far as Pol Pot
is concerned, others were responsible for the failure of the revolution (Chandler, 1999a).
As Shawcross (1986) aptly put it, “The 1970s were the decade in which
Cambodia died; it did not seem at the beginning of the 1980s that there was very much
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chance of its fully reviving” (p. 404). Earlier he wrote that Cambodia’s death “was not an
act of God, but a man-made disaster…” (in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxxiii). That was the
decade of Lon Nol’s and later Pol Pot’s rules. Cambodia under their respective rule was a
“failed state” or even “collapsed state,” which is a “rare and extreme version of a failed
state” (Rotberg, 2004, p. 9), because it had a number of the characteristics of these
categories of state listed by Rotberg such as: (1) being “tense, deeply conflicted,
dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions” (p. 5); (2) inability to “control
their peripheral regions, especially those regions occupied by out-groups” and their loss
of “authority over large sections of territory”; (3) inability to maintain its citizens’
security and freedom from fear; (4) the “growth of criminal violence”; (5) the prevalence
of corruption and the availability of “unparalleled economic opportunity –but only for a
privileged few”; (6) “declining real national and per capita levels of annual gross
domestic products (GDP, or GNI)”; (7) food shortages, endemic hunger, and even
starvation; (8) having “deteriorating or destroyed infrastructures”; (9) exhibiting “flawed
institutions”; (10) loss of legitimacy; and (11) exhibiting a “vacuum of authority” (pp. 59). In the following section, relevant characteristics of a failed or collapsed state are
illustrated for Cambodia under each leader’s rule.
Cambodia under Lon Nol
The Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Republic, totally collapsed on April 17, 1975
when the Khmer Rouge soldiers captured Phnom Penh, after a bloodless coup on March
18, 1970 that had put him in power as Cambodia’s first president. Before the regime’s
collapse, Cambodia was already a failed state. “The Khmer Republic was a terrible
failure,” wrote Corfield (1994, p. ix) and it was a regime of “lackadaisical chaos”
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(Chandler, 2008, p. 232). Most of the Khmer Republic period was “violent and
melancholy” Chandler added (p. 252). The regime was a military, political, economic,
and social failure. The military failure was the most obvious and perhaps most important
mainly because it precipitated the Pol Pot regime that eventually turned a once peaceful
and thriving kingdom in Southeast Asia into a primitive barbarian society.
A pro-Vietnamese left-wing political party called the Workers’ Party of
Kampuchea (Kiernan, 1993, p. 13) that Pol Pot later joined was founded in 1951
originally to resist the French colonial rule and later King Norodom Sihanouk’s political
movement called Sangkum Reastr Niyum (a Khmer phrase for Popular or People’s
Socialist Community), particularly since the mid-1960s. But this revolutionary party –
which was renamed the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in 1966 (Kiernan, 1993)
better known as the Khmer Rouge and eventually headed by Pol Pot–did not become
belligerent and ruthless until Lon Nol seized power in the coup in March 1970, declared
Cambodia –previously named the Kingdom of Cambodia– pro-Western and proAmerican “Khmer Republic” in October of that year, and accepted increased assistance,
mostly military, from the US government. According to Elizabeth Becker –a journalist
who covered Cambodia from 1973 for The Washington Post and one of the few foreign
journalists from Western countries to interview Pol Pot face-to-face, in 1978 –the US
government provided the Lon Nol government with total aid of “$1.6 billion, of which
over $1 billion was military aid” (Becker, 1998a, p. 169).
The Republic’s defeat in the civil war has been attributed to three different
factors: (1) its ineffective and demoralized army and experienced North Vietnamese
troops and a highly moralized and more effective “National United Front,” a military arm
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of the China-backed Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (GRUNK); (2)
the “incompetence of the Government;” and (3) the Government’s “being far less ruthless
than their opposition” (Corfield, 1994, x). GRUNK was a coalition government-in-exile
with Sihanouk as “its token leader” (Becker, 1998a, p. 18), who was still popular among
ordinary Cambodians. Lon Nol’s troops were so “badly trained, poorly equipped, and
badly led” (Chandler, 2008, p. 251) that their two major offensives (Chenla I and Chenla
II) against experienced North Vietnamese troops in 1970 and 1971 respectively were
“military disaster(s)” (Corfield, 1994, p.116). In Chenla II alone, more than 3,000 of Lon
Nol’s elite troops were killed, and thousand others wounded (Chandler, 1991b). Lon
Nol’s troops were weakened so significantly by these failed offensives that they never
conducted any more major military operation. As Corfield (1994) asserts that “[t]hus the
Republic lost the war rather then [sic] their opponents, GRUNK, winning it” (p. x) and
Kamm wrote “Cambodia was at war, but only its enemy was fighting. The [Republic’s]
Army retreated whenever it was challenged” (p. 62). Without “U.S. military and
economic assistance and heavy bombing,” the Lon Nol regime would not have survived
until April 1975 (Chandler, 2008, p. 252).
A massive portion of Cambodia’s territory was controlled by the Khmer Rouge,
others insurgents fighting for GRUNK, and Vietcong formally called the NFL (the
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), a group set up by Vietnamese
communists. By 1970, according to Sihanouk, “[m]ore than two thirds of the country is
now administered by the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia” (quoted in
Jeldres, 2005, p. 157) [emphasis original]. By 1973, besides Phnom Penh, a few
provincial towns, and much of Battambang province, the rest of Cambodia was “either in
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Communist hands or unsafe for anyone to administer” (Chandler, 2008, p. 252). This line
by Gayn (1973, p. 13) is poignant: “Lon Nol is an improbable leader in a never-never
capital. The Khmer Rouge units are only a few miles from Phnom Penh.” The major
province of Siem Reap, where the magnificent 12th century temple of Angkor Wat is
located, was never under the regime’s control. John Gunther Dean, the last US
ambassador to Cambodia days before the fall of Phnom Penh, and eventually Cambodia,
to the Khmer Rouge, agreed on the size of Cambodia’s territory controlled by GRUNK
adding that “[w]ith every passing day, the Khmer Rouge gained more territory and
military strength” (Dean, 2009, p. 91). As a result, as Head of GRUNK, Prince Sihanouk
was able to travel from China to Hanoi and from there along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to
Cambodia to visit some of the GRUNK’s “liberated zones,” including Angkor city of
Siem Reap for a period of one month in March 1973 (Jeldres, 2005, p. 178).
The government was unable to play the most basic and original role of
government, i.e. maintaining order and security. Terrorism was on the rise, mainly in
Phnom Penh, where soldiers, business rivals, or shops were attacked by gangsters with
handgrenades (Corfield, 1994). Yet, one massive terrorist attack stood out. On the night
of January 21, 1971, one day after Lon Nol’s official visit to Saigon, the Vietcong/NVA
sappers bombed Pochentong Air Base in Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s largest, destroying
almost all the Khmer Air Force planes. According to Sihanouk & Burchett (1973, p. 181),
the attack “was carried out by former Phnom Penh residents trained in commando
techniques by our Vietnamese instructors.” “Gone were their entire fleet of Russian Migs,
French Magisters, and most of their helicopters. Also destroyed was Cambodia’s national
airline. Air Camboge [sic] had only a single plane, a French Caravelle that was a twin72

engine medium-range jet transport. By dawn it was a burned-out hulk” wrote Richard
Wood (2002, p. 100), a retired U.S. Air Force colonel who had been involved in what he
called the “secret air war over Cambodia.” Furthermore, there were many demonstrations
and riots that resulted in many casualties. Four most notable incidents are mentioned
here. The first two were the aerial bombings of Lon Nol’s Presidential Palace in Chamcar
Mon. In March, 1973, So Photra, a son-in-law of Sihanouk’s, bombed the palace
destroying several houses in the palace compound and killing “47 people” (Corfield, p.
179). The bombing did not “actually hit” the Palace and Lon Nol was not hurt (p. 179).
The second bombing was carried out in November, 1973 by a Khmer Air Force (KAF)
pilot, who flew off to the Khmer Rouge territory afterwards (Chantrabot, 1978). Lon Nol
was again unscathed, but there were many injuries and deaths. The third incident was the
failed assassination on April 26, 1974 of Long Boret, the last Prime Minister of the
Republic from June 16, 1974 (Chantrabot, 1978). The fourth was the assassinations of
Keo Sangkim, the Minister of Education and Lon Nol’s personal physician, and Thach
Chia, Keo Sangkim’s principal adviser. Given its significance and relevance to Lon Nol,
this mishap will be discussed in details in Chapter V.
The Lon Nol regime is notorious for having been plagued by widespread
corruption in both the civilian and military sectors, but more so in the military sector (e.g.
Gayn, 1973; Chantrabot, 1978; May, 1986; Corfield, 1994; Becker, 1998a; Short, 2005;
Chandler, 2008). The stench of the corrupt government of the Khmer Republic has
minimized, if not altogether eliminated, a chance for a republic to return to Cambodia.
Sihanouk and Burchett (1973) wrote that in 1972 the Americans advised the putschists to
reinstate monarchy because “the ‘republic’ had become synonymous with corruption, an
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unprecedented assault on democratic rights, and above all for [sic] military and political
catastrophes” (p. 168). Also, in an interview in 1987, Sihanouk said, “We need a king,
not a republic. As a republic, we lost our national identity, we lost everything” (quoted in
Weiner, 1987, p. 70).
Corruption was so endemic that it drew the attention of foreign press away from
political developments in Phnom Penh (Corfiled). Corruption had existed before 1970, or
as Lon Non said, “is as old as the land … it is a problem of every area and every country”
(quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 188); but it was “controlled in part by Prince [Sihanouk’s]
authority” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 277). The prince considered “the regime of Lon Nol,
Sirik Matak and the other putschists” to be “incompetent and corrupt” (quoted in Jeldres,
2005, p. 106); It was a “weak and dishonest regime (‘a hundred times more corrupt than
that of Sihanouk’ according to my old enemy Sim Var)” (p. 110)–who had served in
many prominent positions under Sihanouk and became an ardent supporter of the
Republic and dropped out of the presidential election of 1972. Gayn (1973, p. 32) wrote
that “The Lon Nol administration is … shamelessly corrupt...” One significant
consequence of this corruption was the demoralization of the Republic’s troops. The
three most corrupt ministries were Defense, Finance, and Education (in that order); they
“took most of the wartime budget,” a major portion of which came from American aid
(Shawcross, p. 227). According to a majority of participants in this study, historians, and
anecdotal evidence, corruption was a major cause for the decline and eventual collapse of
the regime. This view was held by William Harben, Chief of Political Section of the US
Embassy in Phnom Penh from January 1972, who said that “American toleration of
military corruption led directly to defeat. Every imported motorcycle cost the Army a
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squad, every car a platoon” (quoted in Shawcross, p. 228). Therefore, corruption merits
emphasis and extensive elaboration here. In a similar vein, Ponchaud argued that “The
Lon Nol regime was very, very corrupt and there was no hope for the people ... the only
hope was the coming of the Khmer Rouge” (quoted in Kyne, 2008). One significant
consequence of this corruption was the demoralization of the Republic’s troops.
There are countless accounts and instances of corruption and bribery, especially
finance-related ones. One notable example is the falsification by military generals and
officers of the number of the regime’s troops in order to “pocket the salaries” funded by
the United States (Chandler, 2008, p. 252). As a result there were a large number of
“phantom or ghost soldiers.” By July 1971, “there were at least 22,000 “phantom
soldiers,” with another 46,000 real troops actually untraceable” and according to auditors,
by the end of 1971, “between 6 and 8 percent of all salaries were being paid to ‘ghosts’”
(Shawcross, 1986, p. 227). “Some battalions that were supposed to have 557 soldiers
actually had only 200 soldiers; and some companies that were supposed to have 7500
troops operated with only 3500 maximum on the battlefields” (Chantrabot8, 1978). There
were thefts of military equipment, ammunitions, food supplies, gasoline, military
uniforms, construction material (Chantrabot, 1978). Some Lon Nol generals even “sold
military equipment” to their enemies; as a consequence, “few were prepared to take
offensive action” (Chandler, 2008, p. 252). Customs officers stationed in Phnom Penh,
Kompong Som Port, Pochentong Airport, and along Cambodia’s borders with Thailand
and South Vietnam turned a blind eye to smuggling in return for monthly or per-transit

Citations of Ros Chantrabot are based on a Khmer translation of his thesis in French La Republique
Khmere. He confirmed to the current author that the translation is reliable.
8
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fees paid by smugglers; moreover, corruption was committed by senior officers in Phnom
Penh Customs Department who colluded with military and civilian officers and Chinese
businesspeople in order to earn a fortune in a short period (Chantrabot, 1978).
The following were among the instances of corruption and bribery reported by
Chantrabot (1978) and other authors. The judicial branch could not serve justice because
judges almost always decided in favor of the party who paid them a bigger bribe. The
post of the Commerce Minister was highly competitive and coveted because it was highly
lucrative. Biddings for public projects were conducted mainly in order to receive
kickbacks from the highest bidders. The Ministry of Education was no exception. For a
junior or senior high school certificate, a bribe had to be paid to exam proctors, graders,
and/or administrators. The Ministry’s personnel department took bribes for transfer or
replacement of teachers. So did officers who were in charge of overseas scholarships. All
the corrupt practices invariably benefited the wealthiest the most (Chantrabot). For the
most part, to get a job, one had to have something, and so came this slogan: “Money is
number one, pussy is number two, influence is number three” said Someth May, one of
the first Khmer Rouge survivors who wrote an autobiography or memoir about the two
regimes, among other things (May, 1986, p. 97).
The economy, which depended on foreign aid (especially from the US) and was
overshadowed by political developments, was in poor shape (e.g. Corfield, 1994 and
Shawcross, 1986). In April 1973, Gayn wrote “Thanks largely to the war, Lon Nol’s
Cambodia today is, to all its intents and purposes, a bankrupt that is given the illusion of
solvency by the U.S. taxpayer” (p. 35). The economy worsened every year despite
increased economic assistance to the country (Shawcross, 1986). The value of the riel,
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the Cambodian currency, dropped dramatically on international markets (Corfield, 1994).
In 1970, the official rate was “55 riel” to $1; in April 1973, it was “216 riel” to $1 (Gayn,
1972, p. 35). More significantly, its official value dropped from “280 to $1” to “1,600 to
$1” in a period of one year in 1974 (Becker, p. 18). According to Yathay & Man (2000),
the value of the riel dropped from 60 to a US dollar in 1970 to 2,000 in 1975.
Inflation was incredibly high (or “fantastic,” according to Becker (1998a, p. 18),
particularly the price of rice), which was a major cause of students and teachers’
demonstrations. For example, “a kilo of beef cost a soldier’s weekly wage” (May, 1986,
p. 98). Even Lon Nol’s decision to increase the salaries of civil servants and military
personnel and to set a minimum wage produced negligible impact on their living
conditions (US Department of State (DoS), cited in Corfield, 1994). With regard to the
national deficit, Shawcross said “[d]espite the stagnation of the economy under Sihanouk,
in 1969 exports of rice, rubber and corn had brought in $90 million; a sizable portion of
the Gross National Products of $450 million. By the end of 1970, the [Khmer Republic]
government was spending five times its revenue and earning nothing abroad” (p. 220).
The Lon Nol regime was both “corrupt and inefficient” (Chandler, 2008, p. 253), which
contributed in large measures to its economic plight and sufferings of its people.
The civil war and especially “constant American bombardment” for seven
months caused mass migration of “over half a million” people to Phnom Penh, “doubling
its population” (Becker, 1998a, p. 16). Two major consequences were shortages of shelter
and food, the latter being more grave than the former. “Rice became an obsession in the
capital… Finding rice and the money to buy it was the chief preoccupation not only of
civilians but of soldiers as well” (Becker, p. 17). The Lon Nol government “handed” US77

funded rice to the “notoriously greedy rice merchants” who made enormous profits from
the sales of a large portion of the rice (p. 17).
Due to fighting or bombing during the civil war and its limited budget for
infrastructure repair and development, Cambodia’s infrastructure during the Lon Nol
regime was in shambles. Between 60 and 80 percent of the communication system was
“damaged or destroyed;” the railroads were in poor condition; roads were damaged and
could not be used for miles; and “[h]alf of the farmlands were fallow or damaged”
(Becker, pp. 169-1970). Bridges were cut off or destroyed, most of which by Khmer
Rouge forces. For example, the formerly most important and largest bridge called Chroy
Changvar, which linked Phnom Penh and Kandal province, “[was] blown up by Vietcong
sappers” (Siv, 2008, p. 77).
What Ung Sok Choeu, an economics student who had joined student
demonstrations against the Lon Nol regime, said below is typical of the feelings of many
people on April 17, 1975 about the collapse of the Lon Nol regime and the victory of the
Khmer Rouge; very few people knew what the Khmer Rouge had in store for their own
people.
That morning we were shouting, “Victory! Victory!” and I joined in with great
glee. People were happy. Life had been very difficult under Lon Nol. Not even
the middle classes, civil servants and university professors managed to make ends
meet anymore. Things could only become better now. It wasn’t that we loved the
Khmer Rouge so much, but seeing Lon Nol go was worth an outburst of joy.
After all, we were all Khmers. What use was it that we should kill each other?
(quoted in Barron & Paul, 1977, p. 9)
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Cambodia under Pol Pot
The Pol Pot regime was a “totalitarian” one (e.g. Ear & Ear, 2006a, p. 362) and a
“radical communist revolution” (eg. Ear & Ear, 2006b, p. 522) and was thus very
different from the Lon Nol regime. It had near-total control of Cambodia’s territory and
all aspects of the lives of its population for most of its existence. This prompted Philip
Short, an expert witness at the ECCC, to call Pol Pot’s Cambodia a “slave state” both in
his book and testimony at the court (2005, p. 291 & Cambodia Tribunal Monitor (CTM),
2013). By contrast, he did not consider Lon Nol’s Cambodia a slave state. Nevertheless,
both regimes shared the same fate of military defeat. The Pol Pot regime was toppled on
January 7, 1979 by “Vietnamese troops and the forces of the United Front for the
National Salvation of Kampuchea,” (Dy Khamboly, p. 2) a break-away faction of the
CPK. This event is viewed in two different ways: a “liberation” by the ruling Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP), which is the renamed break-away faction, and its supporters and an
“invasion” by Cambodia’s opposition parties and most Westerners. “For almost all
Cambodians, the Vietnamese invasion of January 1979 was a liberation. The Khmer
Rouge had become more not less brutal, more not less paranoid, as their rule continued”
wrote Shawcross (1986, p. 404). Pin Yathay, a civil engineer under the Khmer Republic
and a Khmer Rouge survivor, wrote “Nearly all the population welcomed the Vietnamese
intervention, as it rescued them from Pol Pot’s murderous utopia” (Pin Yathay & Man,
2000, p. xix). Regarding this historic event, which has been a public holiday since that
year, Prime Minister Hun Sen, also a commander of the United Front, asked his
biographers, Mehta and Mehta (1999, p. xi), “How could I, a Cambodian, invade my own
79

country?” It was a “liberation from a genocidal regime” (p. xi) by Cambodians “with the
help of the Vietnamese army” (p. xvii). Perhaps most significantly, in his 1986 memoir in
French Prisonnier des Khmeres Rouges, King Sihanouk made this observation: “If
Democratic Kampuchea hadn’t been attacked by the Viets, our people might have
remained (perhaps until the end of time) slaves of the cruel and inhuman Angkar and no
power would have been able to liberate them” [emphasis original] (quoted in Oats, 1994,
p. 79). On the one hand, the regime’s military defeat ended its genocidal campaigns and
prevented Cambodia from being wiped out from the world map, which is a positive thing.
On the other hand, this defeat reflects the regime’s military miscalculations and flawed
political strategies.
Before the regime’s military defeat and ultimate demise, however, despite its tight
power grip, there had already been military incidents, sabotages, and uprisings, most of
which were organized by moderate leading CPK cadres who were disenchanted with and
disapproved of the Angkar’s radical policies and purge. All these events contributed to
Vietnam’s eventual military intervention that ended the regime. The first notable violent
incident occurred on February 25, 1976 when the capital of Siem Reap province suffered
a ground explosion in the morning and an air raid six hours later (Kiernan, 2008). Fifteen
people were killed and thirty injured, according to DK, or there were “about 100 deaths,
including 30 soldiers,” according to a DK defector (Kiernan, 2008, p. 316). According to
Kiernan, no real culprit has not been found; but at least “four possible culprits have been
identified” (p. 316)– the US, Thailand, Vietnam, and CKP Center itself. On 2 April 1976,
there were hand-grenade explosions behind the Royal Palace, in Phnom Penh, but
without casualty. Two possible motives have been identified: killing Sihanouk, who was
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then DK head of state at the palace, or Pol Pot. In 1977, in Chikreng district of the same
province of Siem Reap, there was a revolt by “200 to 300 inhabitants armed … with
machetes, spears, pitchforks and knives” (eyewitness Thach Keo Dara, quoted in
Kiernan, 2008, p. 341), killing a prison commandant and dam site supervisors. The day
after, a “crowd of eight hundred” brutally murdered two other CPK officials; “[t]heir
livers were cut out and their bodies ‘chopped into a thousand pieces’” (p. 341). The next
day two village chiefs were killed. In retaliation, KD troops massacred a large number of
residents of this district; the whole population of Kouk Thlok, a commune of Chikreng,
“was assembled, …, then tied up. Their throats were then cut by soldiers, who let the
bodies rot for three days” (Thach Keo Dara, in Kiernan, 2008, p. 343).
DK’s war with neighboring countries, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam started in
January 1977, when DK troops raided a Thai village killing more than thirty people
(Kiernan, 2009, p. 357). Cambodia’s clash with Laos started at around the same time. But
the most intensive raids by DK were conducted along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, pp. 357-358) stated “The
situation gravely deteriorated from March 1977 onwards. According to an official
Vietnamese document published on 6th January 1978, the Cambodian forces made raids
into the Vietnamese provinces of Kien Giang and An Giang on March 15-18 and 25-28
1977… Strong Cambodian forces launched concerted attacks on Vietnamese army posts
and border villages … killing 222 civilians…” DK troops attacked Vietnam’s Tay Ninh
province along the border killing “nearly three hundred civilians in five villages”
(Kiernan, 2008, p. 3737). In the same month of the Tay Ninh massacre, Vietnam
launched the first major retaliatory offensive. “After driving armored columns up to
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fifteen miles into the bordering Cambodian province of Svay Rieng, the Vietnamese
feigned retreat. As a battalion of Khmer Rouge infantry entered Vietnamese territory in
hot pursuit, another waiting Vietnamese column swung from the side and caught several
hundred[s] of them in a mouse trap. However, the losses suffered by the Khmer Rouge did
not seem to stop them one bit” [author emphasis] (Chanda, 1988, p. 196). The main
reasons for DK’s attacks against neighboring countries, Vietnam in particular, were their
(ultra)nationalism and irredentism, on which will be elaborated in the next chapter.
During the Pol Pot regime, there was almost no crime other than the crimes
committed by the regime itself against its own people, which is aptly called “regime or
terror” or “reign of terror” by Johnson (1982, p. 168) and Kiernan (2008, p. ix). As one of
the most feared-and brutal regimes the world has ever had, the Pol Pot regime was replete
with atrocities and violence. A “staggering” level of violence existed in the regime
(Margolin, 2000, p. 610). The period is called a nightmare or “hell on earth” by Sichan
Siv (2008) and Cascio (1998), for instance. Accounts by survivors and journalists abound
regarding its atrocities. Written or published accounts represent only a tiny minority of
the actual number and scale of the regime’s atrocities and the consequent pains and
sufferings. The remaining majority of the accounts are either oral or never told because
oral communication is preferred by a majority of Cambodians and at least 1.7 millions of
Cambodia’s then-population of 7 millions did not live to tell the tales. Sichan Siv, a
former US Ambassador to the UN and a Cambodian American who survived the Khmer
Rouge killing fields, in his memoir, wrote “Life was indescribably cheap under the
Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot” (Siv, 2008, p. 130). “The world’s most brutal tyranny under
Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge goons had enslaved an entire populace and violated every
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standard of human dignity: slave labor was the only means of production, backward
agrarian output was the only support of the economy, and death the only correctional
remedy for mistakes,” he also wrote (p. 163). In a similar vein, Chandler wrote that “… it
became clear that execution had been the normal punishment for most crimes in much of
the country” (1991, p. 242).
The Khmer Rouge’s atrocities had started before they overthrew the Lon Nol
regime, but their atrocities grew in amount and intensity after their victory. On April 17,
1975, when the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh and declared their final victory, high
hopes of peace and joy were in the air. But once they ordered a forced evacuation of
around “two million” people in Phnom Penh and hundreds of thousand others in other
cities and towns into the countryside (Dy Khamboly, p. 14), these positive feelings
started to evaporate. Within only a week, the capital and the cities were nearly completely
empty of people; Phnom Penh ended up with “only about 40,000 inhabitants” who were
“administrative officers, soldiers, and factory workers” thus becoming a “ghost city” (Dy
Khamboly, p. 17). The Khmer Rouge’s justifications for the evacuation varied:
America’s supposedly imminent bombing of Phnom Penh, which never took place; a lack
of means to deliver food to the cities, which was raised by Ieng Sary, DK’s foreign
minister; destruction of an “enemy spy organization,” claimed by Pol Pot himself during
his visit to China about five months after the evacuation (Dy, p. 16); and the prevention
of epidemics (Chandler, 1991b). On the contrary, “[m]ost historians agree that the Khmer
Rouge were determined to turn the country into a nation of peasants and workers in
which corruption, feudalism, and capitalism could be completely uprooted. They felt that
cities were evil and that only peasants in the countryside were pure enough for their
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revolution” (Dy Khamboly, p. 16). It was the Khmer Rouge’s “calculated, political
decision” to evacuate the cities (Chandler, 1991b, p. 247).
Rightly and aptly called “Cambodia Year Zero” by Ponchaud (1978) in his
English edition book by the same title translated from his 1977 French edition book,
DK’s Cambodia came virtually very close to annihilation. A French Catholic priest who
had lived in Cambodia for some ten years before he was forced by the Khmer Rouge to
leave Cambodia in 1975, a proficient Khmer user, and one of the few foreigners who
testified at the ECCC in April 2013, Ponchaud was one of the first authors to report on
DK’s destructive policies and actions that have been confirmed by most other authors.
Asked in an interview by The Phnom Penh Post (2013) if the ECCC is “sufficient to
render justice to the victims” of the Pol Pot regime, he said, “What the Khmer Rouge did
is odious, monstrous, inexcusable. But I deny the international community the right to
judge the heads of the Khmer Rouge, which it supported from 1975 to 1991” (“Year zero
author on justice,” 2013).
Democratic Kampuchea adopted and implemented a wrong economic approach.
They transformed Cambodia into a country of economic dependence or selfreliance/sufficiency at the time Cambodia did not possess the means and resources to
become a country of this sort. “The new leaders are convinced that economic
independence is the only way for the country to attain the desired independencesovereignty” according to Ponchaud (1978, pp. 73-74). DK’s independence was based on
agriculture, mainly rice production and other crops like bananas, soya, sweet potatoes,
sugarcane, sesame, sweet corn, etc. (Ponchaud, p. 79), and an irrigation system, like
dams, dikes, canals. Based on Communist philosophy, DK’s economy revolved around
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cooperatives, state farms, and communal works. Private possessions, particularly land,
were abolished. Cambodia became a “gigantic prison farm” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 239),
one “vast concentration camp” (Pin Yathay & Man, 2000, p. xix), or “gigantic workshop”
(Shawcross, 1976, quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 164) of “indentured agrarian labor,” where
people “of all races and classes” were overworked, unpaid, deprived of leisure, and
“subjected to military discipline” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 164). “Cambodia would grow its
own food” because DK neither sought nor accepted humanitarian aid (Chandler, 1991b,
p. 249). It refused to “import medicine and pesticides, including DDT” (p. 249).
DK inherited a “totally devastated” economy from the Lon Nol regime
(Ponchaud, 1978, p. 85) and Cambodia had a small land area and population and
“relatively poor soil, and no mineral or industrial wealth” (p. 86). Or at least, most mines
in Cambodia then were not discovered or DK was unable to tap them. Ponchaud’s
statement below aptly portrays the state of the Cambodian economy during the two
successive regimes:
In proportion to its size, [the Cambodian economy] was more badly damaged than
any other country in Southeast Asia: in 1970 the South Vietnamese were so
determined to drive out the Vietcong and North Vietnamese that they
unhesitatingly demolished a large part of the economic structure of the
Cambodian territory. When it came the turn of the Americans, their flying
fortresses heavily bombed the rubber plantations, last vestiges of the French
colonial interests. The [Khmer Republic’s] soldiers were ill trained and
oversupplied with ammunition, and, following their instructors’ example, buried
their own country under their bombs and shells. And the Khmer Rouge, with the
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zeal of the neophyte and their hard, pure flame, razed everything in their path that
could in any way be connected with the West. The rage to destroy, on both sides,
left an exhausted, bloodless country. (Ponchaud, 1978, p. 85)
DK’s flawed economic policy and “massive military buildup” (Kiernan, 2008, p.
163) had numerous devastating consequences, including malnutrition, starvation, famine,
sicknesses, and deaths, which will be treated in greater detail in the subsequent chapters.
DK’s institutions were flawed. Contrary to its name, Democratic Kampuchea was
not democratic even in its most basic sense. It “was not democratic at all. It was
genocidal,” Prince Ranariddh said (quoted Mehta, 2001, p. 66). Although he “liked” the
word democracy (Short, 2004, p. 332), “Pol Pot was against democracy,” Ieng Sary, his
deputy and foreign minister, told Kamm (1998, p. 139). According to its constitution,
which was Cambodia’s third, the government was divided into the so-called Cambodian
People’s Representative Assembly (CPRA), a State Presidium above it, and a body of
judges (there was no mention of courts of law). The Assembly was comprised of 250
elected members: 150 representatives of the peasants, 50 representatives of the workers,
and 50 representatives of the revolutionary army. Although the Assembly elections were
held in March 1976, the text did not mention nor is it known how these representatives
were supposed to be elected or “who could vote for them” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 262).
According to DK’s Phnom Penh radio, 515 candidates had been proposed by the only
party, the CPK, for the Assembly’s 250 seats. Pol Pot was a candidate for a representative
of the rubber workers. No candidate engaged in electioneering. Only “base people” were
allowed to vote; they were people who had lived at the same localities before and after
the Khmer Rouge came to power. “New people” were those who had been deported from
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the capital and cities. The Assembly held only one session for three days in April 1976 to
form the DK government with Pol Pot as Prime Minister, Ieng Sary as Deputy Prime
Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs, Son Sen as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of
National Defense, Vorn Veth as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Economy and
Finance and Hu Nim as Minister for Information. The assembly election was a “charade”
(Short, p. 344), “nothing but a ‘shameful farce’” (Stuart-Fox & Ung, 1998, p. 70), or was
merely a façade that “obscured the central roles of [Pol Pot] and his colleagues in the
CPK in governing the country”; “Pol Pot perceived no substantive role for the assembly”
(Chandler, 1991b, p. 263). Even Prince Sihanouk, who was DK’s nominal chief of state
from September 1975 to April 1976, considered the election a “joke” because Pol Pot had
handpicked every candidate (Hamburg, 1985, quoted in Chandler, 1991b, p. 370). As Pol
Pot said, “This isn’t a capitalist election; we apply proletariat class dictatorship” (quoted
in Short, p. 344). After it approved the DK government, the Assembly “dissolved sine
die” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 111). According to a party document, CPK acquired state
power “not through elections or documents but ‘by our violence’” (p. 264). The
Assembly was to select the State Presidium, with Khieu Samphan as its President, as well
as the judges. No evidence exists that “any judges held office in DK or that there was a
legal system in Cambodia” during the DK period (Chandler, 1991b, p. 262).
The DK regime lost legitimacy because it had come to power by military and
violent means and exercised its authority by coercive means, because there was only one
political party, because it had only two branches of government and there was apparently
no system of checks and balances between them, and because its elections were not free,
fair, or just. In short, a strong case can be made that Cambodia under Pol Pot had no rule
87

of law, in the widely accepted sense of the term; rather, it had rule by man, as Douc Rasy
(1993, p. 304) stated “Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge introduced the law of the jungle,” the same
phrase he had used to describe FANK’s action of closing down a student journal in 1973.
The Pol Pot regime discarded “the Western-influenced models of administration” in part
because of the colossal crisis that Cambodia experienced during the Lon Nol regime
(Osborne, 2010, p. 276).
Despite Nuon Chea’s assertion that “our revolution is clean” (Searching for the
Truth, 2001, p. 7), corruption actually existed in DK, albeit much less prevalent,
particularly in a material/financial sense, than in the Republic. “[The Khmer Rouge]
claimed to oppose the venality of Lon Nol’s people, like those officers who did not
update the list of dead and deserters in order to steal their wages. Yet, as I saw in Veal
Vong, they did precisely the same. Instead of being repressed, corruption and
individualistic leanings were encouraged. Each leader was his own God” (Yathay, p.
172).
This statement by Pin Yathay aptly recapitulates the Khmer Rouge’s
revolutionary regime: “The Revolution was a paradox –one mass of people exploited by
another, for ever, both trapped by the system. Ends justified means. Ideals legitimized
any crime. Absolute power had corrupted absolutely. Repression was the only possible
policy, economic collapse the logical consequence, revolt the only answer” (Pin Yathay
& Man, 2000, p. 172).
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Lon Nol’s promise and performance
In his live address to the nation at the National Olympic Stadium less than a
month after the overthrow of Sihanouk, Lon Nol made the following promise of a
“colorful utopia” (Soonthornpoct, p. 168):
Liberty, which we just found again, is for the good of al [sic] Khmers. We shall
use this Liberty to re-organize our economy, our society, and our culture, to make
[Cambodia] a country where he [sic] exploitation of one man by another, or the
enslaving of the poor by the rich does not exist, and where each citizen actively
participates in the economic, political, and cultural life in brotherhood and mutual
cooperation according to the hopes of our people. (Soonthornpoct, p. 168)
A majority of Cambodians, especially intellectuals and youth, thought March 18,
1970 –on which Prince Sihanouk was deposed–would perhaps herald a new era of
freedom. But for five full years, nothing was seen besides perpetual jockeying for power
and dishonest accumulation of wealth, which has resulted in great distaste for the Khmer
Republic among Republican fighters (Chantrabot, 1978).
Pol Pot’s promise and performance
Opening a new cabinet meeting in Phnom Penh on April 22, 1976, Pol Pot said
“We take full responsibility for the rights and wrongs, the good and bad, the gains and
losses, inside and outside the country, for friends and enemies.” One of the tasks of the
new government was “to push people to be happy” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 328). But, as the
following pages show, it was suffering not happiness that Pol Pot’s government actually
brought about.
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Factors for mediocre/failed leadership
The survey respondents who considered Lon Nol and Pol Pot to be mediocre or
failed leaders were asked to rate from 1 to 10 three factors for the leaders’
mediocre/failed leadership: foreign intervention/interference, domestic circumstances,
and personal factors (see Table 4.2). For Lon Nol, the respondents rated foreign
intervention/interference as the most important factor (with a score of 7.2), domestic
circumstances as the second most important factor (with a score of 6.58), and personal
factors as the least important factor (with a score of 5.85). In stark contrast, for Pol Pot,
the respondents rated personal factors as the most important (with a score of 7.65) and the
other two factors similarly (6.32 for domestic circumstances and 6.19 for foreign
intervention/interference).
16.

Factors for Mediocre/Failed Leadership
Factor

Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

Foreign intervention/
interference

340

340

7.2

6.19

2.792

3.3

Domestic circumstances

331

343

6.59

6.32

2.823

3.4

Personal factor

286

345

5.86

7.65

2.654

3

Note: The direction of each arrow indicates a leader’s higher score relative to the other
leader’s.
Because the remainder of this dissertation addresses the personal competences,
styles, skills and traits of the two leaders, this section only gives a brief treatment of the
personal factor for their mediocre/failed leadership and somewhat more extensive
treatment of the other two factors. It would perhaps be helpful to start this section with a
statement made by Prince Sihanouk in 1979 about Cambodia’s leaders that “The humble
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people of Cambodia are the most wonderful in the world. Their great misfortune is that
they always have terrible leaders who make them suffer. I am not sure that I was much
better myself, but perhaps I was the least bad” (in Shawcross, 1986, p. 392). Similarly,
Soonthornpoct (2005), a military officer under the Khmer Republic and a Khmer Rouge
survivor, argued that there were two principal “catalysts” that rendered possible the other
causes for the collapse of Cambodia: “Cambodia’s hatred and fear of the Vietnamese that
had its roots established centuries ago, and the weakness in the characters of the
Cambodian rulers...” [emphasis added] (p. xv). “A person’s character determines his or
her own destiny,” according to the Greek philosopher Democrite (quoted in Vandy
Kaonn, 2012a, p. 13). It follows that “if that person is a dictatorial leader, the entire
nation becomes victims” wrote Vandy Kaonn (2012a, p. 13), a famed Cambodian
sociologist in his earlier 70s who survived the Pol Pot regime by feigning to be mad
(Short, 2005). Short (2004) contended that “local actors” played the main roles in the
“Cambodian nightmare” if foreign powers are partly responsible for it and that “Pol Pot
was the supreme architect of his country’s desolation” (Short, 2004, p. 448).
Still, Nate Thayer, a former Far Eeastern Economic Review correspondent who
interviewed Pol Pot before the latter’s death and the author of the unpublished Sympathy
for the Devil: A Journalist Memoir from Inside Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, even went so far
as to lay all the blame for the suffering of their people on the Cambodian leaders before
and since Pol Pot. In a Facebook post of his, while stating that “Henry Kissinger is a war
criminal,” Thayer wrote:
The mass murder that killed more than a quarter of the Cambodian population in
the past generation was not the result of the loathsome actions of Henry Kissinger.
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It was Pol Pot, and the Cambodian political culture which abetted, supported, and
fought alongside him, before and since Pol Pot did what he did during his 3 years,
8 months, and 20 days in power, that are responsible for the unspeakable suffering
that has rained on the country for 45 years. (Thayer, 2016)
Cambodia has had great leaders, including ancient kings like Suryavarman II,
who built the magnificent Angkor Wat temple and Jayavarman VII, who built the Angkor
Thom temple complex and who effectively practiced the Four Brahma Viharas (the Four
Buddhist Virtues), compassion especially, in his leadership and life. During the reigns of
these and other fine Khmer kings, ancient Cambodia (the Khmer Empire) reached its
zenith and lasted more than 400 years. However, there is certainly truth to the remark by
the late King Sihanouk, who was by and large considered a good leader. He was “the
most important and enduring figure in 20th century Cambodian politics” (Corfield &
Summers, 2003, p. 294) and was “the most revered figure in Cambodia” (Dean, 2009, p.
93). Well before his death in October, 2012 he had been conferred with the honorific “the
Great Heroic King” by the Royal Government of Cambodia and is called by a majority of
Cambodians “the Father of Independence and National Reconciliation.” He was perhaps
the only monarch in world history to have become king in 1941, abdicated as king in
1955 to become a prime minister and then a head of state in 1960 (e.g. Kamm, 1998),
deposed as head of state by Lon Nol and his co-conspirators in 1970, installed as
“nominal head of state” (Corfield & Summers, 2003, p. 297) of DK in 1975 for less than
a year, reinstated as Cambodia’s King in 1993, and finally retired or abdicated in favor of
his youngest son in 2004. It is undeniable that Cambodia often has bad (if not terrible)
leaders, including Lon Nol and Pol Pot, as will be shown in the subsequent sections.
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Personal factor
Lon Nol’s personal factor
Although personal factor is the least important factor for Lon Nol’s failed
leadership, according to the respondents, its score of 5.85 is somewhat high and thus
cannot be dismissed as insignificant, particularly in Cambodia where the standard passing
(or average) score is 5 out of 10. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence that indicates that
Lon Nol’s personal factor played an important role in his failed leadership despite the
presence of the other two factors. Henry Kamm–a Pulitzer Prize winning Southeast Asia
correspondent of the New York Times who had, in his own words, “unparalleled access”
to Cambodia’s leaders, including Lon Nol, his brother Lon Non, his lieutenant Sisowath
Sirik Matak, Norodom Sihanouk, and Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s direct subordinate from 1970
until at least 1998–proposed two “principal causes” of the regime’s “brief and disastrous
life and tragic end” –(1) “the unfathomable mélange of mysticism and dictatorial
nonleadership of Lon Nol, combined with the relentlessly ambitious and divisive
machinations of Lon Non” and (2) “America’s cruel exploitation of Cambodia’s
uncomprehending, blind confidence that the United States would protect it and never let
it down” (Kamm, 1998, p. 93). Corfield (1994) wrote that “Lon Nol … controlled
political events in the country, first as Prime Minister then as President” (p. ix) and that
“Lon Nol and the people and families who were responsible for him being there, thus
became the central figures in the story of how and why the Khmer Republic failed” (p.
xiv).
According to Corfield (1994), “many” people, including Douc Rasy, a prominent
Republican Cambodian politician, attributed the Khmer Republic’s failure to the
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“incompetence of the [Lon Nol] Government” (p. x). Similarly, Abdul Gaffar PeangMeth, a prominent Muslim Cambodian political scientist, wrote:
It has been the consensus of many foreign observers that the troops of
Cambodia’s Republican armed forces were excellent soldiers who fought well,
aggressively and tenaciously. The military deterioration has been said to have
been caused by poor, incompetent, and dishonest leadership. (Quoted in Corfield,
1994, p. x)
This view is echoed by Osborne (1994), who stated that the Communist
insurgents did not defeat the Lon Nol regime sooner because of the “raw courage” of the
regime’s many units and its troops’ readiness to fight under extremely harsh conditions in
spite of Phnom Penh’s characteristically corrupt and weak leadership. More specifically,
Leslie Fielding, the British Ambassador to Cambodia from 1964 to 1966 who met and
knows Prince Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and other prominent Cambodian
politicians on many occasions, wrote in his memoir that “General Lon Nol failed
politically; he was defeated militarily” (Fielding, 2008, p. 226).
Interestingly enough, Lon Nol himself placed the blame on politicians, according
to Chhang Song. “[The Marshal] reminded us time and time again that the Republic did
not lose the war because of the faults of the troops. To blame were politicians who
constantly scrambled in ‘a game of democracy’ for personal power without any regard to
the national interests,” Chhang Song wrote (1997, p. 55). It seems likely that Lon Nol
pointed finger to the other politicians not himself or at least placed more blame on them.
He seems to have implied that had he not shared some power with those other politicians
he would have handled the war more effectively and eventually won it. This is reflected
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in the assertion of his eldest son, Lon Rith, that Lon Nol devised a sound and elaborate
plan for the war, but it did not go as he had intended “because certain people who didn’t
understand enough, who saw a way out and made the country what it is” (quoted in
Lodish & Eang Mengleng, 2008).
Pol Pot’s personal factor
According to the respondents, Pol Pot’s personal factor was the number one
culprit for his failure, and eventual political and physical demise. This finding challenges
(if not contradicts) the belief of Michael Vickery–considered a “leftist scholar” by Nate
Thayer (2011) and one of the first authors on Democratic Kampuchea and the first few
years of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea–that “personalities” are not “very
important in explaining the DK phenomenon” (1999, p. 163). The first reason for his
belief was the shortage of personal detail, which was likely true when he wrote the
book’s main text in 1984–which he did not change in the 1999 edition. The second reason
was that no DK leader was an “evil person” in the mind of “prewar contemporaries.” To
“those who knew him,” Pol Pot was “soft-spoken, courteous, friendly, and kind,” Vickery
wrote (p. 1963).
The fact that Pol Pot is called in Khmer by most Khmer Rouge survivors,
including his biological nephews and nieces (Mydans, 1997), “A-Pot” –which means the
“contemptible Pot” (Chandler, 1991a)–and the Democratic Kampuchea period as “samai
a-Pot (‘the era of the contemptible Pot’)” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 113) speaks volumes
about his leadership quality. Although the prefix A- is often used by parents to address
their children, fans to address their stars/idols, or among friends in a friendly or
affectionate way, the term reflects great disdain or insult when used to address their
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leaders by Cambodian citizens who usually have deference to their leaders. It is a
“pejorative” prefix; so, “A- Pol Pot” means “the loathsome Pol Pot” (Ebihara &
Ledgerwood, 2002, p. 286) or even the “despicable Pol Pot” (Mydans, 1997 and
Schanberg, 2010, Loc 3902). Even one of his brothers, Saloth Nhep, blamed Pol Pot for
the suffering of the Cambodian people. “My brother does not deserve to live. If he is
captured, then every Cambodian should be given a razor blade and allowed to make one
cut,” Saloth Nhep told Jon Swain (quoted in Schanberg, 2010, Loc 3902). It is the
statement “[o]ne is tempted to agree with” (Marlay & Neiher, 1999, p. 196). “I have cut
off that piece of my flesh,” said Saloth Seng, another brother of Pol Pot’s; “I am not
happy that I share even a drop of his blood,” said his older sister, Saloth Roeung (quoted
in Mydans, 1997).
As an actual power wielder, he had a very rare opportunity to do the right things
for Cambodia after his clique and allies’ victory over Lon Nol’s regime in April 17, 1975.
Not only did he fail to improve Cambodia and the quality of life of its people, but he also
made them far worse. Many people’s euphoria during the first few hours of that day
turned into indescribable torment. He eventually plunged his homeland into an abyss.
While acknowledging the role of external factors in the “horrors” that befell Cambodia
during the Pol Pot regime, including, “the American bombing of Cambodian villages in
the early 1970s,” Maoism, and Stalinism, Short (2005, p. 13) contends that “The
individual, whatever the context, has a personal responsibility. Evil, at this level, consists
in deliberately ignoring what one knows to be right. The weaker the moral code, the
easier evil becomes to commit.” And that individual was Pol Pot, the “supreme architect”
of Cambodia’s “desolation” (p. 448). In comparing Pol Pot and Mao Zedong of China,
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Margolin (2000) wrote “The Cambodian tyrant was incontestably mediocre and a pale
copy of the imaginative and cultivated Beijing autocrat who with no outside help
established a regime that continues to thrive in the world’s most populous country”
[emphasis added] (p. 577). Perhaps most important of all, according to Chandler (1999a),
the pointless and painful deaths of one in seven Cambodians were the consequences of
Pol Pot’s “inhuman policies and his unswerving love of power” (p. 188).
Foreign intervention/interference
Lon Nol
The Khmer Republic was sandwiched between three somewhat more powerful
neighboring countries: Thailand, a pro-western country; South Vietnam, a US-backed and
pro-Western country; and North Vietnam, a pro-Soviet communist/socialist country. The
Republic sought to become an ally of the first two countries while striving to prevent
Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops from using Cambodia’s territory to
fight American troops. Given this geopolitical location, “Cambodia had become a pawn
in much bigger conflict” (Cascio, 1998). That conflict was the Vietnam War, which had
originally been fought on the Vietnamese soil but later spilled into the Cambodian soil.
And caught in the East-West tug-of-war, Cambodia became “a ‘sideshow’, used and
misused to suit the larger agendas of the Cold War protagonists” (Corfield, 1994, p. xi).
The term “sideshow” was frequently used to refer to Cambodia during the early 1970s,
according to Shawcross (1986), who titled a book of his “Sideshow.” Powell, a political
biographer of Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright–who was very critical of the
Vietnam War–wrote:
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Nixon and Kissinger had always regarded Cambodia as a sideshow to the more
important issue of who would wield power in Vietnam, and they had previously
realized that if Sihanouk had returned to power in Phnom Penh in the period
before 1973, that would have endangered Thieu’s regime in Saigon. Had
Sihanouk … remained in power, many analysts of Cambodian affairs have
concluded that Pol Pot might never have come to power. Both the White House
and North Vietnam share responsibility for having militarized the conflict in
Cambodia and drawn that small country into the vortex of the war in South
Vietnam. … In retrospect, it would have been wiser had the United States never
intervened militarily in support of the weak pro-American faction of Lon Nol.
[emphasis added] (Powell, 1996, p. 365).
Even more poignant is the comment by Fulbright himself in May 1970 on the April 1970
invasion of Cambodia by American and South Vietnamese troops, which Nixon said
aimed to eliminate the “Vietcong sanctuaries.” He said “The administration now
apparently intends to sustain an indefinite full-scale military intervention by proxy in
Cambodia… It is equally clear that the purpose of this proxy military campaign is not
merely to eliminate communist border sanctuaries… but to sustain the feeble Lon Nol
military regime in Phnom Penh” [emphasis original] (quoted in Jeldres, 2005, p. 161).
The US’s effort to prevent the regime from collapsing, according to Chomsky (2005),
may have contributed to its ultimate fall. “It is ironic that the American intervention,
which was presumably undertaken, in part at least, in an effort to prop up the Lon Nol
regime, may have administered the coup de grace to the Lon Nol government,” Chomsky
wrote (2005, pp. 130-131).
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In the words of Sihanouk, “[w]ith Lon Nol and the armed intervention of the
foreign powers that support him, my homeland and my people have lost everything –
peace, dignity, independence, territorial integrity – and are immersed in the worst
sufferings, the worst misfortunes and the worst catastrophe of their history” (quoted in
Jeldres, 2005, p. 169). In an interview with Shawcross in New York, Sihanouk did not
blame any foreign country for “the state” of Cambodia. Instead, he blamed two men:
Nixon and Kissinger. He said “There are only two men responsible for the tragedy in
Cambodia today, Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. Lon Nol was nothing without them and
the Khmer Rouge was nothing without Lon Nol. Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger gave the
Khmer Rouge involuntary aid because the people had to support the Communist patriots
against Lon Nol. By expanding the [Vietnam War] into Cambodia, …, [t]hey
demoralized America, …, and they created the Khmer Rouge” (quoted in
Shawcross,1986, p. 391). Cambodia “became a lightly regarded pawn” whose
“interests… did not seriously enter into the Nixon-Kissinger strategy” (Kamm, 1998, p.
101). During his testimony before Congress in 1975 after his visit to Cambodia, former
Republican Representative Paul McCloskey, who had run unsuccessfully against Richard
Nixon for the Republican presidential nomination in 1972, made this dramatic statement:
I can only tell you my emotional reaction, getting into that country. If I could
have found the military or State Department leader who has been the architect of
this policy, my instinct would be to string him up. … What they have done to the
country is greater evil than we have done to any country in the world. (quoted in
Lewis, 1975)
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There is consensus among diplomats and historians that the US’s invasion of Cambodia
that involved mainly dropping of 2,756,941 tons of bombs on 113,716 sites in Cambodia
between 1965 and 1973 (Owen & Kiernan, 2006) with the aim to drive out alleged NVA
troops inside Cambodia’s border and to destroy fledgling Khmer Rouge forces “had little
impact” on the Vietnam War. Instead, it had horrendous consequences for Cambodia
such as the strengthening and rise of the Khmer Rouge and its eventual victory in 1979
(Clymer, 2007, p. 96) or at least heightened the morale of the surviving Khmer Rouge
forces to fight on (Chandler, 2008). Commenting on that invasion, Richard Holbrooke,
the late U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, said “Nixon announced that he would go to
Cambodia to do what he called dealing with the heart of the matter. This was a fateful
decision because it led to the destabilization of this pathetic regime headed by Lon Nol.
Lon Nol got sucked into a war in Cambodia. That war led to the rise of Pol Pot” (Cascio,
1998). “When the [Vietnam] War spread to Cambodia, it just seemed insane to me.
Cambodia’s neutrality, which Nixon and Kissinger had been uncomfortable with, was in
fact the best we could get from that pathetic sad little country,” he added. “Although it
was indigenous, Pol Pot’s revolution would not have won power without U.S. economic
and military destabilization of Cambodia... This was probably the most important single
factor in Pol Pot’s rise,” argued the historian Kiernan (2008, p. 16). Likewise, Chandler
(1999a, p. 5) wrote, “Without the [Vietnam] war, Pol Pot’s coming to power… is
inconceivable.” Even Ambassador Dean believed that the external forces fighting inside
Cambodia were largely responsible for the problems in Cambodia. He wrote, “The
problems in Cambodian stemmed mostly from outside forces fighting each other inside
the country, dragging different factors into their battles. The result was chaos” (Dean,
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2009, p. 85). Perhaps most important of all was Lon Nol’s assertion that one of the
consequences of the invasion of Cambodia by American and South Vietnamese troops
that started in late April and ended in late June of 1970 was that “the enemy was
unfortunately forced deeper into Cambodia” (quoted in Clymer, 2004, p. 34).
All this contradicts Nixon’s and Kissinger’s belief that had there not been the
bombing halt imposed by the US Congress, which came into effect on August 15, 1973,
the Khmer Rouge would not have won the war against Lon Nol’s US-backed regime and
that the US bombing did not play a role in causing the rise of the Khmer Rouge. Nixon
told an aide that the US “had ‘lost’ Southeast Asia” because the US terminated the
bombing (Chandler, 2008, p. 252). Kissinger (2003) maintained that “Part of the new
Cambodian guilt-shifting myth is that American bombing was indiscriminate … and that
the “punishment” inflicted on the Khmer Rouge turned them from ordinary guerrillas into
genocidal maniacs driven by “Manichean fear.” The reality is otherwise” (p. 478).
Domestic circumstances
Lon Nol
Throughout the period between Lon Nol’s coup against Sihanouk in March 1970
and the Khmer Rouge’s victory in April 1975, Cambodia was at war not only with itself
but its two neighboring Vietnams. As discussed in the preceding chapters, the Vietnam
War and Cambodian war wrought social and economic havoc in Cambodia. The Lon Nol
regime confronted the Khmer Rouge forces, which were gaining strength almost daily.
Despite the drastic surge in its troops from around 30,000 to 120,000, the regime’s army
the FANK was no match for the mighty NVA and Khmer Rouge troops (Vandy Kaonn,
2012b). “Such a situation did not provide General Lon Nol with sufficient wherewithal to
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build a new leadership system easily,” wrote Vandy Kaonn (p. 279). Had there not been
such dramatic situations, the Khmer Republic would probably still stand today, Vandy
Kaonn contends, a view that was echoed by Interviewee #9. Furthermore, the same
interviewee contended that the Republic even might have thrived.
Two other contributing factors were Lon Nol’s government’s incompetence and
corruption. As Ambassador Dean wrote, “Even more than from [Lon Nol’s] personal
frailties, his government suffered from ineptitude and corruption. The corruption included
all the usual petty crimes of government –stealing war materials to sell on the black
market, providing special favors to friends and family, and the like. The logic of
corruption merged with the logic of fear” 2009, p. 95). “The Cambodian army was not
bad. … The problem was that everything around them was failing,” Dean added (p. 95).
Perhaps the most scathing indictment came from former Prime Minister In Tam: “The
Americans gave enough money, but we failed to help ourselves and the funds flowed into
the hands of the corrupt” (quoted in “Ex-preimer of Cambodia,” 1975).
Finally, the Republic was marred by political infighting or what Corfield terms
“unparalleled disunity within the political nation” (1994, p. ix), which will be dealt with
in detail in a later chapter.
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LEADERSHIP STYLES AND EFFECTIVENESS
According to Table 5.1 below, Lon Nol and Pol Pot had very different leadership
styles. More importantly, whereas Lon Nol was not thought to have utilized any
leadership style predominantly (with an equally 47.97% of the participants thinking Lon
Nol used the affiliative and democratic styles), Pol Pot was thought to have utilized three
leadership styles predominantly: coercive, authoritative, and pacesetting, in that order.
Ninety two percent, 78%, and nearly 62% of the participants thought Pol Pot had used the
coercive, authoritative, and pacesetting styles respectively.
Table 5.1

Leadership Styles
Lon Nol

Pol Pot

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

Coercive

80

20.3

363

92.1

Authoritative

133

33.76

309

78.4

Affiliative

189

47.97

63

16

Democratic

189

47.97

40

10.2

Pacesetting

76

19.29

247

62.7

Coaching

148

37.56

94

23.9
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Lon Nol as a coercive and authoritative leader
Other sources of data confirm Pol Pot’s all three dominant leadership styles but
refute Lon Nol’s somewhat dominant leadership styles, namely affiliative and
democratic. Those sources point out that Lon Nol’s leadership style was frequently
authoritative, and even coercive, albeit less so than Pol Pot’s. For example, Slocomb
(2006) contends that although Cambodia was transformed from a monarchy to a republic,
its leaders’ leadership style was not. “Once more, Cambodian leaders had chosen
strongman rule over the development of strong institutions. Ideology, in this case
republicanism, was merely window-dressing,” Slocomb wrote (p. 384). Perhaps more
significant and reliable is the following observation by U Sam Oeur, a US-educated
member of the Khmer Republic’s National Assembly who had direct contacts with Lon
Nol and also a Khmer Rouge survivor who returned to the US in 1992:
By the end of January 1973 [Lon Nol] actually took over everything, even down
to the level of commanding individual battalions. We had the trappings of
democracy –a president, a prime minister, a parliament with an upper and lower
house, and a judicial branch –but in actual fact we were living under a
dictatorship. As they say in human resource manuals today, it was a clear example
of “top-down” management. (U Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005, p. 168)
It is of paramount importance to address what Kamm called “Lon Nol’s way of living”
(p. 95), which largely shaped his leadership style as well as reflected, to a considerable
extent, his personality and character. Lon Non, who lived with his elder brother most of
his life, related to Kamm that despite being a wartime leader, Lon Nol’s way of living
and working, for that matter, changed little. And there was striking resemblance between
104

Lon Nol’s way of living and working and Richard Nixon’s, whom he considered a “close
personal friend, on whom he and Cambodia could count on in all its needs” (Kamm,
1998, p. 99) despite the fact that the two never met, during the Khmer Republic period or
after its collapse. Aloneness was one major similarity. Burns (2006), who contends that
the U.S. presidents from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush have tried “to govern
alone” and that this attempt contributed in large measure to their failure to lead (p. 4),
wrote of Nixon “Somehow, amid the intense and even frenzied interaction of scores of
West Wingers, the president of the United States remained a loner, seated in an Oval
Office as hushed and solemn as a hermitage” (p. 98). Lon Nol, having confined himself
to his fortress-like villa, “became inaccessible and boring” (Meyer, 1971, p. 308).
Nothing similar to the White House has ever existed in Cambodia. Instead, there
are a Presidential/Prime Ministerial Residenc and the Council of Ministers building,
where the offices of the Prime Minister (and the President mainly in the case of the
Khmer Republic), ministers, and some other cabinet members are located9. Lon Nol was
for the most part housebound and increasingly so after he had a stroke while having a
shower on the night of February 8, 1971 (Corfield, 1994 p. 110), which “left him partially
paralyzed and incapacitated” (Sak Sutsakhan, 1978, p. 72). He “usually worked at home”
(Corfield, 1994, p. 41) or “governed, inasmuch as he did, mainly from his [own] villa” at
the outskirts of Phnom Penh (Kamm, 1998, p. 53), where he kept a brief diary to record
his thoughts and more importantly his “massive” files of “rivals, potential rivals, friends,
and foes alike” (Corfield, 1994). At least by 1971, Lon Nol “had abandoned his office at

Each ministry has its own separate building or set of buildings where the main office of the minister is
located.

9
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the Council of Ministers and hid himself in his own villa, which had turned into a
fortress, surrounded by many generals and colonels” (Meyer, 1971, p. 308). The villa was
quite far from the Council of Ministers, considering the slow speed of various means of
transport and communication in the 1970s. These files, which had been compiled since
the 1940s, “outlined financial transactions, personal transgressions, political activity, and
known contacts of thousands of individuals” and “would be used by him and his brother
to screen friends and possible supporters, or destroy rivals” (Corfield, 1994). Some of his
daily routines at home were as follows, according to Corfield (1994, p. 41): waking up at
5 am every morning; meditating for an hour or so; recording his thoughts in his diary;
having breakfast with Lon Non and other members of his family, including his nephew,
Prasith; continuing to work at home frequently consulting the files before committing
himself to any course of action. According to an ex-US diplomat, in meetings, Lon Nol
“seemed impassive –‘silent as a carp’ –seldom venturing an opinion but always conscious
of rivalries, and weaknesses that might be exploited later on” (cited in Chandler, 1991a,
p. 158). To Sihanouk’s French advisers, Lon Nol came across as a “rock-like figure”
(quoted in Short, 2004, p. 196). He would not make any decision until after his return to
his villa, where he consulted his dossiers (Corfield, 1994). This and other evidence below
proves that Lon Nol was an insular leader, although only about 20% of the survey
respondents selected “insular leadership” for him. Lon Nol was known to be “aloof”
Chandler (2007, p. 238) and “distant” (Becker, 1998a, p. 13).
In December 1970, Kamm titled his newspaper article “Lon Nol Reads No
Newspaper And Never Uses a Telephone.” In his 1998 book, he wrote that Lon Nol
“hardly ever used the telephone, received no regular briefings on the state of the world or
106

the region, and did not listen to the radio, watch, television, or read newspapers” (p. 95).
He made rare telephone calls and even did not answer any (Corfield, 1994). Much of
local and world news he received was reported to him over breakfast by his family
members, most frequently Lon Non and his nephew. His solitary way of life and his
timidity, which according to Kamm (1998, p. 95) he allowed “free reign” from 1970,
resulted in his total lack of “understanding of the real world” (Shawcross, p. 185) and
handicapped his leadership. In an interview at his Honolulu home in May 1976, Lon Nol
said, “I didn’t know that” when told that Kissinger supported détente with Communist
nations and relations among the superpowers, the notion he condemned (Leslie, 1976). A
contributing factor for the fall of the Republic and his own was his ignorance of the US’s
“dearest wish to find a modus vivendi permitting an ‘honorable’ retreat from Southeast
Asia” (Brissé, in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxviii). He did not know the workings of the U.S.
political system, particularly its Congress, and counted so heavily on U.S. aid (e.g.
Shawcross, 1986 and Sihanouk, 1980 & 2005) that he still believed the US would not
cease it even after the Congress-imposed deadline for aerial bombing for Cambodia had
already expired.
The antithesis of his former boss, Prince Sihanouk –who loved to make public
appearances across the country and to have an entourage of “his ministers as supporting
players” (Kamm, 1998, p. 95), Lon Nol as Cambodia’s top leader made rare public
appearances and even rarer public speeches. He would address the nation in recorded
messages only on the radio, which he did only under necessary circumstances. When he,
flanked by In Tam and Sirik Matak, declared the Khmer Republic in his capacity as its
first Prime Minister, he did not speak to the people (Kamm, 1998). He preferred to hold
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most of his meetings with his ministers and commanders at his home, which took place
sporadically. Some ministers rarely met their boss. There were limited exchanges of ideas
because he usually read written reports, mostly in French, that were delivered to his villa
and issued written orders. Similarly, of Nixon, Burns (2006) wrote “FIRE HIM!!!,’he
would scrawl when learning of some bureaucratic outrage. These written orders
minimized his exposure to subordinates outside the powerful threesome [H. R.
Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Henry Kissinger]” (p. 98). As commander-in-chief and
defense minister of the nation at war, Lon Nol paid very rare visits to his troops in the
field. His first such visit took place only after five months of war.
Lon Nol evolved from a “usually taciturn” (Brissé, in Sihanouk, 1980, xxiii), a
timid person, a “quiet, unassuming character” (Ayres, 2003, p. 74) who had been used to
taking instead of giving orders (Shawcross, 1986; Chandler, 1991b; and Ayres, 2003) or
“a man of reserve” who “was in the forefront of the background,” according to an
American (“Pragmatic Cambodian leader,” 1970), to a leader of a nation at war and in
constant crisis who relentlessly pursued and amassed power and dominated Cambodia’s
politics throughout the Khmer Republic period. This was despite the fact that he “was
reported to be a vague and unstructured individual” even before he had the stroke and
“observations by his close associates … [that] his mental faculties have deteriorated
markedly” as a consequence of it (National Security Study Memorandum 152, quoted in
Shawcross, 208, p. 208). The stroke was caused by pressure from calls for his removal
after the failure of Operation Chenla I and an attack on the Pochentong Air Base
(Corfield, 1994). On the whole day of the stroke, Lon Nol faced questions from
lawmakers at the National Assembly on the air base attack and national defense in
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general (Sak Sutsakhan, 1978). In an interview with Kamm after the stroke, Son Ngoc
Thanh told him that the diagnosis of the American and Cambodian doctors who had
treated him was unequivocal: “Lon Nol was too ill to make important decisions or to be
told bad news,” in Kamm’s words (p. 110).
On top of that, he had had a “serious car accident” in 1967, resulting in his
hospitalization for several months and his resignation as Prime Minister immediately
afterwards (Kerr, 1985); he was not reappointed Prime Minister until August 1969. Haing
Ngor10, a medical doctor and survivor of the Khmer Rouge regime who won the 1985
Academy Award for Best Supporting Actor in the famous film The Killing Fields about
ordeals under the Khmer Rouge, wrote in his memoir of Lon Nol’s health condition after
the stroke “When he walked, his right arm shook spastically and his right leg shot out
stiffly in a goose step. His speech was slurred, and those who watched him closely, like
my journalist friend Sam Kwil, believed his thinking was impaired too” (Ngor & Warner,
2003, pp. 66-67). What Emory Swank, the US Ambassador to Cambodia from 1970 to
1973, reported in cables aptly sums up Lon Nol’s state: “He is obviously still too much of
an invalid to face the enormous mental and emotional demands placed upon the prime
minister” [emphasis added] (quoted in Becker, 1998a, p. 131). “Everyone, including the
Americans, assumed he would hand over actual power to Sirik Matak and assume a
ceremonial role as chief of state” wrote Becker (1998a, p. 131). His stroke and the defeat

Sadly, Haing Ngor was killed in 1996, “while attempting to prevent a drug-dealing Los Angeles street
gang from stealing a locket which contained a photo of his wife” (quoted on the first front page of the
second edition of his memoir, Ngor & Warner, 2003).
10
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of Chenla I operation prompted calls for his resignation. Lon Nol proved everyone
wrong.
In light of all this, Lon Nol was called a dictator, authoritarian ruler, or a phrase to
that effect, by several respondents and interviewees and authors (e.g. Shawcross, 1986;
Corfield, 1994; Kamm, 1998; Chandler, 1991b & 2008; Kiernan, 2008) and his friends
and colleagues (e.g. Sirik Matak, In Tam, Cheng Heng). Chhang Song wrote that “Lon
Nol used to be known as a ‘strongman’ in Cambodia” (1997, p. 9). Lon Nol, whose
government could be reasonably called a junta, “used his military to enforce his rule”
(Ngor & Warner, 2003, p. 46), which made him a coercive leader. This contradicts what
Lon Rith, his eldest son and president of the small Khmer Republican Party, said in an
interview shortly before Cambodia’s 2008 National Assembly elections that “He [Lon
Nol] and our people struggled for rights as people to stop tyranny, abuse…” (Lodish &
Mengleng, 2008).
Here are several examples of statements that point out that he was such a leader.
First and foremost is the statement of Ambassador Swank, who described Cambodia as a
“curiosly [sic] leaderless society” in a declassified cable to Washington in August 1973
that “The absence of strong leaders among present-day Khmer is a striking phenomenon,
both in the Republic, where Lon Nol, although an invalid for two and a half years, is still
the most authoritative personality…” [emphasis added] (1973, p. 3). “One observer has
described Lon Nol as a man who would rather rule through consensus than coercion. If
so, whatever consensus the Marshal rode at the war’s start has largely evaporated” wrote
Baczynskyj (1972, p. 23). “In April 1974, Lon Nol presented himself as a big time
winner who had people at his disposal and who elected to rule the country like an
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absolute ‘monarch’ because the people around him chose to conduct themselves so well
in front of him as if he were a real monarch” (Chantrabot, p. 52). “He was a dictator
without being a leader…” (Kamm, 1998, p. 95). “Month by month the Marshal’s
behavior became more autocratic” and “Phnom Penh students … realized that Lon Nol
was far more corrupt and dictatorial than Sihanouk had ever been,” wrote Shawcross
(1986, p. 229). Also telling is what Corfield (1994) wrote “By 1972 Lon Nol [as Prime
Minister], still partially invalid and house-bound, decided to seize control of the
Republic. Previously he had ruled with some restraint, but his methods had become
increasingly dictatorial” [emphasis added] (p. 122). Finally and perhaps most
revealingly, just less than 10 days after the fall of the Republic, In Tam remarked,
“Above all, I blame President Lon Nol… Lon Nol knew he couldn’t do anything to help
the country, but he wanted to keep all the power to himself” (quoted in “Ex-premier of
Cambodia,” 1975). This was in stark contrast to In Tam’s assessment of Lon Nol in the
aftermath of the March 1970 coup: “For many years, I have secretly loved Lon Nol
because he was a very special Khmer leader” (quoted in Ieng Mouly, 2013, p. 137). And
the remainder of this section provides specific details to substantiate the case that Lon
Nol was a coercive or authoritative leader.
The executive branch even before the new constitution was promulgated,
especially Lon Nol himself, was overbearing. He “had no intention of allowing Cambodia
to become a democracy. It was becoming a Buddhist military state” (Becker, 1998a, p.
128). This is reflected in this statement of his: “… we have come to a very important time
that requires us to choose between two paths for the future of our motherland: (1)
continue the sterile game of liberal democracy which will certainly lead us to defeat or
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(2) reduce anarchic liberty to achieve victory. The government is determined to choose
the path that will bring us victory” (Chaktomouk, 1971, p. 4). This statement was part of
his radio address to the nation in October, 1971, in which he stressed the need for
“general mobilization,” which covered military draft. On the one hand, given the fact that
neither Lon Nol nor Sirik Matak knew much about democracy and both had even
“sabotaged democracy” during the Sangkum period (Vickery, 1982, p. 108) and that Lon
Nol believed in hierarchy11 (Chandler, 1991a), Lon Nol’s statement came as no surprise.
Not until 1946 were the first political parties formed and elections for the Consultative
Assembly held (Chandler, 2008). Besides, the term “consensus” does not have a Khmer
equivalent (Mabbett & Chandler, 1995, p. 258). It is a loanword in the Cambodian
vocabulary, which is used officially by ordinary Cambodians and leaders alike, including
Prime Minister Hun Sen. On the other hand, Lon Nol’s statement certainly took many by
surprise considering his grandiose promises of liberty and democracy when he
proclaimed the Khmer Republic, whose motto was “liberty, equality, fraternity, progress,
and happiness” (Chaktomouk, p. 3). The following section addresses two themes that are
not necessarily mutually exclusive: Lon Nol’s interference with the drafting of a new
constitution and his effort to remain Number One in power.
Lon Nol and drafting of a new constitution
After the proclamation of the Khmer Republic on October 9, 1970, the National
Assembly did not start drafting and debating a new constitution; instead, it concentrated

After Sihanouk’s deposition, Lon Nol had “prostrated himself at the Queen Mother’s feet.. to ask her
forgiveness” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 128).
11
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its efforts on how to liberalize the economy (Corfield, 1994) and assigned Ung Mung, its
Deputy-President, to draft a new constitution (Chantrabot, 1978). Because the National
Assembly made no “real” progress on the new constitution, a 231-member Constitutional
Drafting Committee was formed but scraped soon afterwards (Corfield, 1994, p. 113).
Lon Nol eventually transformed the National Assembly into a Constituent Assembly,
which was “powerless” according to Soonthornpoct (2005, p. 2010), exclusively charged
with drafting a new constitution (Corfield, 1994; Kamm, 1998) (but according to
Chantrabot (1978) and Chandler (1991b), it was Head of State Cheng Heng who turned
the two-chamber Parliament –which also included the Senate –into the Constituent
Assembly.) The pressure to come up with a constitution could not be greater now
(Corfield, 1994, p. 116). The new Assembly with In Tam as President held its first
meeting on November 8, 1971 and its members debated the draft constitution article by
article. By the end of January, 1972, the debates still continued.
Lon Nol was “exasperated” with this slow progress (p. 125) and the fact that a
number of his desires had been not complied with, most notably the “desire[s] to limit the
number of political parties to two: a Government party (his own) and a loyal opposition”
(p. 126); to grant “all the power to the President” (Soonthornpoct, 2005, p. 215); and to
incorporate his version of the origin of the Khmer race, the Khmer-Mon, in the preamble
of the draft constitution (Harben, 1972; Corfield, 1994 & Becker, 1998a). According to
Douc Rasy, Lon Nol was furious about the removal of the phrase “We, the Khmer
people, descendents of the Khmer-Mon...” from the first draft of the Constitution (quoted
in Harben, p. 3). This was despite the fact that one of Lon Nol’s grandparents was
Chinese, although his nickname “Black Papa” among the soldiers because of his dark
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complexion had “made [him] in the eyes of his men more Khmer” (p. 3). Had it not been
for Douc Rasy’s successful fight against the propositions, especially the first, they would
have made their way into the new constitution.
Incensed that the draft constitution had not been finalized, the Marshal returned to
Phnom Penh from his vacation to expedite the process and “demanded” that Cheng Heng
resign (Corfield, 1994, p. 129), which the latter did in a radio announcement on March
10, 1972. Three hours later, Lon Nol made the following announcement on the radio
dissolving the Constituent Assembly:
During the last two years the NVA/VC aggressors have invaded and barbarously
ravaged our country, but our fighting men have never hesitated to fight these
atheist [sic] “Thmils” …
Despite all this, certain groups who have strayed from the national
community have forgotten their first duty to the Nation and have unconsciously
assisted the subversive acts of our enemies… I have decided from this moment to
dissolve the Constituent Assembly, and I shall take urgent measures designed to
save the Khmer Republic, to bring about a return of peace to the Cambodian
people, and to lead the country toward prosperity and happiness like other
countries. (New Cambodge, 1972; quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 130)
On that evening, the Marshal accomplished two main objectives: becoming Head
of State and invalidating the incomplete draft constitution. In Tam, who by that time was
the President of the Constituent Assembly, remarked “Everything is gone, everything is
finished. Let Marshal Lon Nol try to make history by himself” (Peang Meth, 1972;
quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 130). Exclusive to the New York Times, Butterfield (1972)
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wrote “President Lon Nol has emerged from Cambodia’s latest political crisis with
virtually unchallenged power, diplomats here agree, having removed the last legal
opposition to him and, in the process, last semblance of democracy.”
After he appointed himself the Republic’s President as well as President of the Council of
Ministers three days later, Lon Nol was devoted to finalizing the draft Constitution by
entrusting Phuong Ton, the new Dean of Law Faculty, with the task of modifying the
Constitution “to Lon Nol’s desires” (Corfield, 1994, p. 139). “Under strict supervision,”
the Dean finalized the Constitution within ten days which was presented to the nation by
Long Boret, who would become the Prime Minister of three short-lived governments
from December 1973 till the fall of the Republic (p. 139). A slightly different version of
the story is that it was both Lon Nol and his underlings who drafted the constitution “to
his liking” (Whitney, C.R, 1972, p. 8). Still absent was the provision on the two-party
system; but this was to be preferred (Nokor Thom, 1972, cited in Corfield, p. 139). The
new Constitution to be approved on April 30, 1972 restructured the Lon Nol government
as a semi-presidential (or mixed) system by creating the brand-new positions of President
and Vice-President while retaining the position of Prime Minister, which became far less
powerful. Vice-President was an unelected position and to be appointed by the President.
Moreover, the Constitution, which was “modeled on those of France and South
Vietnam,” granted “the executive branch overwhelming powers” (Shawcross, 1986, p.
230) and, more importantly, the President (Lon Nol) “augmented powers” (Chandler,
1991b, p. 221). This was diametrically opposed to the previous 1947 constitution, which
gave more powers to the Legislature (e.g. Corfield, 1994; Chandler, 1991a & b and
2008). Prominent figures were critical of the new Constitution, especially before it was
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promulgated. Douc Rasy, a lawmaker with a law doctorate, argued that it gave too much
power to the office of the President. So did In Tam, who commented that “the executive
power is almost exclusively in the hands of the President of the Republic alone.
Therefore neither in peacetime nor wartime is there a harmonious division of power or
any efficiency” and that “the monarchists would doubtless shout dictatorship” (Corfield,
1994, p. 139).
Lon Nol told Swank that the new Constitution would be voted in a national
referendum (Corfield, 1994). An overwhelming majority (97.2%) of those who
participated in the referendum favored the constitution (Corfield, 1994) after the
“populace was warned” that a NO vote against it would mean a Yes vote for Communism
(Shawcross, 1986, p. 230). The “results do seem inflated,” although there would
undoubtedly be a “Yes” vote in the referendum (Corfield, p. 141). The referendum was
not free and its voting system was flawed. To ensure that the referendum would be passed
and the constitution approved, Lon Nol deployed “armed military police… at all polling
booths” (Soonthornpoct, 2005, p. 215). Concerning the voting system, Summers (1972,
quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 141) wrote:
In the absence of election lists, civil servants and military men voted two, or even
three times, casting ballots in all precincts where they worked or resided. Voters
were given two ballots, a white one indicating yes or support for the constitution
or a green one indicating no or disapproval. One ballot was to be discarded; the
other was to be placed in a nearly transparent envelope. Thus, pollwatchers,
usually military police could easily see the green ballot if it were being deposited
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in the ballot box. In one precinct, those who had voted no were asked to give their
name, profession and address before leaving.

Lon Nol’s effort to amass and stay in power
Lon Nol had been “considered a perfect number two for [Sirik] Matak” (Becker,
1998a, p. 13) when the two conducted the coup, which overthrew Prince Sihanouk in
1970, with Sirik Matak allegedly playing the preeminent role and even contemplating the
assassination of Sihanouk (Osborne, 1994, p. 212; Sihanouk, in Jeldres, 2005, p. 66).
Sihanouk and Lon Nol’s co-architects of the coup mistakenly thought he was “too limited
to be a threat” (Becker, 1998a, p. 119). But after the coup, Lon Nol was always Number
One and “by 1972 [Sirik Matak] had become a minor figure” despite the fact that Sirik
Matak was “abler” (Chandler, 1991a, p. 133). As Chandler wrote “Lon Nol was less
adroit than Sihanouk, less conscientious, less popular, and in worse health. He
concentrated his flagging energies on an effort to stay in power. This meant upstaging In
Tam and Sirik Matak and keeping an eye on Son Ngoc Thanh” (1991b, p. 215).
Before he transformed the National Assembly into the Constituent Assembly, Lon Nol
dismissed In Tam, the “popular” Minister of the Interior and Security, “whom he and
Matak had always viewed as a potential rival” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 213) possibly
blaming him for an NVA attack on an oil depot near Phnom Penh that destroyed “40% of
[the] country’s fuel stocks” (Corfield, 1994, p. 115). In Tam was in charge of the
militiamen, some of whom “had been guarding” the oil depot (p. 115). Not only that, on
February 14, 1972, while recuperating in the seat port city of Kompong Som some 225
kilometers from Phnom Penh, Lon Nol made known his plan to request Cheng Heng’s
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resignation on the ground that the National Assembly was dragging its feet on the draft
Constitution, that his ideas for the Constitution had been rejected, and that he would be
able to “take power and strengthen Nixon’s hand if he made any deals with the Chinese”
on Cambodia (Corfield, 1994, p. 123). He later agreed to call off the plan after Sirik
Matak had cautioned him through his assistant. Swank met Cheng Heng at the latter’s
office on February 15, 1972 just as Sirik Matak was leaving. Swank latter wrote:
I found Cheng Heng deeply disturbed but by no means distraught. I think he has
sensed for some time the insecurity of his position… and the likely desire of Lon
Nol to be the first President of the Republic. He was nonetheless bitter at the
precipitancy of the request for his resignation and quick to point out that his
replacement by Lon Nol would pose substantial legal problems… Cheng Heng
remarked that he is prepared to resign for the good of the nation but added that he
believes Lon Nol is no longer sufficiently popular to win a free election and has
therefore chosen a surreptitious route to dictatorial power. [emphasis added] (US
DoS, quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 124)
Upon the parliament transformation, Lon Nol placed Cambodia in a “state of emergency”
(Soonthornpoct, p. 210), ruled by decree (Corfield, 1994 & Kamm, 1998), and issued
new restrictions on newspapers that defamed the army and government officials
(Corfield, 1994). For example, Ros Chantrabot’s Khmer-language daily newspaper was
closed down on Lon Nol’s order on February 26, 1972 because it ran in many of its
editorials analysis of important facts and issues that inevitably accused those leaders of
incompetence, bribery, and irresponsibility (Ros Chantrabot, 1978).
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Lon Nol’s “political demise” started with the spectacular failure of military
Operation Chenla II in December 1971, in which he played a chief role (Corfield, 1994,
p. 122). He had maintained “daily control” over this relief operation, which was his
“idea” and which he assigned to Colonel Um Savuth12 (Corfield, 1994), a half-body
paralyzed man who was “nearly always drunk” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 202). There arose
more serious questions about Lon Nol’s leadership in general and military leadership
skills in particular following, in Becker’s (1998a, p. 132) words, “his defeat at Chenla II.”
In two separate cables to Washington, Ambassador Swank wrote respectively of Lon
Nol’s “highly personal and arbitrary methods of operation” and “haphazard, out-ofchannel and ill-coordinated conduct of military operations” (quoted in Shawcross, p.
204). In the aftermath of the failed offensive, rumors of coups against Lon Nol spread in
Phnom Penh, particular in cafés and ministries (Shawcross, 1986; Corfield, 1994). Son
Ngoc Thanh, the leader of the anti-French, pro-American, and pro-Republican Khmer
Serei (Free Khmer) who had been foreign minister and Prime Minister in the 1940s,
made it known that it was “finally time” for him to become Prime Minister (Shawcross,
p. 204). He was supported by a cabinet minister of Lon Nol’s who said that he “himself
was planning the coup” to bring Thanh to power (Shawcross, p. 204). The coup did not
eventuate. Rather than resign, Lon Nol consolidated his grip. As Cheng Heng had
predicted, he was eventually forced to resign as Head of State on March 10, 1972 by Lon

Um Savuth’s paralysis resulted from his youthful bravado. While a young military officer, he ordered a
reluctant underling to shoot off the cat the former had asked the latter to place on his [Um Savuth’s] head.
The subordinate not only killed the cat but also blew away part of Um Savuth’s brain. He had to consume a
lot of alcohol to “kill his constant pain” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 202). Ironically, a drunk commander was
often the best the Khmer Republic had, as one US adviser remarked, “Savuth drunk was better than most
Cambodian officers sober” (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 219). According to Sak Sutsakhan (1978) and Deac
(1999), Brigadier General Hou Hang Sin was in charge of the operation.
12
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Nol, who replaced him. Lon Nol’s becoming Head of State meant that Sirik Matak
became Prime Minister automatically, the only time he held that position. And Lon Nol
stressed that “he had not appointed him Premier” (Corfield, 1994, p. 131). Therefore, in
spite of this defeat, his “patronage and control over the army survived” (Becker, 1998a, p.
132) and his power became stronger than ever.
Overwhelmed by student demonstrations, which were overtly organized by Keo
An and covertly “orchestrated” by Lon Non (Osborne, 1994, p. 225) against him and
which Swank described as “unfair” (Corfield, 1994, p. 131), Sirik Matak submitted to
Lon Nol his resignation letter on March 12 and was approved three days later. Sirik
Matak announced on the radio not only his resignation as Prime Minister but also his
withdrawal from politics after having been Prime Minster for only five days (e.g.
Chantrabot, 1978 and Corfield, 1994). He and Cheng Heng had earlier failed to “persuade
[Lon Nol] to abdicate some of his power”; and Lon Nol had rejected the imploration of
“his general staff” members that he give up “over-all command” (Shawcross, 1986, p.
204). In a cable to Washington shortly before Sirik Matak’s resignation, Swank wrote
“At issue are not only Lon Nol’s highly personal and arbitrary methods of operation but
very possibly the future of his government should Sirik Matak and others choose to
resign” (quoted in Shawcross, 1986, p. 204). After Matak’s resignation, Swank wrote him
a personal letter quoted in its entirety below:
Excellency, Although I fully understand the motives for your recent withdrawal
from public life, I wish to express to you personally my sincere regret at the turn
of events which will deprive the Republic of the services of one of its most
capable and dedicated patriots.
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I shall be very conscious of the contribution that you have made in recent
years towards the survival of your country. In particular I shall always remember
with pleasure our close collaboration in pursuing the common objectives of our
two countries. I hope that the Republic will be able to profit from your wisdom
and your talents even in your retirement.
With Great Esteem and Undiminished Respect, Emory C. Swank.
(quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 134)
On March 13, 1972, in a national radio address, Lon Nol proclaimed himself “President
of the Khmer Republic” and defined clearly the roles of this brand-new public office in
Cambodian history that would be listed in a new constitution adopted on April 30, 1972
(Chantrabot, 1978). With this new post, Lon Nol became Commander-in-Chief as well as
the President of the Council of Ministers. Early that day, Lon Nol had told Swank that he
“was now again being called to rally the nation in an hour of trial… [which] seemed to be
his destiny” (Corfield, 1994, p. 131).
On March 20, 1972, thirteen days after he became Chief of State and dissolved
the Constituent Assembly –which according to Corfield (1994, p. 130) aimed to “remove
[Sirik Matak] from real power”–and seven days after he appointed himself President, Lon
Nol appointed Thanh Prime Minister (Chantrabot, 1978 and Corfield, 1994) or “First
Minister” (Shawcross, p. 230). Upon his appointment, Thanh remarked, “I am not in
power. I am simply called upon to collaborate with the Marshal. We are moving towards
a presidential system. The Ministers are responsible not to the Prime Minister, but to the
President of the Council (Lon Nol)” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1972; quoted in
Corfield, 1994, p. 132).
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After Thanh’s cabinet was formed, Lon Nol made, in Swank’s words, an
“extraordinary number of appointments” of advisers to himself (quoted in Corfield, 1994,
p. 134); there were “93” of presidential advisers (Corfield, 2009, p. 80), one of whom
was Sirik Matak, who was appointed “with the rank of Prime Minister” before the
presidential election (Corfield, 1994, p. 159). These presidential advisers, who formed the
Executive Cabinet of Advisers, were paid the same salaries as were cabinet ministers
(Corfield, 2009, p. 76). With this new setup, as Thanh had rightly stated above, both the
Cabinet and his advisers were “solely” accountable to Lon Nol; and the Cabinet was
accountable, to some degree, to his advisers (p. 134). In other words, political power had
shifted from the Cabinet and, for that matter, from the Prime Minister to the President.
On the appointments, Swank commented that their “apparent purpose… is to smother all
actual or potential opposition in a benign embrace, leaving the few holdouts like In Tam
and Douc Rasy in lonely isolation” (quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 134). Lon Nol sought
counsel from these advisers “once a month” or less (Corfield, 2009, p. 78).
In three “rigged votes,” which will be addressed in detail in a separate section
later, such as a referendum on the new constitution, the presidential election, and the
parliamentary elections aiming to produce a veneer of legitimacy, Lon Nol “eliminate[d]
all legitimate opposition” (Kamm, 1998, p. xviii). A large majority of people who were
eager for change were disappointed with Lon Nol’s election as president; Lon Nol
became synonymous with “war, suffering, family disintegration, hunger, and injustice”
(Chantrabot, 1978, p. 47).
Lon Nol dismissed Son Ngoc Thanh as Prime Minister and his government
merely after seven months in power and replaced them with people who were more
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aligned with “mainstream PSR/Lon Nol opinion” (Corfield, 1994, p. 174). Thanh was no
longer useful to Lon Nol (Kiernan, 2004), who appointed Hang Thun Hak Prime
Minister, Secretary-General of the PSR, whose figurehead was Lon Nol himself. He did
so despite words of caution from Long Boret, then-Minister of Information who was at
the time attending the UN General Assembly in New York, which was voting on which
Cambodian government should be awarded its seat: the Khmer Republic or GRUNK. To
compensate for Son Ngoc Thanh’s loss of premiership, Lon Nol promoted him Adviser to
the President “with the rank and prerogatives of Prime Minister” and promoted his
brother, Lon Non, Brigadier-General (Corfield, 1994, p. 175). The Hang Thun Hak
government lasted exactly six months. Lon Nol was “impatient with Hang Thun Hak”
(Kiernan, 2004, p. 348).
The last days of the Hang Thun Hak government saw several incidents, the most
notable of which were a teachers and students’ strike and an aerial bombing of Lon Nol’s
Presidential Palace on the same day of March 17, 1973. On the morning of that day,
teachers and students who had begun their strike in late February met at the Faculty of
Pedagogy in Phnom Penh despite the government’s ban on any anti-Government
demonstration. According to Corfield (1994, p. 179), briefly, here was how the incident
transpired. While a speaker was addressing the meeting, three men stormed in and
assailed him. But they were captured and locked up in a nearby room. Suddenly, around
50 men stormed into the room and threw handgrenades killing two students and
wounding another eight. The intruders escaped unharmed. The government claimed the
assailants were “enemy agents”; but according to students, they were soldiers (Kamm,
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1973, p. 3). Lon Non had been involved in these actions, according to US DoS Phnom
Penh, although he told Ros Chantrabot he had not (cited in Corfield, 1994, p. 183).
On that afternoon, the first aerial bombing of Lon Nol’s Presidential Palace by So
Photra described earlier in Chapter IV occured. Lon Nol was unscathed, but 47 people
were killed (Corfield, 1994, p. 179) and some 30 others were injured (Kamm, 1973, p. 3).
Convinced that the attack on the teachers and his attempted assassination were “part of a
new concerted effort against the Khmer Republic,” Lon Nol declared a “State of Siege”
and issued a decree revoking many provisions of the Constitution (pp. 179-180). All nongovernment newspapers and periodicals were suspended indefinitely, “which gives the
apparent coup de grace” to an already tightly-controlled press (Kamm, 1973, p. 1).
Dissenting politicians, including Keo An, the former presidential candidate, and three
sons of Penn Nouth, GRUNK Prime Minister, and around “55 members of the Royal
Family” were arrested (Corfield, 1994, p. 180). The members of the Royal Family were
placed “under confinement” in the house of Prince Sihanouk’s mother, former Queen
Kossamak (Kamm, 1973, p. 1). Prince Ranariddh, a son of Sihanouk’s, said he had been
detained in military prison for three months without any trial or sentencing. “I was
released under American pressure, I think,” Ranariddh said (quoted in Mehta, 2001, p.
39). Also arrested were journalists and “55 leading astrologers”; the reason for the
astrologers’ arrests was their prediction about “Lon Nol’s downfall” (Khmer Republic,
cited in Soonthornpoct, p. 221). Not only that, some 20,000 teachers were ordered to
resume their work “under the state of siege but closed all schools and universities at the
same time” (Kamm, 1973 & 1998, p. 113). They had been on strike (Kamm, 1973) over
inflation and corruption issues (Corfield, 1994).
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Corfield (1994) contended that Lon Nol overreacted to the bombing of the
Presidential Palace by issuing the “State of Siege,” which was approved four days later
by the one-party (PSR) Parliament; it was an “isolated event” (p. 184) or “isolated
episode” (Gayn, 1973, p. 32). Likewise, Ward (1973, para. 6) contended that Lon Nol
used this action by a lone officer as a pretext for “mass arrests and interrogations.” In a
meeting with US Senator Brooke in April of that year, Sirik Matak also considered So
Photra’s bombing as an “isolated, spontaneous action”; it was his retaliation against the
grenade attack by a Lon Non man that wounded his sister (US DoS, 1973b, p. 2). In other
words, Lon Nol blew these events out of proportion. Given these measures, “[t]he Khmer
Republic had begun its irrevocable decline,” wrote Corfield (1994, p. 180). As a result of
his heavy-handed measures, Lon Nol drew scathing criticisms from liberal intellectuals
and there was open talk of a coup against him and a desire among many people for
Sihanouk’s return (p. 184). Prime Minister Hang Thun Hak told the US Embassy five
days later that “he did not believe that the events of March 17 were a ‘Royalist plot’”
(Corfield, 1994, p. 184), even though the flier was the husband of one of Sihanouk’s
daughters, Princess Botum Bopha (Corfield, 1994 and Kamm, 1973 & 1998). Sirik Matak
concurred. “Sirik Matak believed Lon Nol knows that reports of a plot are untrue. The
arrest of the Royal Family is without foundation…, noting that the Queen Mother cannot
now get up from her armchair and is guilty only of continued sentiment for her son
[Sihanouk],” a cable said (US DoS, 1973b, p. 2). A colonel at the air force headquarters
was quoted as saying that “Capt. So Photra had been an air attaché at the palace for two
years” (“20 die in bombing aimed at Lon Nol,” 1973, p. 14). The flier did not publicly
indicate his motives for the bombing. But, Marshal Lon Nol said that the flier had been
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“bribed by the enemy to kill me” (“20 die,” 1973, p. 14). Kamm (1973, p. 3) reported that
despite the much heavier casualties and damage in the bombing, “diplomatic sources [in
Phnom Penh] believe” that the earlier grenade attack “[was] of greater and more lasting
significance.”
Although ex-Prince Sirik Matak had not been arrested on that day (Corfield,
1994,), he was later placed under virtual house arrest (Kamm, 1998). Five days after the
incidents, Sirik Matak invited Henry Kamm, “the veteran New York Times journalist” and
a Voice of America (VoA) correspondent to his villa (Corfield, 1994); they had to be
“smuggled” into the villa by one of the prince’s sons (Kamm, p. 112). As he greeted
them, the prince said smiling that “There is only a slight margin of difference between the
‘protection’ they are giving me and house arrest” (Kamm, p. 112). Calling American
assistance “generous,” Matak said, “But the government uses it all to establish a military
dictatorship in contempt of the people,” (p. 112) apparently referring to that of Lon Nol.
Moreover, he prophetically said, “I believe that this regime must not survive and will not
last” (p. 113). Sirik Matak even claimed that if Sihanouk, his cousin, and Lon Nol were to
contest in free and fair elections, the former would “win easily” (p. 113).
Sirik Matak indicated to the journalists his wish to meet Emory Swank, the US
Ambassador. Responding to this news and declining a “personal encounter” with Sirik
Matak, Swank wrote to Washington, which in part reads:
The Mission Emissary will make the following points orally:
A –It is hoped that [Sirik Matak] will keep his customary sang froid despite the
tragic events of March 17 and the developments which followed.
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B –He should know that I have had a long meeting with the Marshal on March 23
in which, speaking for Washington as well as myself, I counseled him to follow a
course of moderation and national reconciliation. (US DoS Phnom Penh, quoted
in Corfield, 1994, p. 184)
On April 17, 1973, Lon Nol “asked” his Cabinet, including its Premier, Hang Thun Hak,
to resign and they accepted (Browne, 1973a) in order “to allow the President a free hand
in reorganizing the Government” (Browne, 1973b, p. 12). Browne also reported that on
April 23, in a close-session, the one-party National Assembly approved the formation of
a “High Political Council” whose four members would be Lon Nol, Cheng Heng, Sirik
Matak, and In Tam and voted to have a six-month recess. In this manner, the National
Assembly effectively authorized the Council and the Government to rule by decree for
that period (Corfield, 1994). These measures came after the US Embassy and Alexander
Haig, Military assistant and chief deputy to Henry Kissinger –who visited Phnom Penh
on April 11 –urged for “reconciliation” among these “Four Men of March 18” (Corfield,
1994, p. 187). Haig also convinced Lon Nol that Lon Non “go on an extended tour of the
United States” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 275). According Browne (1973a), Cheng Heng, Sirik
Matak, and In Tam sought “assurances that power will be genuinely and equally shared
and that [Lon Nol] will not turn out to be the first among equals with absolute veto
power.” But the next day, Lon Nol became more or less the first among equals when he
officially declared the High Political Council with himself as its President and Cheng
Heng as its Vice-President (Corfield, 1994). A decree issued on April 28 stated that the
Council –“which the London Times referred to as ‘a euphemism for a municipal council
of Phnom Penh’” (quoted in Chandler, 1991b, p. 224) –would decide on all state affairs
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by majority vote. However, if a vote was tied, “Lon Nol’s decision would be final” (p.
188). Burns (1978) pointed out that revolutionary leadership by nature is probably more
“collective” than any other form of leadership and thus relies on “movements, parties,
and political organizations” (p. 203). The Republic enjoyed some degree of “collective
leadership,” as Browne (1973a) called it, only during the 11-month-long lifespan of the
High Political Council between from April 1973 to March 1974. Still, the Council had
“remained largely on paper” by June, 1973 (Swank, in Precht, 1988) and become a
“rubber stamp” by the end of 1973 (Chandler, 1991b, p. 224). “Neither Lon Nol nor the
White House was seriously interested in change. Lon Nol refused to relinquish any
control of the army. Gradually the other members [of the Council]… fell away,” wrote
Shawcross (1986, p. 275).
On May 15, 1973, in a surprise move, Lon Nol appointed In Tam, still a member
of the High Political Council, Prime Minister (Corfield, 1994), as ex-Prime Minister Son
Sann had been expected to take the post. However, just ten days later, Lon Nol flew back
to Phnom Penh from Kompong Som, where he was on retreat, because he was angry that
In Tam had been able to “start implementing several reformist ideas in FANK” while he
was away (Corfield, 1994, p. 191). And, the Marshal suggested having some changes to
the Cabinet appointments (Corfield, 1994).
In July, 1973, Lon Nol signed a decree which coerced all males aged from 18 to
25 into 18 months of military service; they include “students, civil service and those
‘with heavy family responsibilities,’” but they could obtain deferments (Corfield, 1994,
p. 192). The Cambodian civil war became a “poor man’s war”; increasing numbers of
poor Cambodians were being conscripted because, unlike in 1970, now college students
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were “eager to get deferments” (p. 192). In August of the same year, Swank wrote to
Washington about the Republic’s prospect, which included a call for Lon Nol’s
retirement:
There is a substantial and probably growing Khmer opinion that Marshal Lon Nol
should retire as a prerequisite to negotiations with the other side as a stimulus to
enhanced [sic] non-Communist support for the [Government of the Khmer
Republic] and its war effort. Cheng Heng, Son Sann, and Democrat Chau Sau are
among the eloquent advocates of this move, which also has the support of certain
military commanders (Brigadier Generals Dien Del and Un Kauv, among others).
(DoS, 1973, p. 4)
In December 1973, In Tam “resigned” (Corfield, 1994, p. 194); however, the New York
Times reported that Lon Nol “forced [him] out” because Lon Nol thought he was “too
soft when he sought reconciliation with the Communists” (“Ex-premier of Cambodia
criticizes Lon Nol’s rule,” 1975). Still, another New York Times article in 1989 says In
Tam “finally resigned after he was cut out of any real power” (Erlanger, 1989). He was
replaced by Long Boret, the former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs under the two In
Tam governments and he would be the last Prime Minister of the Republic in three
different governments and was brutally executed by the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh in
April, 1975.
The June 4 assassination of Minister of Education Keo Sangkim and his principal
adviser, Thach Chia, mentioned earlier, took place on the premises of a high school in
Phnom Penh called “18 March” (named after the date of Lon Nol’s coup against
Sihanouk) amidst the chaos of two big student demonstrations against Long Boret. Here
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is a truncated summary of what happened, according to Corfield (1994), who drew from
various sources. There had already been a surge in “urban opposition to Lon Nol” (p.
1994). Angered at the failure of the Long Boret Government to solve any of the economic
problems it had agreed to do, on May 17, the Central Committee of the Cambodian
Teachers’ Association condemned it for “corruption, incompetence, and fascism” (p.
199). Before long, four teachers were arrested, prompting the two student
demonstrations. In response, the Government arrested 60 students at the high school at
the dawn of May 26. Although 55 students were released later, the other five students,
including the President of the School Student Association were still detained. This set the
scene for confrontation. On June 4, 1974, student demonstrators stormed into the office
of the Minister at the Ministry while he was talking to Thach Chia; they captured and
marched both of them to the high school, where they were held. The students demanded
the release of the five students in return for the release of the officials.
“A specially trained detachment” of 70 policemen made two attempts to rescue
the officials. On their second attempt, the students started to attack them, resulting in a
battle between those 70 police and some 1000 students in the courtyard in order to take
control of the school entrance. Amidst this chaos, a Cambodian man, aged 25-30,
climbed up the balcony of the second floor of the school building, entered the classroom
where the two officials were held, and shot five times killing the Minister and “fatally
wounding” his adviser (p. 200). The assassin escaped unharmed.
The assassination is still an unsolved mystery. Four theories exist about who was
behind it, which was done professionally. The first theory, suggested by Ros Chantrabot
(1978), is that it was Lon Nol, or his henchmen, who organized the assassination in order
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to prevent Keo Sangkim from revealing his declining medical condition and his physical
and mental state. The second theory is that the assassination was conducted by a Khmer
Rouge hit man (Corfield, 1994 & Short, 2004) or a “Communist ‘hit-squad,’” as Steve
Heder was told (cited in Corfield, 1994, p. 202). The third it was instigated by Sisowath
Sirik Matak. The fourth is that it was the demonstrating students who organized the
assassination.
On January 12, 1974, ex-Premier Son Sann, a “respected neutralist,” publicly
urged Marshal Lon Nol to go abroad for medical treatment for there to be a peace
agreement between the Lon Nol government and Communist insurgents; he suggested
that Cheng Heng, Vice-President of the High Political Council, take the reign of power
(“Cambodian ex-premier,” 1974). Son Sann saw Lon Nol as an impediment to peace. He
announced this proposal in a meeting with students at Phnom Penh University after he
had sent Marshal Lon Nol three days earlier a letter that Lon Nol had not yet replied. In
the letter, he said in part, “I am probably the first one to express such wishes to you
openly by letter. But you can easily determine that a very great majority of our
compatriots think as I do. If need be, a referendum will confirm my affirmation”
(“Cambodian ex-premier,” 1974). Son Sann’s proposal drew attention across the country,
particularly teacher and student leaders whose movement had hitherto been based on
economic issues (Corfield, 1994). However, the government announced that Lon Nol
“was in good health” and that it was members of GRUNK who were the “only obstacle to
peace” because they refused to parley with it (Corfield, 1994, p. 196).
On March 31, 1974 Lon Nol dissolved the High Political Council intentionally in
Ambassador Dean’s “brief absence” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 231), justifying that it had
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outlived its necessity because the National Assembly had already resumed its work after
its six months’ recess (“Cambodia dissolves,” 1974 & Corfield, 1994). However, his aim
was to rid the political scene of In Tam (Chandler, 1991b). Three cabinet ministers from
the Ministries of Health, Industry, and Justice “resigned in protest” (“Cambodia
dissolves,” 1974). Cheng Heng, the Council’s Vice-President, asked Lon Nol to create a
“new coalition government” arguing at a press conference that the dissolution of the
council was tantamount to the dissolution of the Government (“Cambodia dissolves,”
1974). People saw another king emerge in Lon Nol; but this new king was just another
Sdech Kân (King Kân), a commoner in the 16th century who, with popular support,
usurped the Cambodian Throne and declared himself king but who was eventually
defeated by a legitimate heir to the Throne13 (Chantrabot, 1978). One day later, in place
of the Council, Lon Nol created an Executive Committee (or Council, according to Deac,
1999) for Cambodia comprising himself, Sirik Matak, Long Boret, and Sosthene
Fernandez, Supreme Commander of the Army, effectively rendering the Government to
become a “simple secretariat” (Chantrabot, p. 104). Unlike the old body, this body did

Bunchan Mol (1973) wrote the same narrative of Sdech Kân but did not liken Lon Nol to him. Ros
Chantrabot wrote a book Luong Preah Sdech Kân in 2007, which was “commissioned” by Hun Sen and
“funded” by the Prime Minister and his wife (Norén-Nilsson, 2016, p. 52). It is being made into a feature
film financed by a CPP senator and tycoon to be released in 2017. This book offers a different portrayal of
Preah Sdech Kân, which is capatured by Hun Sen in his foreword to the book. Hun Sen, who believes that
he is a reincarnation of Preah Sdech Kân, wrote :
Preah Sdech Kân has been continuously recorded in Khmer history as a man who betrayed the
King, or usurper. … [on the countrary] we can note that Preah Sdech Kân was a Khmer, born in
the class of temple-servants, that he was not a man who betrayed the King, or a usurper, as is
always said.
13

Preah Sdech Kân […] can be considered a brilliant hero in the world, who reaised the doctrine and
vision of freedom rights, and was the first to speak about and practice this, in the sixteenth
century. [Norén-Nilsson’s emphasis]
(Translated by and quoted in Norén-Nilsson, 2016, pp. 53-54)
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not have legislative powers because a two-chamber parliament was reinstated (Deac,
1999).
Pressures from various circles were mounting, including the Americans,
university students, and several countries like Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia,
which threatened to close their embassies in Phnom Penh if he did not leave by the end of
March 1975 (Corfield, 1994). On March 23, Prime Minister Long Boret, Defense
Minister Sak Sutsakhan, President of the Senate Saukham Khoy, his brother Lon Non,
and others wrote Lon Nol a memorandum advising a “tactical” visit to Hawaii
(Shawcross, 1986, p. 357). At first, Lon Nol “did not want to leave his country, which he
had led into a disastrous war,” due to his invariable pride (Corfield, 2009, p. 83). To save
his face, President Suharto of Indonesia invited him to visit Bali, which he accepted
(Corfield, 2009). Moreover, he was given several incentives, chief of which were half a
million dollars by the Cambodian government (or up to “$1 million in Americanprovided pocket money”14 (Kamm, 1998, p. 119) and the honorific “national hero who
has made a brilliant contribution to the nation and to all of us” by his Socio-Republican
Party (Shawcross, 1986, p. 358). At long last, Lon Nol agreed to leave the country for
medical treatment in Hawaii on April 1, 1975 (Corfield, 1994) just 16 days prior to the
fall of Phnom Penh. His departure was “widely believed to be aimed at paving the way
for negotiations” with the insurgents, who had rejected any peace talks with him
(Andelman, 1975). He did not indicate any intention to resign as President and Chief of

According to Ambassador Dean, although Lon Nol had requested a million dollars “to be set aside for
him in case of need,” a maximum of $500,000 had been transferred before he arrived in Hawaii (quoted in
Kennedy, 2004, p. 107).
14
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State, which was confirmed by his eldest son, Lon Rith, who said “… when my father
left, he gave instructions to [Prime Minister] Long Boreth [sic] to do certain things which
were never followed” (Lodish & Mengleng, 2008). Based on a memorandum of
agreement between Lon Nol and other leaders in Phnom Penh, Lon Nol would remain
President and Head of State (Chhang Song, 1997). This is also consistent with an
assertion by Prince Sihanouk, who had visited Washington DC and California in 1980.
“Only Lon Nol refused to see me, even though I let him know that I would be willing to
receive him in audience. He told one of the generals of his former army that ‘Sihanouk is
no longer Head of State. I (Lon Nol) remain the legal Khmer Head of State.
Consequently, it is not proper for me to go and greet Sihanouk,’” Sihanouk wrote (quoted
in Jeldres, 2005, p. 224). Sihanouk’s other “great enemies” such as Cheng Heng, In Tam,
Saukham Khoy, and General Sak Sutsakhan, the Republic’s last acting President and
Minister of Defense respectively, came to greet and “embrace” him (p. 224).
If employed properly–in the right situation, at the right time, and by the right
leader –the coercive or authoritarian leadership style can sometimes be effective. Was it
used properly? Evidently, it was not. First of all, Lon Nol was not the right leader. In
other words, it was unfit, physically, mentally, and emotionally, for the highly demanding
post of a wartime president. Secondly, he used it most of the time even when the situation
dictated more decentralized leadership or delegation. For instance, he interfered with the
war efforts although largely unaware of the military situation on the ground and despite
opposition from his regional commanders.
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Pol Pot as a coercive and authoritative leader
In his rare and last interview in 1997 with Nate Thayer, a Far Eastern Economic
Review correspondent, about six months before his death, Pol Pot uttered these famous
(or notorious, to be more accurate) words: “Even now you can look at me. Am I a savage
person? My conscience is clear” (quoted in Mydans, 1997). “You are accused of causing
the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of innocent Cambodians. And are
you regretful? Are you sorry? And will you apologize? … And he refused to answer the
question. I did get angry. He threatened to end the interview three times within half an
hour,” Thayer recounted latter about the interview in a film documentary (Bluett, 2001).
Despite his denial and lack of remorse for the crimes he had committed, Pol Pot is
described as a tyrant, dictator, despot, or despotic leader by various authors (e.g. Becker,
1998a; Kamm, 1998; Canesso, 1999; Marlay & Neher, 1999; Chandler, 1999a & b;
Short, Koopmans, 2004; Faiola, 2007; Weltig, 2009; Chheng Sorn, 2009; Osborne, 2010)
and by his colleagues/subordinates (like Ta Mok), as “one of the cruelest men that ever
governed” by Henry Kissinger in a TV interview soon after Pol Pot’s death (Woolley,
1998), or at least as an “uncontested leader” (Brissé, in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxix).
The absence of the system of checks and balances in DK allowed Pol Pot to
become the most powerful single individual and partly encouraged him to become a
coercive/authoritarian leader (Chheng Sorn, 2009). “In Democratic Kampuchea, abuse of
power and arbitrariness were made into institutions based on the concept that ‘All the
power to the Party and the Party alone!’ and the conviction that ‘The party is infallible,
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invincible and incorruptible,” wrote Suong Sikoeun15, a high-ranking official in DK’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also a witness at the ECCC, in his recent Frenchlanguage autobiography “Itinerary of a Khmer Rouge Intellectual” (quoted in Vachon,
2014, p. 4). Yet, it was his personality and character that largely shaped his leadership
style. For Pol Pot, “coercion was preferred to an open legal structure” (Kiernan, 1984, p.
2). He had “unswerving love of power” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 188). He even controlled
until 1990 the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, a tripartite governmentin-exile formed after DK’s fall, although Sihanouk was its head of state and Son Sann its
prime minister (Mabbett & Chandler, 1995 and Mehta, 2001).
There was striking resemblance between Lon Nol’s and Pol Pot’s ways of living
and working. As he was a reclusive and secretive man who was “always fearful of
assassination” (Chandler, 199, p. 132), very few details exist about his life during the DK
period. This description of Pol Pot’s way of living is based on Chandler (1999a, p. 132),
if not indicated otherwise. Like Lon Nol, he made rare public appearances and spent
perhaps spent a lot of his time reviewing dossiers prepared for and dispatched to him by
S-21, the prison, and the different ministries and zones. In order to handle this enormous
volume of dossiers, he worked very long hours. He traveled outside Phnom Penh even
much less than Lon Nol did (Kamm, 1998). But, he may have spent somewhat more time
than Lon Nol “talking with his close associates.” Apprehensive of assassination, he was
surrounded by many security and bodyguards and had several residences whose exact

Suong Sikoeun was married to Laurence Picq, a French revolutionary. The couple and their daughters
lived in Cambodia throughout the Pol Pot period. Their marriage ended in December 1980 when Picq and
their children escaped to Paris (Vachon, 2014). She was the first foreigner to publish a memoir of her life
during that period. She published her revised memoir in 2013.
15
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locations are not known. One of Chandler’s informants, on conditions of anonymity, said
that Pol Pot’s main residence, what Chandler called “his Kremlin or Hidden City” was
“near the Independence Monument” in a compound protected by a high fence. He slept at
a different house each night (Koopmans, 2005). Like Lon Nol, he was often ill. Because
he had frequent gastric problems, he suspected that his cooks made attempts to poison
him. Also, like Lon Nol, he was not curious about the outside world. He relied almost
entirely on Ieng Sary for foreign affairs and public relations. The following statement by
Pol Pot during his rule has contradictions:
We promote broad democracy among the people by a correct application of
democratic centralism, so that this immense force will mobile enthusiastically and
rapidly for socialist revolution and construction, at great leaps and bounds
forward…. On the other hand, we absolutely, without hesitation, apply the
dictatorship of the proletariat to our enemies and to the tiny handful of
reactionary elements who oppose the revolution… [emphasis added] (quoted in
Weltig, 2009, p. 119)
Ieng Sary, Number Two in the government but Number Six in the Standing Committee,
told Kamm (1998) in 1997 that Pol Pot opposed democracy. This is likely true
considering his regime’s abolition or abrogation of all fundamental human rights, most
notably the rights to life and education and dereliction of the fundamental tenets of
democracy and good governance, most notably rule of law, transparency, and
accountability. Even more importantly, Pol Pot was far more concerned with maintaining
tight power grip than with exercising democratic leadership by sharing power with other
leaders.
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Pol Pot’s leadership was marked by micromanagement, paranoia, and particularly
purges because, based on the dossiers he reviewed, he developed this “vision of the world
–with Cambodia surrounded by enemies and the country itself seen as concentric circles
with the party leadership at the center” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 132). At S-21 (aka Tuol
Sleng) alone, he “approved the torture and execution of almost fourteen thousand
enemies” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 3). Duch, the S-21 chief, told the ECCC that “whatever
Pol Pot decided everybody had to implement… Pol Pot was the one who initiated the
idea [of setting up the prison], Son Sen implemented it and Nuon Chea is the one who did
the follow up. This is from my observation and from the surviving documents” (quoted in
Sopheng Cheang, 2009, para. 9). However, Pol Pot denied knowing it even during his
last-ever interview with Nate Thayer, implying that the school-turned prison-turnedmuseum and its dossiers had been set up by the Vietnamese. It was an “outrageous”
denial, Thayer said in an interview shortly afterwards (quoted in Holmes, 1997). Pol Pot
said:
I was at the top. I made only big decisions on big issues. I want to tell you–Tuol
Sleng was a Vietnamese exhibition. A journalist wrote that. People talk about
Tuol Sleng, Tuol Sleng, Tuol Sleng…. When I first heard about Tuol Sleng it was
on the Voice of America. I listened twice. (quoted in Chandler, 1999c, p. 8)
He saw “the zone leaders and most other high-ranking party members” as “rivals and
potential enemies” (Ngor & Warner, 2003, p. 433). “[M]icro-managing the smallest
details was part of Pol’s conception of leadership. A firm hand, with no sharing of power.
He wanted to monopolize everything,” said Suong Sikoeun (quoted in Short, p. 340).
“[Pol Pot] was a leader of the Communist Party who could issue orders to be obeyed in
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every aspect of the country –politics, economics, military, culture, foreign affairs just like
in any other communist country,” Suong Sikoeun said later (Al Jazeera, 2008). Sikoeun
reaffirmed his statements in his testimony at the ECCC: “This is how [Pol Pot] managed
things. He was meticulous in his leadership. He left no room for others to intervene in his
decision” (ECCC, 2012d, p. 6). He attended to such “trivia” as approving the menus for
official receptions, sending lengthy instructions to provincial officials who received
government guests, and selecting the announcers for Radio Phnom Penh (Short, p. 340),
and sending soap, towels, and slippers for Thai delegates (Sikoeun, in ECCC, 2012d).
Even though in theory, meetings of the Standing Committee were based on the principle
of collective decision-making and individual implementation, in practice –as Khieu
Samphan maintained in an interview with In Sopheap, a former Khmer Rouge cadre who
worked at DK’s foreign and information ministries and was KR's Ambassador to Egypt
in the 1980s –Pol Pot was the sole decision-maker from 1976. Thanks to its paramount
importance, Khieu Samphan’s statement is worth quoting extensively:
He would listen impassively and with immense patience to detailed reports from
lower-level officials. … He liked to hear the views of many different people …
The more information the better. He would retain whatever was relevant to the
problem at hand, and work out an initial hypothesis, which he would keep to
himself. When he had refined it and reached a conclusion which satisfied him, he
would make his decision, which then became irrevocable. Afterwards, he would
call a meeting [of members of the Standing Committee], explaining the problem
before them in such a way that, without anyone realizing it, the discussion was
orientated to the results he desired… After everyone had spoken, he would make
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the summing up –selecting points from their speeches which buttressed his
position. He would relate these to a number of fundamental principles, including
the Party’s political line and the dialectical rule that all things are linked and exist
in relation to another. Then he would announce the decision, making it appear
that everyone had contributed to its formation. There was no vote. It was stated:
“The collectivity has decided.” [emphasis added] (cited with condensation in
Short, p. 340)
Furthermore, Pol Pot was also “the leading personality” in making the decision to
evacuate people from cities, Ieng Sary said (quoted in Kamm, 1998, p. 137). In 1975,
soon after the Khmer Rouge’s victory on April 17, 1975, Pol Pot could not trust “new
people” (those who had lived under the Republic’s control before their victory),
foreigners, or anyone who did not belong to the party (Chandler, 1999a). “There was no
time for building consensus” (p. 105), hence the absence of democratic leadership style.
Pol Pot did not tolerate dissent or opposition, particularly from 1976, which might have
been a main cause for his failure. As Bennis contends that “Nothing will sink a leader
faster than surrounding him- or herself with yes-men and women” (2009, p. xxii). Or
according to Chandler (1999a), he stifled dissension. He accused anyone who disagreed
with him of treachery or treason. “The individuals Pol Pot considered to have betrayed
[democratic revolution] were pure revolutionaries who opposed his approach or path”
(Hun Sen, 1991, p. 222). This is a sentiment shared by many other people, including So
Phim, Secretary of Eastern Zone and First Vice-President of State Presidium and a
leading victim of Pol Pot’s purges. According to Chou Chet, Secretary of Western Zone
and also a purge victim, So Phim said that Pol Pot had “extremely dogmatic” policies and
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that anyone who opposed his dogmatism was “accused of serving the enemy, of being
non-proletarian ideology, of immorality, of making nothing but appointments that are not
in proper conformity to the line, and the like” (quoted in Heder, 1991, p. 17). For
instance, merely within months his attitude toward Vietnam changed from being friendly
to cautious to hostile; that is, the threat of war (Becker, 1998a). For all his subordinates,
“there was no choice but to agree with Pol Pot or die… It was a matter of life or death
between Cambodia and Vietnam. And in that struggle, Cambodia could only survive if
Pol Pot triumphed. Pol Pot ensured that his and the country’s fates were intertwined”
(Becker, p. 302). Denounced as a traitor, Minister of Defense Son Sen would have been
purged had the Vietnamese not intervened in 1978-1979 (Thion, 1993). Only after
eighteen months’ hiding in the forest did he reemerge in the DK leadership thanks to
“strong Chinese and Thai support” (Thion, p. 93). Pol Pot’s purges will be discussed in
the sub-section of Teamwork and Collaboration.
Pol Pot as a pacesetting leader
Democratic Kampuchea’s key motto “three tons per hectare,” which refers to a
“national target average yield of threshed rice” (Mabbett & Chandler, 1995, p. 248)
indicates how high performance standards Pol Pot and his regime set for his people to
reach. His intention and effort to drive his people to achieve more with less or nothing is
legendary. “After the war ended, Pol Pot wished once more to run faster than Vietnam,”
Khieu Samphan wrote in his memoir (2004, p. 57). In his earliest political writing, a
hand-written essay which was “little-known” (Thion, 1993, p. 81) entitled “Monarchy or
Democracy?” published in Paris in 1952, Pol Pot argued that monarchy was antagonistic
to people; under the monarchy, the Cambodian people were “like animals, kept as
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soldiers (pol) or slaves (knjom ke), made to work night and day to feed the king and his
entourage” (quoted in Chandler, 1991a, pp. 37-38). Ironically, once in power Pol Pot did
nearly exactly what he had accused the Cambodian monarchy of. This was despite the
advice of Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to the Khmer Rouge to carry out their
revolution at a gradual pace. “[W]e the Chinese Communists must bear the distressing
consequences of our own mistakes. We take the liberty of advising you not to attempt to
reach the final stages of Communism with one great leap forward. You must proceed
with much caution and proceed slowly with wisdom on the path leading to Communism,”
Zhou Enlai was quoted by Sihanouk as telling Khmer Rouge delegates Khieu Samphan
and Madame Ieng Sary in the presence of Sihanouk and his wife in China in August 1975
(Jeldres, 2012, p. 61). More evidence of Pol Pot as a pacesetting leader will be revealed
in the next chapter, especially in the sections on empathy and teamwork and collaboration
and on inspiration.
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LEADERSHIP TYPES AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Leadership types
There is significant overlap between many of these bad leadership types and some
EI components. This section therefore addresses only evil leadership in the case of Pol
Pot; the remainder of the leadership types will be addressed in the section on emotional
intelligence.
Pol Pot’s evil leadership
As Table 6.1 shows, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (95.42%)
considered Pol Pot an evil leader. “I think [Pol Pot] was a true nationalist as well as a
truly evil man,” wrote Nate Thayer (quoted in Cruvellier, 2014, chapter 28). Sihanouk
called him an “undisputed master of cruelty” (quoted in Idling, 2006). The evidence for
this categorization is so overwhelming and obvious that only a little mention suffices in
this dissertation.
In his 1952 article, Pol Pot wrote “The absolute king uses nice words, but his
heart remains wicked” (quoted in Thion, 1993, p. 82). Ironically, when he became a an
unelected national leader (or a throneless king), he imitated these very behaviors of which
he had accused the king and which he had so reviled and vilified to the point that he
became reviled and vilified by both Cambodians and foreigners. The fact that Pol Pot’s
final resting place is nearly null (Carmichael, 20015) in the country where the Festival for
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the Dead (Pchum Ben) is held every year for a total of 15 days speaks volumes about this
anti-Pol Pot sentiment.
Table 6.1

Leadership Types
Lon Nol

Pol Pot

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

Incompetent leadership

267

67.77

242

61.42

Rigid leadership

101

25.63

331

84.01

Intemperate leadership

151

38.32

221

56.09

Callous leadership

69

17.51

334

84.77

Corrupt leadership

287

72.84

119

30.2

Insular leadership

77

19.54

325

82.49

Evil leadership

42

10.66

372

94.42

Mean:

36.04

Mean:

70.49

Besides, this commentary by his former student Soth Polin, himself a famous
novelist and poet, accurately reflects these behaviors: “Realizing the power of language,
Pol Pot kills, but he kills with poetry” (Soth Polin et al., 2004, p. 23). He was a
“criminally insane monster” according to Hope Setevens, one of Pol Pot’s defense
lawyers in PRK’s 1979 trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary (quoted in Hunt, 2001, p. 7) and “a
notorious criminal” whose “death cheated the Cambodian people of the opportunity to
bring [him] to trial” (Metha & Metha, 1999, p. xvii). His name “became synonymous
with murder” (Cascio, 1998) and his Cambodia “became synonymous with horror, with
evil in our time” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 403).
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Emotional Intelligence
Norodom Sihanouk was an “emotional man” (Marlay & Neher, 1999, p. 151). So
was Lon Nol (e.g. Haig, 1970, p. 1). But Pol Pot was not. He had a “heart of steel” behind
his friendliness (Corfield, 2009, p. 93). Did Lon Nol and Pol Pot lack emotional
intelligence? The data that has been gathered provides an affirmative answer.
In May 1970, near the end of his conversation with General Alexander Haig in
Phnom Penh after having been told that US assistance would be limited and that
“basically Cambodians must save Cambodia,” Lon Nol “broke down and sobbed. He then
got up and went to the other side of the room until he regained composure,” Haig wrote
in his memorandum to Kissinger, who forwarded it to Nixon on May 26, 1970 (DoS,
1970, p. 1). According to several interviewees, shortly after the presidential election, he
cried when he had learned of the record-high price of Chinese noodle soup. Another
version of the incident is that Lon Nol “was so shocked [by the price] that he had a
stroke” at the noodle shop near his house where he and his family members had just
dinned (Baczynskyj, 1972, p. 23). More dramatically and publicly, on April 1, 1975,
sixteen days before the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge, and shortly before
boarding his no-return flight at the Pochentong Airport to Honolulu, Hawaii, Lon Nol
“burst into tears” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 133) or wept (Hanhimäki, 2004). Sihanouk said “I
cried. But not very often. Because we Cambodians hide our sufferings behind a screen of
smiles. We prefer crying in our hearts –bleeding internally, not externally, if I may say
so” (quoted in Weiner, 1987, p. 69). The prince said he cried when one of his daughters
died, when his mother died in Beijing in 1975, when he was under house arrest during
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DK, and when he learned about the sufferings of the Cambodians from the VoA and the
BBC. “I suffered with them, and so I cried,” he said (Weiner, 1987, p. 69).
A lot of questions have been raised as to why Lon Nol cried before his departure.
Imam (2000, p. 285) charged that he “shed crocodile tears.” Let us assume that he
actually cried. Was it because he knew he would not be able to return to his home
country, the reason which Chhang Song (1997) thought of at that time but which Lon Nol
denied in an interview a year later with Jacques Leslie (1976)? Because he had lost his
power? Because he regretted that “there was no possible way for him to help his people at
the time when they needed him,” as claimed by his eldest son Lon Rith (Lodish &
Mengleng, 2008)? But, this paper raises this question: Was that a sign of emotional
intelligence or lack of it? In sharp contrast, Pol Pot has never been reported or seen to
have cried.
Both Lon Nol and Pol Pot appear to have shared one crucial value: stoicism, “the
fact of not complaining or showing what you are feeling when you are suffering”
(Hornby, 2000, p. 1488). Pol Pot’s stoicism was consistent with one of his Angkar’s ten
commandments, namely “It is forbidden to show feelings; joy or sadness,” as recalled by
Denise Affonco16 (2005, p. 35), a French citizen who survived the Khmer Rouge regime.
Even love became the target of suppression by the Khmer Rouge revolution, on which

16

She was the only foreign survivor who testified against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in PRK’s Khmer Rouge

tribunal in 1979 and is also a witness at the ECCC. She has worked as a secretary at the French Embassy in
Phnom Penh before it fell to the Khmer Rouge. She made a fateful decision to stay with her husband in
Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge’s takeover in 1975.
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will be elaborated under the section on empathy (e.g. Yathay & Man, 2000 and Becker,
2010). As for Lon Nol, he “hardly ever laughed. He said to me many times, ‘Life is
capricious. You only have one life, so you’d better use it well instead of laughing and
wasting it” said Chhang Song (Wallace, 2009a, p. 26). “He was very stoic–there was no
sign of tears, nothing,” Chhang Song said of Lon Nol’s reaction when told that his
brother Lon Non had been savagely murdered by the Khmer Rouge (quoted in Strangio,
2010). Pol Pot, as well as his Khmer Rouge colleagues, was rarely seen laughing
(Chheng Sorn, 2009). If he did, he would laugh quietly. They both sometimes smiled the
Cambodian smile (smile without showing one’s teeth), called “half-smile” by Meyer
(1971) and Chandler (e.g. 1999a) or “quarter-smile” (“Pragmatic Cambodian leader,”
1970) (as opposed to grin).
The stoicism of Pol Pot and Duch, S-21 Director, came to light when the latter
recited at his ECCC hearing a poem called The Death of The Wolf composed by French
poet Alfred de Vigny in 1843, sparking a “tug of war” between his defense team and the
prosecution team (Wallace, 2009b). The defense team argued that Duch simply carried
out his superiors’ orders in a stoic manner. The poem, which according Ros Chantrabot
was on Cambodian school curriculum in mid-20thcentury, depicts the “stoic and silent
death of a ‘sublime’ wolf killed by hunters” (Wallace, 2009b). Pol Pot not only studied
but also taught the poem while a school teacher of French. “I remember [Pol Pot] loved
Alfred de Vigny… He talked about the stoicism of the wolf…. He admired the courage
needed for that kind of death–the courage of dying without crying out,” said Soth Polin
(Wallace, 2009b), a student of Pol Pot’s in the 1950s who became a well-known novelist
and the editor of Nokor Thom, a major newspaper during the Khmer Republic. Pol Pot’s
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stoicism is aptly captured in Gerard Brissé’s statement that the Khmer Rouge “leaders
had teeming brains but hearts of stone” (in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xv) and Short’s assertion
that “[s]entiment has little place in any revolution…. But in Cambodia in the mid-1970s,
the glorification of violent went further. In Pol’s mind, bloodshed was cause for
exultation. Humane feelings were a sign of weakness and should be ruthlessly
suppressed” (Short, 2005, p. 248). Not until during last few months did Pol Pot exhibit
“humaneness” but only about his own suffering. In an interview shortly after his
exclusive interview with Pol Pot, Nate Thayer said:
The only time that he showed any real humaneness was when he talked about,
actually, his own suffering, his own physical illnesses, the sacrifices he made for
the revolution; that’s when he became animated. But when we talked about the
terrible suffering that he had inflicted on his own people, he became very
impassive. It was really rather shocking; it was really rather disgusting. (Holmes,
1997)
The rest of this chapter will be organized by EI components, which will be treated at
varying lengths and in varying depths depending on the data accessible to the author.
Where any EI component corresponds with a bad leadership type and/or a leadership
style, the leadership type and/or style will be incorporated into that component. When the
same pieces of evidence and/or comments point to a number of EI components, those EI
components will be treated in the same section. Still, the evidence and views presented in
each section are not necessarily exclusive to that section. They may be relevant to some
extent to other sections.
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Table 6.2 shows that both Lon Nol and Pol Pot possessed below-average overall
emotional intelligence (4.77 and 4.33 respectively, on a scale from 1 to 10). On average,
Lon Nol fared slightly better than Pol Pot. He fared somewhat better than Pol Pot in 14 of
the 18 EI components (save four EI components such as self-confidence, achievement,
initiative, and influence). These statistics are, for the most part, consistent with the
statistics of the corresponding bad leadership types and leadership styles as well as the
qualitative data presented below.
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Table 6.2

Emotional Intelligence
EI Component

Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

Emotional self-awareness

352

353

5.41

4.47

2.29

3.1

Accurate self-assessment

344

356

4.89

3.74

2.32

2.8

Self-confidence

348

361

5.05

6.38

2.39

3.2

Self-control

352

356

5.2

5.17

2.43

3.2

Transparency

355

365

4.54

3.03

2.51

2.7

Adaptability

345

356

4.62

3.75

2.35

2.8

Achievement

353

365

4.08

4.26

2.38

3

Initiative

351

365

4.42

5.06

2.41

3.1

Optimism

356

360

4.97

4.59

2.43

3.1

Empathy

358

365

4.82

3.11

2.39

2.7

Organizational awareness

354

361

4.82

4.75

2.23

3

Service

351

358

4.52

2.66

2.34

2.3

Inspiration

356

367

4.62

4.58

2.24

3.2

Influence

355

366

4.88

6.08

2.24

3.2

Developing others

348

359

4.48

3.38

2.38

2.7

Change catalyst

191

355

5.73

5.06

2.71

3.3

Conflict management

350

362

4.25

3.59

2.39

2.8

Teamwork and collaboration

351

365

4.64

4.35

2.29

3.2

Average:

4.77

4.33
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Emotional self-awareness
Lon Nol’s emotional self-awareness
Although Lon Nol scored slightly better than Pol Pot in terms of this component
(roughly by 1 point), his score is barely above average (see Table 6.3). The qualitative
data available reveals his weakness in this area.
Table 6.3

Emotional self-awareness
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

352

353

5.41

4.47

2.29

3.1

Soon after Lon Nol’s stroke, Swank notified the State Department that even Sirik
Matak sensed that the general had to step aside. Swank wrote, “[Sirik Matak] said Lon
Nol is obviously not in physical or emotional state to bear burdens of his office; his
articulation is uncertain, and his emotional anxieties are acute, precluding his exposure to
multiple decisions which would be demanded of him” [emphasis added] (quoted in
Shawcross, p. 187). But Lon Nol does not seem to have been aware of his physical
weaknesses and emotional signals. He did not realize the effect of his feelings on himself
and his work performance. For instance, “his mood” determined his unsolicited “tactical
advice” he gave at military briefings. When cheerful, he would give a lecture, sometimes
up to two or three hours, on the Khmer-Mon history. If there was bad news from the
field, he would end the briefing “abruptly” (p. 186).
Lon Nol failed to see the big picture in a complex situation. “While Lon Nol took
care of the military half in considerable detail, it was not always evident that he saw the
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forest for tree. Nor was his stewardship enhanced by his blissful unawareness of
international realities, which caused him no concern” (Kamm, 1998, p. 96). He was a
“nuts-and-bolts man” (p. 97).
Accurate self-assessment
As Table 6.4 shows, 67.77% and 61.42% of the survey respondents respectively
thought Lon Nol and Pol Pot were incompetent leaders. In other words, Pol Pot
performed somewhat better than Lon Nol on this leadership type. By contrast, according
to Table 6.5, Lon Nol scored somewhat better than Pol Pot (4.89 and 3.74 respectively)
on this component, but still below average. It can be therefore surmised that both leaders
did not have accurate self-assessment of their own competence (or rather, incompetence),
which is corroborated by the qualitative data below.
Table 6.4

Incompetent leadership
Lon Nol

Pol Pot

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

267

67.77

242

61.42

Table 6.5

Accurate self-assessment
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

344

356

4.89

3.74

2.32

2.8
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Lon Nol’s self-assessment
Firstly, it would be helpful to start this subsection with quotes and comments by
some of those who knew and had contacts with Lon Nol and those who have indirect (but
likely accurate) knowledge of his competence. “He wasn’t exactly intelligent…,”
Sihanouk told Kamm three years after his overthrow (1998, p. 94). “I don’t think he [Lon
Nol] is going to survive,” but “we must do something to help him survive,” Nixon wrote
in an April 27, 1970 memorandum to Kissinger (quoted in Deac, 1997, p. 65). Sihanouk
wrote that during his first-ever meeting with Kissinger in Beijing in January 1979,
Kissinger “told me that he, also, wished for the fall of Lon Nol and the return of
Sihanouk…” (in Jeldres, 2005, p. 132). “You must believe that we were favorable to your
returning to power and that we did not like Lon Nol. We liked you,” Kissinger is quoted
as telling Sihanouk (Isaacson, 1992, quoted in Clymer, 2004, p. 24). He is called an
“inept and ailing” general (Karnow, 1983, p. 44), “a man who had many flaws” (Dean,
quoted in Kennedy, 2004, 107), “a leader who was already utterly ineffective” (Rainsy &
Whitehouse (p. 33), “an unlikely war leader” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 128), “a hopelessly
incompetent sycophant and mystic” (Seng, 2005, p. 65), “a weak vassal” (Swain, 1999, p.
19), and “a problematic leader for modern times” (Clymer, 2004, p. 24). “No one would
have picked Lon Nol to lead a modern state,” contended Carney (1989a, p. 31). Lon Nol
and Sirik Matak “prove[d] to be incompetent as leaders of the country” (Osborne, 2004,
p. 173). Probably most accurate is the assessment by Ambassador Swank in his
memorandum to the State Department in August 1973: “But the leadership [Lon Nol] has
offered his poeple [sic] has been vacillating, inarticulate, unforceful, and at times
unintelligent, and his reputation, rightly or wrongly, is now so tarnished that he can
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expect to govern in default of a successor. This is a nation still in search of a leader”
(DoS, 1973a). Similarly accurate is the observation by Charles Meyer, Sihanouk’s close
adviser, whose 1971 book is a “hostile treatment” of the Prince’s era (Chandler, 2008, p.
345) and who had dealt with Lon Nol often. “Finally, reluctantly pushed by Prince
Sihanouk to the foreground, Lon Nol was convinced that he had a national destinty,”
wrote Meyer (1971, p. 270). “In fact, he was none of that. He was withdrawn and full of
confused ideas, expressing himself in obscure parables whose significance only he could
see… [and] capable of following his pet projects with all the subtlety of a bulldozer in the
jungle” (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 196).
Secondly, his educational background and administrative experience, mainly prior
to his coup against Sihanouk, is briefly examined based on Corfield and Summers (2003,
pp. 245-248) if not stated otherwise. Lon Nol had his primary education in Phnom Penh
and went to Lycée Chasseloup Laubat in Saigon for six years where he was good at
sports, especially boxing and soccer. From 1934 –when he completed his formal
education –to 1945, Lon Nol held such posts as a magistrate in Siem Reap province, a
policeman, and a district chief in KompongCham province. Unlike the other top leaders
of the Khmer Republic (In Tam, Cheng Heng, and Sirik Matak), Lon Nol never attended
Cambodia’s Royal School of Administration (Corfield & Summers, 2003). Not until
1945, when the Japanese briefly occupied Cambodia, did Lon Nol go into national
politics; Son Ngoc Thanh, the Prime Minister of the pro-Japanese government, appointed
him governor of Kratie province and later chief of the national police. After the French
returned and Thanh was arrested, he was named governor of Battambang province in
1947.
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After having founded a conservative party called the Khmer Renewal (or
Renovation) Party (Parti de la Renovation Khmere) with Nhiek Tioulong in September
1947 and become its general secretary, he unsuccessfully ran as the Party’s candidate for
KompongCham in the National Assembly elections of 1947 and 1951. In January 1950,
he was tasked with heading investigations into the assassination of the Democrat Party
leader Ieu Koeus but “managed to bungle the entire police effort” (p. 246).
The year 1952 marked another shift in Lon Nol’s career, when he joined the army
with the rank of lieutenant colonel becoming a full colonel in December 1953 after his
collaboration with King Sihanouk’s “Operation Samakki” (“Solidarity Offensive”). His
party was disbanded and merged into Sihanouk’s Sangkum in 1955. From March 1957 to
November 1961, Lon Nol rose from a brigadier general to lieutenant general; he then
became commander-in-chief of the Royal Khmer Armed Forces (FARK).
In still another career shift, he was selected Prime Minister for the first time in
1966, when his supporters won control of the National Assembly. But he resigned in
1967 (Kerr, 1985) as a result of a peasant uprising in the Samlaut district of Battambang
province, which was allegedly caused by “his heavy-handed manner of dealing with
dissent” (p. 247) and which he “deliberately provoked” (Sihanouk, in Jeldres, p. 88); his
directing of the armed forces to clamp down on the revolt; the disappearances of the
National Assembly members Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim; and of an
“untimely car crash” in which he was seriously injured (p. 247). Not until August 1969
was he reappointed Prime Minister of a newly formed Salvation Government after he had
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set a condition that “he be given full powers” (Sihanouk, in Jeldres, p. 68)17. Despite
having held various administrative positions, Martin (1994, p. 128) wrote that “His days
as an administrator had left an impression of mediocrity.”
Lon Nol was the leader of a nation at war, but as can be surmised above and as
Fielding wrote, Lon Nol was “more of a policeman than a soldier” (Fielding, 2009, p.
223). Moreover, Lon Nol was “essentially a civil servant”; like most high-ranking
military officers, he was awarded military rank when Cambodia created its army in 1953
shortly after its independence from France (Kamm, 1998, p. 104). Before independence,
a minority of Cambodians were trained to be military officers. Jonathan Ladd, Colonel of
Special Forces in Cambodia during 1970-197 and a political-military counselor at the
American Embassy in Phnom Penh, while acknowledging Lon Nol’s hard effort, said in
an interview that “I don’t think he was a particularly astute soldier” (WGBH Media
Library & Archives, 1982). Moreover, “he did not want to be a military leader”; he was
compelled to do so (Corfield, 2009, p. 74). It was not his military skills that earned him
promotions but his “political loyalty” to Sihanouk (Becker, 1998a, p. 120). As one US
military historian maintained, Lon Nol would have been defeated in either Operation
Chenla I or II, had it not been for “US aid, Allied airpower and [the] 11,000 South
Vietnamese troops [still] in south-eastern Cambodia” (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 221)
[Short’s editing]. The Cambodian army, particularly before the coup, was “tiny”
(Shawcross, 1986, p. 59), a “lightly armed ceremonial and civic action body” (Carney,
1989a, p. 31), and was “less effective than the Paris police,” according to its former

Sirik Matak became Deputy Prime Minister (Kamm, 1998) for the first time after having served as
Ambassador to Japan for many years.
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commander Nhiek Tioulong (quoted in Tully, 2005 p. 153). Cambodia’s defense had
been based mainly on the police forces, as encouraged by the French (Shawcross, 1986).
He “could not lead it” when it increased approximately tenfold (Carney, 1989a, p. 31)
despite his military training in the United States (Clymer, 2011). In the fifties and sixties,
a military career was unattractive to most “ambitious” and educated Cambodians; most of
the people who joined the army were peasants (Becker, p. 120).
Thirdly, a few more illustrations of his incompetence are presented here. First is
an account (quoted in Chandler, 1991b, p. 212) by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., Lon
Nol’s “close associate” (quoted in U Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005, p. 171), who
frequently visited Lon Nol in the hospital in Honolulu after the latter’s stroke in 1971 and
with whom Lon Nol often corresponded and had good rapport. Lon Nol proposed that the
United States build a dam across the Mekong River18 north of Stung Treng province near
Laos in order to “stop the NVA from using the water.” He said US troops should patrol
the dam, to “internationalize the war,” in Chandler’s words, in case of a Vietnamese
attack. He made no mention of what might happen to the water. Admiral McCain
forwarded this proposition, termed “unworkable idea” by Chandler, to his superiors
without comment. Second, two weeks earlier, Lon Nol told McCain that he wished to
convene a Buddhist conference in Phnom Penh with participants from Thailand, Laos,
and Burma, to discuss the Communist peril. Sirik Matak, whom Lon Nol urged to
implement this idea, forwarded it to a committee; such a conference never took place.

One of the world’s great rivers that begins in Tibet, China and ends in then-South Vietnam crossing
Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia in between.
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Third, Lon Nol had another far-fetched idea that he revealed to Prime Minister
Long Boret, Chhang Song, Kang Keng, his physician, and a few closest associates a few
days after his arrival in Bali, Indonesia in April 1975, en route to Hawaii. Here is a brief
description of his “last-resort strategy,” which he ordered Long Boret to carry out (quoted
in Chhang Song, 1997). The strategy was to turn the coastal resort city of Kompong Som
in the Gulf of Thailand, 225 kilometers (approximately 140miles) from Phnom Penh, into
a Republican secessionist zone. He literally dictated the strategy as follows:
1. Khmer Republic troops must withdraw from Phnom Penh immediately.
2. All Khmer Republic troops (infantry, navy, and air force) must fight their
way out of Phnom Penh along National Road #4, rendezvous with one
another at the area called Doh Kanhchor, and altogether push their way
towards KompongSom.
3. Pro-Khmer Republic civilians in Phnom Penh must leave Phnom Penh and
travel under the protection of FANK troops until resettlement has been
arranged along the coast of the city.
4. The General Staff must communicate with each other the fight out of
Phnom Penh to be carried out within four days. (Chhang Song, 1997, p.
81)
“With our back to the sea, we will find it easy to move troops. We can choose to
escape at once, to attack, or to stay still watching people taste Communism with the
‘other side.’ More important than escape, it will be easy to bring in reinforcements and
war materiel from the sea. Easy for external intervention. It will be easy for our warships
and those of our allies to land and help us…. It will be even more convenient to evacuate
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people from there than any other place,” Lon Nol added (p. 82). Chhang Song wrote that
at first, he had found it difficult to understand “a measure that required the Khmer
Republic troops to retreat to Kompong Som on the ‘volunteerism’ of the command of
each army unit up to a division” and he questioned its merits; only some 20 years later
did it dawn on him that it was an “eminently sensible strategy” (p. 86), an assertion that
has not been corroborated. Furthermore, while living in Hawaii, he drew up plans to
create a government in-exile and to return to power, but the plans had no “real support”
(Strangio, 2014, p. 14).
Fourth, his incompetence appears to have been associated with or caused to a
considerable extent by his unshakable belief in occult. Following his spiritual adviser’s
orders, he instructed his military helicopters to sprinkle magic sand19 at main strategic
locations throughout Phnom Penh in order to make them “safe from attack” (Pratt, 1984,
quoted in Maguire, 2005, p. 44) or, in Becker’s words, to “ward off enemy” (1998a, p.
15). According to Chhang Song (1997, p. 148), the magic sand was meant to form a
magic line so that the enemy would not cross it and enter Phnom Penh. He likely
considered himself playing “the role of a Buddhist messiah” (Harris, 2006, p. 165).
Described by Becker (1998a, p. 120) as a “religious reactionary,” Lon Nol believed
himself to be the “leader prophesized by Lord Buddha himself to lead a war” to save
Buddhism in Cambodia (Becker, 1998a, p. 124) or “the instrument chosen by higher
powers to lead the Khmer nation” (Harben, 1972 p. 1). The high Buddhist priests of

According to Strangio (2014, p. 14), not only magic or “blessed sand” but also holy water were sprinkled
from the helicopters by Buddhist monks. This is more plausible because customarily it is monks or holy
men who do the blessing.
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Phnom Penh who backed Lon Nol after the coup even regarded him the “future Buddha”
who had come to “save the country from Sihanouk [,] an advocate of Mara [Buddha’s
legendary enemy]” (Sihanouk, in Jeldres, p. 42). He was keen on strengthening
Buddhism in Cambodia and Asia (Harris, 2005) and on forming an anticommunist
alliance within Southeast Asia (Chandler, 1991b). “If communism comes, Buddhism will
be completely eliminated” was the slogan Lon Nol used to advance his cause (Chandler,
1991b, p. 212). Calling the war with his enemies a “holy war,” Lon Nol said on the
Khmer New Year’s Day in 1971 that “For a year we have fought the expansionist Thmil
[atheists]… Our Buddhist religion will survive for five thousand years as preordained”
(quoted in Thion, 1993, p. 12).
Fifth, unlike Sihanouk –who was articulate in both English and French, not to
mention Khmer –Lon Nol, who could not speak English, was not. Kamm, who also spoke
French, made the following observation about this deficiency:
[Lon Nol’s] elliptical nature of his discourse, his fondness for employing the full
riches of the French language in empty phrases, his softness of voice, and the long
pauses in midphrase that marked his conversation were the despair of his foreign
callers, especially Americans expecting direct answers to blunt questions. They
were rarely sure whether they had understood or been understood, or whether the
head of the government had finished what he intended to say and their turn to
speak had come. (Kamm, 1998, p. 98)
Similarly, Chhang Song, who accompanied Lon Nol “all the time” after the fall of
Phnom Penh, said of Lon Nol in an interview: “A slow talker. He thought deeply and did
not just say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a question” (quoted in Wallace, 2009a, p. 26). Perhaps largely
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due to Lon Nol’s weak communication skills and solitary life style, Kamm wrote “Lon
Nol established no meaningful communications with American leaders, on whom his
country depended…” (1998, p. 98). He never received an invitation to Washington to
meet with Nixon while they were war allies.
Finally, many of the aspects of this EI component are examined here. First, he
was unaware of his own limitations and strengths, most importantly his physical, mental,
and emotional impairment after the stroke. With his stroke, “it was clear that firm
leadership from Sirik Matak might save the Khmer Republic” (Corfield & Summers,
2003: 384). “Mild schizophrenia, paranoid type; symptoms –neologisms, world salad,
delusions of grandeur and persecution; IQ about 105,” William Harben wrote in his diary
of Lon Nol’s diagnosis (quoted in Tully, 2005, p. 159). After admitted to Tripler General
Hospital in Honolulu, he was diagnosed with “diabetes, hypertension, and a cerebral
thrombosis of the right middle cerebral artery with complete paralysis of the left arm and
partial paralysis of the left leg. His speech was moderately impaired and he was
nonambulatory” (quoted in Deac, 1999, p. 101). To prove that he was “physically and
mentally normal,” Lon Nol always showed public guests his youngest daughter, who was
born one year after he had a stroke (Chhang Song, p. 148). According to a New York
Times reporter writing in 1974 (cited in Deac, 1999), Lon Nol believed that the birth of
his fourth child was caused by Geritol, the high-potency rejuvenator he had seen
advertized on television and which he was excited about while convalescing in Honolulu.
He asked for it and received its continuous supply through the US Embassy in Phnom
Penh. “When the war was raging and Cambodia needed a vigorous leader, the Marshal’s
illness severely constrained his movement, confined his planning and issuing of orders to
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the Chamcar Morn Palace, and prevented him from monitoring the development of the
war and from visiting troops directly” (Chhang Song, 1997, p. 147). In Chhang Song’s
view, Lon Nol’s illness played a major role in the regime’s military defeat. But, when he
asked Lon Nol about this issue while in exile, Lon Nol answered with rhetorical
questions: “How about [South] Vietnamese leaders who have lost the war? Do they have
an illness like I do?” (p. 148). Moreover, Chhang Song asked Lon Nol about his
superstitions, especially concerning the magic sand, of which many foreign journalists
always made fun. Lon Nol replied: “Mr Chhang Song, these are superstitions. If you
don’t believe, there are others who do… I’ve led a nation where there are people who
believe in such superstitions. It wouldn’t hurt to hold these superstitions” (p. 148). Lon
Nol related to Chhang Song some “great” miracles, one of which seems to have
reinforced his belief in occult and his own supernatural power. This “miracle” took place
one night in late 1940s after he, as a rookie military officer, had led a battalion in an
operation. He and his soldiers started to set up and sleep in camp beds in mosquito nets
on the ground near a Buddhist pagoda’s dining hall. After he and many soldiers had
fallen asleep, there was a rainstorm with high wind. All the soldiers moved their bed sets
to the dining hall and slept there, instead. But Lon Nol and his bed set, which was in the
center of the ground, was not affected whatsoever by the storm. Neither rain nor wind
touched his him or his bed set. Amazed, no soldier dared to wake him up and let him rise
himself in the morning. He had slept soundly and had not known about the storm. He said
he himself was still puzzled by this great miracle. “He always said he knew that based on
modern science, these ‘nonsense’ superstitions are not to be believed,” Chhang Song
recounted (p. 149). Although a substantial number of Cambodians, especially peasants,
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believe in superstitions, and more so in the Lon Nol period, (e.g. Short, 2004; Tully,
2005), Lon Nol was overly superstitious; he “outdoes his subjects” (Gayn, 1973, p. 13).
Besides, he tended to interpret in his favor phenomena widely believed by Cambodians to
be bad omens. For example, one night in November 1972, lightning hit the Phnom Penh
stupa, which housed the Buddha’s relics, causing its top section to cave in. “This was
widely regarded as an ill omen” for the Khmer Republic (Clymer, 2004, p. 43). However,
in his mind, this phenomenon was a sign that the Cambodian monarchy would end,
Richard Nixon would be reelected, and the republic would survive. “We hope he is
right,” Ambassador Swank wrote (quoted in Clymer, 2004, p. 43). “But it was the
skeptics who were right,” Clymer wrote.
Perhaps, Lon Nol’ lack of awareness of his own shortcomings, his superstitions,
and his belief in his own greatness led Sihanouk to state that while in exile in California,
Lon Nol “might not have lost hope to make a comeback as a victor and a ‘savior’ in the
ancient kingdom of Kambu [ancient name of Cambodia]” (Sihanouk, 1986, p. 47).
Sihanouk went even further to suggest that “it is likely that Lon Nol stole the [Sacred]
Royal Sword20 from the Royal Palace so as to ensure the sustainability of his power over
the nation” (p. 47). This speculation is consistent with Lon Nol’s own remark in Bali,
Indonesia, en route to Hawaii. He said he would remain President of the Khmer Republic
but would not return immediately to KompongSom or Phnom Penh; he would prefer to
live on the Rong Samlem Island south of KompongSom in the Gulf of Thailand with 50
blood relative soldiers as his body guards. “In the future, Khmer Republic troops might

The Royal Sword is a “symbol of Cambodia’s prosperity and an object that brings blessings (Sihanouk,
1986, p. 46).
20
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attack Phnom Penh to rescue the people there if they find out that the ‘taste’ of
Communism is not as delicious as they predicted,” he added (Chhang Song, 1998, p. 83).
Moreover, Lon Nol’s misconcenption about his greatness as a leader started much earlier,
in March 1971. “Lon Nol began to consider himself a great leader, but he was over his
head and gradually revealed his mediocrity” (Martin, 1994, p. 131). If he had any regret,
it came too late–in 1979, four years after his regime’s collapse, when he moved to Los
Angeles. “If there’s one man who can help Cambodia, it’s Samdech; I beg you, help
Sihanouk,” Lon Nol told the Cambodian military officers living in the US whom he had
assembled [emphasis original] (quoted in Martin, 1994, p. 131).
Second, he displayed neither a gracefulness in learning nor his willingness to
welcome constructive criticism and feedback. For instance, Keo Ann, Dean of the Law
Faculty and later a presidential candidate, was sacked as Dean for criticizing Lon Nol for
widespread official corruption and Sirik Matak for what Keo An thought was an attempt
to reinstate the monarchy in a speech attended by Cheng Heng and Buddhist Patriarchs
(Corfield, 1994). Although the Government’s official reasons were that he frequently did
not show up at work and ignored his paperwork, the real reason was Lon Nol and Sirik
Matak’s fear that Keo An would use his legal position (one of the highest in the country)
to disturb the debate on the draft Constitution (Corfield, 1994). Finally, he did not know
when to seek help and where to concentrate in nurturing new leadership strengths. This
failure might have been caused in part by well-intentioned frequent letters of
encouragement from Nixon. In one such letter, Nixon wrote, “I again expressed my
respect for the enlightened policies and national solidarity which have prevailed in past
months and repeated my confidence in your selfless leadership” (US DoS, 1973d, p. 2).
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Pol Pot’s self-assessment
Like the subsection on Lon Nol, this subsection begins with some notable
quotations about Pol Pot’s competence from a few individuals who have direct
knowledge of him and several others who have commented about him. First is a very
favorable quote from Khieu Samphan, which will be repudiated by others’ statements and
facts: “In a word, Pol Pot represented the historical leader who was never wrong when it
came to making important decisions” (Khieu Samphan, 2004, p. 63). A few years later in
an interview for the documentary film Survive in the Heart of the Khmer Rouge Madness,
Khieu Samphan acknowledged Pol Pot’s strength as well as weakness:
I met Pol Pot, that is Saloth Sar, for the first time at the Steung Chinit River. I had
known Saloth Sar when he and I studied at the same school in Kompong Cham
province. But I didn’t know he was a party secretary or leader. Not only I. No
body knew because Saloth Sar was never known to be bright or have high
qualifications… In the first meeting with him, I and everybody else like Hu Nim
and Hou Yuon… recognized his analytic capability. We were surprised. Before
we had known Saloth Sar only as a good violin and soccer player. (Saidnattar,
2009)
The rest are negative. “Pol Pot and Ieng Sary’s mistake during the second Vietnamese
blitzkrieg (1978-1979) was to close down all Phnom Penh’s foreign embassies as General
Giap approached the capital. All diplomats from nations friendly to the Khmer Rouge left
on January 6, 1979. The Vietnamese entered Phnom Penh the next day, but there was no
one left to alert the world of their presence in the capital and the rest of the country,”
asserted Sihanouk (1980, pp. 87-88). Hun Sen (1991, p. 216) wrote of “a massive
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mismatch between Pol Pot’s ambitions and true competence, which was a factor for his
genocidal acts.” Vollmann (2005, p. 10) wrote that “Perhaps the problem is that Pol Pot
was mediocre in almost every sphere: a failed technical student, an uninspired military
leader who wasted the lives of his troops in badly planned offensives and ignored
emergencies, a misguided ruler. In sum, Pol Pot would exert little claim on our attention
were it not for the fact that millions died through his cruelty and incompetence.” Pol Pot
and his lieutenants were not “intellectuals or theorists” (Kamm, 1998, p. 135). According
to Chandler (1999a, p. 55), Pol Pot’s fierce loyalty to the CPK and “manner allowed him
to rise higher than was warranted by his abilities.” And finally, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng
Sary, Son Sen, Ta Mok, and Ke Pauk “were neither peasant, nor technicians, and the
most that they could have become in life would have been minor civil servants, or simple
primary school teachers” (Locard, 2004, p. 66).
Next is a summary of Pol Pot’s educational background and experience, which is
largely based on Corfield and Summers (2003) if not indicated otherwise. In 1934, at age
9, he spent between six months (Corfield & Summers) and a year (Short, 2004) as a
novice monk at Botum Vaddei Pagoda, a Buddhist monastery of the Thammayut order,
about one hundred meters south of the Royal Palace. In September 1935 (Short) or 1937
(Corfield & Summers), having left the pagoda earlier that same year, Pol Pot started the
Ecole Miche, a French-medium Catholic primary school. Due to his poor academic
performance, he did not finish primary school until 1943 instead of 1941; he was already
eighteen (Short). Having failed an entrance exam for the Lycee Sisowath, Cambodia’s
oldest and prestigious high school, he was “fortunate” to be admitted to the College Preah
Sihanouk, a junior high school in KompongCham province, 50 miles north-east of Phnom
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Penh (Short, p. 28), where Lon Non became his “closest friend” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 19),
with whom he played soccer, for which he was talented. At both schools, according to his
schoolmates, he was a “mediocre student” (e.g. Short, p. 31; Chandler, 1999a, p. 4; Ngor
& Warner, 2003, p. 431). In 1947, having passed the College’s examinations, he was
admitted to the Lycee Sisowath, which “was no small achievement” for a “decidedly
average student” like him; the lycee admitted only 120 students per year (Short, p. 36).
But in 1948, both Sar and Non failed an exam, called the brevet, for promotion to higher
levels. Whereas Non could go to France for his further education thanks to this parents’
financial support, Sar went to the Technical School at Russey Keo, in Phnom Penh’s
northern suburbs, to study carpentry, which was considered the “easiest subject” (Short,
p. 43). “Most students used to look disdainfully at the boys at the Technical School. No
one wanted to be seen with them,” Khieu Samphan recalled (quoted in Short, p. 42). In
the summer of 1949, he obtained the brevet d’etudes techniques, “the highest academic
qualification Saloth Sar ever achieved,” and was awarded a government scholarship to
study radio technology at the Radio-Electricity School in France (Short, p. 45). But given
his “plodding academic record,” Sar obtained his scholarship “through influence”
(Becker, 1998a, p. 54), likely through his connection with the Democrat Party, which
controlled the Ministry of Education, according to Mey Mann, also a scholarship student
(Heder, 1997, cited in Chandler, 1999a). Having a re-sit at the first year’s final exam, he
passed. But in 1951, he failed his second year’s final exams; he was longer interested in
his studies. Radio technician was not what he aspired to become. “The first year there I
made great efforts and became a fairly good sudden. Later, I joined the progressive
student movement. As I spent most of the time on struggle activities, I did not attend
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many of the classes at school. I attended the technical school less during the last two
years. The state then cut short my scholarship, and I was forced to return home, where I
secretly joined the struggle movement in Phnom Penh,” Sar admitted for the first time to
the Yugoslav journalists in March 1978 (DC-Cam, 2007, p. 8).
While his formal education–which might be called a “motley training for life” or
“variegated education” (Short, 2004, p. 44)–is somewhat comparable to Lon Nol’s, his
administrative experience21 is even more limited than Lon Nol’s or, according to
Chandler (1999a, p. 167), non-existent prior to becoming DK’s Prime Minister.
Revolution was Sar’s new-found purpose in life. After his forced return to Cambodia in
1953, he joined the underground Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). He
campaigned for the Democrat Party in the 1955 parliamentary elections, where
Sihanouk’s Sangkum won nearly all seats. In 1956, he became a teacher of geography,
history, and civics at a private lycee called Chamroen Vichea in Phnom Penh while
working as the chief secretary to KPRP Secretary, Tou Samouth (Chandler, 1999).
According to Soth Polin, a former student of his, Saloth Sar was actually a French
literature teacher in 1957 but “later claimed to have been a history teacher, in order not to
appear to have been an advocate of the colonialists’ culture” (Soth Polin, Colvin, &
Leong, 2004, p. 21). It was possible that Sar obtained the teaching post because of his

By 1989, a decade after he was outsted as Cambodia’s prime minister, Pol Pot’s leadership of his DK’s
resistance movement might have improved. Roger Normand, field editor of The Harvard Human Rights
Journal, based on his interviews with “several of Pol Pot’s former student-commanders,” wrote positively
about his leadership. “From these interviews, a picture of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge emerges that does
not fit the standard Wstern image of an unstable demoagogue leading an army of killing machines who are
universally rejected by the people of Cambodia. Rather, one sees a disciplined, devoted and efficient
political/military movement, guided by a highly educated and politically savvy leadership, under the
unquestioned control of a charismatic ruler, and commanding the support–both voluntary and coerced–of a
significant portion of the population” (Normand, 1990, p. 198).
21
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schooldays friendship with Lon Non and his family connections with Prince Norodom
Chantaraingsey (Chandler, 1999), who supported Lon Nol after the coup but later fell out
of his favor.
In 1960, he was elected to the No. 3 position on the Central Committee of the
newly renamed KPRP, Workers’ Party of Kampuchea (Kiernan, 2004). In 1963, one year
after Tou Samouth’s “mysterious disappearance” (Lim, 2010, p. 290) in July 1962, Sar
was elected Secretary of its Permanent Committee. Nuon Chea, who was deputy
secretary and briefly acting secretary (Corfield & Summers, 2003) did not challenge Sar
for the position (Kiernan, 2004)22. So Phim did but was beaten “not by a vote but by
opinion,” according to Tea Sabun, a member of the Party (quoted in Kiernan, 2004, p.
200). Tou Samouth’s disappearance, which opened up possibilities for Pol Pot’s ascent to
the top post, remains a mystery because controversy still exists over who was responsible
for or involved in his disappearance. One theory, which is held by Chandler (1999a) and
Khieu Samphan (2007) and which was presented by Pol Pot himself, is that it was
Sihanouk, Lon Nol, his then-police chief, or Lon Nol’s secret police, was implicated.
Another theory, which is advanced by Kiernan (2004 & 2008) and seems more coherent,
is that it was Pol Pot or his group that was implicated. “The Pol Pot group have never
explicitly denied responsibility, and all the evidence, although circumstantial, points to
their involvement” (Kiernan, 2004, p. 198), “even if only by tipping off Sihanouk’s

Pol Pot made a false claim to the Yugoslav journalists in 1978 that he became the Party’s Deputy
Secretary in 1961 (DC-Cam, 2007). He only became Acting Secretary in the wake of Samouth’s
assassination. As Deputy Secretary, Nuon Chea was passed over as a result of rumors that he was still in
touch with his cousin Sieu Heng, a senior CPK member who had defected to the government (Chandler,
1999a & Corfield & Summers, 2003). By contrast, Nuon Chea said it was he who requested that Pol Pot
become secretary general. “I wasn’t the right man to lead the party,” Nuon Chea said he had told Pol Pot
(Lemkin & Thet Sambath, 2009, 10: 15).
22
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police”(Kiernan, 2008, p. 13). The evidence Kiernan offers includes Pol Pot’s “hostility
to Samouth, and his attempt to disguise it” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 14) and Lon Nol’s and his
government’s likely unwareness of Tou Samouth’s death (Kiernnan, 2004). Even seven
years after the demise, Lon Nol reported that Tou Samouth was the leader of the CPK
(Kiernan, 2004). Khieu Samphan (2007) concludes that killing Tou Samouth would not
have benefited Pol Pot reasoning that the two were in agreement about establishing a new
Khmer political party that was in alliance with Vietnam but not under its control and that
despite being third in rank, Pol Pot had played the Secretary role since the Party Congress
in 1960. “… Pol Pot always demonstrated his analytical skills and [Tou Samouth] and
Nuon Chea invariably accepted his analysis” (Khieu Samphan, 2007, p. 141). By
contrast, Kieng Sieu Lim (Lim, 2010), a Chinese national who migrated to Cambodia in
1960, joined the CPK, and lived under the the Khmer Rouge period, recounts “the inside
story” of the escape to Vietnam of Pen Sovann, a key CPK member who became the first
Prime Minister of Cambodia after the fall of the DK period. The story was told to him by
a Khmer Rouge female cadre who had been in turn told by a Vietnamese cadre. Having
suspected the claim by Pol Pot, Pen Sovann and his group secretly launched an inquiry
into the death of Tou Samouth. The party’s discovery of this activity led to the arrest of
Pen Sovann, who later could make it to Vietnam.
Sar was given political and military training and a “positive view of the Cultural
Revolution” in Vietnam and China in 1965-1966 (Corfield & Summers, p. 336). He
secretly renamed his party the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in 1966, whose
existence he did not reveal until September 1977. The CPK was formally disbanded in
1981. Pol Pot was replaced by Khieu Samphan as the nominal leader of the DK
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government in December 1979 and officially retired from politics in 1985 at the age of
60. Son Sen took over as Commander-in-Chief and Khieu Samphan became President of
the Khmer Rouge’s civilian wing, renamed the “Party of Democratic Kampuchea”
(Short). It was announced publicly that Pol Pot would play an “advisory” role (Short,
423). However, after his official retirement, which Sihanouk called “a farce” (quoted in
Short, 2004, p. 423), Pol Pot was DK’s real leader until shortly before his death in 1998.
“And it was certainly true that, Like Deng Xiaoping in China, Pol continued to be the
movement’s ultimate authority, even without any official position,” Short wrote (p. 234).
The following are several examples of Pol Pot’s limitations as DK’s leader.
Sihanouk wrote in 1980 that “Pol Pot and Ieng Sary never seemed aware of their
regime’s many Achilles heels” (Sihanouk, 1980, p. 74). For instance, “[w]ithout the
Chinese government’s wise advice and diplomatic help, Pol Pot’s army would have been
even easier for Gen. Giap to beat” [emphasis original] (p. 81). This could extend to their
own Achilles heels and limitations in both military and civilian matters. But, in an
interview with Playboy in 1987, Sihanouk appears to have contradicted himself when he
said “Pol Pot is a very, very good military leader and strategist. He has succeeded in
making his troops the best guerrillas in the world –even better than the Vietnamese”
(quoted in Warner, 1987, p. 78). Sihanouk’s 1980 statement seems more accurate because
his 1987 statement was made in the following context. He was the president of the
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which consisted of FUNCINPEC,
which he headed, Son Sann’s KPNLF, and Pol Pot’s Party of Democratic Kampuchea.
Since its formation in 1981, his resistance government was engaged in warfare against
the Vietnam-backed People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The withdrawal of
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Vietnamese troops from Cambodia did not start until 1988 and was complete only in
1989; and the Paris Peace Accords were not signed until two years later. The statement is
also consistent with statements made by others. “[Pol Pot] never joined any military
operation or ambush. He knew only how to use a pistol. He was a theory teacher and an
orator” (Dreyfus, 2000, p. 79). Likewise, Short wrote, “But Pol, unlike Mao, had never
led his men into battle. He was a political, not a military strategist” (Short, 2004, p. 304).
As commander-in-chief, he was unlikely involved in day-to-day military decisions;
however, he was “undoubtedly responsible for strategic decisions,” political and military,
including the Khmer Rouge’s so-called “storming attacks” (Chandler, 199a, p. 92) on
Phnom Penh in 1973, 1974, and 1975.
One prime example of his military incompetence is his order to launch an all-out
attack on Phnom Penh at the peak of the rainy (as well as flood) season in 1973,
according to US military intelligence (cited in Short, 2004), with a view to take the
capital before August 1973, when the US Congress-sanctioned bombing halt was to come
into effect. The conditions for the attackers could not have been worse; the capital was
surrounded by flood. “[A]t least 30 per cent” of the 20-25,000 men (or half of the Khmer
Rouge main forces) were killed, as the offensive was driven back in late July, thanks
mainly to US bombing (Short, p. 249 & Chandler, 1999a). The government troops’
casualty rate was equally horrifying, according to Sosthene Fernandez, Commander-inChief (cited in Short, 2004). According to Chandler (1999a), because of the rains, the
Khmer Rouge units had to withdraw from the capital, which was already under their
siege, even when the US bombing ceased on August 15, 1973. Khieu Samphan wrote
that, together with the Khmer Rouge’s ammunition shortage, the US bombing played a
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major role in their defeat and that owing to their great losses they were “no longer able to
launch a final assault against the capital” until mid April, 1975 (Khieu Samphan, 2004, p.
110). The real goal of the offensive was not to humiliate the Americans, as they had
thought, but to “force the hand of the Vietnamese (Short, p. 249), an assertion consistent
with Khieu Samphan’s statement: “Following their much-repeated mantra, they chose to
‘be in charge of their own destiny and that of the nation” (Khieu Samphan, p. 110).
“Pol’s insistence on an all-out assault at the height of the rainy season… was certainly, in
military terms, futile and showed total disregard for the lives of his own men,” Short
contended (p. 249). But it was not only the rainy season, the munitions shortages, and the
US bombing that prevented them from capturing Phnom Penh. “[Their failure] was in
part because they had not yet developed an effective command and control structure, full
strategic mobility or communications security,” wrote Shawcross (1986, p. 296). It took
more than a year for the South-Western zone troops who were the hardest hit to recover
from the attack (Short, 2004), which was in part why they failed to take Phnom Penh in
their second storming attack in early 1974, several months after the bombing stopped.
Additional causes for the failure include the Khmer Rouge’s “still inadequate” command
and control structure, the “uncoordinated piecemeal fashion” of their attack, and their
inability to “replace casualties fast enough” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 320).
The Khmer Rouge’s military victory over the Lon Nol regime on April 17, 1975
did not owe as much to their and their leaders’ skills and strengths as they had claimed.
Pol Pot himself, “the architect of the assault on Phnom Penh” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 103),
was boastful: “in the whole world not a single person believed us. Everyone said that
assaulting Phnom Penh was easy, assaulting the American imperialists wasn’t easy; [our]
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guns had no shells or powder: we had shortages like that. No one guessed we could do it”
(quoted in Chandler, 1999a, p. 102). They “overlooked American war weariness,
Vietnamese help, and the terminal illness of the Khmer Republic” (p. 103). Conditions in
1975 were favorable to them: the disconnection of all roads to Phnom Penh by their
troops in late 1974; the retreat of Republican troops on the eastern bank of the Mekong to
the capital; their planting of floating mines from China in the river in January of 1975,
which resulted in its closure by the government to navigation (p. 102). If any Khmer
Rouge leader deserved most of the credit for that victory, it seems to have been Ta Mok,
the ruthless South-Western Zone leader and commander. Pol Pot’s ex-body guard Phi
Phuon recounted an intriguing exchange at celebratory lunch several hours after they
captured Phnom Penh at his forward base at Sdok Toel (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 265).
“Without me, you wouldn’t be anywhere near taking Phnom Penh,” Mok said, belittling
the military skills of Son Sen and Vorn Vet. Pol Pot “tended to pay more attention to
Mok’s views than those of the other two,” Phi Phuon observed.
Perhaps, the best example of Pol Pot’s military incompetence was his fateful
decision to “provoke” an all-out war with Vietnam in 1978, an action, as Kiernan (2004,
p. 392) contended, that “was to fly in the face of history.” He made and followed through
this decision while accelerating internal purges, particularly of military commanders, thus
further weakening the Khmer Rouge army. It was this provocation that would ultimately
cause DK’s demise. “At the end of December 1977 and early 1978 the KR had to take a
Vietnamese counter-offensive…as a punishment for the numerous and cruel incursions
by the Polpotean ‘yuthea’ in Vietnam’s frontier provinces” (Sihanouk, 1986, quoted in
Oats, 1994, p. 79). This provocation must have been inspired by what Short (2004, p.
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376) called Pol Pot’s “own idiosyncratic view” of the dispute and its possible ultimate
solution that he had explained to Chairman Hua Guofeng of China in late September,
1977.
The nature of the Vietnamese army has changed. They’re no longer willing to
bear hardships and to surfer as they did before. Now they rely more on arms —
artillery, tanks, aircraft. Their infantry isn’t strong. Their soldiers and officers are
degenerate, they don’t want to fight any more. Most of those who’ve come from
the North have found themselves a new wife in the South, sometimes two wives.
Like that, how are they going to fight?…. From a strategic point of view, only the
development of the revolutionary movement in South-East Asia will really solve
this problem. Otherwise, the difficulties between Cambodia and Vietnam will go
on for who knows how many centuries . . . We have united with the Burmese,
Indonesian, Thai and Malaysian [communists] . . . and in the North we have
China to support us . . . This is our strategic beacon. [Short’s editing]
(quoted in Short, 2004, p. 376).
Pol Pot was also ignorant of economics. In a Central Committee meeting, he said
“if we have a million riels, we use it all for national construction and defence . . . [Other
socialist countries] spend half of it on wages and only half on building and defending
their country. That puts them half a million riels behind us” [Short’s editing] (Short,
2004, p. 308). People like Thiounn Mumm, who was the first Cambodian to graduate
with a PhD in economics from the Polytechnique in France, and Khieu Samphan, who
holds a PhD in economics from the University of Paris (Kiernan, 2004), “kept their
mouths well shut,” Short wrote (p. 308).
175

Had Pol Pot accurately assessed his own strengths and weaknesses, he would
probably not have remained in power for almost two decades after his regime’s demise.
In his press release entitled “The True Fact about Pol Pot’s Dictatorial Regime 19751978” on September 8, 1996, Ieng Sary wrote very critically of Pol Pot and his regime.
With regard to his erstwhile boss-cum-brother-in-law’s competence, Ieng Sary asserted
that:
All Pol Pot has ever done has been exclusively done to bolster his dictatorial
power, because he has always considered himself as an incomparable genius in
military strategy, in the economic field, in health, in the composition of songs, in
music, in dance, in culinary art, in fashion, in everything, without forgetting the
art of lying. He is a god on earth. All the editorials he has written for the radio of
Democratic Kampuchea have always been signed: the nation and the people of
Kampuchea. (quoted in Locard, 2004, pp. 9-10).
Locard said this statement above “must contain much truth since it is an
established fact” that Pol Pot wrote, among other works, two national anthems and the
main national slogans that characterized overall DK policies (p. 10). In that same year,
Ieng Sary had broken with Pol Pot, defected to the government with his followers, and
was pardoned by then-King Sihanouk for his 1979 conviction. Talks of a Khmer Rouge
tribunal did not start until 1999, when Ieng Sary issued a statement challenging the merits
of such a tribunal. Ieng Sary’s statement is corroborated by Suong Sikoeun’s observation
in his 2014 memoir that Pol Pot made certain decisions solely to show his power, like
getting engaged in foreign policy in order to diminish Ieng Sary’s role (cited in Vachon,
2014).
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Had it not been for opposition and discouragement from his commanders, as his
former personal secretary Mey Mak revealed, Pol Pot would have ordered the preparation
and organization of his troops to take Phnom Penh again by the end of 1989 (cited in
Brinkley, 2011). As mentioned elsewhere, Pol Pot acknowledged his regime’s mistakes,
but without being specific. He said things like “the line was too far to the left”; the
movement had been fledgling, “drunk with victory and incompetent” and had not been
capable of governing the whole country; and more importantly, he had trusted in people
too much, “who made a mess of everything…” (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 418). However,
he never claimed personal responsibility for the so many deaths under his rule, “nor did
he repudiate the policies that had caused them” (p. 418).
Because Pol Pot claimed that his policies had produced “brilliant results,” it was
doubtful to Kamm that his subordinates “ever reported to him facts that would have
contradicted” those results (1998, p. 142). Moreover, in the DK period, criticism and
particularly, self-criticism became a virtue. CPK Central Committee meetings always
started with criticism and self-criticism sessions where weaknesses and strengths were
analyzed before moving to the business at hand (Short, 2004). However, the fact that Pol
Pot, together with Nuon Chea, was exempted from such sessions and that he was the
uncontested leader reduced his chance of self-examination and self-improvement. Suong
Sikoeun claimed to have been told that he was “casting doubt on the abilities of the
leadership” when he proposed correcting recurrent errors he had detected in Pol Pot’s
speeches and other documents (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 247). Consequently, it seems
likely that Pol Pot deprived himself of useful criticism and feedback.
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Finally, although it is not certain whether Pol Pot knew when to ask for help, it is
certain that he simply did not ask for help. In January, 1978 Sihanouk, no longer DK’s
head of state and under house arrest, wrote to Pol Pot offering to help with the defense of
Cambodia against the mightier Vietnamese army, but the latter turned down the offer
(cited in Chanda, 1986). Pol Pot did ask for the prince’s help on January 5, 1979, just two
days before the Vietnamese and Cambodian anti-Khmer Rouge troops captured Phnom
Penh and declared victory. He asked the prince to plead Cambodia’s cause before the UN
Security Council in New York (cited in Short, 2004). Sihanouk accepted the request and
after his “rousing speech in Cambodia’s defense” was able to convince the Security
Council to vote to “condemn Vietnam’s aggression” (p. 403). But it was too late for his
regime’s survival, although, of course, the Vietnamese intervention saved millions of
Cambodians from the regime’s genocidal acts. About a year later, Sihanouk wrote:
At United Nations headquarters in January, 1979, a good number of diplomats…
assured me that if the Khmer Rouge had empowered me to handle the painful
Kampuchea-Vietnam crisis at the opportune moment, “there would have been a
way out.” Even the Chinese leaders went so far as to tell me how bitter they were
about not being able to persuade the Khmer Rouge leaders (Pol Pot and Ieng
Sary) to avail themselves of my services. (Sihanouk, 1980, p. 66).
Self-confidence and self-control
Chandler used the terms “pride,” “vanity,” and “self-deception” to describe Pol
Pot and Short (2004) used “hubris,” “overconfidence,” and again “self-deception” to
describe the Khmer Rouge leaders, especially Pol Pot. This is consistent with the findings
of this study as can be seen in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. Among the three components of self178

awarness, only Pol Pot’s self-confidence was slightly above the average. He certainly
possessed an element of self-confidenc, that is a self-assurance that allowed him to stand
out in his group, and nothing else. The overconfidence of Pol Pot and other DK leaders
was one of the causes for Cambodia’s “egregious tragedy” (Short, 2004, p. 4). Therefore,
self-deception, not self-confidence, was what Pol Pot had. And because of his selfdeception, self-pity, and vanity, he failed to face “what he had done and what had
happened to Cambodia in the process” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 187).
Table 6.6

Self-confidence
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

348

361

5.05

6.38

2.39

3.2

Table 6.7

Self-control
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

352

356

5.2

5.17

2.43

3.2

Of the three components of self-awareness, Lon Nol fared worse than Pol Pot
only in terms of self-confidence. Apart from his religious belief that he had been chosen
to lead a religious war against the non-believers (Becker 1998, and Chandler, 2008), he
lacked self-confidence as well as self-control, a component of self-management. He was
a “poignant, unconfident figure, out beyond his depth. On several occasions,
contemplating what was happening to is country, he burst uncontrollably into tears”
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(Chandler, 1991b, p. 215). “Lon Nol himself often acted out of fear,” wrote Ambassador
Dean (2009, p. 95).
Chandler (1999a, p. 151) wrote that Pol Pot’s embodiment of the “ideals of
conduct,” including “self-control” made him charismatic to “many” Cambodians who
were in his presence. He was described as “unruffled” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 40; Short,
2004, p. 265) and “composed” (Non Suon, quoted in Chandler, 1999a, p. 198),
“restrained” (Ngor & Warner, p. 432), and as having “equanimity” (Becker, 1998, p. 425
and Chandler, 1999a, p. 107). Pol Pot rarely used violence. Y Phandara, a Khmer Rouge
cadre, reported only one occasion where Pol Pot kicked Vorn Vet so violently that he
broke his leg (cited in Kiernan, 2008). Becker described Pol Pot’s equanimity in her
interview with him in 1978 as follows:
This was the man who said he preferred to “live in the calm”… A man who could
wreak havoc in his country for the larger good only the party could perceive, and
could do so with equanimity. Not once, during a violent attack on Vietnam and
the Soviet Union, did Pol Pot raise his voice or slam his fist on the arm of the
chair. At the most he nodded his head slightly or flicked his dainty wrist for
emphasis. (Becker, 1998, p. 425)
These observations contrast sharply with his rating (5.17) given by the survey
respondents, rending inconclusive the assessment of his performance of this component.
Nonetheless, it is essential to note again that Pol Pot is widely considered an evil leader
and had learned to hide his feelings when he stayed at the Royal Palace in his teens,
according to Suong Sikeoun (Al Jazeera, 2008), and especially his anger behind his
“smooth” face and “unruffled smile,” according to Ieng Sary (quoted in Short, 2004, p.
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338) or what Chandler called a “deceptively smooth psychological surface” (Chandler,
1999a, p. 15). Furthermore, Pol Pot ordered the killing and persecution of millions of
Cambodians under DK and the gruesome murder of Defense Minister Son Sen, his longterm comrade, friend, and colleague, and his extended family in 1997.
Transparency
Despite being different, integrity and transparency are logically linked. Integrity is
made possible by transparency, which is “an authentic openness to others about one’s
feelings, beliefs, and actions” (Goleman, 2011b, Loc 1644). Transparency is an essential
element of integrity (Johnson & Ridley, 2008). Conversely, according to Bennis,
transparency “encompasses candor, integrity, honesty, ethics, clarity, full disclosure,
legal compliance, and a host of other things that allow us to deal fairly with each other”
(in Bennis, Goleman, O’Toole, and Biederman, 2008, p. vii). Bennis also wrote that
“integrity is the most important characteristic of a leader…” (2009, p. xviii).
When asked to choose leadership types that characterized the leadership of each
leader, nearly 73% of the survey respondents chose corrupt leadership for Lon Nol but
only roughly 30% of them chose this leadership type for Pol Pot (see Table 6.8).
Conversely, when asked to rate the transparency level of each leader, they rated Lon Nol
and Pol Pot 4.54 and 3.03 respectively (see Table 6.9). Put differently, in terms of
integrity, which is largely the opposite of corruption, Lon Nol fared markedly worse than
Pol Pot; but in terms of transparency, Lon Nol fared slightly better.
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Table 6.8

Corrupt leadership
Lon Nol

Pol Pot

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

287

72.84

119

30.2

Table 6.9

Transparency
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

355

365

4.54

3.03

2.51

2.7

Two important points can be made in this section. First, based on both the
quantitative and qualitative data, both leaders performed below average on this EI
component of transparency. Second, although only a small minority of the respondents
thought Pol Pot was a corrupt leader, the qualitative data points out that both Lon Nol and
Pol Pot were corrupt leaders (Lon Nol was far more corrupt in a material or financial
sense). What corrupted the two leaders: power or their character or both? Lord Acton’s
dictum that ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” is widely
quoted, particularly by Americans, according to Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, who contends
that it is a “clear but false idea” (1990, p. 317). “A good man will not be corrupted by
power, and a bad man will be corrupted with no power at all,” he wrote. Nonetheless,
borrowing Lord Acton’s aphorism, which Chandler (in the foreword of Yathay & Man,
2000, p. xvi) claimed “is true about the Khmer Rouge,” Yathay wrote about the Khmer
Rouge’s revolution that “Absolute power had corrupted absolutely” (2000, p. 1972). As
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the following evidence shows, the two leaders appear to have been corrupted by both
their power and character.
Lon Nol’s transparency
Lon Nol vowed to eradicate corruption after he overthrew Prince Sihanouk (Pin
Yathay & Man, 2000). Ironically, corruption prevailed in his regime, as elaborated above.
The worthwhile question is: Did corruption also prevail in his leadership? There is little
doubt about, as Kellerman contends, “Bad followers mirror bad leaders. If leaders are
incompetent or corrupt, so are at least some of their followers” (2004, p. 237). Becker
(1998a) wrote of Lon Nol’s “incompetence, corruption, and illusions” (p. 129). Joel
Brinkley, a Pulitzer-Prize winning author, called him Cambodia’s “richly corrupt prime
minister”; and before his departure for Paris and his dismissal, Sihanouk often
commented that Lon Nol and his fellow Cambodians were “more patriots of the dollar
than patriots of Cambodia” (quoted in Brinkley, 2011, p. 30). Although material or
financial corruption is part of moral corruption, moral corruption does not always entail a
material or financial dimension. Hence, the two types of corruption will be addressed
separately.
Lon Nol’s material/financial corruption
What follows is based on Chantrabot (1978, p. 100) if not indicated otherwise.
Bribes were paid to either government officials or people close to them. There are
accounts of Lon Nol’s second wife’s corrupt practices (he married the second wife, who
was a lot younger than he after his first wife had died of an illness –whom “he
worshiped” (Martin, 1994, p. 128) and who bore him no child). She never refused any
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bribe from anyone who earnestly asked for a cabinet ministerial or diplomatic post. Many
witnesses confirmed that she spent nearly all her time counting bank notes. Lon Nol
himself acquired a mansion in Hawaii, USA, through a purchase under his wife’s name.
Before the Khmer Republic period, as Defense Minister, Lon Nol and his family
“profited handsomely” from the organization and protection of the transportation of
military aid from China and European Communist countries across Cambodia to their
Vietnamese allies (Kamm, 1998 p. 33). Likewise, Kissinger wrote “… Lon Nol had been
among those profiting from the smuggling trade with the very Communist forces that his
government was now challenging” (2003, p. 132).
The assemblyman U Sam Oeur recounted an instance of Lon Nol’s corruption
(Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005, p. 166) in December 1972, several months after he was
elected President. Lon Nol submitted to a committee of the National Assembly a 121million-riel budget for the construction of a set of protective fences around his
Presidential Palace. But, according to the calculation of some Assemblymen with
engineering background, six million riels would have been more than sufficient.
Concerned that Lon Nol “might take an appropriation of only six million riels as an
insult,” the majority of the committee increased it to twenty million. Despite being a
member of the committee, Sam Oeur opposed the bill during the Assembly’s floor debate
arguing that the government’s scarce resources had better be earmarked for education and
health. “But I didn’t know about the power of the presidency –that you could do anything
you wanted once you got in,” he lamented. Lon Nol eventually got exactly what he had
wanted (121 million riels), although the Assembly had voted against the bill. U Sam
Oeur’s opposition to the bill resulted in his being observed more closely. “To give you an
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idea of the absurdity of the times, Lon Nol started to suspect that I was one of the
communists in the National Assembly because I didn’t have a car” [emphasis original].
Furthermore, Radio Free Asia reported that Lon Nol spent US$25,000 per month on
soothsayers (cited in Sam Oeur & McCullough, p. 160).
Lon Nol’s moral corruption
In his military report, Brigadier General A. P. Hanket, the Chairman of the
Military Study Group, listed five deficiencies in the Cambodian army (FANK), including
“leadership and discipline.” More importantly, “the problem of Lon Nol,” as Shawcross
termed, underlay these shortcomings. The report is worth quoting extensively below:
He is a political figure and uses the FANK for political as well as military ends.
He insures that promotion and good assignments go to the loyal officers, not all of
whom are capable. He ignores normal staff procedures, in many instances, going
to officers whom he knows and trusts. … This proclivity of the Marshall to ignore
the established command/staff system makes the development of an effective
chain of command and a functioning staff at FANK HQ difficult if not
impossible. Field commanders bypass the HQ or ignore HQ directives to the
extent they believe their political affiliations will allow. … If malaise, nepotism or
weakness is allowed to exist at the top it will pervade the entire organization.
[emphasis added] (quoted in Shawcross, 1986, p. 231)
A combination of Lon Nol’s two main deficiencies made him “rather more dangerous”
but did not enable him to be “very effective”: (a) being a “fool” as always regarded by
Sihanouk, according Charles Meyer, the prince’s French adviser, and (b) having a
“certain guile” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 185). He took advantage of the country’s military
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and political turmoil, as Slocomb (2006, p. 383) wrote “The worsening war situation and
ongoing political crises were grist for Lon Nol's mill.”
Over the years, Lon Nol “bought” a lot of “loyalties” in the military officer corps,
which he sought to retain by allowing and “indeed enourag[ing] military corruption”
(Shawcross, p. 185). For example, in the second semester of 1972, in order to acquire
more loyalty from his officer corps, he gave regional commanders permission to increase
their “recruiting levels.” The consequence was that by the end of that year, payrolls
jumped by 50,000 (p. 228). Many soldiers were not paid for months or paid in arrears.
When these soldiers and their families were on the verge of riot, the Ministry of Defense,
the most corrupt institution, would “demand” more money from the Ministry of Finance;
Lon Nol approved these demands, and “the money had to be found or printed”
(Shawcross, p. 227).
Lon Nol appointed many people military officers without taking into
consideration their personal attributes (Chantrabot, 1978). For example, a small business
owner was appointed a captain. Another businessman who was known to have been
involved in smuggling was suddenly promoted a major and an adviser to Lon Non (Nokor
Thom, 1970, cited in Chantrabot, 1978). In a cable to Washington in May 1972 (Harben,
1972, pp. 7-8), William Harben reported a magazine article about a monk who claimed to
have produced “magical scarves” that could protect soldiers from injury and to have
weekly meetings with Lon Nol to “discuss state affairs.” By Buddhist rules, monks
cannot engage in violent activities let alone become an army officer. However, the
Marshal appointed him a captain in the Cambodian army and gave him an Opel car,
which was “curious in view of this clerical status” (p. 8). There was a culture of impunity
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in Lon Nol’s regime. He “was unable to discipline his officers” (Imam, p. 282). For
instance, Lon Nol reinstated Sek Sam Iet, the governor of Battambang province who was
“widely considered” one of his most corrupt commanders and who had recently
experienced military defeats (Shawcross, 1986, p. 326). Lon Nol did that after he briefly
transferred the governor to another post, on Ambassador Dean’s insistence that the
governor be removed.
One of Lon Nol’ most significant morally corrupt behaviors was his rigging, in
collaboration with his younger brother Lon Non, of the Republic’s only presidential
election in May-June, 1972. Lon Nol was involved in this election fraud (Chantrabot,
1978). Even during its campaign, Lon Nol claimed that if he were defeated in the polls,
all U.S. aid would “immediately be suspended” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 234). Washington
neither denied (Shawcross) nor affirmed it. Lon Nol occupied himself with redeploying
troops, so he entrusted campaigning to his brother and supporters in FANK (US DoS,
1972, cited in Corfield, 1994, p. 145). Before the election day, all provincial governors
and military commanders received orders and missions to secure a victory for Lon Nol
(Chantrabot, 1978). Keo An’s presidential nomination deposit was “embezzled”; had
Queen Kossamak not supplied the money for his second deposit, he would have been
unable to run for the Presidency (Corfield, 2009). Concerned about growing student
support for Keo An, Lon Non organized a “lavish reception” at Phnom Penh University,
where he gave their leaders watches, which had been donated by the US for his soldiers,
and promised them good salary (p. 146). To mitigate corruption allegations, Lon Non told
the audience “When people ask you about the corruption –tell them even the monks have
to eat” (Oeur Hunly, 1990, quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 146).
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The electoral system allowed for opportunities for “abuse” and “corruption”
(Corfield, 1994, p. 142). Instead of a single ballot, each voter was given the photos of the
three presidential candidates at the polling station. They put the photo they had chosen in
an envelope and drop in the ballot box. They trashed the others in the bin provided.
Besides, troops could cast their votes in their barracks, public servants at their offices,
and workers at their workplace (Khmer Ekkaraij, 1972, cited in Corfield, 1994). To
complicate the matter further, the military was more partisan and “many officers were
Lon Nol appointees, and close supporters of him or his brother” (Corfield, 1994, p. 146).
Soldiers could vote up to three times and even “boy soldiers” could vote (pp. 147-148).
Officers cast votes for their soldiers in the field, so many troops did not vote in person.
One day before the election, the semi-official newspaper La Republicain promoted Lon
Nol and denigrated In Tam and Keo An on its front page and predicted that Lon Nol
would garner 60% of the votes (Corfield, 1994).
More dramatic was what Lon Non did on the election night after all polls closed.
After the Ministry of Interior announced that Lon Nol trailed In Tam in Phnom Penh, the
largest and most important constituency, by 9% of the vote (42% and 51% respectively),
Lon Non went straight to the Ministry. He ordered his troops to seal the Ministry’s doors
and prevented “any further press releases until the results were ‘verified’ by him
personally” (Corfield, 1994, p. 148). Thappana Nginn, Minister in charge of the Interior
and four other sectors, assisted him. But a Ministry official contacted Sroch Srang Cheat,
whose editor started his “scoop” about “Lon Non rigging the elections” (p. 148). Upon
hearing that they had started to print the article at 0:30 AM, Lon Non went to the
newspaper office and ordered his soldiers to seal the office and collected every copy they
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found. They searched the staff and Lon Non ordered all 2,000 copies seized and later
burned. To silence the editor, Lon Non “offered him between one and two million riels,
as well as a post as Commandant in the Army” (p. 148). The story was never published
again. Lon Non was terrified to learn that his brother had gathered less than 20% of the
vote. After he had “verified” the results, Lon Non permitted the Ministry to publish them.
The official results were: Lon Nol 55%; In Tam 24%; and Keo An 21%. Corfield (1994,
p. 151) claims that “It is almost certain that Lon Nol received less than 20% of the vote,
probably nearer 15%,” thus making In Tam or Keo An the actual winner. Although
Corfield’s estimate may be rather too conservative, sufficient evidence exists that Lon
Nol did not garner 55 percent of the votes. Lon Non bragged that he had increased his
brother’s share of the vote by 20% (Shawcross, 1986, p. 234). Haing Ngor called In Tam
“as honest general who had lost a crooked election to Lon Nol” (quoted in Corfield,
1994, p. 150).
The massively rigged presidential election resulted in animosity among the three
presidential candidates, but especially so between Lon Nol and In Tam, the coconspirators of the 1970 coup and co-founders of the Republic. In Tam, known for his
honesty (e.g. Shawcross, 1986; Kamm, 1998), told Swank why he refused to join the Lon
Nol government after the election. In Becker’s (1998a, p. 133) words, “He said Lon Nol
was a corrupt dictator and an inept military commander. He said it was impossible to
work with Lon Nol when he surrounded himself with evil opportunists.”
Nepotism and cronyism were Lon Nol’s other most serious dishonest behaviors.
He bestowed “immense and grossly misused powers” on his younger brother (Kamm,
1998, p. 57), whom he treated like his son (Kamm, 1998 and Chhang Song, 1997), and
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appointed his personal physician as Minister of Commerce (Gayn, 1973 and Chandler,
1991b), “one of the most lucrative posts of all” (Gayn, p. 34). Lon Nol promoted the
minister presidential adviser after the latter’s resignation as a result of accusations from
the media that he had sold the government’s rice stocks to the Communists (Gayn, 1973).
The minister resigned again after the press exposed “more damning evidence.” Instead of
being prosecuted, “the good doctor was allowed to retire to Hong Kong” (Gayn, p. 34).
Arguing that Cambodia under Lon Nol was an authoritarian society where corruption
existed and Lon Nol himself was corrupt, Kissinger wrote “It was perhaps inevitable that
Lon Nol should lean increasingly on the people he trusted, who tended to be his family,
especially his younger brother Lon Nol” (Kissinger, 2003, p. 477).
Finally, Lon Nol turned a blind eye to unethical behavior in others or, according
to Shawcross (1979), “tolerated official corruption.” Kamm (1997, p. 107) wrote “I doubt
Lon Nol was aware of his brother’s activities and reputation before his stroke or cared
much afterward.” Kamm’s observation is likely true. Before settling for his SocioRepublican Party, Lon Non had also contemplated forming a “pro-Moscow ‘Communist
Party’” with Hang Thun Hak at the helm (Corfield, 1994, p. 160). He even had attempted
to make overtures with the Soviet Union (Corfield, 1994 & 2009). When Chhang Song
told Lon Nol in Honolulu about allegations that Lon Non had been setting up a
revolutionary movement in Orm Laing, a Khmer Rouge stronghold, Lon Nol said he did
not approve or order that. Nor was he aware of it. Days before the fall of Phnom Penh,
Lon Non and his supporters planned a coup to seize power in Phnom Penh but
surrendered to the Khmer Rouge on April 17, 1975 (Corfield, 1994). He, along with other
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Khmer Republic’s leaders like Prime Minister Long Boret and Sirik Matak, was brutally
executed by the Khmer Rouge.
Lon Nol never questioned Lon Non’s political intrigues or his honesty and
integrity. “My brother died in the name of protecting me and the Khmer Republic. I don’t
believe he did anything non-sense against me. [He] was not only my younger brother; he
was like my son,” Lon Nol told Chhang Song (1997, p. 112). He took no action to end the
corruption (Ngor & Warner, 2003, p. 67). Peang Meth wrote “Susceptible to their
flattery, Lon Nol turned the other way to friends and relatives engaged in corruption”
(quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 41). He “permitted other forms of wholesale corruption that
led to a disintegration of morale” (Becker, 1998a, p. 123). He dismissed Cheng Heng’s
plea to stop military corruption.
Pol Pot’s transparency
In material and financial terms, Pol Pot may not be qualified to be a corrupt
leader. Throughout the DK period, he did not possess any significant wealth or
accumulate it for himself or his family, lived quite a simple life, was rarely seen drinking
alcohol either at public receptions or in private (Ngor & Warner, 2003 and Chheng Sorn,
2009). In his biography of Pol Pot, Non Suon, DK’s secretary of agriculture who had
been arrested in November 1976, wrote “Generally speaking, Brother Secretary lived in
the most ordinary and common way, without any frivolity, carousing, or ostentation”
(quoted in Chandler, 1999a, p. 198). Yet, he was guilty of nepotism or what he himself
termed “familyism” and “siblingism” (Short, 2004, p. 347). “Ironically, this type of
nepotism was a prominent feature of DK political life, despite the party’s explicit
antifamily line” (Hinton, 2005, p. 137). He and “his in-laws dominated at the national
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level,” wrote Kiernan (quoted in Wallace & Gillison, 2011). Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were
in-laws; they were married to the Khieu sisters –Khieu Ponnary and Khieu Thirith
respectively (they were not related to Khieu Samphan). Brissé even claimed that the
“Khmer Rouge was a family affair” (in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xviii). Pol Pot secured “good
careers” for his nephews and nieces, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed
by his in-law, Ieng Sary; a nephew of the former’s became the right-hand man of the
latter (Thion, 1993, p. 130). Moreover, Pol Pot awarded coveted positions to Ta Mok and
Ke Pauk, who were not related to him by marriage but who were hardliners and had been
ordinary peasants, the class preferred by Pol Pot’s faction (Hinton, 2005). Ta Mok was
appointed chief of the most populous parts of the Southwest Zone. Ke Pauk, previously
the military commander of the Northern Zone, was installed as secretary of the zone,
replacing Koy Thuon–who had been purged–and as secretary of the newly created
Central Zone from 1977 (Hinton, 2005 & Kiernan, 2008).
Pol Pot and Nuon Chea were exempt from raising criticism and self-criticism that
was required for Khmer Rouge cadres at all levels (Short, 2004), in violation of their own
ideology of classless and egalitarian society. The Central Committee always began their
meetings at Pot’s headquarters with a week-long session where “[y]ou [each member]
had to examine your own thinking, and analyze your failings and your strongpoints,”
Khieu Samphan recalled (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 235). Pol Pot or Nuon Chea led the
session but was not the subject of criticism and/or self-criticism.
Much worse was the abysmal transparency of the DK regime and Pol Pot himself.
A master of concealment, deception, secrecy, he either revealed little or lied about the
CPK, Angkar, and himself during the DK period, hence his reputation for “enigmatic”
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personality (e.g. Chandler, 1999a; Short, 2004). Kiernan (1984) contends that it was his
deceptions that made him retain his power as the leader of the CPK.
A case can be made that Pol Pot lacked authenticity in both his character and
leadership. He changed his name from Saloth Sar to Pol Pot. Many people even thought
Saloth Sar and Pol Pot were two different people (e.g. Kamm, 1998 & Chandler 1999a);
Pol Pot “never admitted that he [was] Saloth Sar” (Kiernan, 1984, p. 2). He disappeared
in 1963 and his siblings, Saloth Nhep in particular, and childhood friends started to know
that he was DK’s Prime Minister only when they saw his portrait at communal dining
halls in 1978 (Chandler, 1999a and Kinetz & Yun Samean, 2007). Foreign observers
recognized Pol Pot as Saloth Sar only when he visited China in September 1977, when he
“revealed the existence of the CPK” (Corfield & Summers, 2003, p. 337). Even
Sihanouk, who was the president of GRUNK and FUNK and later DK’s “nominal head
of state” (Corfield & Summers, 2003, p. 297) from to April 25, 197523 to April 2, 1976,
wrote that he did not know that Saloth Sar was the Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot until
January 5, 1979 when the two met (cited in Gravois, 2001). When asked if Pol Pot talked
about killing, Chea Sim24, president of the ruling CPP and Cambodia’s Senate and “CPK
secretary of Ponhea Krek district” under DK (Kiernan, 2008, p. 56), said, “It is difficult
for us to understand. We saw Pol Pot’s behavior and heard his words, and he did not
seem to us to be a killer. He seemed kindly. He did not speak very much. He just smiled
and smiled…. And his words were light, not strong. In general, you would estimate that

Sihanouk was allowed by the Khmer Rouge to return to Phnom Penh only on September 10, 1975.
Like Hun Sen and Heng Samrin, vice president and honorary president of CPP respectively, Chea Sim
later fled to Vietnam and joined the pro-Vietnamese forces to defeat the Khmer Rouge in January 1979.
23
24
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Pol Pot was a kindly person, simple, with a mass view. But his methods were
confrontational; he was just a killer” (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 58). Ek Un, Pol Pot’s
childhood playmate, gave a similar description of the young Saloth Sar. “He didn’t like to
talk very much. He always smiled,” she said (quoted in Kinetz & Yun Samean, 2007, p.
22). He never revealed his ambitions, as he told Nate Thayer in 1997, “I never talked
about myself… I was taciturn” (quoted in Chandler, 1999a, p. 40). Much of what is now
known came mostly after the collapse of the regime from hundreds of thousands of pages
of their documents they had failed to destroy and the revelations by refugees and Khmer
Rouge defectors like Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea.
He or his subordinates are not known to have read The Art of War by Sun Tzu,
which deals extensively with deception and secrecy/mystery originally in the military
domain and later in the political domain. Nonetheless, Pol Pot and his regime were so
good at hiding the truth about their atrocities that two Americans (Robert Brown and
David Kline) who had gone to Cambodia in April 1978 on what they called “the first
American visit” to the country after Khmer Rouge took power in 1975 still painted a
positive picture of the regime (their book was mainly a photo-record). “To sum it all up,
what we saw was a country totally unlike the negative image projected in countless U.S.
newspaper articles and television programs,” Kline25 wrote (p. 2). “But Kampuchea’s
leaders are even being accused of actions against their own people which have never been
seen in human history!” he added. Indeed, these real actions have never been seen before
in human history. For example, they deemed untrue a report by the CBS Television

25

David Kline wrote the text and Robert Brown prepared the photos.
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Network of a “mating season” (a period when Angkar paired up men and women and
married them in mass-wedding ceremonies). Perhaps the two journalists could not be
faulted. For the DK leaders and their servile subordinates went to great lengths to stagemanage what outsiders could see and could not see, be they journalists or delegations
from other countries.
Not only journalists but also academics were duped by DK leaders, particularly
Pol Pot, one of whom was Malcolm Caldwell, a radical academic from the University of
London who visited Cambodia with two American journalists, Elizabeth Becker of The
Washington Post and Richard Dudman. An active supporter of DK and considered a
“friend” of its, Caldwell was granted an individual audience with Pol Pot while Becker
and Dudman, deemed hostile to the regime, were granted a joint audience (Becker,
1998a). Caldwell and the two journalists returned from their separate audiences with two
different impressions: a sense of rejoice and a “sense of unreality of Pol Pot’s talk”
(Chandler, 1999a, p. 155). Unfortunately, in a fracas at around 1:00 AM the next day
Caldwell and one intruder were shot dead at his guest house. Why he was killed and who
killed him remains a mystery. One explanation is that Pol Pot had the radical academic
killed in order to prevent him from denouncing DK’s revolution (Chandler, 1999a).
Similarly, Suong Sikoeun, a DK spokesman, told Chhay Sophal (2012) in 1996 that it
was likely that Pol Pot was angry with the professor because he showed disapproval of
what he had seen during his visit.
Another foreigner “conned” by DK (De Launey, 2008) was Gunnar Bergstrom
from the Swedish Cambodian Friendship Association who, together with his colleagues,
visited Cambodia, interviewed, and dinned with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and other DK cadres
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in April 1978 roughly a month after DK launched an “international public relations
campaign” (Kinetz, 2007). Because his delegation’s visit to DK had been carefully
orchestrated by DK, he was able to meet “only the well-fed people,” among other
positive sights (Kinetz, 2007). Having believed in Pol Pot, he said “It was a dream …
Here we thought we could have a country with a totally egalitarian society with no
landlords. We thought Pol Pot’s regime had found the solution to the Third World
problem” (Kinetz, 2007). He changed his perspective about DK and Pol Pot, for that
matter, in 1979 only months after the visit. Bergstrom apologized for sympathizing with
the Khmer Rouge regime and went back to Cambodia after his 30 years of absence on a
“mission of redemption and reconciliation” (De Launey, 2008). “I was crazy enough to
support the Khmer Rouge when I came home, and I quieted that voice,” he sighed (De
Launey, 2008).
To DK leaders, particularly Pol Pot himself, the need for total secrecy became a
sacred cow. In his statement to the Danish delegation in 1978, Nuon Chea elaborated
extensively on the vital importance of secrecy:
In this period, after liberation, it is secret work that is fundamental. We no longer
use the terms “legal” and “illegal”; we use the terms “secret” and “open.” Secret
work is fundamental in all that we do. For example, the elections of comrades to
leading work are secret. The places where our leaders live are secret. We keep
meeting times and places secret, and so on. On the one hand, this is a matter of
general principle, and on the other, it is a way to defend ourselves from the danger
of enemy infiltration. As long as there is class struggle or imperialism, secret
work will remain fundamental. Only through secrecy can we be masters of the
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situation and win victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is who.
(quoted in Searching for the Truth, 2001, p. 15).
Part of Pol Pot’s deception was in the forms of exaggerations or distortion of facts, or in
the words of Kamm (1998, p. 134), “spectacular perversions of the truth.” In an interview
with Yugoslav journalists in March 1978, Pol Pot made so many exaggerated claims
about DK’s “outstanding achievements.” The journalists told Kamm in private, in his
own words, that they were terrified even by the “prettified glimpses of reality” lurking
behind their carefully stage-managed visit (1998, p. 135). Probably his most outrageous
claim in late March 1978 was that the “people’s living conditions [had] improved” and
that they had sufficient rice to meet their needs (DC-Cam, 2007), while in fact, their
extreme collective system resulted in incomprehensibly poor living conditions and most
people were starving or died of hunger. Since nearly all adult Cambodians were turned
into slave farmers, agricultural production (rice production, in particular) must have
increased exponentially, resulting in rice surplus for export; but most people, including
the farmers themselves, simply were poorly fed. Large quantities of rice were exported to
China in exchange for weapons and ammunitions (e.g. Sihanouk, 1980; Kiernan, 2008).
Another claim he made was that DK had “succeeded in basically eradicating illiteracy,”
while his regime had eliminated the whole system of education (Kamm, 1998). Most
schools were turned into barns, stables, or “storehouse[s] for cow dung” Kamm (p. 185),
and most school-age children did not go to school because they were forced to do hard
labor, including gathering cow dung. The current author could not start his primary
schooling until age 9–after the fall of the Pol Pot regime. With excessive chauvinism and
racism, the Khmer Rouge ‘khmerized’ formal education too much; as a consequence,
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Cambodian children were taught “almost nothing” and ended up being “ignorant slaves”
(Sihanouk, in Jeldres, 2005, p. 142). His other incredible claim was about the eradication
of malaria, while he himself had recurrent bouts of malaria (Chandler, 1999a & Short,
2004) and malaria was rampant. For example, malaria or famine was the cause of the
deaths of “thousands of children” in a region where Ouk Villa’s (1997, p. 118) sisters
were sent. “[I]neffective herbal remedies” were the only medicine available (p. 118).
According to Laurence Picq, the Khmer Rouge made lying a virtue. “One stubborn truth
in the face of lies of the Khmer Rouge who have made a law out of this advice: Lie and
keep on lying, something will always stick,” she wrote (quoted in Vachon, 2014, p. 2).
It is very likely that Pol Pot excelled in concealing or feigning his true emotions,
as Short (2004) reports that his face was very difficult to comprehend. “[E]ven when he
was very angry, you could never tell. … his face was very smooth. …You could not tell
from his face what he was feeling. Many people misunderstood that –he would smile his
unruffled smile, and then they would be taken away and executed,” Ieng Sary said of Pol
Pot (quoted in Short, p. 338). His silence was even “more ominous”: it could mean his
granting of rare leeway to those he trusted or a “prelude to political disgrace” to those of
whom he had grown suspicious (Short, p. 339). To make the matter even worse, Pol Pot
preferred to be implicit (Short, 2004).
Both Norodom Sihanouk and Ieng Sary acknowledged Pol Pot’s eloquence. “I
cannot help admiring his eloquence,” wrote Sihanouk in his memoir (1986, p. 361). “He
was a master of words. He spoke convincingly at meetings,” Ieng Sary told Kamm (1998,
p. 141). It was likely that Pol Pot’s words were not aligned with his deeds, as Ieng Sary
recalled “Pol Pot spoke only in theory” (Kamm, p. 141). Pol Pot “[spoke] softly [and]
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always with courtesy,” Sihanouk wrote (quoted in Short, p. 338). Similarly, he had a
“soft and reassuring voice” (Becker, 1998a, p. 425). The Khmer proverb “an evil heart,
but an angel’s mouth” (Fisher-Nguyen, 1994, p. 97) seems an apt description of Pol Pot’s
speech. Besides, his words were replete with “obliquity” and implicitness (Short, p. 338).
Kong Duong, who was Pol Pot’s subordinate during the 1980s, recalled Pol Pot’s
obliquity: “He would imply things, so that we would have to think about them
ourselves… it was sometimes very difficult to figure out what he was getting at. So we
were very cautious, because we used to worry about misinterpreting his meaning”
(quoted in Short, p. 338).
Transparent leaders “openly admit mistakes or faults” (Goleman, 2011b, Loc
1644). Pol Pot did not admit most of his mistakes or guilt, especially the most serious
ones. Even Deng Xiaoping –the late President of the People’s Republic of China, DK’s
chief supporter –acknowledged that Pol Pot had wrong policies (cited in Lee Kuan Yew,
2000). For example, when his Four-Year Plan failed miserably, “he refused to
acknowledge fault” (Koopmans, 2005, p. 65). “Pol Pot and his group do not say that they
are guilty but that they are aware of their mistakes,” Sihanouk contended (quoted in
Weiner, 1987, p. 69). To Pol Pot, others were responsible for the failure of the revolution
(Chandler, 1999a). Of his errors, Pol Pot said “We were like babies learning to walk”
(quoted in Chandler, 1999b). “I was too trusting of others” was his reason for “everything
that had gone wrong” (quoted in Heder, 1984, p. 6). Pol Pot “seemed to be saying, ‘If
only I had eliminated the people closest to me at the very beginning, none of this would
ever have happened’” (p. 6). Such was the statement by the man whose “tyranny” caused
“unmatched horrors” (Osborne, 2010, p. 284). Pol Pot even suggested that the revolution
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and foreign pressures on Cambodia necessitated the use of violence (Chandler, 1999a).
All this is contrary to Khieu Samphan’s claim of Pol Pot’s admission of the movement’s
serious failure and his assumption of responsibility for it. According to Khieu Samphan,
at a meeting in March 1979, “[a]s party secretary, [Pol Pot] assumed [responsibility] and
[offered to resign]. But no one accepted it” (2004, p. 90). Even his brother, Saloth Nhep,
suggested that he bore responsibility. “[M]any people died and [he] was the leader, so it’s
difficult to say he’s not responsible,” Loth Nhep said (quoted in Kinetz & Yun Samean,
2007, p. 22).
Pol Pot’s failure to admit responsibility or guilt might be attributed to his fear of
“psychological and physical” consequences, “self-pity, pride, and self-deception”
(Chandler, 1999a, p. 187). His absolute devotion to a vision of Cambodia, and of himself,
and the demands of revolutionary transformation and maintaining power–all these made
many things, including “personal responsibility,” non-existent (Chandler, p 187).
According to Lao Tsu, a leader’s failure to admit mistakes will in the long term result in
self-defeat, which was the case for Pol Pot:
A great nation is like a great man:
When he makes a mistake, he realizes it.
Having realized it, he admits it.
Having admitted it, he corrects it.
(quoted in O’Toole, 2008, p. 70)
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Adaptability
There is a popular Khmer proverb that encourages adaptability and flexibility,
“especially in new situations,” that is “Negotiate a river by following it bends; enter a
country by following its customs” (Fisher-Nguyen, 1994, pp. 93-94). According to
Tables 6.10 and 6.11, both Lon Nol and Pol Pot had limited adaptability. Pol Pot’s
adaptability was even more so. Even when faced with new challenges, change, and new
data and realities, they were not nimble or limber in their thinking and behaviors.
Table 6.10

Rigid leadership
Lon Nol

Pol Pot

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

101

25.63

331

84.01

Table 6.11

Adaptability
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

345

356

4.62

3.75

2.35

2.8

Lon Nol’s adaptability
One day after the 1970 coup, Lon Nol was described in a New York Times article
as “pragmatic, nationalistic and anti-Communist without being dogmatic about it”
(“Pragmatic Cambodian leader,” 1970, para. 2). However, throughout his tenure, only
nationalistic and anti-Communist remained true about him. Lon Nol was a “willful and
obstinate man” (Swank, 1973, quoted in Clymer, 2004, p. 67). In a memo to Kissinger
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about his meeting with Lon Nol about two months after the coup in 1970, Alexander
Haig wrote “…the Cambodian government or at least its leadership [Lon Nol] has burned
its bridges completely and is resolved to hold firm” (1970, p. 1). Comparing Sihanouk
with Lon Nol, Chhang Song said “Lon Nol was his opposite, a one-line person from the
beginning to the end. He wasn’t fickle. He was very, very, very, very extremely loyal to
his ideas and to what is Cambodian” (quoted in Wallace, 2009a, p. 26). In the same
token, Leslie (1976) observed that “… the ideas that Lon Nol espoused are unchanged
from the days when he was president of Cambodia.” Last but perhaps the most important,
his eldest son Lon Rith said that from the beginning of the Republic until the final days of
his life, Lon Nol was always faithful to “the principles that guided” the Republic (Lodish
& Mengleng, 2008, para. 15). On the one hand, Lon Nol could be described as possessing
certain degree of integrity in this respect. On the other hand, Cambodia paid a hefty price
for this attitude. His lack of adaptability as regards peace negotiations with Sihanouk was
perhaps most costly to Cambodia, which will be discussed under his conflict
management.
Pol Pot’s adaptability
Pol Pot never changed or discarded his personal vision and vision of Cambodia,
the latter seemingly colored by the former; he stayed the course he had adopted in the
1950s until the very end (Chandler, 1999a). In a similar vein, Pol Pot had “total
commitment to his cause,” according to Khieu Samphan (2004, p. 115), who also wrote
that “the Khmer Rouge leaders should have… shown more political courage to make
prompt, substantial changes in the policy [on its relations with Vietnam] they had
followed since 1975” (p. 112).
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For example, on January 6, 1978 Pol Pot ordered his troops to conduct incursions
into Vietnam. Twelve days later, Zhou En Lai’s widow, Madame Deng Yingchao, visited
Cambodia in an effort to persuade the Khmer Rouge to change its policy. Pol Pot rejected
both her request for an audience with Prince Sihanouk and her suggestion that Cambodia
endeavor to resolve the disputes with Vietnam through negotiations (Chanda, 1986).
Although Sihanouk wanted to meet her, she was informed that he had no interest in
meeting anyone (Chanda, 1986). She was allowed only to see him riding in a limousine
(Short, 2004). The Cambodian leaders were so furious (Short, 2004) about her reiteration
of China’s support for the Five Principles of Peaceful of Coexistence (Chanda, 1986) that
they responded with “the oblique refutation” in a speech by Nuon Chea (Chanda, p. 211)
and a “public rebuke” in a commentary on Radio Phnom Penh (Short, p. 379) while she
was on her way to Angkor (Chanda, 1986). “We respect and love friends who are good to
us, who respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, and
who deal with us on an equal footing. But our friend-making criterion is not based on
whether this or that friend can provide material aid,” the commentary said in part (quoted
in Chanda, p. 211). “The only solution was to change policy or possibly the leader. Pol
Pot used to be skillfully flexible. But this time his attitude was entirely rigid; nothing
could soften it,” wrote Vandy Kaonn (2012b, p. 89). Prevented from meeting the prince,
Mme Deng was unable to deliver him a letter from his eldest daughter Bopha Devi, who
was residing in Paris, according to her husband Khek Vandy (cited in Chanda, 1986).
Besides, on January 8, 1978 Bopha Devi had sent Mme Deng another letter asking her to
help get Sihanouk out of Cambodia.
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Both Heder (1984) and Chandler (1991a) concurred that the DK leaders,
especially Pol Pot, firmly believed that their revolutionary ideas and policies and
leadership were right. In a closed meeting, while criticizing the Russian and Chinese
revolutions, Pol Pot said that “The standard of the [Cambodian revolution of April 17
1975, raised by Comrade Pol Pot, is brilliant red, full of determination, wonderfully firm
and wonderfully clear-sighted. The whole world admires us, sings our praises and learns
from us” (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 342).
All the four warring factions (the government of the State of Cambodia (SoC)
solely controlled by the CPP, the FUNCINPEC led by Prince Ranariddh, the KPNLF
later renamed BDLP led by Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge’s Party of Democratic
Kampuchea nominally led by Khieu Samphan) signed the Paris Peace Accords on
October 23, 1991 paving the way for the first UN-sponsored general elections in July
1993 after many decades. However, towards the end of March 1993, Pol Pot ordered his
party, recently renamed the Cambodian National Union Party, to boycott the elections;
but in defiance of his order, some local Khmer Rouge commanders permitted some
villagers and even soldiers to vote for the FUNCINPEC (Short, 2004). Phi Phuon, Pol
Pot’s long-time aide-de-camp of Jarai ethnic, was bitter about his boss’s decision:
Most people at that time were against continuing to fight. The vast majority
thought that the Paris accords were the last chance for Cambodia, and the decision
not to take part in the elections shocked them. A lot of us had sent our families to
our home villages, or had children studying in Thailand. Now we were told to
bring them back, otherwise we would be considered traitors. How could Pol Pot
make such a serious error of appreciation about the reality of the situation —
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about the way the people on our side really felt? . . . It was because anyone who
disagreed with him was accused of being ideologically backward, or of falling
under the influence of enemy propaganda. So everyone kept quiet. (quoted in
Short, 2004, p. 433)
He never had a change of heart in terms of fighting (Short 2004 & Khieu Samphan,
2004), which left “many” of those close to him perplexed (Short, p. 433). “He ought to
have known that resuming armed struggle wouldn’t work,” Long Narin, a veteran Khmer
Rouge cadre said later (quoted in Short, p. 433). This rigid attitude, in Khieu Samphan’s
words, “not only prolonged the suffering of the Cambodian people, but also eventually
destroyed the movement” (p. 102).
This conviction had catastrophic consequences. First and foremost, “there was
more prospect” that the killing would speed up rather than slow down (Heder, p. 6).
Second, not only did they fail to alter their policies at all, or blame themselves, but also
blamed “their subordinates and the poor drones” at the lowest echelon (Locard, 2004, p.
300) and enemies’ “sabotage” for any failure (Heder, 1984, p. 6 & Locard, p. 300). All
this contradicts Khieu Samphan’s claim that in a meeting in March 1979, a few months
after his regime’s overthrow, Pol Pot, in the former’s phrase, “assumed full
responsibility” for the revolution’s “serious setback” and offered to resign; but everyone
in the meeting refused (Khieu Samphan, 2004, p. 91).
Achievement
The component of achievement covers such aspects as “high personal standards,”
“performance improvements” for the leaders themselves and their followers, pragmatism,
“measurable but challenging goals” that are also “worthy but attainable,” and most
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important of all, “continually learning –and teaching ways to do better” (Goleman,
2011b). In this subsection, both leaders are appraised against these aspects. Both the
quantitative and qualitative data point to the poor performance of both Lon Nol and Pol
Pot in this component.
Lon Nol’s achievement
As elaborated above, Lon Nol’s Cambodia was a failed state. To most people,
Lon Nol had no important achievement, as Table 6.12 shows. According to Corfield
(cited in Strangio, 2010), what happened in 1970 possibly caused deeper polarization
among the Cambodian population and transformed the “system of political
accommodation” practiced by Sihanouk into “one of confrontation.” Yet, to some,
particularly those with republican leanings, Lon Nol’s Cambodia (or the Khmer
Republic, to more precise) left some positive legacy and therefore Lon Nol had important
achievement. The republican regime was the harbinger of the “spread of liberal ideas and
principles” into Cambodia, Chhang Song said (quoted in Strangio, 2010). Abdul Gaffar
Peang-Meth, quoted earlier, agreed: “Khmers who stood opposed to the Vietnamese
occupying forces espoused Republican ideals. In March 1970 many who took on the
republican cause, many who gave their lives in that struggle, did so not because of
personal allegiance to Lon Nol or Sirik Matak, but because they believed in democratic
principles” (quoted in Strangio, 2009). One author even called the Republic’s
performance “amazing.” “The little they did is already amazing considering the war
conditions,” said Locard (quoted in Vachon, 2010, p. 8).
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Table 6.12

Achievement
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

353

365

4.08

4.26

2.38

3

These different views stem mainly from different interpretations of the coup
d’etat of March 18, 1970. The coup gave birth to the Cambodian civil war and the Pol Pot
regime, according to Prime Minister Hun Sen, and indirectly caused the murder of “over
two million people by Pol Pot,” according to Lu Laysreng, Funcinpec First Deputy
President and former Assemblyman during Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic (quoted in
Strangio & Neth Pheaktra, 2009, para. 4). By contrast, the Cambodian Action Committee
for Justice and Equity based in the US gave credit to both the coup and the Lon Nol
regime for halting an “invasion” of the North Vietnamese (Strangio & Neth Pheaktra,
2009, para. 3).
Unlike Pol Pot, Lon Nol, according to the survey respondents and other sources of
data, was not a pacesetting leader. Therefore, he did not have high standards for himself
or for his followers. Nor was he pragmatic for most of tenure. Overall, his goals were not
challenging with a few exceptions. First, he had an obviously unrealistic and
immeasurable vision or goal of unifying all people of the Khmer race, including those
residing in Laos, Thailand, and Kampuchea Krom in South Vietnam into a greater
Cambodia (Harris, 2004). Second, having failed to calculate any possible risk, he had
what Sak Sutsakhan called a “fairyland ambition” to see the rapid transformation of the
FANK from a very small ill-equipped, and thus weak, army into a “grand armed force”
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resembling the RVNAF or even the U.S. forces (Sak Sutsakhan, 1978, p. 45). To that
end, new recruits were trained for eight days at first, hence nicknamed the “24-hour
soldiers”; later the new recruit training was increased to three months (Vachon, 2010).
Lon Nol’s aim was to attack or defend against the far mightier battle-hardened
Vietnamese forces. “This was a serious mistake on the part of Lon Nol,” said Ros
Chantrabot, who also added that “[The government] was totally disorganized” during its
early offensives against Communist forces (quoted in Vachon, p. 6).
As can be inferred from the foregoing sections, Lon Nol’s performance worsened
over time due in part to his declining health and to his failure to continually learn and
teach and to make necessary changes in both in his thinking and actions despite sound
advice and strong objections. Lon Nol “not only failed to learn from his mistakes, but
compounded them.” (U Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005, p. 168). As elaborated above,
there was only negligible difference in the ways he conducted the two failed Chenla
operations, which were almost 12 months apart. From the beginning till the end of his
life, Lon Nol did not change or modify his attitude towards all Communists. He always
considered them Thmil (a derogatory term for non-believers, and according to Kamm
(1998, p. 95), a term that “evokes religious anathema”) and his actions were true to his
attitude. In the early 1980s, this message of Lon Nol read out by Chhang Song to a small
meeting in Chicago, USA, stated: “People around the world, please stand up to fight
Thmil in order build a freedom where people have equal rights…” (quoted in Chhang
Song, 1997, p. 249). Confrontation, not accommodation, became his modus operandi
throughout. “So long as Lon Nol remained to conduct his holy struggle against the demon
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Communists no cease-fire was likely. A more realistic leader might have tried a path of
accommodation,” remarked Shawcross (1986, p. 235).
Pol Pot’s achievement
As discussed above, Pol Pot was a pacesetting leader; however, the performance
standards he set for his followers, and more importantly, his subjects were far greater
than those he set for himself. Although perhaps worthy, his goals were immeasurable,
overly challenging and unrealistic, hence unachievable because he failed to calculate risk.
As a rigid leader, he was not pragmatic and failed to continually learn and teach new
ways to improve. All the aspects of this component, except the last one, have been
discussed earlier. Thus, only this aspect is addressed here. But before that, further
examination of Pol Pot’s achievements in the sense of results and legacy is now in order.
An anonymous 39-page document26 prepared in December 1986 obtained by the
U.S Embassy in Bangkok in 1988 which, based on “its style and tone,” was authored by
Pol Pot likely for a study session (Chandler, 1999a, p. 165), reveals a good deal of his
thoughts and claims on a wide range of issues, particularly as regards DK’s history and
achievements. He said DK had both “victories” and “mistakes” but the former
outweighed the latter. Democratic Kampuchea was “right on target,” he said. Mentioning
nothing about the Four Year Plan’s failure and, in Chandler’s words, “its enormous
human costs” Pol Pot spoke of the plan in glowing terms: The plan “was moving along
nicely, considering that we had so little capital…. [W]e strove to meet our schedule so
that the Vietnamese would not catch up with us and be our master” [Chandler’s editing]

26

The document was cited in and perhaps translated by Chandler (1999a, pp. 165-170).
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(p. 167). Comparing DK with four 19th-century Cambodian figures who had fought the
French and pointing out that they failed to liberate the country, Pol Pot said, “Between
these heroes and Democratic Kampuchea, which one is better? … Democratic
Kampuchea is far better than any of these historical heroes. We can say that during the
history of Kampuchea for more than two thousand years the virtues, qualities, true
character and value of Democratic Kampuchea are the best” (p. 170). As for himself, he
told Nate Thayer taht “Everything I have done and contributed is first for the nation and
the people and the race of Cambodia…” (quoted in Hinton, 2005, p. 15) and that “without
our struggle there would be no Cambodia right now” (quoted in Chandler, 1999a, p. 183).
Besides mentioning in broad terms various types of mistakes made by DK, he
never placed responsibility for the mistakes on any individual, political group, region, or
policy. Moreover, because it was inevitable, he said, the major mistake was not a mistake
whatsoever. Apparently to downplay DK’s mistakes, Pol Pot said, “in the history of the
world there has never been a country that made no mistakes” (p. 167) and despite its
“mistakes” Democratic Kampuchea fared better than other socialist countries. “Without
using the term (or saying ‘I’) Pol Pot was describing his own enlightenment,” Chandler
contended (p. 170). His party colleagues attributed Cambodia’s achievements to Pol Pot;
other people “found it prudent to say so, because of his frequent resorts to terror” and
because of their desire to keep their positions (p. 149).
Apart from the afore-mentioned so-called achievements Pol Pot claimed he and
DK had made and its other “outstanding achievements” he described to foreign
journalists in late 1978, his subordinates and followers claim oft-cited achievements in
terms of agriculture and irrigation, particularly the still operational “1 January” dam in
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Kompong Thom province, a massive dam built by hundreds of thousands of people
largely with traditional tools. When Henry Kamm asked Ieng Sary in 1980 “to describe
some of the good things” about Khmer Rouge revolution, he was lost for words before
asking Thiounn Thioum27, the minister for economy and finance, to “fill the awkward
gap.” “Agricultural progress,” Thiounn Thioum (or Chhum) said, a “claim belied by the
state of the country that I had toured earlier in the year,” Kamm wrote (1998, p. 138).
Khieu Samphan, considered by some the architect of DK’s economic system (e.g. Pfaff,
1998), wrote, “I saw with my own eyes some of the achievement I had wished for,
especially irrigation in the countryside. Thanks to reservoirs in Trapeang Thmar… and in
Kamping Puoy… there were rice fields for as far as the eye could see” (Khieu Samphan,
2004, p. 114). The former Khmer Rouge cadre Van Rith also agreed with Khieu
Samphan on the usefulness of these reservoirs (cited in Youk Chhang, 2003). In regard to
the controversial “1 January” dam, Ou Bunthsophoan, director of Kompong Thom’s
provincial department of agriculture, said, “People… should think about [its] utility, not
its history” (quoted in Kinetz & Yun Samean, 2007, p. 22). “It is a good achievement for
the country’s development.” But the DC-Cam Director, Youk Chhang, strongly
disagreed: “[The dam]’s not a victory. This has been done over the dead bodies of
millions of people” (p. 22). Democratic Kampuchea’s achievement in terms of irrigation
was greater than that of Sihanouk’s Sangkum; however, it was “at vastly higher human
cost” and the outcomes were “uneven” because technical expertise was not utilized
(Short, 2004, p. 351). Many major dams failed soon after construction.
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The other more common spelling of Thioum is Chum (e.g. Kiernan, 2004 and Short, 2004).
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Another proclaimed achievement of DK is preventing Vietnam’s alleged attempts
to include Cambodia in a “Democratic Republic of Indochina”–later called “Indochinese
Federation” (e.g. Van Rith, in Youk Chhang, 2003; Verges, in Khieu Samphan, 2003, p.
iii) envisioned by Ho Chi Minh’s Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) (Short, 2004, p.
53). In March 1978, Pol Pot said, “[The Vietnamese] did not deal with [the border] issue,
because they had the greater ambition of annexing the whole of Cambodia in the form of
an Indochinese federation in which their people would be settled in Cambodia by the
thousands and millions each year so that within 30 years or more the Cambodian people
would be turned into a minority” (DC-Cam, 2007, p. 6). “Firstly, [Pol Pot]’s a patriot….
he continued to lead a struggle against foreign occupation for years. He’s not a normal
person,” said Tep Kunnal28 in English (Al Jazeera, 2008), his “chief aide and confidant”
in the 1990s who was loyal to him until his death (Willemyns & Reaksmey, 2014, para.
1) and who married Pol Pot’s second wife six months after his death (Chhay Sophal,
2014b). The director of the Health Center of Anlong Veng, a former Khmer Rouge
stronghold where Pol Pot died, said “Pol Pot was a kind man and the only people killed
during the Khmer Rouge time were Vietnamese spies. In the next years people will begin
to see the positive result of what Pol Pot did” (Crampton, 2003, quoted in T. Wood, 2006,
p. 185). However, in Sihanouk’s view, neither Lon Nol nor Pol Pot deserves this credit.
“Lon Nol and Pol Pot will be able to tell their grandchildren that they killed ‘their
Kampuchea’ to save it from Vietnamese domination. Unfortunately, it is all too clear that

Like his late leader, Tep Kunnal, a French-educated intellectual, is unrepentant: “Do I have any remorse?
No I don’t” (quoted in Willemyns & Hul Reaksmey, 2014, para. 21). Now a staunch advocate of capitalism
and modern management, especially Peter Drucker, he is a university lecturer of management and a
salaried adviser to Prime Minister Hun Sen.
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their own anti-Vietnamese mania triggered the Vietnamese threat,” wrote Sihanouk
(1980, p. 57). “Pol Pot and Ieng Sary… are now responsible for the loss of dignity, of
national honor, and for infringements on Kampuchean territory,” he added (p. 106).
Perhaps, Meng-Try characterized DK’s achievements best: “The excessive
optimism manifested by the government is not supported in any way by the facts.
Enforced collectivization, political upheaval, and armed conflicts with Vietnam all led to
results contrary to the proclaimed achievements” (Meng-Try, 1981, p. 217). One of Pol
Pot’s enduring legacies is “the culture of impunity” by which Cambodia is “still hobbled”
(“Pol Pot: Dead at last?,” 1998, p. 38). Another legacy is that Cambodia “lacks a coherent
administration” after his murder of “90 per cent of Cambodia’s intelligentsia and trained
personnel” (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, p. 368).
There is no evidence that Pol Pot continually learned and taught ways to do better.
When the Four Year Plan–which he regarded as a “fait accompli” and which Chandler
considered “slapdash, naïve, and uninformed” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 115)–started to
flounder, he did not consider a possibility that there might be something wrong with the
plan itself. Pol Pot placed ideology above all else; he did not consider the possible flaw of
DK’s party line, the “total opposition” between ends and means and ideology and
practice, and a possibility that radicalization exacerbated “every problem” (Short, 2004,
p. 353). Sabotage by microbes within the Party was the root cause, according to Pol Pot,
setting the stage for purges. “The problem stems from personal factors within the Party…
[Our] revolutionary stance and consciousness are not yet strong… The line must seep in
everywhere until it is effective,” he said (quoted in Short, p. 353). In Short’s words, “The
solution, Pol determined, was to be still more thorough and intransigent.”
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Empathy and teamwork and collaboration
There are three types of empathy: (a) cognitive empathy, the ability to “know how
[others] see things” and willingness to “take [others’] perspective[s]”; (b) emotional
empathy, the ability “to feel with [others]” (Goleman, 2011a, Loc 746); and (c) empathic
concern, one’s ability to perceive others’ need for “some help” and spontaneous
readiness to provide it (Loc 755).
As shown in the Table 6.13 below, according to the respondents, Lon Nol and Pol
Pot fared badly in terms of empathy; Pol Pot fared much worse (3.11 as opposed to 4.82).
These ratings correspond with the qualitative data below. It is noteworthy that empathy
is more important in Cambodia than many other countries–where there is greater
reverence for the authority or power of a ruler or leader rather than the office (e.g.
Chandler, 1995) and where society is hierarchical, particularly during the Lon Nol and
Pol Pot eras and before the advent of the Internet. “Cambodian political life imitates a
hierarchical, absolutist and patronage form, which creates weak institutions…,” wrote
Kim (2012, p. 10). The divine status devaraja (god-king) accorded to kings and queens
from the ancient time, which according to Kim (2012) still persists today, creates vast
social distance between the leader and the led (Mehmet, 1997, cited in Kim, 2012).
Between government officials and citizens there exists “steep power differential, which
prohibits the ability of citizens to claim rights and freedom in the face of official
highhandedness” (Hughes, 2003, quoted in Kim, 2012, p. 9). That is why, ordinary
citizens and subordinates very often do not dare or have the opportunity to raise their
demands, needs, desires, and/or wishes or express their feelings or views directly to their
leaders, especially when they are different from or contradict those of the leaders. This is
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even truer about the DK, in which “planting the kapok tree29” (a Cambodian metaphor
which means “pretend[ing] to be deaf and dump”) could save one’s life (Yathay & Man,
p. 63). Additionally, these two of Angkar’s commandments severely limited the abovementioned opportunity: “Obey Angkar whatever the circumstances” and “Never
complain about anything,” which were quoted in Affonco (2005, p. 35). It is the task and
ability of the leaders to empathize, perceive, or read those needs and feelings.
Unfortunately, both Lon Nol and Pol Pot lacked that ability.
Table 6.13

Empathy
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

358

365

4.82

3.11

2.39

2.7

Lon Nol’s empathy
Lon Nol was described by many as a “devout Buddhist” (e.g. Shawcross, 1986, p.
128; Greenfield & Lock, 1984; Harris, 2005), although his Buddhist belief was “highly
personalized, unorthodox” (Kamm, 1998, p. 94). This is despite a comment by a
Cambodian to a foreign diplomat that Lon Nol was not a Buddhist but a Hindu (Harben,
1972) and his fervent belief in magic and devotion to the occult (e.g. Harben, 1972 &
Becker, 1998a) and his being “extremely superstitious” (Sihanouk, in Jeldres, 2005, p.
66), which is far more in line with Hinduism than Buddhism. The Buddha’s “original
teachings” are devoid of “popular superstitions” (King, 2004, p. 165).

29

In Khmer, the words for the kapok tree and deaf are homonyms.
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Yet, Lon Nol still lacked empathy, a component of an integral Buddhist virtue–
compassion, although his empathy was not as bad as Pol Pot’s. Absent in Lon Nol were
attentive listening and the ability to understand the other person’s viewpoint, which are
the marks of empathy. According to U Sam Oeur, Lon Nol “appeared to be indifferent to
everything” (U Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005, p. 168). His colleagues told him that
Lon Nol “never paid attention to the opinions of ‘outsiders.’ In fact, he wouldn’t take
advice in general” (p. 168). For example, Sak Sutsakhan, Defense Minister during the
final days of Sihanouk’s government and the early period of Lon Nol’s government,
wrote that as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, he had “repeatedly suggested” in the
latter period to Lon Nol that Cambodia’s armed forces be restructured in line with
existing thinking in other nations. But it was not until about a month before the
Republic’s collapse (following Sutsakhan’s reappointment as Defense Minister) that Lon
Nol, “by now convinced but still not happy,” agreed with the suggestion (Sak Sutsakhan,
1978, p. 46). Sutsakhan had fallen out of favor with the Lon brothers in mid-1972 and
been moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a roving ambassador (Deac, 1999),
although it is uncertain if his suggestion then played any part in his transfer. What
follows elaborates on other specific instances of this lack of empathy.
Lon Nol’s lack of cognitive and emotional empathy
First, urged by his brother Lon Non and, according to Short (2005, p. 209) “a
group of intellectuals,” Lon Nol decided to move too quickly to abolish the “1,168-yearold Khmer monarchy” (Kamm, 1970b, p. 116) or “perhaps two thousand years of
monarchical rule” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 90) and install the first republic in Cambodian
history after he had deposed Sihanouk in the coup. Sihanouk wrote that Son Sen had told
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him in March 1973, in the presence of other Khmer Rouge leaders, including Pol Pot,
Ieng Sary, Hu Nim, and Hou Yuon, a story the former called “historic.” Before Son Sen
fled to the jungle, well before the coup, Lon Nol told him during an audience: “Your
Khmer Rouge and my many partisans and I share a common goal. We both feel an
unquenchable hatred for the Khmer monarchy and Norodom Sihanouk. Up to this point
we have chosen and used two different routes to an eventual elimination of these two
abominable enemies… In order to be able to overthrow and replace them, it is
indispensable for us to join forces and coordinate our plans, efforts, and action. I
therefore propose a secret alliance to you” (quoted in Sihanouk, 1980, pp. 11-12). Lon
Nol’s decision shows his being out of touch with reality and a lack of appreciation of
what Ponchaud (1989, p. 176) termed the Cambodian “traditional mindset” and of the
perspectives and moods of the general public, particularly the peasants who usually
account for more than 85 percent of Cambodia’s population. Without a seven-month
delay, the Khmer Republic might have been declared on March 24, 1970, only six days
after the coup. According to a US Embassy cable to Washington dated March 23,
preparations had been made to rename the kingdom the “Cambodian Republic” the next
day, March 24 (Corfield, 1994, p. 82). The delay was caused by pro-Sihanouk
demonstrations (Chandler, 2008).
Short (2005) argued that this decision to proclaim the Republic was a
“monumental strategic error” because the proclamation alienated the peasants (p. 210).
Prince Ranariddh called this move of Lon Nol’s “a big mistake” (quoted in Mehta, 2001,
p. 44). “If [Lon Nol] had been more intelligent, he would have asked one of the members
of the royal family to become king. … But Lon Nol and his people were not intelligent,”
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Ranariddh added. Lon Nol’s reason for abolishing the monarchy and forming a republic
was to make it difficult for Sihanouk to return to Cambodia (US DoS, 1970, cited in
Corfield, 1994).
Cambodia was not ready for a republic. The “monarchy had been an integral part
of the Cambodian psyche, the source of its culture and pride,” wrote Imam (2000, p.
356). “[I]n practice Cambodia was no more ready for republican democracy than England
under Henry the Eight,” in the words of Short (2005, p. 209). Sirik Matak, who earlier
had not been “eager for a Republic” (Corfield, 1994, p. 82) and attempted to prevent this
move (Chantrabot, 1978) to no avail, supported the move only shortly before the
proclamation of the Republic (Corfield, 1994). Keng Vannsak, the former Deputy
Secretary of the pre-1955 Democrat Party who was both anti-Sihanouk and antimonarchy, now became an impetus for the move (Ros Chantrabot, 1978), as he led that
group of intellectuals. The political elite, the majority of whom “rejected” Sihanouk in
the 1970s (Sihanouk, in Jeldres, 2005, p. 43), still strongly identified with the values of
the ancien regime despite their “republican rhetoric” (Thion, 1993, p. 83). Disenchanted
Lon Nol supporters were frequently regretful that “a new king had not been put on the
throne” immediately following their coup (p. 83). If a new king had been appointed, more
popular support could have been “mobilized,” according to Ranariddh (quoted in Mehta,
p. 44), and the result “might have been different” (Short, 2004, p. 209). Ponchaud even
contended that had Lon Nol become a self-proclaimed or anointed king, “he could have
fulfilled the symbolic function of the king and thereby united his people” (1989, p. 176),
a statement with which Thion agreed. By severing all royal connections, Lon Nol’s
republican regime “lost its chance” to unite the nation and “gain legitimacy” even among
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the urban population (Thion, 1993, p. 125). In a similar vein, the US Ambassador to Laos
cabled Washington on March 31, 1970 warning of the danger of any move to form a
republic. He wrote:
We are convinced that a Republic form of Government is undesirable and
untenable at this time. Historically, Cambodia has been a monarchy and the King
considered as a father and/or god image by the rural population. Constitutionally,
the King is the Head of the Buddhist Church. We therefore suggest every effort be
made to get Lon Nol and Cheng Heng to reinstate a real working Constitutional
Monarchy headed by a brother or nephew of the Queen [Sihanouk’s mother].
(quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 82).
Second, soon after Sihanouk’s dismissal–“the event that sparked Cambodia’s civil
war” (Chandler, 1999c, p. 4)–Lon Nol conducted a “smear campaign” against Sihanouk,
whom he denounced as a “traitor,” according to Vannary Imam, a Vietnamese
Cambodian woman of a privileged class who was then about 18 years old (Imam, 2000,
p. 256). Sihanouk was accused of “corruption and other crimes” and his statues were
removed and even buried in pig manure (Ngor & Warner, 2003, p. 44). His portraits in
public places were replaced by those of Cheng Heng, a newly installed head of state
(Kamm, 1998) and those of Lon Nol (e.g. May, 1986 and Yathay, 2000). Not only that,
portraits of him and his mother, the Queen Mother, were torn up and burnt in the streets;
and drawings of his “face were crossed out in red paint” (Imam, 2000, p. 256). Lon Nol’s
campaign also targeted Princess Monique, Sihanouk’s last wife. Imam charged that the
“concern of the whole nation” was reduced to the “level of trifling gossip” over “true or
made-up” details of the Princess’s private life such as “her ex-boyfriends and her origin”
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(Imam, 2000, p. 256). Also harshly criticized were his “personal style of government, his
general political record,” and the private life of his close associates, according to British
Ambassador Fielding (2008, p. 225). “True or false, these were harsh judgments,”
Fielding contended (p. 225).
In the wake of his dismissal, Sihanouk was not certain about his next move (e.g.
Chandler, 2008; Shawcross, 1986; Short, 2004). The morning following the coup, the
Prince said, “I am going to return home and fight” when asked about his post-coup
intentions by Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai, who suggested that the Prince take a day to
ponder (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 198). Earlier, on the day of the coup, during the flight
from Moscow to Beijing, Sihanouk had talked with his wife of going into retirement at
Mougins on the Cote d’Azur (Short, 2004), an option to which he was inclined
(Shawcross, 1986). Vietnam’s Emperor Bao Dai and Egypt’s King Farouk had been in
exile in France. But Sihanouk did not admire these men; exile would make him a coward
(Short, 2004). It was the “vilification” of him by the Lon Nol regime that strengthened
his “resolve” (p. 198). Father Ponchaud observed:
I think Sihanouk would have accepted being overthrown. But the Khmers . . .
don’t understand the difference between criticism and calumny. I used to read the
Khmer newspapers. There were pictures of a naked man with Sihanouk’s head
and a naked woman with the face of Monique. When I saw that, I said to myself:
‘Sihanouk can never accept that.’ That was my immediate reaction. (quoted in
Short, 2004, p. 198)
The following day, Sihanouk told Zhou that he would “fight for ‘justice,’” by
which he meant revenge,” Short contended (p. 198). Although he rejected the accusation
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that he had acted in a “spirit of revenge,” Sihanouk admitted that “I felt profoundly
wounded and humiliated by the dreadful calumnies and humiliations heaped on me by the
clique of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak” (in Jeldres, 2005, p. 106). All these actions “injured
his public image, or face,” which is the “mask of status and dignity that Asians show to
others, who are all wearing masks of their own…. In our language, to insult someone
publicly is, in the literal meaning, to ‘break his face’” (Ngor & Warner, p. 51).
According to the Cambodian traditional mindset, the king was “the key for the
preservation of harmony with the elements” (Forest, 1980, quoted in Ponchaud, 1989, p.
176). To the peasantry, who “had, anyway, always been loyal to Sihanouk” (May, p. 95),
his dismissal meant the destruction of harmony (Ponchaud, 1989). Even after the coup,
“Sihanouk still enjoyed an almost divine status in the eyes of many [Cambodian]
peasants, a status which Lon Nol, as the new President of the Khmer Republic, could not
usurp,” wrote Stuart-Fox and Ung (1998, p. 27). “He was their god-king,” Ngor and
Warner (p. 45) and Lee Kuan Yew (2000, p. 365) coincidentally wrote. Thanks to this
legendary status, Lee Kuan Yet “believed” that “no solider would have dared to shoot
him on arrival at the airport30” if he had returned to Cambodia in the wake of the 1970
coup (p. 365). Even after his abdication, Sihanouk “was the ‘Master of Life’” (Short, p.
209). “The news of [his] fall stunned the nation,” Imam wrote (p. 256). To many peasants
especially, Sihanouk’s dismissal was a “bad omen” for the nation (Corfield, 1994, p. 91)
and the “end of the world as they knew it” (Short, p. 209). “How shall we tend our ricepaddies, now that the King is not here to make it rain?” peasants asked Father Ponchaud

Phnom Penh’s Pochentong International Airport and Siem Reap Airport were closed shortly before the
coup. Sihanouk was still in Moscow when he was overthrown (e.g. Chandler, 1991b).
30
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(quoted in Short, p. 209). “When the prince will return, the rains will start up again as
before,” some peasants would say ten years after his deposition (Ponchaud, 1989, p. 176).
Old people cried while watching his and his mother’s portraits on fire in disbelief that the
“sacred monarchy… could be eliminated so abruptly and ruthlessly” (Imam, p. 256).
His status as a god-king aside, Sihanouk certainly had genuine popular support,
the fact substantiated by many prominent politicians and authors. And Cambodia under
Sihanouk is considered by most an “oasis of peace” and that period a “golden age” by
“many” (Shakespeare, 2013, p. 37). Chhang Song, former Minister of Information under
Lon Nol, said an interview “Prince Sihanouk enjoyed a lot of public support” (WGBH
Media Library & Archives, [year unknown]). “If you believe in democracy, there is no
doubt that Sihanouk basically had the support of the ordinary people of Cambodia,”
Ambassador Dean said in another interview (quoted in Kennedy, 2004, p. 92). “Before
1970, few countries were so united by their leaders as Cambodia was behind Prince
Norodom Sihanouk. His little kingdom was still a marvelous oasis of peace,” observed
Jon Swain (1999, p. 17), a journalist who lived in Cambodia between 1970 and 1975. The
father of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, who first visited Cambodia with his wife in 1962, has
fond memories of Cambodia and Sihanouk of the 60s. “I prefer to remember Cambodia
as that oasis of peace and prosperity in the war-torn Indochina of the 1960s,” he
reminisced in his memoir (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, p. 364). “Sihanouk was an
extraordinary personality, highly intelligent and full of energy and joie de vivre. He had
the airs and graces of an educated French gentleman…,” he commented (p. 365).
Sihanouk said he was “never abandoned” by the “little people” (Jeldres, p. 43), whom he
referred to “the true people of my country” or “those who loved me although they had
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received from me neither money nor honors” as opposed to “those in search of privileges
and power” (Jeldres, p. 39).
When thousands of unarmed peasants demonstrated against the Prince’s
deposition or, according to Ngor and Warner, for at least the restoration of his statues,
“almost everywhere in the country” (in Sihanouk’s own words, quoted in Jeldres, 2005,
p. 161) or “in many places all over the country” (Soonthornpoct, 2005 p. 163), Lon Nol’s
army suppressed the demonstrators and killed “hundreds” of them (p. 27). “Lon Nol
savagely put down the demonstrators by force of arms; his soldiers and even his tanks
massacred them pitilessly by the hundreds,” Sihanouk wrote (in Jeldres, 2005, p. 161).
This is consistent with Kamm’s report that “pro-Sihanouk” uprisings in some main
provincial towns were “harshly put down” (Kamm, 1998, p. 56). In addition to killing
“hundreds of peasants” and “many innocent” onlookers, including “numerous children,”
the armed forces arrested “thousands” of the protestors (Soonthornpoct, 2005, p. 161 &
163). Although the demonstrators had no guns (Ngor & Warner, 2003), the
demonstrations were not always peaceful (Soonthornpoct, 2005); and the government had
casualties, but far fewer. In two demonstrations in Kompong Cham on March 26 and 27
which turned violent, at least three members of the government were murdered: two
National Assembly representatives, Kim Phon and Sos Saoun, and one military officer,
Major Lon Nil, Lon Nol’s younger brother. Lon Nol rejected the notion that most
demonstrations were motivated by peasants’ anger at Sihanouk’s deposition and that
many peasants “were prepared to answer his call to arms,” as Corfield (1994, p. 92)
contended. Instead, Lon Nol said these demonstrations had “signs of careful
organization” and would disappear soon (US DoS, 1970, quoted in Corfield, p. 92). Lon
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Nol did not show any regret over the massacre (Chandler, 2008). But this was not Lon
Nol’s first bloody suppression of protestors; his first was the suppression of the abovementioned Samlaut uprising in April 1967, which “he deliberately provoked” (Sihanouk,
in Jeldres, 2005, p. 88) when he was prime minister. Its death toll varied from fewer than
one hundred to several hundreds (Chandler, 1991b). Accordind to Donald Lancaster,
then-adviser to Sihanouk, a monetary reward was paid for each rebel’s severed head
(cited in Chandler, 1991b). Milton Osborne, a prolific Australian author of Cambodia
who has visited the country since the early 1960s, wrote of Lon Nol’s involvement in the
revolt, in the aftermath of which he resigned as prime minister:
When I returned to Cambodia at the end of 1967 after an absence of just over a
year Phnom Penh talk was full of what had happened. The suppression had been
bloody. Resistance had been met with the greatest possible force. Lon Nol had
been implacable and retribution had ranged from summary executions to the
burning of villages. Ghoulish details were provided of trucks filled with severed
heads that were sent from Battambang to Phnom Penh so that Lon Nol could be
assured that this program was being followed. (Osborne, 2004, p. 43)
On April 19, 1970 the Lon Nol regime announced that all assets of Sihanouk and
his five associates would be sequestrated immediately and on July 3, 1970 Sihanouk was
given a death sentence in absentia in a “show trial” before a military tribunal (Corfield,
1994, p. 103), which “had no jurisdiction” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 204). “No high-ranking
witnesses were called and no revelations were forthcoming,” Chandler wrote (p. 204).
His defense attorney had not seen the indictments before the morning of the trial, which
started at 8:30 am (Corfield, 1994). In August, his wife Princess Monique, called by the
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tribunal as “the very soul of treason” was sentenced to life imprisonment (Chandler,
1991b, p. 204).
Third, Lon Nol was not aware or empathetic of the level of popular support for his
government and himself, which was in dramatic decline (Soonthornpoct, 2005, p. 215)
and which had been corroded by “his own erratic actions” (US DoS, quoted in
Shawcross, 1986, p. 230) and his growing reliance on his brother. As the American
Embassy’s 22-page-long report on Lon Non concluded, “Increased reliance upon Lon
Nol has thus decreased to a dangerous level Lon Nol’s ability to rely on others” (quoted
in Clymer, 2004, p. 69). During the leadership vacuum in May 1971, caused by Lon
Nol’s stroke earlier and his brief resignation afterwards, public sentiment started to flow
in Sihanouk’s direction, and Lon Nol’s popularity started to decline (Chandler, 1991).
This decline in support was more so in the countryside (Criddle & Mam, 1998). Writing
in June 1970, Francois Joyaux, an analyst in Le Monde diplomatique, claimed that “[Lon
Nol’s government] hold the cities, [the Cambodian Government and National Union
Front of Kampuchea of Peking] hold the countryside. The former survive only thanks to
the military aid of the imperialists, and the latter enjoy all popular support. This is a
simple schema, clear-cut, irrefutable…” (quoted in Chomsky, p. 128). Despite the fact
that the putschists, particularly Lon Nol himself, called their coup and their actions
following it a revolution, “[i]t was an upper-class coup, not a revolution,” contended T.
D. Allman, a Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent described by Noam Chomsky
as “one of the most knowledgeable and enterprising of the American correspondents”
(1970, quoted in Chomsky, 2005, p. 100). Even if that had been a revolution, Sihanouk
contended, it was not carried out by “the least favored classes: peasants, laborers,
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unemployed” and thus cannot be compared to the French Revolution, which resulted in
Louis XVI’s execution (in Jeldres, 2005, p. 97). “The nation fought without the loyalty of
its peasants, many of whom were still angry over the removal of Sihanouk,” Criddle and
Mam asserted (p. xxiv). That was also because, as Chomsky pointed out (2005, p. 107),
Lon Nol’s regime was “isolated from the peasantry.” William Colby, former CIA
Director who was then based in Saigon, was certain that Lon Nol was responsible for the
dissipation of popular support and enthusiasm; he had no clue that there were such
problems. Colby told Shawcross in 1977 that Lon Nol “did not seem to grasp the points
being made, giving the impression that they were above his head” when his subordinates
tried to indicate the problems (quoted in Shawcross, 1986, p. 183).
The people were also not on his side in terms of the losing war. “Most important,
the people had lost their will for a long drawn-out battle,” wrote Ambassador Dean
(2009, p. 94). This echoed Swank’s assertion in his only press conference in Cambodia in
1973 that the war was “losing more and more of its point and has less and less meaning
for any of the parties concerned” (Segall, 2010). In addition, there was a sense of
alienation among the armed forces as a result of his interference with battleground tactics
(Shawcross, 1986), which will be discussed below.
The decline in or loss of support for Lon Nol extended beyond the army and
peasantry and the countryside. Cambodian intellectuals, a “small but vital class
indispensible to [Cambodia] in time of crisis” who had welcome the Lon Nol regime,
became disillusioned with the new leadership; consequently, an enormous number of its
“best-trained” people abandoned Cambodia, triggering “brain drain” that went on
throughout the war despite increasingly stricter restrictions on emigration (Kamm, 1998,
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p. 102). These educated elite, who included doctors and other professionals, migrated to
France; those already there simply stayed over (Becker, 1998a). Some of the students
who remained in the country, especially those in Phnom Penh, demonstrated against him
and his government because of his corrupt and dictatorial actions (Shawcross, 1986) and
because the expected democratic reforms did not happen (Clymer, 2004). Also
disillusioned were high-ranking government officials (Deac, 1999). “If we had known
you were going to back a Lon Nol dictatorship, we would have overthrown Lon Nol on
March 18 instead of Sihanouk,” said Hoeur Lay Inn, a presidential assistant, to a US
Embassy officer and a reporter at a social function (Deac, p. 163). More significantly, the
alliance that had deposed Sihanouk had “fallen apart” (Shawcross, p. 231). In particular,
three years after the coup Sirik Matak, the chief coup leader (according to Kamm, 1998
and Chandler, 1991b), became sharply critical of the regime and Lon Nol himself.
Disenchanted with Lon Nol, he proposed that Sihanouk be approached. “He counts for
something in this country… He is a Cambodian, too. If the people wanted him, I would
accept,” Sirik Matak told Kamm (1998, p. 114) while under house arrest. Unlike many
members of the educated elite, Sirik Matak did not quit Cambodia. “Man is born to die. I
will not move. I shall stay here and face everything that happens. [Lon Nol soldiers] can
arrest me. If they kill me, what of it? I stay for my country,” Sirik Matak added31 (p.
114). Moreover, Lon Nol alienated the Buddhists as a consequence of “his authoritarian
actions” (US DoS, quoted in Shawcross, p. 230). Finally, Jacques Decornoy (1970)
reported that even in the town or city centers, his regime had failed in its attempts to

Sirik Matak was executed by the Khmer Rouge in April 1975 after he was forced to leave the French
Embassy, where he had taken refuge.
31
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“organiz[e] truly popular meetings in its favor” (quoted in Chomsky, p. 131). Despite this
reality, “Lon Nol, to the end, solemnly proclaimed that he and his government enjoyed
the ‘unanimous support of eight million Khmers’ and that the only partisans, in no way
disinterested, of Sihanouk were the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese,” wrote Sihanouk
(in Jeldres, 2005, p. 107). One day after the bombing of his presidential palace on March
18, 1973, Lon Nol still claimed in his letter to Nixon that the Khmer Republic was
“created by popular referendum” (US DoS, 1973). As discussed earlier, the referendum
was flawed and the popular support in serious decline. He was likely not aware of
citizens’ general dissatisfaction with his “general mobilization” –for which he had “vague
plans” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 234) and which led to its failure and his defeat in Phnom
Penh in the presidential election of June 4, 1972 (Ros Chantrabot, 1978, p. 70).
Fourth, Lon Nol and Khmer Republic leaders “grievously misread the intentions
of the United States. They…assumed that an ideologically anticommunist America would
support them as a matter of course” (Carney, 1989a, p. 31). That was why, even after he
left Cambodia, he still believed that the US would not abandon the Khmer Republic.
Besides, he believed that the US gave him a “blank check” when they supported the
Cambodian war (e.g. Becker, 1998a, 128 & Rainsy & McCullough, 2013, p. 32). Like his
colleagues, he failed at first to appreciate the need to “inform opinion” in the US; as a
result, not until the spring of 1973 did he replace his first ambassador to Washington who
was a “kindly, elderly traditionalist” who spoke no English with a “bright, tougher,
American-educated professional” (Carney, 1989a, p. 31).
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Lon Nol’s lack of empathic concern
At the heart of Buddhism is one’s willingness to help others, namely compassion,
or more specifically empathic concern. Compassion “is the Buddhist emotion par
excellence” (Humphreys, 1993, p. 108). That is why the Buddha is also called the
“Compassionate Buddha” (Easwaran, 2008) or the “All-Compassionate One”
(Humphreys, 1993). “Buddhism is also a combat of all forms of suffering … This
temporal and dynamic aspect of Buddhism is expressed, finally, in man’s will to go
beyond himself, in his personal search for truth, as well as his sacrifices to help his fellow
man…” (Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxi). A devout follower of Mahayana Buddhism, which
stipulates that enlightenment results from the marriage between wisdom (pranja) and
compassion (Chandler, 2008), King Jayavarman VII got ill more often from the illness of
his own subjects than from his own illness because it was their suffering, not his own,
that became his suffering (Coedes, 1934, cited in Tranet, 1996). “This was a very
important idea in civilization and statecraft,” wrote Coedes (quoted in Tranet, 1996, p.
60). Compassion seems to be even more important for national leaders, particularly in
hierarchical societies of generally docile people like Cambodia. As Humphreys (1993, p.
106) wrote “Compassion looks downward towards the world of suffering.” Out of
compassion for the people, particularly in the aftermath of bloody conflicts with the
ancient kingdom of Champa (now in present-day Vietnam), the king built roads, rest
houses, hospitals, reservoirs, and pagodas that served both as places of worship and
schools (e.g. Coedes & Chandler, 2008).
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Lon Nol’s lack of empathic concern is reflected in his pogroms against and
persecution of civilian Vietnamese and his failure to deal with the plights of his people
both civilian and military, both of which are interrelated.
On March 13, Lon Nol “most foolishly” gave a 72-hour ultimatum32 (Fielding,
2008, p. 224), to all Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops to leave Cambodia
(Chandler, 2008 & Siv, 2008), which was “probably the most unrealistic demand in
modern Cambodian history” (Chandler, 2008, p. 251) or a “clearly impossible” demand
(Corfield, 2008, p. 93). When the Vietnamese had paid no heed to him, tens of thousands
of Cambodians enlisted in the army to expel the “invaders” (Chandler, 2008, p. 251).
“There was a lot of evidence of communist involvement in our internal affairs, so
students and progressives … came to offer their services to defend the country,” said Son
Soubert, son of Son Sann and former member of Cambodia’s Constitutional Council
(quoted in Strangio, 2010). These “24-hour soldiers,” so nicknamed because of the token
training they received (Strangio, 2010), were slaughtered or wounded by the thousands in
a few weeks by combat-hardened Vietnamese soldiers (Chandler, 2008).
Another kind of killing occurred in Phnom Penh and elsewhere, which intensified
after the bloodless coup. Lon Nol “allowed his troops” to massacre several thousands of
the city’s some-200,000 Vietnamese residents in late April and early May of 1970
(Osborne, 1994, p. 219). In the village of Prasot near the Cambodian-Vietnamese border,
Lon Nol’s soldiers “gunned down” more than a hundred men, women, and children and
wounded many more (Kamm, 1998, p. 77). Father Ponchaud reported that one night

Also, according to Nolan (1990, p. 91), Deac (1997, p. 57) and Corfield (2008), Lon Nol gave seventytwo hours. But, according to Siv & Chandler, he gave only 48 hours.
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some 515 Catholic Vietnamese villagers were murdered outside of Phnom Penh. “This is
when Lon Nol lost the war,” he said (quoted in Vachon, 2010, p. 5). Other Vietnamese
were detained en masses, usually in makeshift camps (Short, 2004) or Catholic churches
(e.g. Kamm, 1998; Osborne, 1994). Those living in the Tonle Sap River had their floating
houses cut loose and pushed and pulled by tugboats “out of sight of the capital” while
most of them were still inside (Kamm, p. 83). “We have to do it… We no longer know
how to assure the security of Phnom Penh with these potential enemies and subversives
among us,” Lon Non told Kamm (p. 83). Lon Nol considered all Vietnamese
Communists (e.g. Tully, 2005; Chandler, 2008) or thmil (atheists) (eg Corfield, 1994 &
Chandler, 2008), to whom “the normal requirements of Buddhist ethics did not apply”
and hence could be liquidated “without compunction” (Harris, 2005, p. 165). In actuality,
these Vietnamese residents had “lived in peace and national harmony with our
Cambodian people for generations” [emphasis original] (Sihanouk, quoted in Jeldres, p.
156). And the vast majority of the Vietnamese living in urban areas “tended to favor,
without enthusiasm, Saigon” (Kamm, 1998, p. 78). Addressing the US Senate on April
16, 1970, Senator Mike Mansfield said:
What was for a decade and a half the only oasis of peace in Indochina has been
turned into a bloody battlefield in the space of one month. … The conflict already
involves the potential of an ugly genocide by government-stimulated mob action
against the several hundred-thousand Vietnamese civilians –for the most part
farmers, fishermen and tradesmen –who come from both North and South
Vietnam and who have lived for decades in reasonable peace in Cambodia. In
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short, the Pandora’s box which was held shut by the leadership and diplomacy of
Prince Sihanouk is now wide open. (quoted in Sihanouk, 1970, p. 1).
These atrocities, Kamm (1998, p. 74) contended, “contributed greatly to the
scantiness of sympathy and humanitarian assistance for Cambodia and its suffering
population” during the five-year war. The “goodwill” his regime had garnered abroad
faded away partly as a result of Lon Nol’s failure to show regret about the massacre
(Chandler, 2008, p. 251), which Sirik Matak “tried to prevent” (Corfield & Summers,
2003, p. 384). He did apologize to the South Vietnamese government (Chandler, 1991b),
his close ally, but complained that “in many cases it was difficult to tell whether [the]
Vietnamese were Viet Cong or peaceful citizens” (New York Times, 1970, quoted in
Chandler, 1991b, p. 203). One of the many ramifications of the atrocities was that,
according to Kamm (1998, p. 83), Phnom Penh’s “life slowed considerably” because
most of the Vietnamese in the capital had been gone, who were mainly craftsmen, petty
merchants, and office and domestic workers. They “cracked Lon Nol’s fragile alliance
with” South Vietnam; and South Vietnamese soldiers would avenge their fellow
Vietnamese people’s deaths by terrorizing Cambodian people randomly (Deac, 1997, p.
75). A great majority of the Vietnamese whom Saigon failed to repatriate were
exterminated by the Khmer Rouge (Kamm, 1998). Kiernan said “There are no confirmed
reports of any ethnic Vietnamese surviving the entire Pol Pot period” (Bluett, 2001).
Once the Pandora’s box was open, Cambodia’s status as an “island of peace”
came to an abrupt end and its people’s suffering began. The people under both Lon Nol’s
control and GRUNK’s were in the crossfire, and thus to most people both civilian and
armed (except for those elite few in Phnom Penh) life was extremely hard if not
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intolerable, which was further exacerbated by rampant corruption, looting, pillaging,
rapes, and grenade attacks. To escape the fighting and the American bombing in the
countryside, hundreds of thousands of peasants migrated to Phnom Penh and provincial
capitals (Osborne, 1994). More than two out of seven Cambodians had been displaced by
the end of 1971, according to the Cambodian Ministry of Health’s estimate (cited in
Shawcross, 1986, p. 222). The refugees in Phnom Penh, in particular, fell victim to the
insurgents’ “irregular but frequently fatal” and indiscriminate shelling of rockets and
artillery (Osborne, p. 225). The people were simply out of the frying pan and into the fire.
By the time the Khmer Rouge’s victory in April 1975, some 500,000 lives had been lost
in the civil war (Clymer, 2011).
A tragic deadly bombing incident took place in Neak Luong, a “strategic ferry
town” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 358) in Prey Veng about thirty miles from Phnom Penh in
August 1973. About 200 civilians were killed (Strangio, 2010) and several hundred
others were wounded (Palling, 1983) in the incident, dubbed “misbombing”33 (Becker,
1998a, p. 156), which was featured prominently in the film The Killing Fields. The
American B-52 bomber pilot was fined US$700 for the mistake (Corfield, 1994) and
Ambassador Swank gave each survivor US$100 (Palling, 1983). The Neak Luong
incident was an impetus for the US Congress’s order of a bombing halt in Cambodia
eight days later.

According to U Sam Oeur and McCullough (2005, p. 172), the misbombing was a result of an inaccurate
report by a Lon Nol spy about the alleged existence of the Viet Cong’s massive fortress in Neak Luong,
which was in fact five miles away from the town. Ironically, the Viet Cong took over the town after the
incident.
33
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Pillaging, burning, and raping were carried out mostly by South Vietnamese
troops (Shawcross, 1986). Lon Nol was asked about pillaging, which aroused
considerable concern among the populace, at his 2nd press conference on June 29, 1970.
He said that South Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia would improve their conduct, that
Cambodia had deployed “liaison officers” in several South Vietnamese units, and that the
“Saigon command was dealing severely with offenders,” in the words of Kamm (1970a).
But according to Cambodian sources knowledgeable about the subject, Lon Nol’s
comments were “diplomatic” and South Vietnamese troops’ pillaging of Cambodian
villages “continued unchecked” (Kamm, 1970a). A joint Cambodian-South Vietnamese
committee was established to investigate the “outrages”; but by September 1971, out of
three hundred cases they had investigated, they “paid compensation on only two--$90 for
a rape and $180 for a murder” (p. 223).
Lon Nol was asked about military spokesmen’s admission that military officers
“pocketed” the salary of some 100,000 phantom soldiers every month; he allegedly said,
“Calm down! The Americans are killing a thousand of our enemy every week. Victory is
ours” (quoted in Chandler, 1991b, p. 223).
The people’s suffering of such proportions prompted Cambodians and even
Ambassador Dean to comment adversely about the Republican leaders and their regime.
“[Lon Nol] holds on to power and everybody else suffers. All the families separated
because of the war and nobody making a living” (Pok Saradath, quoted in Ngor &
Warner, p. 83). “Our former [Republican] leaders had been more concerned to preserve
their power than protect ordinary people” (Pin Yathay & Man, 2000, p. 29). Finally,
Dean wrote, “There are only so many years of war to which you can subject a people. At
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some point, you cannot drag them along anymore. You have to find a way to end the
misery and build something new” (Dean, 2009, p. 94).
Lon Nol’s teamwork and collaboration
As a coercive and authoritative leader with limited empathy, Lon Nol was not a
team player and did not offer, ask for, or foster cooperation (see Table 6.14). To borrow
the title of a book about Abraham Lincoln’s leadership by Doris Kearns Goodwin (2005),
neither Lon Nol nor Pol Pot had a “team of rivals.” At best, they had a team of
sycophants. Lon Nol surrounded himself with “self-serving advisers” (Osborne, 1994,
225) or wicked opportunists, according to In Tam, which was one of his main reasons to
refuse to join Lon Nol’s government formed after the rigged presidential election (cited
in Becker, 1998a). Lon Nol considered his peers as “potential rivals” and hence did not
trust them (Swank, quoted in Precht, 1988). Lon Nol proved “incapable of developing a
competent team to cope with increasing military, political and economic difficulties,”
read a memorandum by the State Department’s Cambodia experts (quoted in Clymer,
2004, p. 70). Moreover, Lon Nol was reported to have told Ambassador Swank and
visiting General Haig on July 3, 1972, shortly before his investiture as President, that he
was determined to “to emulate the methods of totalitarian indoctrination” (quoted in
Deac, p. 135).
Table 6.14

Teamwork and collaboration
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

351

365

4.64

4.35

2.29

3.2
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Examples of Lon Nol’s lack of teamwork and collaboration can be found
elsewhere in this paper, especially Chapter VI. This section is therefore intended to
illustrate his lack of teamwork and collaboration largely in military matters (Chenla I and
II Operations, in particular), which were the principal focus of his governance (Kamm,
1998) and in which he was “always” the final decision-maker (Sak Sutsakhan, p. 74).
Sirik Matak said he handled “the civil half” (quoted in Kamm, 1998, p. 96). Ambassador
Swank acknowledged in a August 1973 cable that Lon Nol would undoubtedly not have
survived in power without his “truly exceptional tenacity” coupled with “his continuing
grip on the armed forces and military affairs,” which was his “true power base” (Swank,
1973).
Unfortunately, Lon Nol did not stay abreast of the realities of the war (e.g. Kamm,
1998 and Baczynskyj, 1972), in which his regime suffered one defeat after another. “Of
special concern is General Abrams’ assessment that Lon Nol and his key leaders are
strangely detached from the implications of the immediate military situation,” Melvin
Laird, Secretary of Defense, wrote to Nixon in early in 1971 in his report on his recent
visit to Vietnam (quoted in Shawcross, 1986, p. 186). One striking example, according to
one of the recently leaked “Kissinger Cables,” is that in 1973 and 1974 his regime still
wrongly identified the North Vietnamese as its “primary enemy” (Drennan, 2013, para.
4). In fact, most of the North Vietnamese troops had withdrawn from Cambodia by early
1973 as a result of a ceasefire declared in late 1972 and the Paris Peace Accords signed
on January 27, 1973 by the US and North Vietnam. Ambassador Swank, who departed
from Cambodia on September 5, 1973, said that by the time he left, the Cambodian war
had become a “bitter civil war,” although he did not “articulate” that in his pre-departure
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press conference (in Precht, 1988). Lon Nol’s regime “didn’t want to believe they had a
civil war on their hands, as opposed to a war against non-Khmer non-believers,”
Chandler said (quoted in Drennan, 2013, para. 13).
As pointed out above, both Operations Chenla I and II –which were under his
overall command, were complete defeats (e.g. Chandler, 2008; R. Wood, 2002; Becker,
1998a; Sak Sutsakhan, 1978), which contradicted Lon Nol, who declared them victories.
After his return from his hospitalization in Honolulu in April of 1971, Lon Nol resumed
military activities. Having mistakenly believed that Chenla I –which he “assumed
personal command” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 206)–was a success (e.g. R. Wood, 2002 &
Chandler, 1991b), he started to plan Chenla II with a vengeance. However, in the words
of Sak Sutsakhan (p. 72), “… there was concern for regaining the initiative, and a desire
to return the enemy’s ‘blow for blow’, to take ‘eye for eye’ and “tooth for tooth.’”
Although similar to those of Chenla I, the objectives of Chenla II were more ambitious
(R. Wood, 2002). “The Rustics [the American pilots] would be fighting for the same real
estate that was supposedly captured during Chenla I” (R. Wood, p. 111). Chenla II aimed
to reopen “Route 6 all the way to Kompong Thom” (Sutsakhan, p. 72) from both Skun
and Kompong Cham (R. Wood, 2002). The “technicians of the General Staff” agreed
with Lon Nol on his overall objective of the operation but disagreed over how the
operation would be conducted. Lon Nol preferred the rapid liberation of the highway,
whereas the General Staff preferred a “series of moves which would lead or draw the
enemy into areas where they could be destroyed by air or ground action” (Sutsakhan, p.
74). They reasoned that Lon Nol’s rapid operation would render the FANK units along
that route “highly vulnerable to fragmentation by flank attack and afterwards easy prey
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for the enemy.” But, Lon Nol objected, thinking that this would be prevented by US
airpower. “This showed a serious lack of understanding of what airpower could and could
not do. Airpower could not occupy and control territory,” R. Wood (2002, p. 111)
asserted. His “own officers complained that these [bombing] raids were
counterproductive, but they were ignored by their leader [Lon Nol]” (Becker 1998a, p.
130). But this should not be surprising given Lon Nol’s total trust in the bombing. He
considered the bombing and the US itself as a “deus ex machina” (Chandler, 1991b, p.
225). Besides, the military general staff argued, based on the “principle of economy of
forces,” for the reutilization of the same units that had been involved in “most of the
fighting” so far. “They were understrength, lacking in certain skills, and required
refitting” (p. 74). Thus, time was needed. Worse still, the FANK soldiers had never been
properly trained to resist “the superior weapons and seasoned, skilled” North Vietnamese
soldiers (Becker, 1998a, p. 131).
As a result of the disagreements, “great difficulty” was encountered when the
concept was translated into an operational plan. “But as always the final decision being
with Lon Nol,” General Sak Sutsakhan lamented, “the difficult birth of the CHENLA II
plan was, in the end, carried out over the objections of these technicians who, for their
part, watched with sinking hearts the launching of this operation on 20 August 1971” (p.
74). Lon Nol went ahead with his original plan apparently as a result of his being
“unrealistic about his country’s capabilities,” as Swank concluded after the operation
echoing Haig’s assessment in May 1970 (quoted in Clymer, 2004, p. 49), and his vision
of Cambodia’s brilliant future and his mission of the holy war.
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Lon Nol declared a victory in the third week of October after the FANK had taken
control of “a narrow strip of land that paralleled” Route 6 by that month, making possible
supplies to Kompong Thom (R. Wood, p. 116). But, Chenla II was not a success; opening
the highway was a “minor victory,” which was thought to be short-lived (p. 116). The
city of Kompong Thom was relieved with minimal fighting (Shawcross, 1986). “They’ve
opened a front forty miles long and two feet wide,” grumbled General Creighton Abrams,
Commander of US Forces in Vietnam (quoted in Shawcross, 1986, p. 203). No outpost
was established in order to keep the flanks safe and the road was not patrolled by the
Cambodian army (Shawcross, 1986), who lacked both the strength and weapons to
control that stretch of the road, which was approximately 70 miles long (R. Wood, 2002).
So, when the North Vietnamese counterattacked in late October, the soldiers could not
protect themselves. They “fled in panic” in order to keep from harm’s way their families
who had always accompanied them (Shawcross, 1986, p. 203).
After visiting the field, Lon Nol “continued his practice of issuing contradictory
and irrelevant orders” to Colonel Um Savuth (Shawcross, p. 203). In one of his personal
letters to Admiral McCain in Honolulu, he asked for more helicopters and amphibious
vehicles. “We have determined that our weakness is attributable to the lack of mobility of
our reaction forces … I count on your kind understanding to help me resolve my
difficulties…,” he wrote (Shawcross, p. 203).
After more than three months of fighting, Chenla II ended on December 6 when
the North Vietnamese broke its column along the highway (Shawcross, 1986 & Becker,
1998a). “The rout was complete and the losses were enormous” (Shawcross, p. 203). The
losses included the deaths of 3,000 soldiers and the destruction of equipment for twenty
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battalions. The defeat “completely demoralize[d]” the FANK units involved in the
campaign (Sak Sutsakhan, p. 78) and “broke the spirit of the army forever” (Becker,
1998a, p. 132). General Sak Sutsakhan (1978, p. 79) poignantly described Lon Nol’s
reaction: “Faced with the sad spectacle caused by the collapse of his troops Lon Nol
could do nothing more than to conclude the tragic story of CHENLA II.” In the wake of
the Chenla II defeat, Lon Nol not only rejected calls from key politicians, including Sirik
Matak that he resign but also attributed the defeat to the “lack of ARVN and U.S.
support,” according to a US report (quoted in Deac, p. 121). Clymer (2004) contended
that Swank was right about holding Lon Nol responsible for the Chenla II defeat. Swank
wrote, “Not only were the important decisions his, he also reverted to his habit of giving
specific instructions to individual brigade commanders, bypassing normal chains of
command and presuming to make tactical decisions without adequate knowledge of the
military situation” (quoted in Clymer, 2004, pp. 48-49). Largely due to these military
defeats caused in large measures by his interference, Lon Nol lost the respect he had
enjoyed earlier (Clymer, 2004). As the Defense Minister told Swank, “many FANK
soldiers do not now really know for what or for whom they are fighting” (quoted in
Clymer, p. 70).
Reasons for Lon Nol’s lack of empathy and teamwork and collaboration
The overarching reason for or cause of Lon Nol’s lack of these attributes appears
to have been his deliberate isolation –which, according to Khieu Samphan (2004, p. 36) –
was “his Archilles’ [sic] heel.” Regarded as “one of the world’s most isolated leaders”
even by his friends (Leslie, 1976, para. 9), Lon Nol became an “increasingly isolated
leader” after his stroke in early 1971 (Kamm, 1998, p. 102). As a “recluse,” he spent
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most of his time consulting Buddhist monks and fortunetellers and even “clanging gongs”
in his presidential palace (Swain, 1999, p. 35) and a lot of his time writing lengthy letters
to President Nixon, imploring for US assistance (e.g. Shawcross, 1986; Chandler, 2008).
Lon Nol received Nixon’s “effusive replies” to his letters till the latter’s indictment
(Shawcross, p. 168). “He found time for all [the monks]” who came to his villa without
appointment while his ministers and generals visited his villa “too infrequently” (Kamm,
p. 102). To the “despair of those [both Cambodians and Americans] who had to deal with
him about the present,” Lon Nol devoted most of his time to his visions of the “brilliant
future” of Cambodia he had written in his blue booklet called “Neo-Khmerism” and to
his growing belief in predictions of the future by Buddhist monks (or rather “Buddhist
mystics,” as Chandler (2008, p. 252) called them), especially his chief spiritual advisor,
Mam Prum Moni, a monk from the countryside famed for being a “visionary” (Kamm,
pp. 102-103) or probably “the most notorious of the priests” (Deac, p. 152), who
“claimed to be a reincarnation of Jayavarman VII” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 205). U Sam
Oeur wrote that he had been told that “[Mam Prum Moni] was the only advisor [Lon Nol]
trusted” (U Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005, p. 169). Another related cause, as
Baczynskyj reported in July 1972, was that his advisers and subordinates frequently
withheld “unpleasant facts” from him (p. 23).
Pol Pot’s empathy
As mentioned earlier, the Pol Pot regime was so brutal and destructive that
Cambodia by 1977 had become what Ponchaud (1978) called “Cambodia Year Zero” and
its people had lived harrowing lives. This prompted Sir Robert Jackson, former Deputy
Secretary-General of United Nations, to remark that “Pol Pot’s revolution was “the most
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murderous revolution in a century of revolutions” considering the death-to-population
ratio (Chandler, 1999b, [no page]). Hanoi asserted that “In Cambodia, a former island of
peace … no one smiles today. Now the island is soaked with blood and tears …
Cambodia is hell on earth,” an assertion that Shawcross contends “impossible not to
agree” (Shawcross, 1986, p. 389). Similarly, Cambodian refugees had “unspeakable
ordeals under Pol Pot’s ‘DK’” (Sihanouk, in Jeldres, p. 214). More importantly, Pol Pot
“was below zero [in terms of humanness],” wrote Dith Pran (quoted in Greenfield &
Locke, 1984, p. 123). As a result, some Khmer Rouge survivors cannot forgive Pol Pot
for the pain he inflicted on their families and Cambodia. One such survivor, Nuon So
Thero, in response to Pol Pot’s only daughter’s positive description of her father, wrote in
The Cambodia Daily, “My pain will never heal no matter the circumstance. I will never
forgive her father. Patchata [the daughter] is not to blame for her father’s inhumane
leadership; however, it is her responsibility to know and understand what he did to
Cambodia and its people” (Nuon So Thero, 2004, p. 19).
Did Pol Pot know or care to know these ordeals? Did he feel or care about his
people’s suffering or “pain,” which–according to Koopmans (2005, p. 8)–he “caused”?
Did he do or attempt to do anything to reduce their pain and suffering? In short, did he
lack empathy? The following section points out his lack of empathy–which, according to
Goleman (2011a, Loc 746) – means “sensing that others are thinking and feeling, without
them telling us in words.” Pol Pot’s lack of empathy can be substantiated by two main
interrelated threads of evidence: (1) his and his regime’s opposition to and abolishment of
traditional culture and all religions, particularly Buddhism, Cambodia’s predominant
religion–whose Four Brahma Viharas, mentioned in the Introduction of Chapter 1,
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contain compassion, for which “empathy is the essential building block” (Goleman,
2011a, Loc 758) and (2) his lack of empathetic attitude and actions. Following this
evidence, the reasons why Pol Pot lacked empathy will be explored.
Abolishment of traditional culture and religions
The Khmer Rouge created “their own ‘revolutionary culture’” in place of two
basic “pillars” of traditional Cambodian culture, the monarchy and Buddhism, because
they considered these as “threats to the total control desired” by them (Becker, 1998a, p.
189). According to Hun Sen, Pol Pot destroyed almost all the “characteristics of a
nationality”; the only characteristic that remained under DK was the Khmer language
(1991, p. 187). Yet, by also adopting certain old lexical items, adding new meanings to
other old ones, and coining new terms, as pointed out by Soth Polin (2004) –Pol Pot’s
former student –and Locard (2004), the Khmer Rouge ultimately created a unique variety
of this ancient language. Additionally, aiming to create a “unique society” the Pol Pot
coterie set out to eliminate all the “vestiges of the ancien regime, including emotions” (p.
197). Such words as “pity, compassion, charity, love, happiness” lost their meanings
(Brissé, in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xv)
The Khmer Rouge’s ideology “represents a strong reaction against [Buddhism’s]
antimaterialism and nonviolence” (Becker, 1998a, p. 189). They regarded “revolutionary
violence” as a necessary means to abolish both institutions and to achieve such goals as
sovereignty, independence, and self-sufficiency (p. 189). Pol Pot said Buddhism is a
religion that hampers the state’s leadership (cited in Sihanouk, 1986). This contradicts
what Pol Pot stated in his 1952 essay under the pen name “original Khmer” (Khmer
doem), in which he envisioned an important role of Buddhism in a new democratic
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Cambodia. A “democratic regime will bring back the Buddhist moralism because our
great leader Buddha was the first to have taught (democracy),” Pol Pot wrote (Thion and
Kiernan, 1981, quoted in Harris, 2005, pp. 160-161). He also argued in that essay that
because the Cambodian monarchy had relegated religion (below itself), it was “inimical
to Buddhism.” He claimed to have been a monk for two years during the interview with
the Yugoslav journalists (Gerrand, 1988), which was true (Short, 2005). Under Pol Pot’s
rule, religion was a “reactionary belief” (Yathay & Man, 2000, p. 170). To him, for
example, monks were “leeches who lived off the toil of others” (Rainsy & Whitehouse, p.
90).
The Khmer Rouge’s elimination of Buddhism from the beginning of their
revolution meant the abolishment of “most” of Khmer culture (Becker, 1998a, 191)
because Buddhism is both a culture and a religion (Rainsy & Whitehouse, p. 91).
“Culture [under the Khmer Rouge] was work. Nothing else” (Becker, p.191). “I have
been a communist most of my life. I am used to going without. But I was unprepared for
the life of Phnom Penh. … People did nothing but work, nothing,” remarked one Chinese
diplomat who had worked in Pol Pot’s Cambodia (quoted in Becker, 1998a, p. 191).
All other religions, especially Islam, Cambodia’s second religion practiced by the
Moslem ethnic minority, were abolished by Pol Pot in May 1975, according to Heng
Samrin (cited in Kiernan, 2008). Pol Pot personally instructed his people “to force the
Cham people” to implement orders “just like normal Khmers” (pp. 266-267). Only one
race was allowed under DK, the Khmer; Pol Pot “scattered the Islamic race,” said Ouch
Bun Chhoeun, the CPK’s deputy secretary of Region 21 (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p.
265). Pol Pot himself ordered the dispersal of 150,000 Chams from east to the north and
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northwest (Kiernan, 2008). “So they forced [the Cham people] to eat pork, to stop
believing in religion … had them raise pigs.… Anyone who resisted was killed … Pol
Pot said this,” Heng Samrin told Kiernan (2008, p. 267). The ethnic Chinese were also
persecuted or killed albeit for a different set of reasons. They were considered by the
Khmer Rouge to be exploiters of the Khmer people. There was an exception, however.
Pol Pot did not order the persecution of indigenous people, who are concentrated mostly
in the north-eastern part of Cambodia. “There was no policy of [allowing] minority
nationalities. Everyone was mixed together. There was only one race the Khmer . . . from
liberation in 1975. Pol Pot was very close to the Jarai and other minorities but he
scattered the Islamic race,” Ouch Bun Chhoeun added. This is reflected by what Pol Pot
wrote in 1975: “We relied on the people and to crown it all these people were only the
poverty-stricken local people of the remote rural areas. This was because our revolution
came out of the jungle” (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, pp. 302-303).
In addition to religion, Pol Pot led the regime to “completely shatter” two other
“underpinnings of Cambodian society” –the family and the village (Schanberg, 2010, Loc
175). Or in Kiernan’s words, “the Khmer Rouge regime … mounted history’s fiercest
ever attack on family life”; they “redefined the family” (1997, p. xi). The Khmer word
kruosaa, which before their revolution had meant family “came to mean spouse” under
their rule (p. xi). The children were no longer part of the family; they belonged to Angkar
not their parents (e.g. Kiernan, 1997; Becker, 2010; Chhay Sophal, 2012). They were
taught to love only Angkar. “[Children] were taught only about hard work and
faithfulness to the government,” said Ouk Villa (1997, p. 116), a Khmer Rouge survivor,
in his memoir. This is reflected by another commandment of Angkar’s that “It is
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forbidden to beat children, as from now on they are the children of Angkar” (quoted in
Affonco, 2005, p. 35). And one of the regime’s many songs “We Children Love Angkar
Boundlessly” is equally revealing:
Because of Angkar, we have a long life ahead.
A life of great glory.
Before the revolution, children were poor and lived lives of misery.
Living like animals, suffering as orphans …
Now the glorious revolution supports us all
Secure in health, full of strength to develop collective lives.
With clothes to wear, not cold at night. (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 247)
All affection and love between children and their parents were shifted to Angkar,
which saw Cambodian society as “one big family” and itself as its head and “tutor and
parent” of the whole population (Locard, 2004, p. 270). This saying of Angkar’s clearly
coveys this notion of family: “Renounce immediate family ties, the hearth’s pot, and
adopt the big pot, the big family, the immense family” (p. 270). What Pol Pot told the
Central Committee is even more revealing: “Mothers should not get too entangled with
their offspring” (quoted in Short, p. 325).
By contrast, children were taught to hate and spy on their parents and siblings.
Calling their parents “comrades” and spying on them was what children were taught to do
(Ouk Villa, 1997). Chhay Sophal, a Khmer Rouge survivor and experienced journalist,
brilliantly captured the status, attitudes, and behaviors of children under Pol Pot’s rule in
the title of his 2012 memoir Mom and Angkar’s Kid: “We Dare to Smash Our Parents
for Angkar.” As a gesture of remorse, he apologized to his parents in its foreword: “I
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cannot forget to beg for ‘forgiveness’ from my dad, …, and my mom for my being so
crazy that I scorned their lives under the DK regime and said that I would smash (kill)
them if they did anything wrong to the revolutionary Angkar” (p. i). He seems to have
had blind faith in Angkar and its ideology. Consequently, he was not concerned about his
parents and siblings, especially while on the so-called “mobile child group” away from
them. Fortunately, unlike many other children, teenagers, and youth, he did not smash his
parents. But because of the regime’s indoctrination, he, as well as other children, would
likely have done so if Angkar had required him to, he said. Similarly, Affonco and her
indoctrinated children lived in different worlds. “All the emotional and material bonds
which linked them to us are severed and destroyed. … Son, daughter, daddy, mummy,
these are now meaningless terms. All values are reduced to nothing,” she wrote (2005, p.
79).
“[L]ove and loyalty to the revolution” were given precedence over love and
loyalty between husband and wife (Becker, 2010, p. 64); and more notably, romantic
relationship between a man and a woman not sanctioned by Angkar was a serious crime
and pre-marital sex could incur death penalty. The Khmer Rouge replaced traditional
marriages, which are both “family holiday” and “religious festival,” with “austere,
collective, civil ceremonies”; it was Angkar that arranged or forced marriages of many
couples at a time (Locard, p. 257), including Hun Sen and his wife, Bun Rany. According
to Short (2005, p. 326), Angkar collectively wedded a “minimum of ten couples” at a
time. Angkar had a policy of rationing (Becker, 2010) or repressing sex (Locard, 2010).
Couples, whether or not wedded by Angkar, frequently lived separately and could visit
each other only a few times a month. An excellent illustration of this policy of Angkar’s
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and of a love story in the crossfire is the following tragic love story of Comrade Deth and
Hout Bophana –both of whom were brutally tortured and executed at the S-21 prison on
the formal charges of being CIA agents but, in fact, for their forbidden romantic
relationship. This tragedy is recounted in the book Bophana by Elizabeth Becker (2010)
based on Hout Bophana’s file at the prison (her forced confessions and her
correspondences with Comrade Deth seized by Khmer Rouge cadres as evidence against
them), which was “thickest” (p. 77). The Bophana Center, an audio-visual resource center
in Phnom Penh, is named after her. Below is a summary of the tragedy, which mirrors
other facets of life under Lon Nol’s and Pol Pot’s rules.
Born shortly before Cambodia’s independence from France in 1954, having come
of age in the 1960s, and whose father was held in high regard in her hometown in a
northwestern province of Cambodia, Bophana could afford to learn and use French (she
later could use English) in addition to her mother tongue, Khmer. Her being trilingual,
which was an asset before the war, became a fatal liability in the Pol Pot regime. At
roughly sixteen (around the end of the 1960s or beginning of the 1970s), she fell in love
with a distant cousin by the name Ly Sitha, who lived and studied in a Buddhist pagoda
for high school education. Their families allowed them to marry each other. But Lon
Nol’s Operation Chenla I “robbed her of her life” and their longed-for marriage (p. 11).
The fighting divided not only her family but also her from her fiancé, who had become a
novice monk to avoid Lon Nol’s military draft.
While fleeing the fighting amid mayhem, she was raped and impregnated by a
FANK solider. Having been “humiliated and ashamed at losing her virginity,” Bophana
contemplated suicide. But her Buddhist faith, which forbids suicide or killing in general,
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kept her alive. She left her baby boy in the care of her sister and started look for a job in
Phnom Penh. After one rejection after another, she joined a welfare center for widows
called the House of Butterflies, started by the wife of Thomas Enders, the deputy chief of
mission at the US embassy in Phnom Penh, where she started to learn English and to be
doing well. It was sheer coincidence that Bophana and Sitha met each other at a religious
ceremony at Wat Lanka, a Buddhist monastery in Phnom Penh, in 1974. He was still a
monk. “Against all odds, they discovered they were still in love” (p. 18). But then, he
disappeared again without warning and saying goodbye.
One day during the Pol Pot period, they met by coincidence again after she had
moved back to her home village. But this time, he was no longer a monk but a Khmer
Rouge cadre with a new name, Deth. He had joined the revolution before the fall of the
Lon Nol regime. He told the villagers that Bophana was his “long-lost wife” (p. 27). As a
cadre, he could order increased rations and medical treatment in a local clinic for her.
Like most couples, Bophana and Deth were allowed very few visits. They ended up
writing each other letters in Khmer, French, and English “which are the only known
cache of love letters to survive” (p. 29).
It was their correspondence that got them arrested. To the Khmer Rouge, it
revealed that they were not officially married before the war’s end; they “exalt[ed] in
love in a time or revolution and inhumanity” (p. 29); and that they lied about their
educational and occupational backgrounds when she had written him an “effusive letter”
in English and Khmer (p. 30), among many other things. “Angka[r] would never approve
of a new evacuee marrying a cadre,” Deth reminded her in a letter. She replied in
English: “Dear Darling! I have just received your letter and some things that you sent me
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this afternoon with great pleasure. Dearie! You don’t worry about me. Nowadays I am
well but I miss you very much” (p. 30). One of her letters became a piece of
incriminating evidence to the Khmer Rouge because it mentioned revenge. In part, she
wrote:
If [Bophana] dies, please do not forget to dress me in my evening gown so I can
succeed in avenging in hell. When I am dead and I am a ghost my desire for
revenge will burn in [Bophana’s] chest and [Bophana] will win total revenge.
(quoted in Becker, 2010, p. 60)
Deth was arrested and executed at Tuol Sleng, followed by Bophana’s arrest and
detention at the prison on October 10, 1976. Duch, the prison’s chief, accused her of
being the “head of CIA cell working to destroy Cambodia” (p. 65). She suffered brutal
and “sadistic” physical and psychological torture (p. 66), like whipping, electrocution,
ducking in water tanks, water-boarding, and more horrifically, torture techniques
designed only for women. In his writing that accompanied her confession, Duch called
her “piggish animal,” a vulgar word in Khmer (p. 67). “In all likelihood her breasts were
slashed and her vaginal area burned with hot pokers,” Becker wrote (p. 67). The reason
for her brutal torture was not her involvement with the CIA, which was unlikely, but her
refusal to “live a solitary, emotionally barren life without love” (p. 68). To show her
devotion to Deth, she changed her name to Sita Deth and signed her confession with that
name all the time she was held at Tuol Sleng (Sita was the wife of Rama, the protagonist
of the Indian epic Ramayana). She was executed and her corpse was not buried until
March 18, 1977, an historic day for the Khmer Rouge, as it marked the seventh
anniversary of the coup against Prince Sihanouk. Her final resting place was a mass grave
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outside Phnom Penh. Her skeletal remains were wrapped in her black prison garb, not the
evening gown she had wished for her revenge.
Pol Pot’s Cambodia was economically united but socially divided (Kiernan,
2008). Economically, Cambodia was a “gigantic workshop,” as Shawcross termed it,
where Cambodians of “all races and classes” were subjected to the same economic
conditions: long hours of work, absence of wages or leisure, living in “thatch huts or
barrack-style houses” etc. (Kiernan, 2008, p. 164). However, Cambodian society was
divided into two groups: the so-called “new people” and “old people” or “base people.”
The “new people” or “17 April people” (e.g. Chandler, 1999a, p. 103 and Stuart-Fox &
Ung, 1998, p. 42) referred to former city or town dwellers and peasants who lived in Lon
Nol-controlled areas until April 1975 and who accounted for 30 percent of DK’s
population; the “old people,” who made up the majority, referred to peasants who had
lived in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas for a number of years. Because most of the city
dwellers had not been sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge or had not joined the revolution,
the Khmer Rouge considered them enemies who were “less than human, without
privileges or rights” (Chandler, p. 103) or “earmarked as the most ‘disposable’ people of
all” (Imam, 2000, p. 294). The “new people” were considered impediment to
development, as reflected in this Khmer Rouge saying: “Where there are ‘17 April
people,’ no development is possible” (quoted in Locard, p. 184). For the most part, the
Khmer Rouge not only treated the “new people” and the “old people” differently but also
“segregated” them; the new people “constituted a class of their own” (Stuart-Fox & Ung,
1998, p. 43). They instructed the “old people” to be suspicious of the “new people” and
to constantly monitor their actions. Some of the relatives of Bunheang Ung, a DK
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survivor, avoided talking to him when he returned to his family village “because he was a
‘new person’” (p. 43). It was a disadvantage for “old people” if any of their relatives were
“new people.” This was carefully planned. According to a 1977 speech of Pol Pot’s, the
Khmer Rouge’s April 1975 victory was the result of “class and national hatred” not of
“the prospect of building a just and happy country” (Chandler, p. 103).
The abolishment of these pillars was part of the eight points Pol Pot made
immediately after Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge in 1975, all of which were
implemented in DK:
1.

Evacuate people from all towns.

2.

Abolish all markets.

3.

Abolish Lon Nol regime currency and withhold the revolutionary currency
that had been printed.

4.

Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice.

5.

Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders.

6.

Establish high-level cooperatives throughout the country, with communal
eating.

7.

Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population.

8.

Dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese border.

(quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 55)
Sin Song, a political commissar in DK and Minister of National Security in the
early 1990s, said that he had been told this list by Chhouk, his “immediate superior” and
“the Region 24 CPK secretary” who had attended a special five-day meeting chaired by
Pol Pot on May 20, 1975. The list was confirmed by Chea Sim, CPK secretary of Ponhea
Krek district (Kiernan, 2008, pp. 55-56). Mat Ly, a “CPK district committee member in
Region 21” in DK and a cabinet minister in PRK, confirmed the existence of eight points
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and recalled points 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, in that order, on Sin Song’s list. But he added three
different points: shut down schools, shut down hospitals, and “uproot spies root and
branch” (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 56). More specifically, Heng Samrin, who said that
“It was Pol Pot who distributed this plan personally,” quoted Pol Pot as saying, “Don’t
use money, don’t let the people live in the cities” (Kiernan, p. 57). “… [Monks] had to be
wiped out (lup bombat). … I heard Pol Pot say this myself. … He said no monks were to
be allowed, no festivals were to be allowed any more, meaning ‘wipe out religion’”
Samrin added (p. 57). Likewise, On Bun Phan, an ethnic Lao who was a militiaman in
Voeunsai district in the northeast of Cambodia told Kiernan (2008, p. 83) that “From
1970 they came and propagandized the people not to be believe in anything at all. They
wiped it all out. … Pol Pot personally spoke about wiping out religion.”
Pol Pot’s lack of empathetic attitude and actions
Despite Pol Pot’s denial of his knowledge and accountability for mass killings,
the available evidence clearly points to his lack of empathetic attitude and actions. “First,
I would like to tell you that I came to carry out a struggle, not to kill people,” Pol Pot told
Nate Thayer in his last interview in 1997 before his death (quoted in Maguire, 2005, p.
137). Instead, he claimed that his regime was carrying out its “policy of providing an
affluent life for the people” and that “only several thousand Kampucheans might have
died due to some mistakes in implementing [this] policy” (Maguire, 2005, p. 60), while
conclusive evidence exists that at least 1.5 million Cambodians perished during his rule.
He only regretted abolishing money, calling it “a drastic measure” (Chandler, 1999a, p.
162). In the same interview, Pol Pot dodged Thayer’s question asking if he had any
repentance for the “very serious mistakes you made while you were in power” (quoted in
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Maguire, p. 137). The evidence also contradicts his denial of knowing the Cambodian
people’s suffering under his rule. Ieng Sary, who claimed he only learned about people’s
starvation from his children, told Kamm that he asked Pol Pot in “tete-a-tete” about this.
“[Pol Pot] said I was against the regime,” Ieng Sary said (Kamm, 1998, pp. 140-141).
What follows discusses Pol Pot’s emotional empathy and empathic concern. His
cognitive empathy will be dealt with under the component of teamwork and
collaboration.
Pol Pot’s emotional empathy
Marcucci proposes that “the sharing of pain is a major element by which the
Khmer distinguish their identity and provide meaning to their existence” (Marcucci,
1994, p. 129). In an interview with a foreign journalist in 1978 (likely Becker), Pol Pot
said, “These people [the workers and farmers] bore the greatest hardships. Our revolution
is for their benefit” (quoted in Lemkin and Thet Sambath, 2009, 15:17). On the contrary,
it is unlikely that Pol Pot shared his people’s pain or suffering or, in other words, felt with
them. It is not certain whether Pol Pot “had a faint perception (or a bleak, horrifying
vision) of the sufferings” he had caused (Chandler, 1999a, p. 187). He did not even care
about people’s suffering, according to Un Reth, a former Khmer Rouge soldier and a
village chief in Anlong Veng (cited in Schearf, 2011). Ieng Sary even “suggested” that
Pol Pot was probably not concerned about knowing “the full truth” of his people’s
miserable life (Kamm, 1998, p. 141). “Nothing that Pol Pot has said publicly, in or out of
power, indicates that he was interested in the effects of his rule on the Cambodian
people,” Kamm wrote (1998, p. 142). He was only interested in advancing his cause.
Neither his “faith” in this cause was shaken nor was he unnerved by the loss of so many
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lives, which had been made possible by “his naïveté, idealism, or incompetence
(Chandler, 1999a, p. 163). For example, Pol Pot was emotional in a talk to his supporters
in January 1981. One of his supporters recounted the talk in an interview with Steve
Heder (1981, quoted in Chandler, 1999a, p. 163) mentioned in part here:
[Pol Pot] said that he knows many people died. When he said this he nearly broke
down and cried. He said he must accept responsibility because the line was too far
to the left, and because he didn’t keep proper track of what was going on. He said
he was like the master in a house who didn’t know what the kids were up to, and
that he trusted people too much.
According to Chandler (1999a), Pol Pot may have been “genuinely sorry” about these
many deaths (p. 163), but the purpose of the talk was “to serve communism, to secure
and deepen his listeners’ loyalty to him, and to anchor their devotion to his cause” (p.
164). Interviewee #2, an NGO leader, said in English “these two [leaders] had a
diametrical difference when it comes to this criterion” when asked why he gave both
leaders totally different scores for empathy, a 10 for Lon Nol and a 1 for Pol Pot. In the
same vein, interviewee #1, a high-ranking government official, said that “needless to say
[about Pol Pot’s empathy], he did not care… He would say good things about you to your
face but order you arrested and killed after you barely left the gate of his house.” “Pol Pot
did not seek to understand others’ feelings but his own” said interviewee #8, an
academic.
People were forced to move from their home provinces and villages mostly on
foot to distant places, resulting in separation of families; many of these families have
never been reunited (Schanberg, 2010). One striking example is Pol Pot’s extended
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family. Saloth Chhay, his “favorite brother” (Short, 2004, p. 275), died during the forced
evacuation (Chandler, 1999a). Saloth Nhep, his younger brother who was very close to
him in childhood, said in his rare interview, “[Pol Pot] abandoned us when he became the
leader” (quoted in Kinetz & Yun Samean, 2007, p. 22). Since his return from France, Pol
Pot visited the family only twice. “He did not care about family. He has never even seen
the face of my oldest child,” Nhep said in another interview (quoted in Brinkley, 2011, p.
288). Perhaps, most importantly, his oldest brother Loth Suong and his sister-in law Chea
Samy, as Chandler (1999a, p. 104) wrote, “had apparently stopped meaning anything to
him.” Suong as a palace protocol officer and Chea Samy as a royal dancer provided for
him from his first years in Phnom Penh up to the late 1950s (e.g. Chandler, 1999a;
Kiernan, 2008). Even while in France, he sent Suong letters, “asking for money”
(Kiernan, 2008, p. 11).
Cities were evacuated for political reasons (Chandler, 1999a and Kiernan, 2008),
“not humanitarian reasons” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 165). This contradicts Pol Pot’s assertion
that the reasons for the evacuation were to solve food and security problems. “Staying in
the cities meant starvation. A hungry people would not believe in the revolution,” he told
the Yugoslav journalists in March 1978 (DC-Cam, 2007, p. 4). The forced evacuation of
the cities, planned six months earlier (Short, 2005), within a week, possibly to destroy
“political position” (Vickery, 1999, p. 165), was “the most far-reaching decision” by a
modern Cambodian government (Chandler, 1999a, p. 103). With the aim to display “their
independence” and extend “their victorious campaign,” the Khmer Rouge leaders, Pol
Pot included, did not appear to have cared about their “cruel and thoughtless tactic,”
namely the forced evacuation (p. 103). The number of lives lost during the evacuation of
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the capital and cities, which also caused immense distress and suffering to the living, is
estimated to be between 10,000 (Kiernan, 2008) and 35,000 (quoted by Short34, ECCC,
2013, p. 39). Had Pol Pot been alive on August 15, 2105, he would have been convicted
of this crime against humanity, namely evacuation of cities, along with Nuon Chea and
Khieu Samphan. Pol Pot’s lack of emotional empathy was made plain by what he wrote
after the evacuation: It was “an extraordinary measure … that one does not find in the
revolution of any other country” (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 288).
Pol Pot’s empathic concern
According to Sydney Schanberg, considered by Ambassador Dean (2009, p. 103)
as “the brilliant New York Times reporter,” the Khmer Rouge “obviously” showed no
“concern either for the Cambodians as human beings” (quoted in Greenfield & Locke,
1984, p. 123). Each person was “no more than an antlike worker in a regimented society”
(Brissé, in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xv). To Pol Pot, “[l]ife is worth nothing. A man is a louse
to be crushed (Soth Polin et al., 2004, p. 25). Pol Pot, as well as other CPK leaders, paid
no heed to difficulties in carrying out his Four-Year Plan–which had too unrealistic goals
(Chandler, 1991a & 1999a) and sloppy proposals, whose data was drawn from the 1960s,
which did not into account the “demographic or ecological changes since then” or the
destruction of the civil war, and which was not based on ongoing research (Chandler,
1999a, p. 113). One example of an unrealistic goal that was to be achieved immediately
was a yield of “three tons [of unhusked rice] per hectare,” [emphasis original] which had
been borrowed from China (p. 116). Before 1970, Cambodia’s average yield of unhusked

34

Short’s own estimate is 20,000.
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rice per hectare was one ton. “[W]e mean to build the country quickly, and build
socialism quickly,” Pol Pot declared in the preamble to the Plan (quoted in Chandler,
1999a, p. 116). Answering his own rhetorical question “Can we accomplish the Plan or
not?” Pol Pot said, “The answer is that we can accomplish it everywhere; the evidence for
this is our political movement” (p. 116). Tens of thousands of people died as a
consequence of the hasty implementation of the plan (Chandler, 1999a). Instead of
blaming himself or the plan when it started to fail, he blamed and ordered the roundup of
“counterrevolutionaries” or traitors (Chandler, 1999a, p. 141). According to Tep Kunnal,
Pol Pot even blamed the peasants. “He said that there might be one big mistake that he
had made. He relied mostly on the poor peasants. When the poor peasants [had] some
power, military power or political power, they use[d] it in a very very different way…
very very bad way… And I remember that he always focused on this point,” Tep Kunnal
said (Al Jazeera, 2008).
Pol Pot said “If someone suffers from malaria, he needs only take up a pick and
break earth in the sun; he will be cured because of his highly political consciousness”
(quoted in Martin, 1994, p. 206). Calling them useless “iron buffaloes,” Pol Pot left to
rust two hundred small tractors provided by China, according to a Chinese embassy
official (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 320). During one of his state visits to China, Pol Pot
requested only 2 million hoes from Mao Zedong; he declined Mao’s offers of other aid,
including rice, reasoning that the people would resolve the issue by themselves through
farming, according to Van Rith, a former high-ranking official in DK’s Ministry of
Commerce (cited in Youk Chhang, 2003). He also turned down an unconditional grant of
5 million US dollars from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
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according to Suong Sikoeun (ECCC, 2012c, p. 30). In April 1977, Khieu Samphan
boasted about the nonexistence of machines in DK and its dependence on “the strength of
our people” to get everything done (Kiernan, p. 320). Moreover, “[i]n Pol’s mind,
[mechanization] was a sign of weakness, of lack of confidence in the peasants’ strength”
(Short, 2005, p. 340). With such an attitude, the Khmer Rouge accepted nearly no foreign
aid arguing that “Cambodians were not beggars” (Becker, 2010, p. 23). As regards the
health sector, Pol Pot told Yugoslav journalists that “Now, as we have solved more than
90% of the malaria eradication problem, our people’s health is far better than before”
(DC-Cam).
Such were Pol Pot’s judgment, claim, and first-resort measure while his people
were forced to “work fourteen-to-eighteen-hour days” (Dith Pran, 1997, p. x) and many
were either starving or starved to death and many were sick. According to Thion (1993,
p. 130), the relatives of Pol Pot and other top DK leaders “enjoyed privileges” in housing,
food rations, as well as certain luxury goods. Likewise, Hun Sen wrote of the “special
prerogatives” of the Pol Pot clique, including the power to order arbitrary killings; they
had “very rich and abundant living conditions” (Hun Sen, 1991, p. 215). “Hence, it is not
too absurd to classify the [DK] leadership as slave owners” [emphasis original] (Hun Sen,
p. 216). Pol Pot had put on weight, as he appeared with a double chin in his 1977
photographs taken in China (Marlay and Neiher, 1999). Pol Pot and Nuon Chea appeared
“bloated” in contemporary photos (Short, 2004, p. 346). “In the Pol Pot era, the people
were more miserable than the beasts… The beasts had enough to eat,” said Nong Kim
Srorn, a teacher (quoted in Kamm, 1998, p. 185). Most people’s daily ration was a “bowl
of watery rice” (Dith Pran, p. x); the rice was generally “an insipid liquid from which it’s
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difficult to fish out even a spoonful of rice,” wrote Affonco (2005, p. 65). As a result, like
most other people, Affonco was forced to forage for food like leaves from yams and
cassavas, wild thorny spinach, and kapok shoots. Worse still, foraging for food was
punishable by death (Becker, 2010). As for Chanrithy Him’s (2000) family, their daily
rations were cut while their workload was still the same. “We eat anything,” Him wrote,
including tadpoles, crickets, toads, centipedes, mice, rats and scorpions, which were
becoming scarce (p. 121). “Some days, our meals for the entire day consist of boiled
leaves,” Him added (p. 121). After his visit to the South-West region in August 1970,
according to Khieu Samphan (quoted in Short, 2004, 308), Pol Pot realized that the labor
force was being affected by food and medicine shortages and the “new people” from
Phnom Penh suffered the brunt of the shortages. “It was not the suffering that bothered
Pol; it was the fact that lack of food might reduce their ability to work,” Short wrote
citing Khieu Samphan (p. 308). The best solution, Pol Pot decided, was not to get rice
from other areas but “to redistribute the labor force in a balanced manner in accordance
with the production needs of the different regions,” Khieu Samphan said (p. 308). What
resulted was another mass deportation of people to various random regions, triggering
mass starvation. “To Pol and his colleagues, the Cambodian people were no longer
individual human beings, each with hopes and fears, desires and aspirations. They had
become soulless instruments in the working out of a grand national design,” Short wrote
(p. 309).
Due to such extreme hunger, cannibalism –although less prevalent than in China
during the Great Leap Forward–became one of the last resorts, which “seems to have
been limited to the eating of the people who were already dead” (Margolin, 2000, p. 603).
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In one instance, a former teacher ate her own sister; in another, the prisoners of a hospital
ward ate a young man (Pin Yathay, 2000). The offenders in both cases were punished
with death. “These instances of cannibalism reflect … the disappearance of the central
Buddhism value of compassion” (Margolin, p. 603).
Ouk Villa, another Khmer Rouge survivor, resorted to stealing tapioca to feed his
starving sisters when they were allowed to visit him and their mother for only one night.
“Their faces were haggard, their eyes looked hollow, and their skin was blue.… I decided
to do something that I didn’t want to do,” Villa recounted (1997, p.118). It was fortunate
for him not to have been caught. But it was not so fortunate for Someth May, who was in
his twenties at that time. He had a brush with death. He resorted to stealing cassava from
the commune field because his “unit’s rations were stopped without explanation” (May,
1986, p.197). He stole cassava on three different nights. On the first and second nights, he
was safe. The first night he was so weak that he could not pull up a cassava stem, which
could normally have been easy for him. Instead, he used his hands to dig out the tubers.
On that night, he lay sleepless because he ate it raw and it “attacked [his] stomach” (p.
198). The third night, he was caught by a reconnaissance team, called kang chhlob in
Khmer. They tied his hands behind his back and tortured him, including kicking him in
the backs and ribs and beating him with their fists. He was taken to a place several
kilometers away from his unit. He was asked to dig his own grave near grave mounds
using a spade made from a piece of oil drum. “Here is your pen. Go ahead and dig the
ground,” his unit leader, Comrade Khann ordered (p. 203). After the digging was
complete, “I sat on the edge of the grave, looking into it thinking I would be inside it in a
minute or two,” he recounted (p. 203). Luckily enough, his life was spared. “This person
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is a thief of Angkar… However, I am very glad to say that the co-coperative leader told
us not to put him away. However, he will have to work very hard in the next few days,”
Comrade Khann told the assembled unit members (p. 204). Someth was ordered to make
a promise. “If I do anything wrong again, please banish me from the Angkar’s territory.
Friends and comrades, do not emulate my behavior,” he said (p. 205). Even more
dramatic, in Yathay’s village, stealing was a “way of life” at harvest (p. 171), which was
true about many other villages throughout Cambodia not only at harvest time despite the
fact that “Do not steal” was another commandment of Angkar’s. “To survive, people
were forced to cheat, lie, steal, and turn their hearts to stone” [emphasis added]
(Margolin, p. 603). This way of life has deleterious ramifications for and impacts on the
next generations of Cambodians, as Cambodia was ranked 160th out of 177 countries on
the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International (2013). Cheating
has produced “a cynical and selfish generation” and “seriously compromis[ed] the
country’s chances of development” (Margolin, p. 605)
In the wake of the January 7 1970 liberation, “hundreds of thousands of gaunt and
diseased people, dazed as if they were returning from hell, wandered shoeless along dusty
roads…,” observed the Vietnamese general Bui Tin (quoted in Tully, 2005, p. 200). This
statement and the evidence below completely contradict Pol Pot’s statement above about
people’s health and his assertion below about DK’s health system. He told the Yugoslav
journalists:
However, we wish to inform you that we have organized our health system
throughout the country, particularly in our co-coperatives. Each co-opeartive has
an infirmary and a pharmaceutical production center. The pharmaceutical
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products are prepared in accordance with national and popular methods… In the
past, there were medical personnel only in Phnom Penh and other major towns,
but now members of the medical corps are stationed throughout the country and
in our co-coperative. Medical services are now available even to people in remote
areas. (DC-Cam, 2007, p. 2).
But the main problem was that the health personnel were not professional in
either modern or traditional medicine and thus both their service and medicines were not
effective. Pol Pot talked about “the national and popular methods” of preparing
medicines; but in fact, he referred to DK’s new way of producing medicines. Khmer
traditional drug and treatment have been effective and in use since the ancient time and
has been a helpful alternative to modern medicine for certain medical conditions. “The
Khmer Rouge began to invent their own medicines, made of crushed roots molded into
pills. We called these rabbit droppings. The Khmer Rouge called them multi-purpose
pills. There was also a kind of serum and vitamin C liquid, used for injections and kept in
Coke or Pepsi bottles sealed with polythene and a rubber band,” Someth May wrote
(May, p. 166). This truth was revealed by a visit to Cambodia in 1976 by a delegation of
the Vietnamese Women’s Union. Ha Thi Que, the union’s president, and four other
women, including a textile worker and a medical doctor visited a pharmaceutical factory.
Its director was a seventeen-year-old woman and the workers who were generally
illiterate were between twelve and fourteen years old. According to the director, the
factor produced tetracycline, aspirin, and antidiarrheal pills. Because there was no
machinery, mixing was done manually. Que had “a long argument” about technical
expertise, particularly in pharmacy, which the director argued “Cambodia did not need”
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(quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 161). Ieng Thirith, DK’s Minister of Social Action (which
included health) and Education, told the delegation that Cambodia had devised a Khmer
“formula” during the resistance against the French and the Americans to prevail over the
shortage of technicians and chemists (p. 161). Ieng Sary & Ieng Thirith’s eldest daughter
became a doctor despite the fact that “she was not trained as such”; and her two other
daughters turned pharmacists in spite of their “dubious credentials” (Becker, 1998a, p.
171)35. Yathay’s statement “Thus self-sufficiency became its opposite: self-insufficiency”
(2000, p. 193) aptly sums up the condition of life under Pol Pot’s rule as a consequence
of his policy.
Furthermore, Pol Pot was carried away by his vision of an egalitarian and
collectivized Cambodia; other considerations almost never entered his equation. Actually,
he frequently talked about improving people’s living conditions. In August 1976, he
urged zonal leaders to recruit good cooks, “so that no one can criticise the notion of
collectivism, saying that the food . . . made collectively tastes bad . . . If they make tasty
food, people’s stomachs will be full” (quoted in Short, 2005, p. 348). But, Short wrote,
Pol Pot was not concerned about people’s dissatisfaction if collectivism was unsuccessful
but about the reemergence of individualism.
Pol Pot’s cognitive empathy and teamwork and collaboration
Chandler (1999a) wrote that Pol Pot was excellent at handling small groups, but
as the available evidence shows, Pol Pot was not good at teamwork and collaboration. He

According to Thion (1993, p. 130), the eldest daughter became director of the former Calmette hospital,
one of Cambodia’s top hospitals, and the second daughter director of the Pasteur Institute in spite of the
fact that they had not completed their secondary education.
35
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surrounded himself with sycophants, did not tolerate dissent (e.g. Heder, 1991 & Locard,
2004), and was rarely accessible to his low-ranking subordinates (e.g. Chandler, 1999a).
Purge was his most preferred method of dealing with his enemies and opponents. “Pol
Pot killed [his] own comrades; there is no way he spares others,” Hun Sen remarked in
2013 (quoted in Ek Madra, 2015, p. 62) [Ek Madra’s editing].
Democratic Kampuchea had seven somewhat autonomous geographic zones:
Northern, Northeastern, Eastern, Southwestern, Western, Northwestern, and Central, each
of which had its own leaders. In order to achieve “supremacy of [his] political line”
(Chanda, 1989, p. 248) and “impose a vertical authority over the zonal leaders while
maintaining a tight horizontal division between the zones” (p. 249), Pol Pot conducted
purges of leaders of Eastern, Northern, and Northwestern zones. He paid greater attention
to the purges of enemies than to the country’s economic development (Chandler, 1999c).
The Four-Year Plan appears to have been discarded (Heder, 1991, cited in Chandler,
1999c).
There had been two main factions or cliques within the CPK, particularly since
Tou Samouth, its first secretary, mysteriously disappeared in 1962 (Chanda, 1986). The
Pol Pot group held a “radical, chauvinist line” and the other group held a “relatively
moderate line stressing collaboration with Sihanouk’s anti-American government and the
Vietnamese” (pp. 58-59). The speed of revolution and the “harshness of its methods”
were the locus of disagreements between the two factions (Chanda, p. 249). Pol Pot
regarded as “traitors deserving execution” those leaders “who questions [his] ultraradical
line of instant communism and ruthless treatment of the urban population and his
adventurist policy toward Vietnam” (p. 249). The purge, or the “political rectification”
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campaign as the regime called it, also aimed to put in place Party cadres who exhibited
personal loyalty to Pol Pot (Stuart-Fox & Ung, 1998) and to eliminate anyone whose
popularity he considered a threat to him (Chandler, 1999a). Pol Pot, surrounded by his
“frightened sycophants” (Locard, p. 194), used the charge of treason against dissidents to
avoid “debate on the party line in which not only might Pol Pot be defeated, but the
whole party unravel” (Heder, 1980, quoted in Chanda, 1986, p. 249).
Only very few people were safe from Pol Pot’s purges and liquidation; those were
a handful of people he trusted such as Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and his wife (Ngor &
Warner, 2003, p. 434) and Khieu Samphan (Heder, 1991). When asked by The Phnom
Penh Post reporter Thet Sambath in a film documentary “Did you and Pol Pot ever argue
with each other when you were in government?” Brother Number Two Nuon Chea said
“No, we didn’t have any problems… not between 1975 and 1979. I can’t think of a single
argument” (Lemkin & Thet Sambath, 2009).
According to Ieng Sary, Khieu Thirith (later renamed Ieng Thirith)–who was his
wife, Pol Pot’s sister-in-law, and DK’s Minister of Social Action –said to Khieu
Samphan, “You should talk back to him. You act like the head of his office, not like the
head of state” (quoted in Kamm, 1998, p. 139). She was annoyed that Khieu Samphan
displayed “slavish devotion” to Pol Pot, particularly while he was DK’s head of state
from 1976 to 1979 (p. 139). “I could not bring myself to raise my voice to express
opposition to the violences … perpetrated in my name,” Khieu Samphan wrote in his
memoir (quoted in Kiernan, 2006, p. 35). Similarly, in a documentary film interview,
Khieu Samphan admitted that “I can be accused of [my involvement in] the evacuation of
people and collectivization measures. I did not resolutely oppose these measures. I
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merely raised my opposition [passively]” (Saidnattar, 2009). Steve Heder, also an expert
witness at the ECCC who considers Khieu Samphan Pol Pot’s sycophant, maintains that
Khieu Samphan’s value to Pol Pot was not his “faded economic expertise” but “his
usefulness as [Pol Pot’s] accomplice” in purges (1991, p. 22). Without his being
excessively loyal to Pol Pot and being his accomplice, Khieu Samphan could have been
purged because he did not belong to Pol Pot’s original faction or clique, which had fled to
the jungle in 1963.
More than half of the 22 members of the CPK Central Committee had been
executed by the end of his rule in early 1979 (Kiernan, 2008) and more than ten
thousands of other DK officials had been tortured and executed at S-21 (Chandler, 1999a
& c). Sihanoukists, who were outside of the CPK, were among the victims of his purges
(e.g. Shawcross, 1986). One of his first purge victims was Hou Yuon, who had been a
cabinet minister in the Sangkum government in 1962-63, and was now “minister for the
interior, communal reforms, and cooperatives of the CPK’s front, the pro-Sihanouk royal
government” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 33). A PhD holder in economics from France, Hou Yuon
disappeared in late 1975 during or after his house arrest evidently because he opposed the
Khmer Rouge’s evacuation policy (Chandler, 1991a, p. 250) and more notably, according
to Suong Sikoeun, because he was the only Khmer Rouge official who dared to differ
with Pol Pot over the latter’s plan to evacuate cities, establish forced labor camps and
abolish money (cited in Vachon, 2014). Despite being an “outspoken critic” of Pol Pot’s
policies, Hou Yuon was “personally loyal” to Pol Pot (Short, p. 451). Heng Samrin, 1st
Deputy Chief of Eastern Zone Military Staff, reported Hou Yuon’s reaction to the
Center’s evacuation plan at an Eastern Zone meeting on 4 April 1975 that he attended:
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The plan was announced at the meeting to attack and liberate Phnom Penh, and to
evacuate the people out of Phnom Penh, temporarily... Hou Yuon struggled
against it. He got up and said that it was not the right situation to evacuate the
people from the circles. At that time, Pol Pot accused Hou Yuon of not agreeing
to implement the Center’s plan. [emphasis added] (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p.
33).
It was in the interests of Saloth Sar and Nuon Chea to kill this “popular, outspoken
figure” because they had the desire to impose their “collective will” on the whole country
(Chandler, 1991a, p. 250). In his book, Khieu Samphan wrote that he had challenged Pol
Pot on the evacuation plan in his private meeting with him. Khieu Samphan wrote (2004,
p. 57), “… after five years of war, the country needed to take a breather, that city
dwellers needed time to readapt. I said that by not taking these legitimate needs into
consideration, it would inevitably exacerbate discontent, which our enemies would gladly
use against us.” Pol Pot’s reply implied, in Khieu Samphan’s own words, that “You
intellectuals, you are all the same, you never have your feet on the ground” (p. 58).
Norodom Sihanouk was the “Khmer Rouge’s figurehead leader” in Beijing during
1970-1975 (but according to Sihanouk (Jeldres, 2005), he was GRUNK’s head of state
not the Khmer Rouge’s) and DK’s Head of State from April 1975 to April 1, 1976
(Chandler 1999a). In the first period, “the Khmer Rouge exploited his name to rally
peasant support, but never had the slightest intention of allowing him real power”
(Shawcross, in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxxviii). They used him to achieve their ultimate aim
of defeating the Lon Nol regime. In the second period, he was still a “figurehead”
(Weltig, 2009, p. 117). Only in September 1975, some six months after they had won
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total victory over the Lon Nol regime, did the Khmer Rouge permit him to return to
Cambodia after pressure from the Chinese, “who wanted the prince to be treated fairly”
(Chandler, 1999a, p. 106). He had an “ambiguous” role within the new DK government,
which had taken a year to form; he was always precluded from wielding power (Corfield
& Summers, 2003). The Khmer Rouge wanted to “move against him,” but he had support
from the Chinese (Chandler, pp. 108-109). However, in January 1976 there came
uncertainty about the prince’s position when Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, “his most
enduring patron,” died (Chandler, 1999a, p. 109). At his hospital in August 1975, Zhou
“urged” the Khmer Rouge to cooperate with Sihanouk (Jeldres, 2012, p. 61).
In early March 1976, Prince Sihanouk took the initiative to tender his resignation,
which was perhaps intended to please the Khmer Rouge; but this “angered their leader
[Pol Pot], who presumed he was upstaging them” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 109). At a
Standing Committee meeting, where Sihanouk’s proposed resignation was discussed, Pol
Pot said the resignation meant nothing. “Sihanouk isn’t resigning now; he did that already
in 1971,” Pol Pot said (p. 109). The Prince, Pol Pot said, was incapable of causing any
harm because he had now become “an old, meek tiger, all skin and bones with no claws
or fangs” (quoted in Short, 2005, p. 334). On the one hand, Pol Pot found it justifiable to
remove Sihanouk from office. There was a “class contradiction between him, his wife
and the revolution” and the party no longer needed him (p. 109). On the other hand,
Sihanouk’s departure from Cambodia on his own would “confuse the Chinese,” Pol Pot
said. If he stayed, they could muffle his grievances within a month. As a result, Pol Pot
proposed that Samphan meet with Sihanouk praising him “deceptively” and telling him to
“withdraw his resignation until it was demanded.” It was vital to the party that the “prince
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remain silenced in Phnom Penh” (p. 109). After his meeting with the prince, Samphan
told the committee that Sihanouk “had ‘crawled and begged’ for permission to resign.”
The prince was horrified. Pol Pot suggested that the prince not be permitted to leave the
country; that its Council of Ministers approve his resignation; and that the prince taperecord his statements supporting the regime. Pol Pot said Sihanouk’s life would be spared
because he had joined the revolution. On 2 April 1976, grenades went off behind the
prince’s palace. Three hours later, he eventually resigned largely because DK’s
Constitution abolished Buddhism, among a myriad of other things (Weltig, 2009). But in
his official “request for retirement,” he explained that the Cambodian People’s
Representative Assembly (CPRA) would “elect the patriots who are to be members of the
government” (Phnom Penh Radio, 1976, quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 326). Sihanouk
wrote in 2008 that “as retribution” for his resignation, the Khmer Rouge killed five of his
children and fourteen of his grandchildren (quoted in Gillison, 2008). He was replaced by
Khieu Samphan and was placed under house arrest on the premises of the Royal Palace in
Phnom Penh until January 6, 1979, just one day before the forces of the Vietnameseassisted United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea took over Phnom Penh. In
a 1987 interview, Sihanouk said he had met Pol Pot twice: in 1973, when he visited
Cambodia’s liberated zones but because of Pol Pot’s concealment he did not know Pol
Pot was the man in charge, and again in January 1979, when Pol Pot “praised me very
much,” (Weiner, 1987, p. 70) possibly deceptively.
In 1976 and 1977, Pol Pot focused on maintaining his power (Chandler, 1999a).
What follows details some of Pol Pot’s moves against his opponents (or in his own
words, enemies or traitors) during that period. One of Pol Pot’s first purges was against
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Hu Nim, DK’s Minister of Information, a former journalist with a doctorate in law from
France (e.g. Stuart-Fox & Ung, 1998). Considered an intellectual, he was a member of
the National Assembly and held various ministerial positions in Sihanouk’s Sangkum
period. Then in 1967, Hu Nim, along with Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon, disappeared
and all three were labeled “The Three Ghosts” because there were erroneously thought to
have been killed by Sihanouk’s, or more precisely, Lon Nol’s police, as he was a police
chief. They were among the “original Red Khmer.” They reemerged in 1973, when
Sihanouk visited them in the jungle. But by then, the three ghosts had been under Pol
Pot’s control. According to a 1971 remark by Keous Kun, a Khmer communist who
defected to the Republic and who had attended a CPK conference in 1970 to “American
debriefers,” Hu Nim was “a ‘garrulous,’ intelligent person who “never lost an argument’
in the Party ideological discussion” (quoted in Chandler et al., 1988, p. 232).
Hu Nim was arrested on April 10, 1977 and executed at S-21 on July 6, 1977.
Yun Yat, wife of Son Sen, became the new Minister of Information. Not until their defeat
in 1979 did the exiled DK regime “quietly tell selected foreigners” that they had had Hu
Nim incarcerated in 1977 (Chandler, Kiernan, & Boua, 1988, p. 228). He had been
accused of being a CIA agent (Chanda, 1986 & Chandler et al., 1988), which “can be
dismissed” (Chandler et al., 1988, p. 227). The other accusation against him was that he
had cooperated with pro-Vietnamese Khmer communists who were plotting to topple
“Pol Pot’s DK regime from within” (p. 227). No evidence exists to support this
accusation either. He underwent repeated wanton torture. “We whipped him four or five
times to break his stand, before taking him to be stuffed with water,” his interrogator
wrote in a note appended to the first of Hu Nim’s seven confessions submitted to S-21
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Director, Duch (p. 227). The torture compelled him to write more than two hundred
pages of “confessions” from his arrest to his execution (Chandler et al.) saying many
things that were not true about himself, including being a CIA spy. At one point, he wrote
“I am not a human being. I am an animal…” (p. 227).
It is more likely that Hu Nim was marked a “traitor” by Angkar as a result of his
disagreement with the party’s policies. In early January 1977, according to his own
written confession, he “opened an education session for core members of the
Organization.” The “consciousness documents” were about “the abolition of money,
materialism, the abolition of money, the evacuation of money, and the collective system”
among other things (Chandler, 1988, p. 311). Like many other members, Hu Nim and
Prom Sam Ar, also a core member, were “disturbed and tormented” by the documents.
“As for me, though, my strategy was that if I violently, frontally, and openly opposed the
party, I would not succeed in my aim. But for Prom Sam Ar it meant big trouble because
he dared to frontally and openly oppose the party and the party line,” he wrote (pp. 311312). In his “fateful interview” with Brother No. 1 in late January 1977, it occurred to
him for the first time that his boss did not favor “a system of plenty,” not even an iota;
instead, Pol Pot favored the idea of people working very hard without the aid of
machinery and growing sufficient rice to “support the state a lot” (Chandler et al., 1988,
p. 232).
Two reports suggest Hu Nim’s arrest came soon after he voiced dissenting
opinion. First, at a meeting of the CPK Standing Committee in early 1977 that discussed
the “drastically poor harvest just brought in,” Hu Nim is reported to suggest that “some
material incentive” was needed if the party were to increase the people’s productivity;
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“and when asked what this would mean in practice, he replied that money would have to
be re-introduced” (Thun Saray, quoted in Chandler et al., p. 321). Second, Lim Mean, a
CPK regimental commander who had fled to Thailand in 1978 asserted that “several
members of the Party such as Hu Nim and [Ros] Nhim asked the Party to have mercy on
the people.” They were of the opinion “that the Party must act to carry out democratic
actions according to the democratic system. They said that the working people must not
be persecuted, and foreign aid must be accepted so that the Kampuchean people do not
suffer too much. Such opinions were regarded by the Party as subversion” Lim Mean
claimed (p. 321).
In 1978 just before the first visits by three Westerners (two American
correspondents and one British academic), Ben Kiernan wrote in a newspaper article that
Pol Pot was pursuing “unchallenged authority” (Kiernan, 2008, p. 443). That year alone
saw a suicide of one prominent Standing Committee member, So Phim, and the
executions of two other members, Ros Nhim and Vorn Vet.
Another prominent victim of Pol Pot’s purges was So Phim, the First Vice
President of State Presidium and “popular” secretary of Eastern Zone (Chandler, 1999c,
p. 72), which bordered Vietnam. So Phim’s zone had close ties with the Vietcong and
was distinguished by the “more moderate behavior” of its troops in the evacuation of
Phnom Penh and by its administration (Kiernan, 2008, p. 313). Whereas Heder (1991,
cited in Kiernan, 2008) conjectured that So Phim agreed with the Party Center’s (hence,
Pol Pot’s) political views, Kiernan (2008) and Chandler (1999c) argued otherwise. He
was the fourth member in the CPK hierarchy; but, according to Kiernan (2008), there is
no evidence that he took part in Center decisions during DK’s first two years and that he
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attended any of the fourteen meetings of the CPK Standing Committee since September
1975. He introduced the “more radical aspects of CPK policy” like communal eating into
his zone later than did other zonal secretaries (Chandler, 1999c, p. 72). In some parts of
his zone, he permitted people to wear clothes of their choice rather than black peasant
uniform (Chandler, 1999c). According to the confession of Vorn Vet, Deputy Prime
Minister for Economy and also a purge victim, So Phim and his men planned to form a
party which would be the “reverse of the CPK” and to reintroduce money, salary, and
market (quoted in Chandler, 1999c, p. 184). An erstwhile “right-hand man of Pol Pot’s”
(Chanda, p. 248), So Phim was so duped by Pol Pot that until almost the end (or even till
the end) of his life, he still did not believe it was Pol Pot who ordered the purges against
his zone. Heng Samrin, his direct subordinate, recounted: “He said the coup was the work
of Son Sen, who had done it to overthrow Pol Pot. But I said that it was not [just] Son
Sen, it was a policy of Pol Pot. It was very clear that Pol Pot had a policy of screening out
internal agents in the Party… I told him this. But he didn’t believe me. He said he still
had hope in ‘Brother Number One’” (quoted in Kiernan, 2008, p. 397). “It was brother
number one (Pol Pot) who decided that [So] Phim would die…a very secret meeting was
held—Pol Pot ordered it,” Duch told Nate Thayer in an interview [emphasis original]
(Thayer, 1999??). Because of his trust in Pol Pot, So Phim made an attempt to meet with
him in Phnom Penh. What follows very briefly recounts his tragic final days, based
mainly on the work of Kiernan (2008).
So Phim drove his jeep with only six bodyguards to Arei Khsat on the Mekong
River opposite the capital and sent one of them by boat with a note to the office of a
military commander near Unnalom Pagoda in Phnom Penh. The messenger returned
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without any response. While he was waiting for a response, Center marines arrived on
two ferries; they opened fired and wounded him in the stomach. Too far from his jeep, he
had to escape on foot and then on a horse cart. He stopped at a pagoda near a banyan tree
near Prek Pra village. Three days later, Heng Samrin found him there and his family also
joined him. “We begged him to come along. But he insisted on staying… He sent me
away to look after the troops,” recalled Samrin (p. 399), who left with his troops on May
31. The district’s deputy chief ordered Phim’s arrest. On June 3, 1978, to avoid arrest by
Ke Pauk’s three-hundred-strong force sent by Pol Pot, he shot himself with a pistol in the
chest and through the mouth, ending “a thirty-year revolutionary career” that had started
in the 1940s (p. 400). His wife and children were “massacred” later that day “as they
prepared his body for burial” (p. 400).
Ros Nhim, secretary of Northwestern Zone, was arrested on June 11, 1978 and
executed in December of that year. He is purported in Hu Nim’s confession to have
complaints “about the heavy demands of the 1976 Plan on his zone and his criticisms of
the DK policy to spurn foreign aid and modern machinery.” “Hu Nim merely records
these views,” which seem to be “the most genuine” (Chandler et al., p. 230).
Pol Pot may have effectively exterminated zonal leaders who attempted to carry
out a coup against him. However, he paid a hefty price for his purge campaigns,
particularly against So Phim. “The Center’s triumph over Phim did not achieve its goal,”
Kiernan contended (p. 400). The events preceding and particularly following So Phim’s
death appears to have spelled the beginning of the end of the Pol Pot regime. “The
ruthless killing of the Eastern Zone cadres and soldiers extinguished the last hopes of an
internal coup against Pol Pot. Vietnamese firepower was now the only alternative,” wrote
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Chanda (p. 248). Those leaders like Heng Samrin, commander of the 4th Division of the
Eastern Zone, who had been aware and fearful of the purges, fled to the jungle and then
to Vietnam. These leaders and other Khmer Rouge defectors, with Vietnam’s help,
formed United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea. The Front, which
included anti-Pol Pot troops inside Cambodia, was able to defeat the DK troops thanks to
Vietnam’s material and military assistance (including combat troops and advisers) and
because of the absence of what Chanda called “China’s military commitment against
Vietnam” (1986, p. 261). Son Sen, DK defense minster, received a lecture about “the
merits of self-reliance” from the Chinese leadership when he requested this commitment
(p. 261). China provided DK with arms, ammunition, and up to five thousand Chinese
personnel and advisers (p. 262) but no combat troops.
Reasons for Pol Pot’s lack of empathy and teamwork and collaboration
Why did Pol Pot lack empathy, particularly while ruling Democratic Kampuchea?
Two groups of mainstream Khmer Rouge authors and commentators offer two different
main reasons/factors for Pol Pot’s and his regime’s racism and genocide: 1) his political
ideology and 2) power or political ambitions. According to Meng-Try (1981), Pol Pot
placed his ideology, in which case was his extreme version of Maoist Communism,
above all other considerations. “Under Pol Pot, excess mortality was caused by
massacres, executions, war with Vietnam, famine, deportation, and penurious working
conditions. In all of these developments, ideology played a dominant role,” Meng-Try
wrote (p. 209). Similarly, Jackson (1989) contented that “neither pragmatism nor
compassion” was present or possible given the Khmer Rouge’s rapid and literal
application of “untried revolutionary theories” (p. 4).
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By contrast, Sihanouk considered Pol Pot’s “personal ambitions” the main factor.
“Pol Pot is very cruel, very mad… I know these people [Pol Pot and Ieng Sary] .. their
main motivations are not of an ideological nature _personal ambitions,” he said in an
interview (in Gerrand, 1988). In a similar vein, the DK was a “self-absorbed regime,”
argued Chandler (1999a, p. 113); and its revolution placed its goals and principles above
all else (Yathay & Man, 2000). In Yathay’s words, “Ends justified means. Ideals
legitimized crime…” (p. 172). Other authors argued that a combination of these factors
were at play. For instance, in Chandler’s view, the Khmer Rouge leaders, including, of
course, Pol Pot, drew inspirations from Maoist China, “their own pride,” and their
misconception of Cambodia’s “revolutionary potential” (in foreword of Yathay & Man,
2000, p. xiii). Still, other authors and commentators offered other possible reasons.
The first reason was his loss of contact with everyday Cambodian life for four
years from 1965 when he lived with indigenous people in his resistance base in
Rattanakiri, a far-flung, densely forested province in the northeast of Cambodia; whilst
there, Chandler (2008, p. 247) wrote, Pol Pot “polished his Utopian ideas, nourished his
hatreds…” Similarly, Pol Pot is likely to have become radical while in the jungles,
according to Peter Fröberg Idling, a Swedish author of a nonfiction account and a
fictional novel of Pol Pot (cited in Murray, 2014). Moreover, Pol Pot’s unquestioned
“aloofness,” according to Becker (1998a & 1998b), and his physical isolation seem to
have largely made his regime become, in Brissé’s words, “out of touch with reality” (in
Sihanouk, 1980, p. xv). “He stayed in an ivory tower cut off from reality, cut off from the
people,” said a Khmer Rouge officer (quoted in Koopmans, 2005, p. 65). More
specifically, Pol Pot’s policy of turning everyone into a slave peasant and forcing them to
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achieve unrealistic agricultural targets might have stemmed from his isolation from the
rice field and village. Sar “never worked a rice field or knew much of village life”
(Kiernan, 2008, p. 10).
The second reason was that he was broken-hearted, according Keng Vannsak
(cited in Mudie, 2006 and Idling, 2014), Pol Pot’s former mentor at whose home in Paris
he, Ieng Sary, and other would-be Khmer Rouge leaders discussed Marxism. Before
leaving for his study in Paris in 1949, Pol Pot had established a romantic relationship
with a “one-time beauty queen” (Idling, 2014, p. 16), named “Soeung Son Maly” (Short,
2004, p. 49) or “Suon Somaly” (Keng Vannsak, quoted in Mudie, 2006), whose mother
was a princess and father a school teacher (Short). Their relationship was “serious and
chaste” (Short, p. 50). After his return from Paris in 1953, they met again quite often at
Vannsak’s house in Phnom Penh while campaigning for the Democratic Party in
Cambodia’s first free general elections in 1955 (Williams, 2005). “At that time, she loved
him,” Vannsak said in a film interview (Williams, 2005). “Her idea was that when the
Democratic Party triumphed, Sar would become an important official and then they
would be able to marry,” Vannsak said (Short, p. 117). Unfortunately, the Democratic
Party lost and she ended their relationship. “[Maly] abandoned [him] to go out with
Sihanouk’s second in command36. She gave herself to someone richer and better known

She became the “junior wife” of the rightist Sam Sary (Short, p. 117), Pol Pot’s political nemesis and the
father of Sam Rainsy, Cambodia’s current opposition leader. Sam Rainsy acknowledged that his father kept
a “series of mistresses” (Sam Rainsy & Whitehouse, 2013, p. 19). However, he wrote to Idling (2014) that
Son Maly was unfamiliar to him and that Iv Eng Seng, a mistress of his father, who lived with the latter and
his first wife in London in the 1950s while a Cambodian ambassador, had never been in a beauty pageant.
Idling’s other candidate named Tep Kanary, although beautiful, neither had royal blood. nor lived in Sam
Sary’s London household. Idling could not “confront Keng Vannsak with these contradictions” in a
scheduled meeting in 2009 because the latter had died in December, 2008.
36
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than Saloth Sar, the poor revolutionary without a revolution,” Vannsak said (Williams,
2005). Keng Vannsak “told me that he believed [Pol Pot] suffered from a broken heart,”
wrote Idling (p. 16). As a consequence of this loss, caused by the Democratic Party’s
defeat in the elections, and Sihanouk’s campaign against Communists (Williams, 2005),
Pol Pot started to devote himself to “revolutionary struggle”; he “gradually lost faith in
both romantic love and democracy…” (Idling, p. 16). In a radio interview, Keng Vannsak
explained why he raised Pol Pot’s love story. It was “because it is a factor in the politics
of the then Democratic Kampuchea becoming violent, with lots of killing and bloodshed,
and it was also hard to understand the source of this violence,” Keng Vannsak said, while
acknowledging that there were other factors for DK’s violence and Pol Pot’s “pure
politics” (quoted in Mudie, 2006).
Although he married Khieu Ponnary (whom he had met in France in 1951) in July
1956, it is not clear that their relationship–which lasted until 1985, at least publicly37–was
romantic. According to keng Vannsak, the Pol Pot’s relationship with Khieu Ponnary was
“like [that] between relatives” (quoted in Mudie, 2006) and Pol Pot was “on the rebound”
at the time of their marriage (cited in Short, p. 117). There was something unusual about
their marriage, which, according to Chandler (1999a, p. 50), “seems to have taken their
mutual acquaintances by surprise.” She was five years his senior, which is unusual in
Cambodia, especially in that era, where men marry women considerably younger than
they (Sar would marry in 1986 his second wife, Meas (or Meas Som, according to Chhay
Sophal (2014b, p. 79), who was “twenty-two years old” (Short, p. 422) and thus more

Khieu Ponnary was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia in the late 1960s and lived much of her life
with her mother and sister, Ieng Thirith.
37
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than 35 years his junior, as he was then sixty). In terms of beauty, Sar and Ponnary were
different. Sar was tall, good-looking and charming (e.g. Sikoeun, in Al Jazeera, and
Short, 2005), whereas Ponnary was “small” (Chandler, 1999a, 49), had smallpox scars on
her face (Short) and almost always wore neither make-up nor jewelry (Chandler, 1999a).
She was called “the old maid” (Short, p. 118) or “the old virgin” (Chandler, p. 50) by her
friends behind her back. As one of the first Cambodian women to finish the baccalaureat,
which Sar never obtained, she was better-educated, also still unusual in Cambodia
tradition. “[W]omen of Ponnary’s social class, at least in the 1950s, seldom married men
with so few prospects or attainments” (Chandler, p. 50). The following year, she was
diagnosed with uterine cancer. Although the surgery was successful, she would not able
to bear children (his second wife bore him a daughter). Sar’s reason to marry Ponnary
seems to have been much more than romantic love. Short contended that Sar needed
someone he could rely on after his personal losses; she had that quality. That they shared
revolutionary ideals was another reason. As Chandler (p. 50) speculated that “Perhaps she
and Saloth Sar were drawn together by their shared commitment to utopian policies and
the idea of working in secret to transform their country.”
The third reason or factor was that Pol Pot transformed himself after he had joined
the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) after his return from France in 1953 and, more
importantly, once he was at the helm of Democratic Kampuchea from 1975 to 1979. He
had become an atheist (Chandler, 1999a & c and Harris, 2005) or a “super-atheist”
(Sihanouk, 1980, p. 52) and abolished all religions by the time he ruled DK. However,
perhaps around the age of six, he actually served as a novice at a Buddhist monastery in
Phnom Penh between a few months (e.g. Chandler, 1999a; Corfield & Summers, 2003)
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and a year38 (Harris, 2005). As noted earlier, when he wrote his first political polemic
while in Paris, he praised Buddhism and the Buddha and envisioned its role in a future
Cambodia. His personal transformation was not only in terms of faith but also character
or personality. As Vickery (p. 163) acknowledged, no one could predict the evilness of
the regime of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan, etc. on the basis of “their
characters as observed in pre-revolutionary circumstances.”
The fourth reason, according to Sikoeun (Al Jazeera), Pol Pot learned to conceal
his emotions after his several visits to his sister, Saloth Roeung, then-King Monivong’s
favorite secondary wife (Chandler, 1999a & Short, 2004) at the Royal Palace during his
teenage years. Since then, he “dissimulat[ed] his thoughts behind an impenetrable wreath
of smiles and laughter” (Short, p. 28). In an interview on his book on Pol Pot, Short
(quoted in Cumming, 2005) said “[Pol Pot] was good at hiding his views and hiding what
he really felt…” in response to the interviewer’s statement, in part, that Pol Pot “really
wasn’t good at anything.” Last but not least, Pol Pot did not treasure individuals but the
Cambodian “race” (Kiernan, 1993, para. 10).
Organizational awareness and conflict management
Before discussing the two leaders’ organizational awareness and conflict
management, it is useful to briefly describe the organization of each leader using two of
Morgan’s (2006) organization images or metaphors which are directly relevant or even
akin to the types of organizations of Lon Nol and Pol Pot, namely “organizations as

He claimed in 1978 that he had stayed at the pagoda for six years, two years as a novice monk, which
was an exaggeration (Short, 2004 and Harris, 2005).
38
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political systems” and “organizations as instruments of dominations” respectively. An
understanding of the type of organization within which each leader operated leads to (or
at least facilitates) an appreciation of each leader’s leadership style.
While the term “organization” (or Angkar or Angkapheap in Khmer) was seldom
used during the Khmer Republic, both the term “Angkar” or “Angkar Loeu” (higher or
upper organization in Khmer) and its physical and psychological existence were
omnipresent during Democratic Kampuchea. The term Angkar carries so sinister a
connotation that the various governments after DK have avoided using it; instead, they
have used the word Angkapheap, which has the same English equivalent. The word
Angkar is reserved for civil society organizations (NGOs). As will be elaborated below,
no discussion of Democratic Kampuchea is complete without a discussion or mention of
Angkar. Some Khmer Rouge authors used the Organization and others, even foreign
ones, used Angkar; hence, both terms will be used interchangeably in this paper.
Lon Nol’s organization as a political system
A description of what the term “government” means in Cambodia’s political
context is necessary for understanding each leader’s organization. This description is
rendered even more necessary by the unique characteristics of both the Lon Nol and Pol
Pot governments. As opposed to the US government –which covers three separate
branches: the executive (the presidency), the legislature (Congress), and the judiciary (the
US Supreme Court) –Lon Nol’s government before the Republic’s constitution was
promulgated in April 1972 was a “cabinet government,” where “the cabinet as a whole,
rather than the prime minister who heads it, is considered the executive, and the cabinet is
collectively responsible to Parliament for its performance” Shafritz (2004, p. 39). The
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government of this kind covers not only the executive branch; but in reality, this cabinet
government is usually the most powerful and often over-bearing branch. The chief reason
is that members of the cabinet, especially ministers (or secretaries as in the US) are
typically also the majority or ruling party’s members in Parliament. “In fact, the
[Cambodian] Parliament had consistently, out of servile habit, approved all measures put
before it by the government,” wrote Kamm (1998, p. 110). After the promulgation of its
constitution, the Khmer Republic’s was a mixed presidential government. Still, the
presidency was the most powerful.
Therefore, the Khmer Republic’s political system or government structure was a
lot closer to the widely accepted modern government structure than Democratic
Kampuchea’s in the sense that the former consisted of three branches: executive,
legislative, and judicial while the latter consisted almost exclusively of the executive
branch. According to Morgan (2006), this type of organization [Lon Nol’s] inevitably
involves interests, conflict, and power. Different people’s competing interests make
“wheeling and dealing” necessary and reconciliation of their differences (i.e. conflict)
require “consultation and negotiation” (p. 150). And power, which “influences who gets
what, when, and how” is needed to wheel and deal in order to satisfy their interests (p.
166).
Interests and power under Lon Nol
Interests refer to “predispositions embracing goals, values, desires, expectations,
and other orientations and inclinations that lead a person to act in a way rather than
another” and has three separate but “interconnected domains” such as task interests,
career interests, and extramural interests (Morgan, 2006, p. 157). These domains are
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represented by three circles that can converge. There is frequently only a small “area of
complete convergence,” which is “one reason why organizational (or task) rationality is
such a rare phenomenon” (p. 158). The task interest of each key political player in the
Khmer Republic was even rarer, as their career and extramural interests more often than
not took precedence and, as Canesso (1999, p. 46) wrote, “Lon Nol and other top leaders
fought for power among themselves.” Unable to get things done or to obtain agreement
from other ministers, Sirik Matak is quoted as saying that “Before 1970 there was only
one Sihanouk. Now there are 7 million Sihanouks, each wanting power for themselves”
Suon Kaset, Matak’s assistant, quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 115). The following section
elaborates on only a few major instances of interests and power.
The key political and military actors were Lon Nol himself; Prince Sisowath Sirik
Matak, Lon Nol’s closest friend since childhood, Deputy Prime Minister, Vice-President,
and “mastermind” (Chhang Song, 1997, p. 110) or “chief conspirator” (Kamm, 1998, p.
94) of the 1970 coup; In tam, President of the National Assembly after Sihanouk was
removed and later Prime Minister; Cheng Heng, Head of State; Keo An, Dean of the Law
Faculty at Phnom Penh University and a presidential candidate in 1972; Son Ngoc Thanh,
Prime Minister; Sim Var, Ambassador to Japan and a disqualified presidential candidate
in 1972; and Lon Non, Lon Nol’s younger brother.
No analysis of the Khmer Republic and the circumstances that led to its existence
and downfall is adequate without a mention of the role Lon Non played prior to and
during the Republic. He was a “police officer, Army General and later Minister attached
to the Ministry of the Interior” (Corfield, 1994, p. 95), a founder of the Socio-Republican
Party (PSR, a French acronym), founder and director of the National Committee of
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Special Coordination –which he claimed was representative of “youth” and
“intellectuals” but which Kamm (1998) called a “sinister political cabal” (p. 107). Most
important of all, he was Lon Nol’s younger brother–who lived with and was closest to
him and who influenced his judgment. Capitalizing on this blood relationship, the “Little
Brother” as called by high-ranking government officials (Gayn, 1973; Kamm, 1998),
became the regime’s “strongman” (Chantrabot, 1978, p. 30); a “political manipulator”
(Corfield, 1994, p. 95); a “brutal fascist with political ambitions” called by Prince
Sihanouk (Jeldres, p. 69); the “evil genius” as described in the world’s media (quoted in
Kissinger, 2003, p. 477); a “feared man, whose troops were stationed in perfect coup
position” (Kamm, 1998, p. 107); and “one of the most notoriously corrupt, hated
members of the old regime” (Swain, 1999, p. 143). Lon Non was so powerful that one
columnist asserted that he had been a “kingmaker” and on the day his article was
published, it appeared that Lon Non wanted to be a ruler of Cambodia himself (Gayn,
1973, p. 32). In a similar vein, Prince Sihanouk remarked “Lon Non is more terrible than
Lon Nol. Lon Non wants to reign; to always be master of one part of Cambodia” (quoted
in Corfield, 1994, p. 209). Gayn even seems to have implied that Lon Non bore much of
the blame for the Cambodian tragedy when he wrote “Lon Nol’s presence is only half of
the Cambodian tragedy, however. Almost by default, power in Phnom Penh has passed to
his abrasive and devious “little brother,” brig. Gen. Lon Non” (p. 32).
Lon Nol’s conflict management
Conflict is inherent in leadership. What separates great leaders from ordinary or
bad leaders, according to Burns (quoted in Moyers, 1989), is that the former have been
faced with conflict, grappled with it, and been encouraged by it. “Great politicians thrive
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on [great conflict]. They know how to deal with conflict and to exploit it and to use it for
their own purposes, whereas the lesser politician, the transactional type, is more likely to
be crushed by conflict” (Burns, quoted in Moyers, 1989, p. 195). Pseudotransformational
leaders, like Lon Nol and Pol Pot, tend to be crushed by conflict as well.
Both types of data point out the leaders’ ineffective management of their own
conflict with others and of the conflicts between and among their subordinates, which
contributed to their eventual downfall. Rather than staying above conflict, they
themselves were party to their respective regime’s and organization’s conflict. Unlike
their predecessor, Sihanouk, who “was the glue that held Cambodia together,” according
to Ambassador Dean (2009, p. 97) and “the only person capable of uniting and rebuilding
the country” (Sam Rainsy & Whitehouse, p. 33), both Lon Nol and Pol Pot can be said to
have been dividers rather than unifiers. Chhang Song39 asserted that Lon Nol “wanted his
country to be unified…” (quoted in Strangio, 2010). Pol Pot himself said, “Good
leadership must nourish, strengthen and extend solidarity and internal unity for ever....
This is an old problem. If we have solidarity and internal unity, we can resolve any
problem. On the other hand, if the solidarity and internal unity are not good, a
comfortable situation is still fraught, and a difficult situation becomes even more
confused…. Therefore, wherever we live, whatever work we do, whomever we lead,
whatever we say, we must carefully consider solidarity and internal unity” (quoted in
Kiernan, 2008, p. 332). However, the following evidence and Dean’s statement contradict

39

It was Chhang Song who read Lon Nol’s eulogy at his funeral in California (Strangio, 2010).
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this assertion. “[Lon Nol] certainly tried to keep the country together against the Khmer
Rouge, a policy we supported,” Dean said (quoted in Kennedy, 2004, p. 107).
Lon Nol’s management of conflicts within his government
As far as Lon Nol’s regime is concerned, a lot of political conflict or internal
strife occurred after the March 1970 coup, which turned into “political crisis”
(Shawcross, 1986, p. 204) or even “a leadership crisis now that we didn’t have under
Sihanouk,” as one Western analyst said (quoted in Schanberg, 1973b, para. 19). The
conflict frequently turned personal and which were caused in part by military defeats and
in large measures by Lon Non. The primary motivation of the parties to the conflict was
to stay in power. As Sam Oeur & McCullough (2005, p. 159) wrote “… Lon Nol, Sirik
Matak, Cheng Heng, and Son Ngoc Thanh continued to elbow each other, as they queued
for American money and political power.” Moreover, as Swank said in an interview, Lon
Nol was “the most daunting” of the “political challenges of Phnom Penh” (Precht, 1988).
The political infighting and power struggle resulted in power sharing and nine short-lived
governments headed by five prime ministers, including Lon Nol, who was also president
for most of the Khmer Republic period. Ros Chantrabot (1978) argued that the conflict
between Lon Nol and Sirik Matak started with one disagreement before the Khmer
Republic was declared on October 9, 1970: Lon Nol wanted Cambodia to become a
republic but Sirik Matak wanted the country to remain a monarchy. Some individuals,
especially Lon Nol and Lon Non, accused Sirik Matak of wanting to become King
himself on the ground that in 1941the French had chosen to crown Prince Norodom
Sihanouk King passing over Sisowath Sirik Matak (based on royal lineage, he or another
Sisowath should have been crowned). However, this is incorrect (Corfield, 1994, p. 82),
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as confirmed by Son Ngoc Thanh (cited in Corfield, 1994). Instead, Sirik Matak wanted
one of his brothers, Essaro, or his son-in-law, also a Sisowath, to become King. Sirik
Matak later abandoned his Royal title and wished “to be known as a citizen equal to his
compatriots” (Agence Khmere de Presse, 1970; quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 101) and his
intention for a monarchy.
According to Ros Chantrabot (1978), a member of Lon Non’s National
Committee of Special Coordination who met with Lon Non while the latter was in exile
in Paris, Lon Non was driven not by real Republican ideals but by power and his burning
desire to succeed his brother. Lon Nol confided to him that as long as his brother was still
in power, Lon Non would not seize power from him in order to avoid more accusations
against him [Lon Non]. Likewise, Sihanouk said that Lon Non was “known for his
‘strong arm’ method and as a contender for power in case his ailing brother becomes
incapacitated” (quoted in Deac, p. 102). Lon Non also told Ros Chantrabot that it was
Sirik Matak who stood in his path to power, or so Lon Non thought. But, Lon Non
“wanted to seize power” from Sirik Matak (Vandy Kaonn, 2012, p. 272). If Cambodia
were to remain a kingdom, the political ambitions of Lon Non, a commoner, would be
dashed (Chantrabot, 1978).
Questions had already been raised about Lon Nol’s fitness for the top post after
his stroke. His incapacitation became a possibility and a major source of conflict. While
he was receiving treatment for two months in Hawaii, there was “power vacuum,”
although as Deputy Prime Minister, Sirik Matak by default became acting Prime Minister
(Shawcross, 1989). Yet, Lon Non made it clear that Sirik Matak would be in this position
only temporarily. The Americans were considering who would succeed him, particularly
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who “might be suitable to run the country, and to accept their aid” (Corfield, 1994, p.
111). There were three top candidates for the post: In Tam, Sirik Matak, and Lon Non.
After brief consideration, the Americans ruled out the candidacy of In Tam because “he
had too many enemies” and was not widely popular among “students and intellectuals”
(Bennett, 1971, quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 111).
Before they could decide between Sirik Matak and Lon Non, who were archrivals, Lon Nol returned from Honolulu, Hawaii on April 12 after two months of
treatment and convalescence. His ability to “walk with difficulty” with a cane (Corfield,
1994, p. 111) prompted calls for him to resign. At first, despite calls for his retirement, he
was determined to hold on to power but resigned as Prime Minister on April 20. One day
later, In Tam promoted Lon Nol to Marshal, the position that had never before existed in
Cambodia. However, on that same day, Cheng Heng as Head of State “asked Lon Nol to
form a Government” as a result of pressure from Lon Non’s National Committee of
National Coordination, which “openly celebrated” his return to power (p. 112). But again,
Lon Nol declined acknowledging he was too ill. Cheng Heng turned to In Tam and Sirik
Matak, both of whom declined. Although preferred by the Americans (Kamm, 1998) and
described by Kissinger (2003, p. 477) as “perhaps the ablest Cambodian leader,” Sirik
Matak was not popular in the army. Worse still, had he replaced Lon Nol, Lon Non
would have possibly led a military coup against Sirik Matak and formed a junta
(Corfield, 1994). The Americans indicated that they would terminate military and
economic assistance in the event of a coup. Lon Non was adamant that no one could
replace his brother as Prime Minister (e.g. Corfield, 1994; Kamm, 1998; Chandler, 2008),
“even if, on his doctors’ orders, [Lon Nol] could devote no more than thirty minutes a
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day to the job” (Kamm, 1998, p. 107). After nearly another month of authority vacuum,
Cheng Heng had no choice but to “recall Lon Nol as Prime Minister, with Sirik Matak as
his deputy” (Corfield, 1994, p. 112), “prime minister-delegate,” (Chantrabot, 1978 and
Kamm, 1998, p. 108), or “premier-designate” (Chandler, 1991b, p. 212). But, according
to Soonthornpoct (2005), it was Lon Nol who had a change of heart and “withdrew his
resignation” (p. 209). Lon Nol told Sirik Matak to “act as if I’m overseas” (Chandler,
1991b, p. 212). But it was Sirik Matak who was in charge of “actually running the
country in all but name” (Corfield, 1994, p. 112), to Lon Non’s chagrin. Had Lon Nol
forgone the premiership, the fate of Cambodia could have been very different, as
Sihanouk, to reiterate, said “the Khmer Rouge was nothing without Lon Nol.” To ensure
that his brother would not undermine his friend, Lon Nol told his brother to make his
pledge of allegiance to Sirik Matak in public. Kamm (1998) described Lon Non’s display
of what he called the “hollowness of his promise” at a military press briefing as follows:
He made of his first appearance before an international public a stage-managed
show of muscle. Wearing a dashing, one-of-a-kind camouflage uniform, he drove
up to the Magasin d’Etat at the wheel of a long maroon Mercedes, a rarity in
Phnom Penh, preceded by a radio jeep and followed by two truckloads of guntoting bodyguards. It was a sight of personal power never before seen in Phnom
Penh. [Lon Non] delivered his brief declaration in French, did not wait for its
translation into a language that most of the press understood, allowed no
questions, marched out, and drove off. (Kamm, 1998, p. 108)
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Lon Non capitalized on the success of a hyped military offensive called Operation
Akineth40 Moha Padevath (Operation Burning Eyes of the Great Revolution) in May
1971 that he himself had led in order to consolidate “family control as his brother’s grips
over events began to falter” (Corfield, 1994, p. 113). The operation had a political not
military aim (Corfield, 2009). According to Jim Gerrand (1971), a veteran
photojournalist, Lon Non was “pleased by the comparisons drawn with” Operation
Chenla I, the failed operation earlier (quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 113). As a result of the
operation, there was talk of him being Cambodia’s “potential leader” (p. 113). But his
fortune did not last long.
In Tam was so angry with Lon Nol, who had won the massively rigged
presidential election in June 1972, that without Swank’s mediation, the whole
government might have collapsed (Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005). In the second half
of 1972 the US pushed for national unity, which all Cambodian leaders thought was
needed; however, “unity was difficult to achieve” (Clymer, 2004, p. 56). Lon Nol’s
actions deepened the nation’s division. For instance, he held Sirik Matak responsible for
the military defeats, the student demonstrations, the estrangement of the Buddhist monks
(Clymer, 2004). His government shut down one of Sirik Matak’s newspaper after it had
published an article deemed unfavorable to the government (e.g. Corfield, 1994 &
Kamm, 1998). Part of the reason was that the paper covered an argument at a diplomatic
reception between Douc Rasy, who was against Lon Nol’s position and Son Ngoc Thanh,
who was in favor of it (Corfield, 1994).

Lon Non believed he was a reincarnation of Akineth, a wizard in the Reamker, the Khmer version of
Ramayana (Corfield, 1994).
40
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American officials, including Henry Kissinger and Vice President Spiro Agnew,
who made short visits to Phnom Penh en route to Saigon, exhorted Lon Nol to “broaden
his government” by bringing back Sirik Matak (Kamm, 1998, p. 111), who had resigned
earlier as a result of Lon Non-organized demonstrations against him. But Lon Nol had
little interest in doing that despite his agreement “in principle” to do so (Clymer, 2004, p.
65). Or Lon Nol did it half-heartedly. Under the American pressure, he did start to
consult his opponents, according to Chandler (1991b). According to In Tam’s memoir,
when Sirik Matak asked Lon Nol, “Well, Nol, why have you summoned us?” the latter
replied, “Our foreign friends, who provide so much aid, have asked me to reconstitute the
1970 government” (quoted in Chandler, pp. 223-224). Lon Nol offered to make Sirik
Matak his Vice-President; but the latter declined (Chandler, 1991b). In Tam resigned as
special adviser to the government soon after his appointment by Lon Nol, when he
became Lon Non’s subordinate (Corfield, 1994 & Clymer, 2004).
Defying the Americans, his brother Lon Non made two moves. First, he asked
Henry Kamm, the New York Times journalist, to interview him in March 1973 in order to
present his views to the American public because he could not contact the US Embassy in
Phnom Penh. “How do you think the Americans can bring Sirik Matak back into
government?” he asked Kamm “rhetorically.” “Do you think my political group would
accept Prince Sirik Matak?” (Kamm, 1998, p. 112). Second and more importantly, Lon
Non placed Sirik Matak under “virtual house arrest” (Kamm, p. 112) or “confin[ed] [him]
to his villa and [cut] off his telephones” (Gayn, 1973, p. 32), which Lon Non claimed
aimed to protect Sirik Matak (Kamm, 1998). Lon Non “overplayed his hand in March
1973” (Corfield, 1994, p. 188) and caused so much trouble, including what Ambassador
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Swank called “actions bordering terrorism” (Corfield, p. 161) against his political
opponents, for example by being behind the narrowly-failed assassination of Tep
Khunnah, a supporter of Sirik Matak and Head of the Independent Republican
Association (p. 187) and potentially the attempted assassination of Thomas Enders, the
US Charge d' affaires in Phnom Penh, as William Harben alleged (Corfield, 1994 &
Clymer, 2004). “Lon Non appears to stand athwart practically everything we are trying to
accomplish in Cambodia in terms of unity of purpose and national solidarity,”
commented Marshall Green, US Assistant Secretary of State, a few weeks after the later
incident (quoted in Clymer, 2004, p. 57). After General Haig told Lon Nol that the US
would stop all economic and military aid unless he embraced opposition leaders and
terminated his brother’s activities (Moose & Lowenstein, 1973; cited in Clymer, 2004),
Lon Non’s National Committee of Special Coordination was disbanded by a government
decree and he was pressured to resign from the Cabinet and to go abroad. He left for Paris
in April 1973 (Corfield, 1994) and by late 1973 moved to Silver Spring, Maryland, the
United States and lived there for most of 1974 (Becker, 1998). He returned to Cambodia
on September 21, 1974 after almost 17 months in “exile” (Corfield, 1994, p. 204).
Although Lon Nol acquiesced to the formation of the above-mentioned High Political
Council, which he chaired and whose members were In Tam, Sirik Matak, and Cheng
Heng, according to Chandler (1991b, p. 224), he “encouraged” quarrels among
themselves. “Unintentionally, the new leaders set about destroying themselves,” wrote
Ros Chantrabot (quoted in Chandler, 1991b, p. 224).
Lon Nol publicly supported the “principle of all for one and one for all” which did
not come to fruition (Sutsakhan, p. 150), in part because his behavior was inconsistent
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with it. Together with his brother, he became a deeply divisive figure, a case of which
was his actions against rival political parties and individuals. In the post-Sihanouk era,
there were three political parties led by three prominent figures: the Democratic Party
(DP) of In Tam, the Republican Party (RP) of Sirik Matak, and Socio-Republican Party
(PSR) of Lon Nol (e.g. Corfield, 1994, Deac, 1997 & Sam Oeur & McCullough, 2005).
In Tam’s Democratic Party was very similar to the pre-1955 Democrat Party in
terms of ideas and aims and included such prominent members as Douc Rasy and Ieng
Mouly, later co-founder of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) later
renamed the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), the third largest party to win
seats in the 1993 UN-sponsored general elections. When In Tam further promoted his
party, “[t]he government responded by blocking their channels of communications”
(Corfield, 1994, p. 158). It “suspended” major pro-DP newspapers: Khmer Angkor of In
Tam and Sangros Chiet (national rescue), to which Douc Rasy was a regular contributor
(p. 158). Furthermore, the regime rejected the DP’s application to establish a Party
newspaper, arguing that its proposed Director had been imprisoned despite the fact that
his sentence “had been imposed for political activities against Sihanouk” (p. 158). Soon
after both newspapers resumed their publication, Lon Non shut down Sangros Chiet
again because its editor had taken the government to task for its failure to raise salaries in
the midst of massive inflation. After having arrested and tried by a martial court, he was
found guilty of “endangering national security” and received a “six-month suspended
sentence” and a 50,000-riel fine (Corfield, p. 159).
Sirik Matak’s Republican Party was transformed on June 15 1972 from the
Independent Republican Association managed by Tep Khunnah, a close ally of the
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former’s (Corfield, 1994). Sirik Matak was elected its Secretary-General. Although it
developed from a “split between Lon Nol and Sirik Matak” (Deac, p. 275), Sirik Matak
kept open his option of joining Lon Nol’s National United Front or even merging the RP
with the PSR (Corfield, 1994). Its policy advocated further restructuring (US DoS, 1972,
cited in Corfield, 1994). Like the DP, the RP became a target of “persecution” by Lon
Non soon after the presidential election, who “felt that the ex-Prince was dispensable”
despite the fact that Sirik Matak had been appointed a presidential adviser prior to the
election (Corfield, p. 159), and he did not run for President. Sirik Matak was given the
position “as a sop to the U.S. and to neutralize him further” (Deac, p. 126).
The Socio-Republican Party, of which Lon Nol was the “figurehead leader,”
evolved from his Socio-Republican Association (Corfield, p. 160). Its three core values
were Republicanism, Social Responsibility, and Nationalism, with “all power emanating
from the people” (US DoS, 1972, quoted in Corfield, p. 160). Lon Nol was not among the
20 members of its Central Committee elected by its Congress on July 9, 1972; it was
Hang Thun Hak who gathered the most votes and thus became the Central Committee’s
first ranking member and the PSR’s Secretary-General. Nonetheless, the Central
Committee decided to choose Lon Nol as its patron and pledge its full support for him
after some of its members had been put under pressure (US DoS, 1972, cited in Corfield,
1994). Under further pressure, the Committee accepted six additional members
handpicked by the Marshal, including his little brother Lon Non (Koh Santepheap, 1972,
cited in Corfield, 1994).
“One of Lon Nol’s first actions” after becoming President was to make sure his
party achieve dominance over the other two parties ahead of the National Assembly and
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Senate elections in September of 1972 (Corfield, p. 160). And in the process, he caused
conflict before, during, and after these legislative elections, particularly when the vacant
Vice-President position was expected to be filled before September 4. Sirik Matak’s
Republican Party boycotted the elections followed by the Democratic Party. At a press
conference, he condemned the new electoral law –which guaranteed that the PSR would
garner a significant majority of votes (Clymer, 2004)–and use of state apparatus in favor
of a “particular party” and announced, “The Republican Party withdraws its confidence
in the present Government” (US DoS, quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 167). Lon Nol was
confident that the elections should proceed despite external protests. Lon Non, by
contrast, wanted the election held with “proper” competition, and therefore chose not to
run (Corfield, p. 168).
The situation was complicated further by an assassination attempt on Prime
Minister Son Ngoc Thanh while he was being driven to the Foreign Ministry on August
21. He escaped unhurt apparently because only one of the two antipersonnel mines
detonated (Corfield, 1994). Some people implicated Sirik Matak’s Republican Party
because it had harshly criticized the Prime Minister during the previous few weeks
(Corfield). However, Thanh himself said he suspected “an unarmed someone,” referring
to Lon Non (cited in Deac, 1997, p. 134). Additionally, hope of compromise between the
PSR and RP was shattered when the RP newspaper published an account of events in the
run-up to the elections two days following the assassination attempt (Kanapak
Sathearanak Rath, 1972, cited in Corfield, 1994), drawing wrath from the PSR
(Corfield).
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According to Corfield (1994), Reverend Hout Tath, the Supreme Patriarch of the
Buddhist Mohannikay Order, urged “the men of 18 March” to reconcile among one
another and wrote a letter to Lon Nol, In Tam, Sirik Matak, Trinh Hoanh, Son Ngoc
Thanh, and Cheng Heng. On August 30, Sirik Matak and In Tam responded to the
Patriarch’s letter, “but Lon Nol refused to consider postponing the election or revising the
electoral law” (p. 169). Additionally, in their joint reply letter, Sirik Matak, Cheng Heng,
and In Tam thanked the Patriarch deeply, “saying that they are about to be reunited with
one another and that they do not want to be divided,” according to the Assemblyman
Bunchan Mol (1973, pp. 91-92), who said he had delivered in the person the Patriarch’s
letter to Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Cheng Heng at their respective residences. The
Assemblyman did not mention whether or not Lon Nol replied the letter.
Sirik Matak, In Tam, Trinh Hoanh, and Cheng Heng requested a meeting with
Lon Nol. He at first accepted the request but then decided that he was willing to meet
Cheng Heng only. On August 31, a meeting between Lon Nol and some of the opposition
leaders did take place, but it failed to reach any agreement. The only outcome of apparent
American intervention was Lon Nol’s offer of an adviser post to In Tam, which the latter
turned down. In early 1973, Sirik Matak said that he would accept the Vice-Presidency
on the conditions that the Parliament, the Military High Command, and the PSR
approved. But soon afterwards, 107 of 126 deputies, who were all PSR members, voted
to oppose the nomination. “Thus the proposed reconciliation between Sirik Matak and
Lon Nol never reached fruition,” wrote Corfield (1994, p. 176).
The PSR won all the National Assembly seats because all its candidates ran
unopposed in the election, which was “even more one-sided than the presidential one”
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(Deac, p. 135). “[T]he results of the [National Assembly] election were a foregone
conclusion” as soldiers were eligible to vote (Sam Oeur & McCullough, p. 165), whose
loyalty Lon Nol had either won or bought over the years, as noted earlier. “In political
terms, the most significant aspect of the assembly elections and the new cabinet [which
Lon Nol formed after asking Son Ngoc Thanh to resign] was that In Tam, Sirik Matak,
and Cheng Heng had been deprived of power,” wrote Chandler (1991b, p. 222).
As Deac (1997, p. 111) wrote, “Lon Nol used divide-and
conquer tactics to destabilize [the Republicans and the Democrats]
and protect his power.” He allowed his brother to form dummy political parties to contest
in the legislative elections, one of which was the Pracheachon. Lon Nol even used the
divide-and-conquer tactics with his own PSR, which started to split into two factions:
“Dangkor” of Lon Non and “Dangrek” of Son Ngoc Thanh and Hang Thun Hak.
Although the rift between the two factions offered “some of sense of unity” among most
politicians who had not joined either of the other two parties, it was to “plague the party”
in its entire existence (Corfield, p. 161). According to the PSR assemblyman U Sam
Oeur, “[Lon Nol] broke us up into three or four factions, to keep any one group from
gaining too much momentum–one group in the National Assembly might be pro-Lon
Nol, another might be pro-Hang Thun Hak…, and so on” (Sam Oeur & McCullough, p.
165-166). More dramatic is the statement below by Sak Sutsakhan, the Republic’s last
Defense Minister and President:
By 1975 it was also clear to the various elements of the republican side that our
internal political divisions could no longer be ignored if we were to have any hope
of salvaging the situation for the Khmer Republic. The divisions between the
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political party in power, the Socio-Republican Party of Marshal Lon Nol, and the
other parties were becoming deeper and deeper. No reconciliation was found. In
his leadership Marshal Lon Nol was completely isolated from his companions of
the early hours: General Sirik Matak, Mr. Cheng Heng, Mr. In Tam. The
[National Assembly] and the Senate, with their presidents, expressed their
disagreements over the way in which Marshal Lon Nol carried out his
responsibilities as chief executive of the country. (Sak Sutsakhan, 1978, p. 149).
From late 1974 through early 1975, Lon Nol seems to have been indifferent to the
political dispute between the Dangrek faction of the PSR and Lon Non, the leader of
Dangkor, the PSR’s other faction (Corfield, 1994). Besides, he did not “interven[e] in
military planning” (Corfield, p. 209). “He fulfilled the role of the symbolic Head-of-State
well, but for a country fighting for its very survival, this aloofness was perhaps illadvised” (p. 209).
Lon Nol’s management of conflicts between his government and the insurgents
It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify who was ultimately or largely
responsible for the failure to get the Lon Nol regime and the GRUNK (or more precisely,
the Khmer Rouge) to the negotiation table, which led to the Khmer Rouge’s military
victory in April 17, 1975 and then Cambodia’s unspeakable tragedy under Pol Pot. Such
an undertaking would require a separate paper that delves into massive historical archives
and extensive interviews with key players and covers many nations involved.
Therefore, this section is concerned only with (a) Lon Nol’s inability or even
unwillingness to resolve conflicts with the insurgents, particularly his refusal to negotiate
with Sihanouk despite Son Sann’s and others’ efforts to get them to the negotiating table
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(Corfield, 94) and (b) his refusal to either resign or timely leave Cambodia. It should be
acknowledged that, in all fairness, Lon Nol did not have carte blanche as far as
negotiation was concerned and that neither Sihanouk nor Lon Nol was willing to
negotiate directly with each other, although both appear to have been genuinely eager to
bring an end to the Cambodian conflict. Additionally, not until February 1975 did
Kissinger “agree to try to contact Sihanouk” (Clymer, 2011, p. 375). And not until April
11, 1975 did President Ford, on Kissinger’s advice, contact Sihanouk in China and
“asked him to go to Cambodia to save his country,” but the latter rejected (Dean, 2009,
106) because it was too late, as the Khmer Rouge’s total victory was imminent (Clymer,
2004) and in part because Sihanouk knew then he had no decision-making power; he and
his wife “were still practically under house arrest” (Soonthornpoct, 2005, p. 232).
Efforts to seek a solution to the Cambodian conflict started soon after Sihanouk’s
March 1970 deposition by the veteran statesman Son Sann (Corfield, 1994), who had
served under Sihanouk’s Sangkum government in various positions, including prime
minister, minister of finance and economy, and governor general of the National Bank of
Cambodia (e.g. Corfield, 1994; Puy Kea, 2010; Chhay Sophal, 2014a). Despite the fact
that he had been out of favor with Lon Nol and placed under house arrest soon after
Sihanouk’s deposition and later released (Corfield, 1994), Son Sann was generally
considered a neutralist and likely the most active figure in terms of getting the warring
parties to the negotiating table (e.g. Chandler, 1991b and Corfield, 1994). On June 25,
1970, Son Sann met with Pen Nouth, President of GRUNK’s Politburo in Beijing and
Etienne Manac’h, French Ambassador to China, to get peace talks started (Corfield,
1994). But, a meeting between representatives of both sides scheduled for July 14 did not
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occur. The peace initiative failed –which according to Kissinger, had a 50% chance to
survive (cited in Corfield, 1994). The main cause, according to Etienne Manac’h and Ieng
Mouly (cited in Corfield), was that Lon Nol refused to negotiate with the insurgents
while his government had military power; and he also was unlikely to accept a
compromise while Sihanouk became more powerful. Lon Nol, who “claimed more than
anyone else that ‘We [the Khmers] all are the warrior race’” (quoted in Meyer, 1971, p.
36), told Son Sann in their meeting in Phnom Penh that he “still believed” that he would
win the war (Corfield, p. 136) because “the conflict has become a religious war and the
reign of Buddha is to last another 2,500 years” (quoted in Clymer, 2004, p. 50). Although
a “devout Buddhist” since 1969, Son Sann found Lon Nol’s attitude discouraging
(Clymer, p. 50). Besides, Lon Nol said in his press conference on June 29, 1970 that the
American military intervention in Cambodia had produced “favorable” outcomes and that
he was optimistic about the growth of his army (Kamm, 1970a).
On October 22, 1972, Kissinger met Lon Nol in Phnom Penh urging him to parley
with Sihanouk’s GRUNK; on January 1, 1973, Lon Nol declared that he would not
(Kaonn, 2012a, p. 288) and Sihanouk also refused (Chandler, 1991b). In his meeting with
Kissinger in Bangkok on February 8, 1973, Ambassador Swank emphasized Lon Nol’s
refusal to deal with Sihanouk (Precht, 1988). Swank said “Distrust of Sihanouk was still
widespread in Phnom Penh in 1973” as a result of his unconditional alliance with the
insurgents and the North Vietnamese. “No Phnom Penh politician could have stomached
his return to power in 1973 in a role of national reconciliation,” Swank added (Precht,
1988). The Republican government officials were also against such negotiations.
However, “many Cambodians” in Phnom Penh were convinced that the government had
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lost the war and that they should launch negotiations with Sihanouk (Chandler, 1991b, p.
215).
In March 1973, Lon Nol was pressured by the Americans to declare a unilateral
cease-fire, which he did (Chandler, 1991b & Clymer, 2011). Sihanouk and the Khmer
Rouge leaders announced that they were interested in peace; but because they were in a
stronger military position, some preliminary contacts between the two sides produced no
result (Clymer, 2011). Sihanouk asserted that despite the efforts of the Americans from
1973 to persuade the Khmer Republic to parley with the FUNK, the latter always refused.
Sihanouk wrote, “The ‘Republican’ leaders replied in chorus to the Americans that they
were prepared to negotiate with the Red Khmers ‘who genuinely represent a section of
the Khmer people’, but never with Sihanouk, who no longer had any support in his
country and ‘does not represent anyone but himself’” (in Jeldres, p. 107).
Shortly before the Paris Peace Accord between the US and North Vietnam was
signed, Sihanouk proposed an idea of having a “third force” government which he would
lead and be comprised of moderate figures from the Lon Nol regime and the Khmer
Rouge such as Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. But the idea “was doomed
before it began. Lon Nol showed little interest in a negotiated peace in Cambodia —
which, whatever else it might do, would certainly remove him from power — and Nixon
and Kissinger none at all” (Short, 2004, pp. 242-243). Also in March 1973, William
Harben wrote in his diary implying that Lon Nol should resign apparently as a result of
the student demonstrations, Lon Nol’s harsh response to the March 17 aerial bombing of
his presidential compound, and his agreement to broaden his government only after the
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American pressure, particularly from Vice President Agnew and Kissinger. Harben
wrote:
To say that there is no alternative to a chief of state who received only about 35
percent of the vote… eight months ago before his popularity began to decline
really seriously seems to me to run counter to the whole raison d’être of the
United States itself. The result will… be a shift of support to the enemy, which we
have already begun to witness among the students…. There is still a chance to
win, but not with Lon Nol. [emphasis added] (quoted in Chandler, 1991b, pp. 225226)
In early July 1973, Lon Nol received an invitation from Nixon to the States for medical
treatment, but he declined (Schanberg, 1973b), fearing that it was a “ruse” by the Nixon
administration to remove him from power (Dean, 2009, p. 95). On January 12, 1974, Son
Sann publicly suggested that Lon Nol leave Cambodia for medical treatment so that
peace could be restored in Cambodia, drawing considerable attention across the country;
but the Government announced that Lon Nol’s health was good and that GRUNK
members’ refusal to meet with it was the only impediment to peace (Corfield, 1994). The
Ministry of Information stated that “Our president has no intention of renouncing his
duties while the nation is facing danger from the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong,”
making no mention of the Khmer Rouge (quoted in Deac, 1999, p. 189).
Pol Pot’s organization as an instrument of domination
Borrowing from former British Prime Minister Edward Heath’s phrase, the “ugly
face” of organization, Morgan (2007) uses the metaphor “the ugly face” to describe
organizations as instruments of domination. Both the image and the type of organization
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fit very well with DK’s central committee known as the Upper Organization (or simply
the Organization), which, according to Mabbett & Chandler (1995, p. 258), was the
“Stalinist organization.” Also called “the organization with pineapple eyes” (or all-seeing
eyes), the Organization had an ugly face and was all at once nameless, “mysterious,
arbitrary and impossible to question” (Chandler, 1991b, 246), “omnipotent and baleful,
impersonal and remote” (Short, 2004, p. 296). It was omnipotent in that it “covered the
powers of the Party and the legislative, executive, and juridical bodies,” Hun Sen asserted
(1991, p. 212). “Based on Pol Pot’s actions, Angkar was a nation,” Hun Sen added (p.
188). Similarly, Angkar was the Khmer Rouge’s “faceless, clandestine, and collective
leadership” (Short, 2004, p. 295).
Keng Vannsak, Pol Pot’s “old mentor” (Short, 2004, p. 296) or “youthful mentor
in Paris” (Kiernan, 2007, p. 28) and the “noted philologist” who championed KhmerMonnism during the Khmer Republic (Corfield, 1994, p. 8), considered Angkar
an immense apparatus of repression and terror as an amalgam of Party,
Government and State, not in the usual sense of these institutions but with
particular stress on its mysterious, terrible and pitiless character. It was, in a way,
political-metaphysical power, anonymous, omnipresent, omniscient, occult,
sowing death and terror in its name. (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 296)
Angkar acted as people’s “mother and father”; therefore, they had to obey it
(Chandler, 1999a, p. 1) as they would their parents in Cambodian tradition. Yet, Angkar
had the exclusive right to discipline people; parents were deprived of the right to
discipline their children (Short, 2004, p. 347). And even long before the Khmer Rouge
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came to power, the Cambodian peasantry was expected to be totally obedient and loyal to
Angkar, as reflected in its 1971 slogan (quoted in Frieson, 1993, p. 39):
Love Angkar;
Hate Angkar’s Enemies;
Tell the Truth to Angkar
Finally, Hun Sen (1991) wrote that “Based on the actions of the Pol Pot clique,
Angkar was a nation. … [it] was like a new Cambodian nation that inherited nothing from
the previous Cambodian nations except for language and literature” (pp. 188-189).
This conception of organization as instruments of domination underscores Max Weber’s
three types of domination or bureaucracy: charismatic domination, traditional
domination, and rational-legal domination. A pure form of any of these types of
domination rarely exits in reality, as Weber recognized (Morgan, 2007, p. 294). Even
though the Organization was undoubtedly an instrument of domination, as has been
hinted and will be elaborated in this section, it cannot be strictly categorized as any of
these types of domination. For it was an anomalous or extreme form of organization.
Nonetheless, it may be closer to the rational-legal domination than any other type; and
more importantly it can be classified as an oligarchy, which is inevitable in political party
and organizational life, either in a democracy or non-democracy, according to the French
sociologist Robert Michels (1999). Michels wrote these words which summarize the
essence of his famous “iron law of oligarchy:” “It is organization which gives birth to the
domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the
delegates over the delagators. Who says organization says oligarchy” [emphasis original]
(Michels, 1999, p. 15). Sihanouk termed Angkar the “Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Ponnary-Thirith
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oligarchy” (1980, p. 158). In a similar vein, Hun Sen contends that “the Pol Pot clique
was a ruling oligarchy that controlled [Cambodian] society by using wanton violence to
protect their own prerogatives” (1991, p. 226). The Khmer Rouge took this iron law of
oligarchy to an unprecedented level when the Organization was all-important, more
important than even the Buddha, the Great Teacher worshiped like God in Buddhism, as
it had been abolished. Rather than in the Buddha or Buddhism or any other Higher Being
or religion, everyone was supposed to exhibit “absolute faith” in the Organization,
considered to be the ‘correct and clear-sighted revolutionary organization” (Short, 2004,
p. 324). In his statement to the Communist Workers’ Party of Denmark in July 1978,
Nuon Chea, CPK’s Deputy Secretary, said:
The leadership apparatus must be defended at any price. If we lose members but
retain the leadership, we can continue to win victories. Defending the leadership
of the party is strategic. As long as the leadership is there, the party will not die.
There can be no comparison between losing two to three leading cadres and 200300 members. Rather the latter than the former. Otherwise the party has no head
and cannot lead the struggle. (Nuon Chea, 2001, p. 6)
According to Kiernan (1993, p. 13), DK’s sole political party, the CPK, had a
central committee that in turn had a standing committee. The members of the Standing
Committee made up DK’s “ruling body.” But only those members based in Phnom Penh
or “national leaders,” known as the Party “Center,” exercised “maximum national power
and responsibility… for genocide.” Pol Pot, as CPK Secretary-General from 1963 and
DK’s Prime Minister from 1976 to 1979, was at the top of DK’s political and military
chains of command. With regard to the political chain of command, the Standing
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Committee comprised, in addition to Pol Pot, the following eight members in that order:
Nuon Chea, CPK Deputy Secretary-General; Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister for
Foreign Affairs; So Phim, CPK Secretary of Eastern Zone; Vorn Vet, Deputy Prime
Minister for the Economy; Ros Nhim, CPK Secretary of Northwestern Zone; Ta Mok,
CPK Secretary of Southwestern Zone; Son Sen, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense; and
Khieu Samphan, President of the DK State Presidium. By November 1978, only six
members of the Committee remained, thus making it more oligarchical, as no new
member was appointed when So Phim committed a suicide on June 3 and Ros Nhim and
Vorn Vet were executed (smashed or purged in the Khmer Rouge jargon) in June and
November respectively, all in 1978. The military chain of command at the Center
consisted of five members in that order: Pol Pot himself, Son Sen; Ta Mok; Ke Pauk,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff; and Siet Chhe, member of the General Staff. Pol Pot
ordered the execution of Son Sen, his wife, and “at least ten others of his family” in June
1997 (Kamm, 1998, p. 240), which led to his [Pol Pot’s] own arrest and conviction in a
show trial by Ta Mok and his supporters in July of that year, and ultimately to his demise
in April, 1998.
Before 1975, the Organization referred to the CPK’s Central Committee. But
from 1975, the Organization “referred mostly to Pol Pot and Nuon Chea” (Weltig, 2009,
p. 148) and even exclusively to Pol Pot, according to the confession of Hu Nim, DK’s
Information Minister (Chandler, Kiernan, & Boua, 1988), reflecting the rising power of
the first two brothers or bang in Khmer (the term the Khmer Rouge cadres used to
address their leaders) within it and DK as a whole. Chandler titled his political biography
of Pol Pot “Brother Number One” and other authors, including Kiernan and Kamm, call
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Pol Pot Brother Number One and Nuon Chea Brother Number Two. Similarly, Pol Pot
was sometimes addressed as “elder brother number one” (Hinton, 2005, p. 190).
Although the titles of Brother Number One and Brother Number Two may not have
existed during the DK period, as asserted by Nuon Chea and Philip Short in their
respective testimonies at the ECCC, it is true that Pol Pot and Nuon Chea were number
one and number two in terms of rank and that subordinates addressed them and other
leaders as bang (elder sibling). Ieng Sary, who said he was Number Six in the Standing
Committee although Number Two in the Government, told Kamm (1998, p. 137) that the
Committee, in Kamm’s words, “actively discussed important policies, and Pol Pot did not
rule alone.” Yet, all the same, Pol Pot was in fact, albeit not in name at some points, the
regime’s unrivaled leader or “undisputed Number One,” in Kamm’s words (1998, p.
148), in that the Committee was a ranked or hierarchical body. Pol Pot was at least the
first among equals even if Angkar was truly a body of “collective leadership,” as
considered by Chandler (1991b, 246 & 1999a, p. 112) and Short (2004, p. 295) and as
this term was actually used by Angkar, according to its memo read out loud by the
international co-prosecutor at the ECCC hearing (White, 2013). According to Short, it
was solely Pol Pot who “held the key” to a “grand design”; and to implement it, it was his
Angkar that “wield[ed] absolute control over” every facet of the entire population’s lives
(p. 296). He had total control over the party (Chandler, 1999a). Partly for this reason, he
was also known as “the party center” and “the leading apparatus” (Chandler, 1999a, p.
149). From 1963, when he became CPK’s Secretary, to 1997, when he was arrested and
tried by his own (ex-)supporters, Pol Pot was almost invariably at the helm and had the
last word.
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Pol Pot’s conflict management
To quote Goleman (2011b) above again, “Leaders who manage conflict best are
able to draw out all parties, understand the differing perspectives, and then find a
common ideal that everyone can endorse. They surface the conflict, acknowledge the
feelings and views of all sides, and then redirect the energy toward a shared ideal.” As
can be inferred from above, Pol Pot did not have any method of managing conflict other
than purging, as reflected by this well-known Khmer Rouge saying “To spare you is no
profit; to destroy you, no loss” (Schanberg, 2010, Loc 183). This section addresses Pol
Pot’s management of conflicts between his faction of GRUNK and the Lon Nol regime,
within DK, and between DK and Vietnam.
Pol Pot was the leader of one of GRUNK’s and later DK’s three rival factions and
was directly involved in their conflicts rather than stayed above the conflicts and played
the role of a mediator. He was frequently against compromises and consensus, especially
after 1975 (Chandler, 1999a). Similarly, Hun Sen wrote, the Pol Pot clique’s “terms
‘absolute’ and ‘total’ meant the absence of compromise with anything that was against
their wish, not even with the minimum needs of the nation and people…” (Hun Sen,
1991, pp. 185-186).
As discussed under Lon Nol’s conflict management, despite Lon Nol’s refusal to
negotiate with Sihanouk, he actually made several offers to parley with the Khmer Rouge
forces, voluntarily and with American pressure. Every offer of his was rejected by the
Cambodian communists. “Absolutely no negotiation,” Pol Pot said in a ten-day meeting
of zonal and military leaders in July 1971 (Ros Nhim, quoted in Short, 2004, p. 242).
When Le Duan, Chairman of the Vietnamese Communist Party, invited him to talks in
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Hanoi, he declined, citing ill-health (according to minutes of meeting between Le Duan
and Ieng Sary, cited in Short, 2004). Khieu Samphan wrote that the Khmer Rouge
refused to negotiate with Lon Nol against their North Vietnamese comrades’ “advice,”
the position Suong Sikoeun confirmed in his testimony at the ECCC (2012b); had they
not done that, “they probably would have been dragged into an inescapable labyrinth”
and would inevitably have relied on their “‘fraternal’ intervention” to liberate Phnom
Penh (Khieu Samphan, 2004, pp. 109-110). On the contrary, according to Sihanouk
himself, North Vietnam in 1973 “tried to make [the Khmer Communists] negotiate with
Lon Nol, but it would have been too dangerous for them. They would have to share
power and they wanted it all alone” (quoted in Deac, 1999, p. 154) [Deac’s editing]. The
Vietnamese’ advice or “attempt,” according to CPK leaders, caused the Party to be
increasingly hostile toward the North Vietnamese in 1973 (Kiernan, 2004, p. 360). Not
only that, Pol Pot fought against peace initiatives from other friendly nations like Algeria,
Romania, Yugoslavia, and, “more subtly,” from China (Short, 2004, p. 244). In 1978, Pol
Pot himself remarked, “If we had agreed to have a cease-fire in 1973 in accordance with
the maneuvers of the U.S. and Vietnamese enemies, we should have suffered a heavy
loss. First of all, we should have lost to U.S. imperialism and its lackeys; and secondly,
we should have become slaves of the Vietnamese, and the Cambodian race would have
entirely lost its identity” (quoted in Shawcross, 1986, p. 296).
A different reason for their refusal, according to Zhai (2003), was that Lon Nol
was not acceptable to Beijing, the Khmer Rouge’s main patron, and Sihanouk. When
Kissinger, in his meeting with Zhou En Lai in Beijing in February 1973, proposed an
option of forming an “interim government” without Lon Nol but with elements from both
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his group and Sihanouk’s, Zhou argued that such a solution would be unacceptable to the
Khmer Rouge or Sihanouk (Zhai, p. 28). Kiernan (2004) contended that Ta Mok’s and
the CPK Center’s refusal to negotiate with Lon Nol was a “costly decision for its people”
because they would “isolate and expose their country, alone in Asia, to the might of the
American war machine” (p. 361). Kiernan also wrote that the CPK Center considered it
to be costly for them to accept a 1973 cease-fire, which would have required a “left-wingdominated coalition government” in Phnom Penh (p. 392). “The possibility of the return
of Sihanouk, accompanied by Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan and other popular figures,
would have sealed the fate of Lon Nol, and of the war. But the CPK Center did not wish
to win in such fashion. They saw that this would have been at their own expense, at least
relatively speaking, because they stood to lose much in an open political atmosphere”
(Kiernan, 2004, p. 392).
During the DK period, Thion (1993, p. 133) argued, ideology was not a “decisive
factor” in the division among these factions; it was the drive to occupy, particularly on
the part the Pol Pot faction. Due to scant communication between DK’s zones, Pol Pot
and other central leaders manipulated “differences and jealousy” between the zones up to
1977-1978, when they and Ta Mok’s zone forces purged and took control of three of
DK’s other four zones (Kiernan, 1984, p. 3). Pol Pot “was able to resolve domestic and
international contradictions correctly and well and was able to gather friends while
isolating the enemy…,” wrote Non Suon, DK’s secretary of agriculture, in his
“unsurprisingly supportive” evaluation of Pol Pot as part of his confession while detained
at S-21(Chandler, 1999a, p. 198). But the main problem was that Pol Pot saw enemy
everywhere, even under one’s skin. He said, “The enemy is everywhere: in the
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parliament, the courts, … Enemy networks honeycomb the country,” (FBIS, 1977, quoted
in Locard, p. 184) and “has hidden and buried itself inside our flesh and blood”
(Chandler, Kiernan, & Boua, 1988, p. 189). To a Khmer Rouge survivor, Pol Pot even
made up adversaries. “Pol Pot created enemies, and it is hard to say why. Perhaps he
needed someone to blame when reality didn’t match his politics. Or perhaps he created
enemies to destroy…. Eventually he created so many enemies that the regime started
falling apart” (Ngor & Warner, 2003, p. 435).
In late September 1976, a “political crisis” caused by disagreements about the
founding date of the CPK deepened (Chandler, 1999a, p. 122). Although the party was
founded in June 1951 with Son Ngoc Minh (or Achar Mean) as its secretary after the
breakup of the Indochina Communist Party, Pol Pot wanted 1960 to be its founding date.
He and his colleagues in the Standing Committee revised the party’s history in order to
favor himself and to purge the Party of any “Vietnamese, pre-Pol Pot component”
(Chandler, p. 122) and of members of the Song Ngoc Minh faction (Khmer Viet Minh),
who of course favored an “alliance” with Vietnam (Corfield, 2009, p. 91). Pol Pot might
have “planted” an article in the Party’s youth magazine that mentioned 1951 as its
founding date with a view of getting his opponents out into the open (Chandler, 1999a, p.
122). Pol Pot had two senior party members, Keo Meas and Ney Saran, arrested and sent
to Tuol Sleng in order to intimidate their patrons and to “tighten his own grip on the
party’s apparatus” (p. 123). Chandler wrote that based on his speeches and the files at
Tuol Sleng from September 30, 1976, Pol Pot “spent his time … extirpating enemies
inside the party and dealing with a hostile Vietnam” (1999a, p. 123).
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Pol Pot’s method of dealing with Vietnam was very similar to his method of
dealing with his opponents within the DK government. It was characterized by a lack of
interest in negotiation and compromise (e.g. Chandler, 1999a), an instance of which
concerning the sea border is discussed here. Sihanouk (1980, p. 65) wrote that “Pol Pot’s
government rejected all proposals for a peaceful settlement advanced by the Hanoi
government (most notably on February 6, 1978).” Democratic Kampuchea, on Pol Pot’s
advice, broke off negotiations with Vietnam after five meetings and called off the summit
with Vietnam scheduled for June 1976 (Kiernan, 2008). What follows is a truncated
summary of the dispute and especially a meeting of CPK Standing Committee on May
14, 1976 attended by Pol Pot and all its other members based on its minutes cited in
Kiernan (2008).
The agenda of the meeting was the dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam over
the Brevie Line, the maritime demarcation between Cochin China and Cambodia drawn
in 1939 by the French governor-general of Indochina Jules Brevie. The line divided areas
of administrative and police control of Vietnam and Cambodia: islands south of it under
Vietnam’s control and islands north of it under Cambodia’s. But Brevie evaded the issue
of sovereignty: “The question of whose territory these islands are remains outstanding”
(quoted in Chanda, 1986, p. 33). A secret 1977 document of the DK foreign ministry
acknowledged the point: “This border was of an ‘administrative’ character, but
Democratic Kampuchea considers it as the state border between Kampuchea and
Vietnam which was left by history” (quoted in Kiernan, p. 112). In 1976, DK claimed the
Brevie Line to be the “nonnegotiable” maritime border, while Vietnam insisted that the
border be negotiated (Kiernan, p. 113). Prior to the Standing Committee’s meeting, there
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had been five separate negotiation sessions between Vietnam led by Phan Hien, deputy
foreign minister, and DK headed by Ney Saran, former CPK secretary of the Northeast
Zone. Pol Pot did not participate in any of the sessions.
Ney Saran opened the Standing Committee meeting summarizing the previous
talks, followed by discussion. At one point, Pol Pot asked whether the Vietnamese were
intended to continue the negotiations, which Kiernan (p. 116) maintained was Pol Pot’s
“first suggestion of ending the talks.” Responding to Pol Pot, Saran said that Vietnamese
“can extend the time and chew on it” and repeated that “This morning the atmosphere
was tense but did not reach a breakdown.… The two organizations [parties] will meet in
June” (p. 116). Saran reasoned that the negotiations should continue. Nuon Chea, Vorn
Vet, and Son Sen chimed in, all arguing that the negotiations should not be extended. “By
this time,” Kiernan asserted, “Ney Sarann must have seen the writing on the wall” (p.
117).
The first eight pages of the 17-page minutes of the meeting covered the
introduction by Ney Saran and exchanges among some other Committee members. Pol
Pot, the minutes say, only “asked for clarification” (p. 116). No one dominated the
discussion. Pol Pot then made a speech that covered the next eight pages. The final page
of the minutes mentions a short interaction among Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Sary.
This 8-page-long speech was essentially about ending the negotiations. He saw further
negotiations as risky because Vietnam wanted concessions. He concluded by saying that
“We have arrived at a standstill…. If we follow this direction we would be tricked and
led into tension. It is a loss to continue. It is better to end it. But how are we going to end
it? Let’s discuss that” (p. 119). But no discussion followed. He then proposed that the
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negotiations be broken off with “sweet talk,” as Kiernan termed it, in the beginning and
in the end (p. 119). “In our answer the day after tomorrow, we’ll stress that we stand on
friendship and solidarity,” Pol Pot said (p. 119). He also suggested what Ney Saran’s
delegation should tell the Vietnamese. For example, he said in part “We consider
friendship and solidarity with Vietnam as our sacred object.” He ended his speech by
saying “Tell them that enemies are active. [Say that] it could be that the enemy starts
conflicts in order to destroy our negotiations” [Kiernan’s editing] (p. 120). The minutes
make no mention of disagreement with Pol Pot’s instructions, only expression of
concerns by Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary. The DK negotiating team, led by Ney Saran,
never met with the Vietnamese negotiating team again. Only Ieng Sary met with Phan
Hien, the leader of the Vietnamese team on May 19, 1976 informing the latter of the CPK
Standing Committee’s decision (or Pol Pot’s, to be more precise).
Democratic Kampuchea responded to Hanoi’s attempts to reconcile with it to
resolve the border issues with more frequent military attacks on villages inside Vietnam
(Locard, 2004). The Khmer Rouge soldiers made attempts to capture Vietnamese soldiers
and officers and bring them to S-21 for torture and interrogation. As mentioned above,
these DK actions eventually led to Vietnam’s invasion (or liberation) of Cambodia on
January 7, 1979. “He expressed confidence in victory.… He never considered the
alternatives of defeat, compromise, or negotiation” with Vietnam (Chandler, 1999a, p.
138). According to Heder, Pol Pot was “anti-Vietnamese” for two reasons. They “were
the greatest threat to his position of leadership. If anybody had the power to knock Pol
Pot out of the box, it was the Vietnamese. Beyond that, the Vietnamese represented the
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greatest threat to the independence of the Cambodian revolutionary movement,” he wrote
(1984, p. 5).
Inspiration and influence
Leaders with inspiration not only possess but also are able to articulate a
compelling vision or shared mission in an inspiring way. They have people follow their
vision and mission and are able to make work “exciting” (Goleman, 2011b, Loc 1674).
Neither Lon Nol nor Pol Pot was such a leader. As Table 6.15 shows, both leaders scored
below average and roughly the same in terms of inspiration. By contrast, while Lon Nol
scored slightly below average (4.88), Pol Pot scored slightly above average (6.08). These
results are consistent with the qualitative data.
Table 6.15

Inspiration
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

356

367

4.62

4.58

2.24

3.2

Prince Sihanouk seems to have contended that both Lon Nol’s and Pol Pot’s
“success” was not attributed to their personal qualities but to the proclivity of many
Cambodians towards Cambodia’s delusions of grandeur. He wrote:
The success of “enlightened people” such as Lon Nol and Pol Pot clearly reflects,
especially throught events, that in our race there are a lot of people (and there will
be more) including “intellectuals” who like to follow demagogues who promise
the “retrieval of Vietnam” and especially the restoration of the “Mon-Khmer
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Empire” … rather than to accept a leader like Sihanouk, who is most realistic,
because [the demagogues] had promised them the impossible. (Norodom
Sihanouk, 1986, p. 362)

Lon Nol’s inspiration and influence
As Table 6.15 above and Table 6.16 below show, Lon Nol scored 4.62 (out of 10)
and 4.88 in terms of inspiration and influence respectively. According to Peang-Meth, he
was not charismatic (cited in Corfield, 1994). While acknowledging that Lon Nol was
still “formidable and authoritative,” Swank wrote that the Marshal was probably
“unappealing” (Swank, 1973, p. 3). Had he been inspirational, popular support not only
among the peasantry but also intelligentsia for him and his regime would not have
deteriorated dramatically, as the following evidence confirms.
Table 6.16

Influence
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP

355

366

4.88

6.08

2.24

3.2

Lon Nol’s “blue booklet”
Considered by Douc Rasy a “man of the past” (Corfield, 1994, p. 41), the Marshal
outlined his vision of Cambodia on Cambodia’s past glory in a blue booklet called “NeoKhmerisme” in French (e.g. Becker, 1998a; Corfield, 1994; Kamm, 1998) or “The New
Khmer Way” in Khmer printed in both Khmer and French and disseminated in December
1972 (Schanberg, 1973, para. 6). He single-handedly wrote both texts. “This booklet ‘The
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New Khmer Way’ has been prepared as a plan/program of actions for the highly
respected Supreme Patriarchs of the two Buddhist orders [and] leaders and public
servants to implement for national construction,” Lon Nol wrote in its preface (Lon Nol,
1972). This “manifesto” (Becker, 1998a, p. 127) is well worth reviewing briefly given the
paramount importance Lon Nol attached to it and its ability (or lack thereof, to be more
accurate) to inspire Cambodian people.
Called a “Booklet of ‘Dreams’” by Schanberg (1973a), it was an “embarrassment
to many” and “most” of the comments about it were “critical” (para. 15). Very few
foreign diplomats, generally from countries that provided aid for Lon Nol, were kinder.
“Perhaps it’s true the book is visionary and impractical in an immediate sense,” one such
diplomat remarked, however “it’s a serious effort to project what he sees as the
rejuvenation of the Khmer nation. You’ve got to give him credit for being one Khmer
who is trying to articulate national aspirations for the postwar world” (quoted in
Schanberg, 1973, para. 16). Yet, even such a positive comment has quite a direct
opponent. “No one, with the possible exception of Sirik Matak, ever gave any thought to
the postcoup period or envisioned any alternative solution,” Martin wrote (1994, p. 135).
The critical comments about the booklet came from a considerable number of
Cambodian newspapers and high-ranking officials at the time and from an overwhelming
majority of authors on Cambodia later on. The newspapers made fun of it. Nokor Thom,
the newspaper with the largest circulation, had a cartoon on its front page “lampooning”
the booklet as an effort to imitate Mao’s “Red Book, the Nixon Doctrine and other such
personal ideologies” (Schanberg, 1973a, para. 9). Another newspaper asked rhetorically
where Lon Nol found the time and energy to write “dreams and imagination while the
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country he is supposed to govern is undergoing such difficulties” (quoted in Schanberg,
para. 8). To the officials, the booklet lacked political maturity (Schanberg, 1973a).
The booklet, hence its ideology, is considered “ramshackle” (Ayres, 2003, p. 73
and Kiernan, 2004, p. 348), “a mishmash of Khmer history as seen by its author and
sweeping platitudes on the ‘brilliant future’ of Cambodia” (Kamm, 1998, p. 103) and “a
shallow reading of Khmer history written to glorify Cambodia and the Khmer race to the
detriments of its neighbors” (Becker, 1998a, p. 127), and it lacked “coherent threat”
(Corfield, 2009, p. 74). These criticisms are well-founded. The booklet is neither wellstructured nor well-thought-out, making it hard to comprehend, at least in Khmer. First of
all, for the most part, it contains several levels of bullet points and disjointed sentences
and paragraphs; it reads like an outline rather than a unified essay. Hence, it fares badly
in cohesion. The following excerpt from its conclusion illustrates this point:
We will address our three problems (nationalism, republican democracy, and
people’s well-being) in democratic socialism with liberty (a formula for public
employees and users) in order to avoid errors and confusion found in:
- absolute liberalism or historical capitalism
- and historical communism and Indochinese communism, which is a
highly destructive doctrine, with a character
- that is absorbing (without neglecting the common needs of mankind for a
world of ideal liberty, egalitarianism, and fraternity)
- Buddhist egalitarianism with:
- an adoption of private property
- rectification of monopolistic enterprises in order for all
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people to have equal economic, political, and social rights…
(Lon Nol, 1972, p. 26)
Secondly, it is “a disjointed collection of lofty principles and precepts”
(Schanberg, 1973a), and therefore fares badly in coherence and practicality. Reportedly
without understanding whatsoever of the real world (Shawcross, 1986) and deemed by
Haig (1970, p. 1) a “not very realistic leader,” Lon Nol had “delusions” (Swank, in
Precht, 1988), “illusions” (Becker, 1998a, p. 129 and Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxxvii), or at
least had “impossible dreams of restoring a Mon-Khmer Empire” (Short, 2005, p. 341).
Lon Nol “knew nothing…. His knowledge and the reality were very different,” said Dien
Del, who was described by Jon Swain as FANK’s “best general” (quoted in Strangio,
2010). Lon Nol was committed to his ideas and visions (Dean, in Kennedy, 2004 and
Kamm, 1998); unfortunately, his ideas and visions were unrealistic, too distant into the
future and thus unattainable. For instance, as regards equality, Lon Nol wrote “There will
no longer be master and subject, poor and rich. Each one is a responsible member of the
state and a controller of the country” (quoted in Slocomb, 2006, p. 384). “We must
realize this goal [of equality] at all costs and by 2020, we will have a Khmer population
of at least 30,000,000 who will certainly be prosperous and mightily organized so as to be
poised to proudly face the future,” he concluded his booklet (Lon Nol, 1972, p. 28).
Thirdly, “most foreign diplomats” were unable to “find anything of substance” in it
(Schanberg, 1973a).
Fourthly, Lon Nol had no “real strategy” for the war (Becker, 1998, p. 130 and
Ngor & Warner, 2003, p. 67) or “effective direction … of what they were doing”
(Osborne, 2010, p. 259). More scathing and perhaps most accurate is Ambassador
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Swank’s comment: “But perhaps Lon Nol’s major weakness was his failure to provide
leadership. He could not articulate objectives –did he even see them clearly? – or to
motivate his people…” (Precht, 1988). Earlier, in 1987, Swank said that he had never
faced a “situation so fraught with ambiguity in his career” (quoted in Chandler, 1991b, p.
213). Deputy Chief of Mission Enders made a similar comment in a November 1973
cable to Kissinger after his meeting with Assemblyman Thach Toan: “Thach Toan is
something of a perennial malcontent. But there is no doubt that his disilussionment with
the present weak leadership and lack of direction is shared by a large number of people,
both civilian and military” [emphasis added] (Enders, 1973b, p. 2). In his booklet, Lon
Nol actually attempted to formulate a strategy and objectives. But according to Ngor &
Warner (2003, p. 67), he merely developed “vague, mystical plans for restoring
Cambodia to the greatness of its times in the ancient empire at Angkor.” This is a tenable
remark. In its original layout, Lon Nol wrote the following:
Strategy of the free, united, proud, and happy people
A) Essential objectives to be achieved
- The present time is a war of resistance
- Because of this war, we will achieve independence; the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong must leave our country; and monarchy is
outdated.
- Afterward and in the meantime, we will move to internal unity
among Republicans who are all ordinary people.
- Then and in the meantime, we will conduct a war of reconstruction
and national renaissance, of the diffusion of culture and tradition, and
of the absorption of ideas of world civilizations in order to seek
prosperity for our people based on the following formula:
- the Government helps
- the people realize (achieve)
- technicians assist
(Lon Nol, 1972, p. 5)
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Finally, Lon Nol started to have “dreams of glory” well before he deposed
Sihanouk, according to Gerard Brissé, who wrote an introduction to Sihanouk’s book
War and Hope (Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxiii). “Lon Nol traded his dream (foiled by Norodom
Sihanouk) for reality,” wrote Brissé (p. xxiv), who prior to the Prince’s deposition had
been told by Lon Nol this dream of reclaiming a province Cambodia had lost to Vietnam.
“Usually taciturn, one day he told me that if Norodom Sihanouk (then head of state) gave
him the wherewithal, the Khmer army, with the help of the Americans, would push ‘as
far as the Point of Caman,’ the extreme southern tipi of Cochin China (a part of southern
Vietnam that includes Ho Chi Minh city). He added ‘Furthermore, we would have the
complete support of a million Khmer Krom in Cochin China; we could make quick work
of recapturing that lost province of ours” (Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxiii-xxiv).
Lon Nol’s ability to inspire and influence people
As mentioned previously, Lon Nol was reticent (e.g. Chandler, 1991a; Corfield,
1994) and “uncommunicative” (Martin, 1994, p. 128) despite being “deeply patriotic”
(e.g. Chandler, 1991a, p. 124). His booklet “Neo-Khmerisme” appears to have failed to
rally people to his side. Its statements “fell on deaf ears” (Kiernan, 2004, p. 348). Then,
what else did he employ to inspire people?
He “presented himself well in public” and, therefore, his walkabouts were
“popular” (Corfield, 1994, p. 42). However, being a recluse, his walkabouts were very
rare and his remarks during these visits were even rarer. The predominant channel he
employed to communicate with the people was mostly radio and occasionally prepared
television addresses. He seldom gave impromptu speeches or comments. In August 1970,
when Lon Nol delivered his radio address entitled “Concepts and Measures of the
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Salvation Government” to the nation, former CIA director William Colby reported
pessimism about the Cambodian situation to Washington41. One of the reasons was that
the government was unable to “communicate at all with the people” (Shawcross, 1986, p.
183). “Lon Nol,” Colby added “is a poor speaker and he lacks the oratorical talent to
persuade, encourage, and sustain the revolutionary spirit.” Unlike Sihanouk, who was
“full of life, the kind of person you can almost always talk with” (Dean, 2009, p. 88) and
who had a high-pitched (e.g. Shawcross, 1986) or “soprano” (Karnow, 1983) voice, Lon
Nol was a “shy man always” (Kamm, 1998, p. 95) and had “a bass voice” and a
“minimum of gestures” (“Pragmatic Cambodian leader,” 1970, para. 1). His voice,
particularly after his 1971 stroke, was slurred and his speech was not fluent or
mesmerizing and of much substance. “I enjoyed the good fortune of easy access to [Lon
Nol], and he seemed to speak openly. Yet more often than not interviews that he allowed
to go on as long as I wished yielded nothing worth reporting,” remarked Kamm (1998, p.
98).
The recurring themes found in Lon Nol’s booklet and radio addresses revolve
around the glory of the Khmer Empire and the Khmers’ magical and occult practices, the
latter being the basis for the former, as well as his characterization of communists,
particularly the NVA/VC as thmils. In the August 15, 1970 radio address’s opening
paragraph, Lon Nol said, “My compatriots, I would like to remind all of you that it is
opportune time for us to move to victory. The NVA/Viet Cong and Pathet Lao cannot
prevent us from achieving victory” (Lon Nol, 1970, p. 1). He went on to talk about “the
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It is not certain whether Colby reported after Lon Nol’s radio address.
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blessings of our Khmer nation.” The first blessing was that the Khmer people were
Buddhists. The second was that “all of us have tried [successfully] to preserve our
national culture and tradition” (p. 24). He then touched on the topics of magic spells and
occult that he claimed had been bequeathed by Khmer ancestors, on his belief that the
spirits of more and more powerful Khmer ancestors “came out to help us from
everywhere” (p. 25), and on the origin of the Khmer race he called the Mon-Khmer or
“Khom” “the mighty and exemplary race in Southeast Asia” (p. 26). Lon Nol’s
conviction in the notion of the Mon-Khmer (or Khmer-Mon) race was clearly inspired by
Keng Vannsak, Director of the Khmer-Mon Institute, established before Sihanouk’s
overthrow in 1970. In a May 1, 1972 letter to Lon Nol, Keng Vannsak wrote, “The
Khmer-Mon Commonwealth has triumphed in your person in the form of the PresidentGovernment as the synthesis of the Me and Ba (mother and father) rediscovered. The
Constitution will become the holy book of the Khmers (Khumpi)” [emphasis original]
(quoted in Harben, 1972, p. 5).
Lon Nol’s “eccentric” ideas, as he was well aware, were appealing to the simple
Khmer rather than modern politicians (Becker, 1998a, p. 120) or “the French-educated
elite, who for the most part are repelled or embarrassed by them” (Harben, p. 2). The
army found his notions, especially occult, even more appealing. Most of the commanders
and troops wore talismans, partly as a result of Lon Nol’s instructions on occult practices.
He himself had worn amulets since his youth (Harben, 1972). There was another reason
for his appeal to the common men and military officers: He was one of them. “Lon Nol
had filled the officer corps with men largely like himself, men who lacked the education
or background to compete in the civilian world and who were loyal to him,” wrote
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Becker (1998a, p. 122). Similarly, Lon Nol “associated himself with the common people”
(Peang-Meth, quoted in Corfield, 1994, p. 41). For example, the favorable vote for the
popular referendum for the new constitution was attributed, to a considerable extent, to
the Marshal’s reference to it as “the ‘Kbuon’– a body of accumulated unchallengeable
wisdom redolent of magical formulae and sacred scriptures” [emphasis original] (Harben,
p. 2). The intellectuals’ legalistic objectives were totally incomprehensible to the largest
segment of the population. However, although figures vary, the government of the Khmer
Republic controlled only approximately half of the total Khmer population of 8 millions.
Also, by the time Ambassador Swank finished his mission in Cambodia in August 31,
1973, even the support of the common people for his “holy war” –into which Lon Nol
injected occult practices, the Khmer-Mon race, Cambodia’s past grandeur, and
Buddhism–had waned drastically. “On the other hand, the present war enjoys little
popular support, and the motivation and stamina for a prolonged conflict, unless marked
by only very low level hostilities, are not present,” he wrote in his valedictory (Swank,
1973, p. 3). This statement is likely to have been influenced by an earlier US Embassy
cable to Kissinger in April of that year. The cable reported on meetings between US
Senator Brooke and Sirik Matak and two other opposition leaders. “All of the opposition
leaders agreed, however, that an alternative to the present leadership must soon be found
if the government is to regain the confidence of the people” (US DoS, 1973b, p. 1). Even
in March 1970, according to Peang-Meth, many people sacrificed their lives because of
their belief in republican ideals and democratic principles not because of their personal
loyalty to Lon Nol or Sirik Matak (cited in Strangio, 2009).
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Furthermore, Lon Nol even failed to inspire and influence his closest alliesturned-fierce opponents –Sirik Matak, In Tam, Cheng Heng, just to mention three –and
even Keng Vannsak, his mentor and later, according to Enders (1973a, p. 1), a
“disaffected Lon Nol ideologue.” In his meeting with Senator Brooke, Sirik Matak –who
said that he and Lon Nol differed on “governing concepts” and that their “basic
friendship” had been intact –had sharp criticisms for his friend and his government (US
DoS, 1973b, p 3). He criticized Lon Nol’s “solitary rule” and what he called the
“militarism” of his government. He said that it was no longer the people that Lon Nol
governed for but a small clique of closest allies and considered the Marshal’s dependence
on Lon Non his “gravest fault” (quoted in US DoS, 1973b, p. 4). Vannsak, in October
1973, raised to Enders his proposal of establishing a new military government which
would effectively abolish the High Political Council, which Lon Nol chaired. The
proposal included, in Enders’ words, “kicking Lon Nol upstairs to some vague” position
which Vannsak termed “supreme magistrature” (Enders, 1973a, p. 1). In the wake of the
second bombing of his presidential palace in November 1973, in a 3-minute radio address
to the nation, Lon Nol said he was determined “to stay with all of you in order to fulfill
the nation’s work until the final and permanent victory” (quoted in Deac, 1998, p. 182). It
is, however, unclear if this remark raised or at least maintained the morale of the
populace.
The seemingly only other means Lon Nol employed to rally his people was a
propaganda campaign, which Shawcross (1986, p. 183) apparently sarcastically described
as “appropriate enough.” When Dr. Hannah from the USAID met Lon Nol in March
1973, the former emphasized that the Cambodian government needed to design policies
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in such a manner that the “little people” of Cambodia would actively support the
government. Dr. Hannah “noted that improving the lot of these people would mean that
they would have confidence in the government,” Swank wrote in a cable (US DoS,
1973a, p. 2). In that propaganda campaign, in the words of William Colby, “the
government should even resort to making promises it knows it cannot keep simply in
order to raise the spirits of the people. Sihanouk got away with this for fifteen years”
(quoted in Shawcross, 1986, p. 183). The problem was that it was peacetime under
Sihanouk’s rule. “[P]romises would arouse skepticism” in wartime under Lon Nol,
Shawcross contended (p. 183). Another technique of the campaign was a poster of the
Buddha defeating the NVA/VC. The depiction was obviously an adaptation of the
legendary event in which the Buddha, unperturbed by provocation and aggression of
Mara the Prince of Evil and his followers, defeated them (e.g. Kelen, 1989). As it turned
out, the peasants treated the poster as a sacred object and thus used it as an altarpiece
(Becker, 1998a). “Mistakenly, Lon Nol thought he could rally the peasants to his side in
wartime simply by saying God, or Buddha, was on his side and by painting Vietnamese
atheists as the enemy” (Becker, 1998a, p. 128).
Last but, by no means, least, Lon Nol’s government’s “repressive action” in the
aftermath of the March 17, 1973 events were demotivating, according to Sirik Matak,
who claimed that “many students have also gone over to the other side” (US DoS, 1973b,
p. 2). In addition, in an April 1974 cable, Ambassador Dean wrote, “In stark contrast to
the rigid, harsh control of the Khmer communists, the government and FANK have been
unable to instill [sic] a sense of discipline or impart much enthusiasm to civil or military
ranks” (quoted in Seiff, 2013).
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Pol Pot’s inspiration and influence
As Tables 6.15 and 6.16 on pages 332 and 333 respectively show, Pol Pot scored
below average (4.58) in terms of inspiration but slightly above average (6.08) in terms of
influence. These findings are mostly consistent with the qualitative data available to the
author.
It is somewhat common knowledge that Pol Pot had charisma (e.g. Becker, 1998;
Chandler, 1999a; Heder, 1984 & 1991; Sam, 2002; Short, 2005), the attribute recognized
even by Sihanouk, who himself is considered to have been charismatic (e.g. Becker,
1998; Chandler, 1999a; Heder, 1991; Kiernan, 2008; Krisher, 1990; Shawcross, 1986; &
Short, 2005). “If nobody told you that Pol Pot was Pol Pot, that he was Khmer Rouge, if
you met him without knowing who he was, you could be seduced,” the late king told
Weiner (1987, p. 70). “Although I had heard stories of Pol Pot’s charisma I had doubted
them on the basis of the few mugshots of the man I had seen published. But in person
there was no question of his appeal…. His gestures and manner were polished, not
crude,” recounted Becker (1998a, p. 424), who interviewed the tyrant on December 22,
1978. In a film documentary, Becker also described the tyrant this way: “When we think
in our imagination, an evil man must show his evilness and thuggery…but No, this is a
finely chiseled face, small delicate hands, and he spoke quietly” (in Cascio, 1998). But
there was a contradiction about him: his aloofness (Chanda, 1986), which was beyond
doubt (Becker, 1998a & b). It was the characteristic noticed also by Gunnar Bergstrom,
the chairman of the Swedish-Kampuchean Friendship Association who visited DK with
his four-man delegation for fourteen days and had dinner with Pol Pot on their final night
in August 1978; Pol Pot did not display any charm (cited in Strangio, 2014). Philip Short
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has quite a peculiar description of Pol Pot’s charisma: “I mention this smile. He radiated
an extremely engaging personality. It was not charismatic in the sense that there was
personality cult around him. There was none of that. But he had a kind of serenity that
made him seem very attractive to other Cambodians, to the people who worked with
him…” (quoted in Cumming, 2005). Most importantly, according to Cunha, Rego, and
Clegg (2015, pp. 11-12), “[i]t would be a mistake to assume that Pol Pot was a
charismatic revolutionary hero.”
Given this contradiction and the scant popular support Pol Pot enjoyed, especially
during the DK period, did his charisma or charm effect inspiration and influence? It did
not, particularly inspiration, as the following evidence reveals. This is despite Sam’s
assertion that his “charisma played an important role in recruiting followers from among
Cambodia’s poor and illiterate to his cause” (Sam, 2002, pp. 39-41) and Nuon Chea’s
claim that his boss “had a certain skill of bringing new people into the party. He was
modest, a charming person, but he was clever and good at explaining things so that
people could understand” (Williams, 2005, 9:30). But first, a brief discussion of charisma
is in order.
Drucker’s argument against charisma may well be applicable to Pol Pot’s case. One of
the main lessons Drucker said he had learned about US presidential leadership was, in his
own words, “beware charisma, the great delusion of the century. The most charismatic
leaders in history were Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. What matters is leadership. Charisma is
almost always misleadership, partly because it covers up the lack of substance…”
(quoted in Moyers, 1989: 404). Similarly, Solomon (2004), suggesting that trust would be
“much better” than charisma for leadership discussion (p. 100), wrote that “And as a term
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of analysis in leadership studies, I think that [charisma] is more of a distraction than a
point of understanding” (p. 93). Pol Pot actually won trust, as Heder (1991, p. 22)
concluded; but it was the trust of his colleagues, who were only a “handful.” More
importantly, although, according to Conger & Kanungo (1998), inspiration is widely
considered part of charismatic leadership, Goleman’s EI model not only excludes
charisma but also seems to dismiss it as detrimental to good leadership. “People with
fiery temperaments are frequently thought of as ‘classic’ leaders their outbursts are
considered hallmarks of charisma and power. But when such people make it to the top,
their impulsiveness often works against them” [emphasis added] (Goleman, 2011b, loc.
429-434). According to Bass and Riggio (2006), Pol Pot was at best (or at worst) a
pseudotransformational leader, as he was one of “those charismatic leaders who use[d]
their abilities to inspire and lead followers to destructive, selfish, and evil ends” (p. 5).
According to Cunha, Rego, & Clegg (2011, p. 281), Pol Pot’s was “dysfunctional
charismatic leadership). In a similar vein, Kotter’s assertion about the charismatic leader
in general and his “flawed vision” and an eventual tragic end-result is relevant to the Pol
Pot case:
This [charismatic] person is not a good manager and, in fact, does not like good
managers because they are too rational and controlling. The charismatic has a
flawed vision… But the lack of a rational management process–that is as
powerful as the leadership–means the bad vision is not publicly discussed and
discredited. The strong charisma creates commitment and great motivation to
move in the direction of the vision. Eventually, this movement leads to tragedy;
followers trample other people and then walk off a cliff. (Kotter, 1990, p. 18).
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Most importantly, as Heder (1991, p. 22) concluded, Pol Pot would not have been
successful as a “political killer” without “his great skills in deception and manipulation
and the help” of his very few colleagues. He combined his manipulation with his “charm
and charisma” to get rid of his potential rivals and opponents (p. 22). Therefore, it was
other factors that inspired and influenced other people.
Pol Pot’s vision and mission
First and foremost, did he have a compelling vision or shared mission? If so, did
he succeed in articulating it in an inspiring way? Considered a “visionary leader” by
Chandler (1999a, p. 1986), Pol Pot had a vision (e.g. Chandler, 1999a; Osborne, 2002;
Short, 2004). However, “wishful thinking” (Mabbett & Chandler, 1995, p. 249) or
“bloodthirsty fantasies” (Hanhimäki, 2004, p. 392) would be a more accurate term
because it was grandiose or probably “too incandescent for others to accomplish”
(Chandler, 1999a, p. 188). Like other politicians before and possibly after him, Pot lacked
realism (e.g. Chandler, 1999a & b & Short, 2004). He had a “Utopian vision of
uninterrupted progress” (Short, 2004, p. 353), a vision that DK could rival Angkor’s
glory (Osborne, 2002) or even “surpass it” (Short, 2004, p. 293). “Pol Pot is a visionary
with an even worse case of megalomania than Hitler’s,” wrote Sihanouk (1980, p. 92).
Despite the fact that Pol Pot believed that he would lead Cambodia to achieve these
goals, the vision “was the ideal, not the reality,” Short added (p. 353). Similarly, Nuon
Chea revealed in a film documentary by a Cambodian reporter who lost both parents and
several family members to the DK regime that “Ours was [to be] a clean regime, a clearsighted regime, a peaceful regime. That was our aim, but we failed” (Lemkin & Sambath,
2009, 10:25). Moreover, their aim was to make “an extremely marvelous, extremely
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wonderful, prodigious leap” into full communism (Short, 2004, p. 341). As Locard stated,
out of well over 433 “sayings of Angkar” he collected, the most often heard during the
Pol Pot period was “With the Angkar, we shall make a Great Leap forward, a prodigious
Great Leap forward” (Locard, 2004, p. 70). Clearly inspired by Mao’s Great Leap
Forward, which had failed nearly twenty years earlier in China, this slogan captured Pol
Pot’s vision of even surpassing, at a more accelerated pace, both China’s (Koopmans,
2006) and Angkor’s achievements (Short, 2004). In doing so, Pol Pot acted against the
advice of his Chinese mentor, Chairman Mao: “You should not completely copy China’s
experience, and you should think for yourself” (quoted in Koopmans, p. 64). Nor did he
heed the advice of Zhou Enlai and Mao’s successors –Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping
(Short, 2004). In Ieng Sary’s words, “[Pol Pot] said our revolution was a model for a
world revolution” (Cascio, 1998). Pol Pot “tried to make reality fit politics instead of the
other way round” (Ngor & Warner, p. 431). Pol Pot and his colleagues never examined
the social conditions where their revolution was to take place (Short, 2004), thus ignoring
the necessity to “seek truth from facts” and “test the correctness of ideas in action”
emphasized by Mao Zedong in his book On New Democracy, which Pol Pot had read in
Paris (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 148). Additionally, Pol Pot’s lack of realism might have
been caused by what Ieng Sary called his “very simplistic vision of things” (quoted in
Short, 2004, p. 294). “With his words, Pol Pot simplifies society. Everything is reduced
to caricature, to extreme polarities, to a puerile Manicheanism swathed in the finery of
well-turned phrases,” said his former student Soth Polin (Soth Polin et al., 2004, p. 23).
As a coercive leader, as discussed earlier, Pol Pot’s vision or mission does not
appear to have moved people. “Most of the best and brightest of the country’s intellectual
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elite bought into the vision that Pol held out,” Short (2004, p. 448) wrote in the afterword
of his book. However, in his 2013 memoir, Suong Sikoeun offered reasons why so many
intellectuals joined the Khmer Rouge’s cause in the 1960s and 1970s. One was keenness
to eradicate social justice. “One should add another factor, a characteristic of the young
people of my generation: Refusing the established rules, repugnance for every convention
and the will to sacrifice onself for a just cause,” Suong Sikoeun said (quoted in Vachon,
2014, p. 4). The intellectual elite, of whom Short wrote, included the four Franceeducated Thiounn brothers, who, according to Quinn (1982), may be credited for
recruiting Cambodian students who had gone to Paris, including Pol Pot, to join the
Communist Party. Thiounn Mumm, the second brother who was the first Cambodian to
go to and hold a doctorate in economics from the Polytechinque, France’s most
prestigious Grande Ecole, had arrived in Paris in 1946 and co-founded and headed the
Cercle Marxiste throughout the 1960s (Short, 2004). Despite his denial, Mumm is widely
believed to have joined the French Communist Party (Short, 2004) with his Parisian wife
(Quinn, 1982). The rise of communism during that period was another major reason.
Pol Pot couched DK’s development policy in militaristic thought and terms. It
was the “doctrine of the bludgeon” that had been embedded in the “Party’s genes” by
1975 (Short, 2004, p. 294). For example, people “struggled” to land fish or to gather
fertilizer, “waged continuous offensives” to plant “strategic crops” (quoted in Short,
2004, p. 294). To build socialism, “cutting-edge violence” was essential: The “Party
leadership must exercise its leading role by the use of cutting-edge violence . . . This is
the most important factor, the decisive factor, which is the power that drives things
forward,” Pol Pot declared (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 294). In the first slave state in
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modern times, where Pol Pot incarcerated people in what is called a “prison without
walls,” the people had no exercise of free will or “control over their own destinies”
whatsoever (Short, 2004, p. 291). His regime “controlled and directed [its citizens’]
public and private lives more closely than government had ever done” (Kiernan, 2008, p.
464). He mentioned “encourag[ing] democracy” in some of his speeches; however, what
he actually meant was that local cadre should encourage “the masses” to actively support
the regime rather than to merely carry out “their tasks like machines” (quoted in Short, p.
291).
The DK regime lacked popularity, even among the “base people” (Locard, 2004).
More importantly, among the three categories of people into which DK society was
divided (i.e. full-rights people, candidates and deportees (or depositees, according to
Short, in order of importance), Pol Pot was popular only among full-rights people,
according to Lei, a deportee (cited in Kiernan, 1996). As a result of the DK’s
unpopularity, counter-slogans emerged that expressed contempt for the regime. For
example, “If you eat prahok42, you are unable to leap”; “The super great leap forward,
this is a big leap beyond all reality”; and “The great leap forward, the prodigious great
leap forward –this is like swallowing liquid [clear rice gruel], this is the tears flowing
from the eyes” (quoted in Locard, p. 72).
The failure of his revolution was attributed “in large part” to the unwillingness
and inability of “so many Cambodians”–who found it “irrelevant”–to implement it
(Mabbett & Chandler, 1995, p. 259). Most of those Cambodians were impoverished

42

Cambodian fermented fish paste that is the staple food of the poor.
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people, whose priorities–which revolved around family, religion, and leisure time –were
“disregarded” for his vision of Cambodia (Chandler, 1999a, p. 187). This vision “seems”
to have been clouded by his “more personal” vision: “He probably saw the Communist
movement as an avenue through which he could find and express his personal identity,
particularly in terms of exercising power over others, so as to control the future.”
Furthermore, according to Short (2004, p. 445), Pol Pot’s vision was “all his own.”
Pol Pot’s and his regime’s manipulation of the Khmer language
According to Soth Polin, the “use of the Khmer [language] for propaganda, lie,
and illusion” was one of the means the the Khmer Rouge regime used to establish itself
and an “important” but “rather neglected” factor for the Khmer Rouge’s “phantasmagoric
catastrophe of human judgment” (Soth Polin et al., p. 21). A country with an oral
tradition like Cambodia attaches paramount “importance and prestige” to the word,
especially the spoken word (p. 21). Possessing “magic of oratory,” especially while in
Paris (Ponchaud, 1989, p. 158), Pol Pot was called a “master of words” by Ieng Sary and
a “good philologue” by Soth Polin, who said he needed to modify his memory of his
school year with Pol Pot, which had been mainly positive43. “His ability to enchant his
listeners was a crucial part of his equipment as a leader,” wrote Chandler (1999a, p. 151).
According to a Cambodian official who remembered his speeches, Pol Pot used simple
“everyday” way of speaking, “like a father speaking to his children” (quoted in Chandler,

In the late 1980s, recalling his school year with Saloth Sar in 1957, Soth Polin said, “I still remember
[his] style of delivery in French: gentle and musical. He was clearly drawn to French literature in general
and poetry in particular… The students were subjugated by this affable professor…” (quoted in Chandler,
1999a, p. 52).
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1999a, p. 151). However, a “maniputalor of words” is perhaps a more accurate title for
Pol Pot. The oxymoron title of Soth Polin’s article “The Diabolic Sweetness of Pol Pot”
clearly reflects the tyrant’s contradictions or even hypocrisy. So, too, does this statement
by Chhit Do, a former the Khmer Rouge cadre who met Pol Pot in March 1977 and
escaped from Cambodia in 1979: “[Pol Pot] seemed like a nice guy when he talked, but
what happened afterwards was not nice” (WGBH Media & Archives, 1982). In an eerie
and ironic way, what he wrote of “the absolute king” in his first article in the 1950s
depicts him accurately: “The absolute king uses nice words, but his heart remains
wicked” (quoted in Thion, 1993, p. 82). So, too, does this warning by the Buddha: “The
smooth talker is always ready for mischievous deeds, but not for good ones. He sings
your praises to your face, but behind your back, speaks ill…” (quoted in Kelen, 1989, pp.
133-34). Also ironically, this common Cambodian saying “Your heart is like
Devadatt[a]’s, your mouth like a tevada [angel],” which was also used during Pol Pot’s
rule (Locard, 2004, p. 203), can accurately describe him. In this sense, Pol Pot can be
called Devadatta, the Buddha’s wicked first cousin and adversary who had, among his
many evil acts, attempted to kill the Buddha (Kieschnick, 2004).
From the existing Cambodian language, the Khmer Rouge developed what may
be called the “Khmer Rouge parlance.” Henry Locard’s (2004) Pol Pot’s Little Red Book
contains 433 sayings or slogans of Angkar. As mentioned earlier, Pol Pot in particular
wrote the lyrics of the Khmer Rouge’s two national anthems as well as main national
slogans (Locard, 2004). As a result of Pol Pot’s “reductive Manicheanism,” the language
lost its layers and traditional vocaculary its richnes (Soth Polin et al., p. 24). For instance,
under his rule, there was only one way to speak of eating or drinking or smoking rather
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than more than one thousand ways previously. Under Pol Pot, “woe betide he who uses a
forbidden word” (p. 24). The Khmer Rouge combined “irreconcilable opposites” (p. 21).
Rigidity was presented as softness. Sweetness and cruelty were intertwined until they
were indistinguishable from each other. For instance, instead of the words order or force,
the the Khmer Rouge used request, which became horrifying. They requested you to do
almost anything, including to die. “And Pol Pot, the bloody tyrant, soul of that regime,
continued to present himself as a man so sociable and amiable he almost seemed naive.
You could even be briefly annoyed with yourself for begrudging him his request for your
self-genocide” (Soth Polin et al., p. 23).
Many old sayings and words were attached new meanings. Other sayings and
words or their original meanings were distorted. The Buddhist proverb “Nothing is lost,
only transformed” was distorted as “To preserve you is no gain; to destroy you is no loss”
(p. 24). The Khmer Rouge refrain “The trees in the country, the fruit to the city” was used
to breed bitterness with urban people. Repeated a thousand times, it produced a
“unquenchable hatred” and convinced peasants that it was right and even imperative to
destroy city dwellers (p. 24). The Buddhist saying “The life of a man [or woman] is a
bowl of ashes” (p. 24) means that what remains of man after his life (and at his death) is a
bowl of ashes. Cremation of dead bodies is a common Buddhist practice (e.g. Blum, 2004
& Soth Polin et al., 2004). “[B]ut under the Khmer Rouge, it is the living who are already
ash,” wrote Soth Polin (p. 24). By “ash” he must have meant death or dead because under
Pol Pot, corpses were generally buried coffinless in mass graves.
Soth Polin’s statement “Pol Pot kills, but he kills with poetry” (Soth Polin et al.,
p. 23) clearly indicates how skillfully and deliberately Pol Pot manipulated the modified
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Khmer language in his efforts to achieve his vision. This language–which “acts like a
drug” –caused a loss of “original faculties of reason and natural feeling” and utterly
destructive behaviors on the part of children and young women, like murdering people
with a smile without hesitation, without a blink (p. 24). Pol Pot could kill without having
to take personal responsibility for the killing. The individual was not to blame; “it is the
group that kills. And the more people one kills, the more merit one acquires in this new
faith” (p. 24). The Khmer Rouge’s language, which was their “weapon,” had hitherto the
most “satanic efficiency”; their words have “created an apocalypse” (p. 25).
Furthermore, Pol Pot combined his gentle mannerism with his language skills. As
Sihanouk (1986, p. 361) wrote:
As opposed to Hitler, who used direct and loud speech to memerize his soldiers
and youth, Pol Pot attracted his audience’s attention with his gentle mannerism,
smile, and polite behavior (but this did not appeal to people like me who were
consciously aware). This was despite the audience’s knowledge that he was a
murderer more deliberate and brutal than any other history’s worst dictators.

Pol Pot’s and his regime’s recruitment and retention strategies
Apart from their deliberate manipulation of the Cambodian language, Pol Pot and
his regime adopted various tactics to recruit and retain their followers such as the
manipulation of class revenge or hatred and extreme patriotism/nationalism, obedience to
authority, and the prestige of popular figures and the politicization of the American
bombing.
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Manipulation of class revenge or hatred and chauvinism
Hinton (2005) and, more importantly, Chandler (1999a & b) wrote of the Khmer
Rouge leadership’s, Pol Pot’s in particular, ability to inspire many of Cambodia’s poor,
especially teenagers and people in their early 20s to join their revolution and take revenge
against their class enemies. Also recruited were people living in mountainous, forest, and
most remote regions (Nordom Sihanouk, 1980). However, according to them, it was not
the leader’s vision or mission that inspired the people but their utilization of “ideological
palimpsests” (Hinton, 2005, p. 46) or “mass resentments” (Chandler, 1999b, [no page]),
which centered around the notion of class rage (Hinton) or class hatred (Chandler), or in
Sihanouk’s (1980, p. 27) words, “seething, unquenchable hatred for the ‘upper classes’”
as well as the Cambodian notion of karsangsoek or kum, “disproportionate revenge” or “a
head for an eye” (Hinton, 2005, p. 47), which was revised and integrated into Khmer
Rouge ideology (Hinton). Haing Ngor gave an apt description of kum:
Kum is a Cambodian word for a particularly Cambodian mentality of revenge –to
be precise, a long-standing grudge leading to revenge much more damaging than
the original injury. If I hit you with my fist and you wait five years and then shoot
me in the back one dark night, that is kum. Or if a government official steals a
peasant’s chickens and the peasant uses it as an excuse to attack a government
garrison, like the one in my village, that is kum. (Ngor & Warner, 2003, pp. 9-10)
About two years before the Khmer Rouge’s takeover, Bunchan Mol, a member of
the National Asssembly of the Lon Nol regime and an uncle of Thiounn Mumm, the
intellectual Khmer Rouge cadre, wrote of revenge and victory:
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If a man is condemned, we [Khmers] kill all his relaives lest one day they take
revenge… If we knock down an opponent, we beat him unti he dies. Victory, to
us, means that our adversary is dead. If he lives, it is not victory. That is our
Khmer mentality. (quoted in Short, 2004, p. 365)
Kum was one of the key ideas Pol Pot wrote in his first known political article in
the early 1950s while in Paris. According to Martin (1994, p. 160), class hatred had
stemmed from his “personal hatred” towards the monarchy and its representatives. He
bore a grudge against King Sisowath Monivong (Sihanouk’s predecessor who passed
away in 1941) because he had failed to make his sole wife a cousin of Pol Pot’s whom he
regarded as a sister. She was merely one of the the monarch’s favorites.
After his return to Cambodia from France, Pol Pot, a “true national chauvinist”
(Kiernan, 1993), drummed class hatred or revenge and chauvinism into people in study
sessions, meetings, mutual and self-criticism sessions, and formal schooling he and his
subordinates conducted before and after he took power (e.g. Carney, 1989b). These
gatherings appear to have been very numerous; Nuon Chea told Thet Sambath, a
Cambodian reporter, that in his dreams he saw only Pol Pot chairing meetings (Lemkin &
Thet Sambath, 2009). Given the abolishment of educational institutions and the high
illiteracy rate among the peasants, and Cambodia’s predominantly oral culture, these
sessions became an indispensible indoctrination tool for the Khmer Rouge in general and
for Pol Pot in particular. “[T]here are no schools, faculties or universities in the
traditional sense… because we wish to do away with all vestiges of the past,” Pol Pot
said in 1978 (quoted in Procknow, 2013, p. 17). DK’s only schools were the CPK’s
Central Political School under Nuon Chea (Carney, 1989b) and ministry-level political
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schools in Phnom Penh (Heder, 1980, cited in Carney, 1989b). Exclusively for party
members, DK published its monthly magazine Revolutionary Flags, which among other
things “widely disseminated policy lines and changes, ideological and theoretical
views…” (Carney, 1989b, p. 87). The only telecommunication means Angkar had and
used to reach the masses was the radio. Although only very few cadres were allowed to
have a radio set, under Pol Pot, as fairly common in communist regimes, people could
hear from miles away speeches, revolutionary songs, and announcements that Angkar
broadcast on the radio through old-fashioned loudspeakers placed high on the top of
poles and trees. In his speeches and lectures both on and off air, as part of his
propaganda, Pol Pot frequently told lies or distorted facts. For example, Pol Pot claimed
that the destitute accounted for 75 percent of pre-revolution Cambodia’s population,
which “he must have known was absurd”; it was an “ideological figleaf” (Short, 2004, p.
247). In fact, only 25 percent were destitute. However outrageous, once he declared, the
claim became “holiy writ” (p. 247). He even lied to Prince Sihanouk about his plan of
war against Vietnam during their first four-hour one-on-one meeting at Pol Pot’s
residence on January 5, 1979, just two days before Phnom Penh fell. Pol Pot’s war plan
“showed pure madness and was merely a lie in order to hide the humiliation of an
imminent defeat,” wrote Sihanouk (1986, p. 361).
According to Norodom Sihanouk (1980), Pol Pot and his lieutenant Son Sen were
exceptionally successful in amassing a “strong army” after years of “persistent
indoctrination and harsh training” (p. 27) for three reasons: a) the recruitment of the
afore-mentioned categories of people, those “most ‘neglected’ by the old regime” (p. 27),
b) the use of child-soldiers, and c) the “school for cruelty” (p. 29). Once recruited into the
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revolutionary army, these children were removed from their families and relocated to
“Pol Pot’s indoctrination camps” and became soldiers at the age of twelve. When named
by the party “the dictatorial instrument of the party,” these child-soldiers were
“convinced before long that the party was doing them the greatest of honors” (p. 28).
With this honor came certain privileges of having “command of ‘troops of workers,’” the
“power of life or death over all categories of slaves,” and the “right to any food available
in cooperatives or in the wild” (p. 28). These child-soldiers were made courageous by
“true patriotic feeling” and “solid ideological indoctrination.” They “had no reason to
hate Pol Pot’s inhuman regime. They had never known and so could not remember what
life was like under Sihanouk. They sincerely believed what they were told about the ‘old
regime’: that it was despicable, contemptible, corrupt, unjust, oppressive in the extreme”
(p. 29).
Prince Sihanouk wrote that while under house arrest during the Pol Pot regime, he
and his wife could observe a few of what he called “super soldiers” who were both
sadistic and stoical. They were fearless of death or injury and “remained perfectly stoical
in the worst of personal circumstances,” he wrote (pp. 29-30). That was because they had
been hardened by their training in the “school for cruelty.” “Pol Pot and Ieng Sary quite
rightly thought that if they trained their young recruits on cruel games, they would end up
as soldiers with a love of killing and consequently of war” (p. 29). He witnessed the
soldiers who guarded his “camp” “constantly take pleasure in tormenting animals (dogs,
cats, monkeys, geckos” (p. 29). Meanwhile, without fear of death or injury, they “often
complained” that they were not sent to the front to “knock off some Viets.”
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Manipulation of obedience to authority/hierarchy
According to Cunha et al. (2010, p. 297), “extreme obedience” in DK was
founded on four “building blocks,” namely a “pre-existing culture of obedience, strong
institutional control, intense indoctrination, and the banalization of violence.” The last
two have been discussed earlier. Reverence and obedience are traditionally accorded to
teachers and monks, who “traditionally imparted knowledge in the education process”
(Ayres, 2003, p. 41) and many of whom were still monastery school teachers for the most
part of the 20th century 44. The traditional Cambodian teacher has a “lopsided” relation to
his student; “[t]he teacher, like a parent, bestows, transmits, and commands. The student,
like the child, receives, accepts, and obeys. Nothing changes in the transmission
process…” (Chandler, 2008, p. 107). More importantly, to a parent, the “teacher was the
source of all authority” (Ayres, 2003, p. 61), as this adage points out:
I give to you my whole child. Teach him everything you know. You set the rules.
Whatever you do is up to you. I need only the skin and bones.
(quoted in Ayres, 2003, p. 61)
Particularly before the revolution, Pol Pot and many other top Khmer Rouge
leaders –who had been schoolteachers –were revered by their students and had unparallel
access to the destitute, the landless, and the young, those whom Pol Pot called the
“masters” of Cambodia and Mao the “poor and blank” (Chandler, in Locard, 2004, p. xv).
As a “talented, popular” (Chandler, 1999a, p. 52) or “unusually gifted” teacher (Short,
2004, p. 120) in the 1950s and early 1960s at Chamroeurn Vichea (Progressive

Schoolteachers and university professors (generically called krou) are still generally considered their
students’ second parents in Cambodia.
44
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Knowledge), a private school that had numerous young radical teachers (Chandler 1999a
& Short, 2004), Pol Pot was able to play various roles (Chandler, 1999a). He did not
reveal his political leanings or ambitions to his students, but he was passionate about
moral training and teaching offered him an essential “cover” to attract youth to the
Communist movement (Chandler, p. 52). The simple lifestyle of many Red teachers like
Pol Pot made them appealing to their students. “To many of their students, it was Red
teachers who seemed to be the only people above them in Cambodia’s social hierarchy
who visibly exhibited some concern with the plight of the poor,” wrote Ayres (2003, p.
62). In hierarchical Cambodia, particularly in the 60s and 70s, even long after Pol Pot
gave up his formal teaching career, he might still have been regarded as a teacher.
With his dual role of a top leader and teacher, Pol Pot exacted unquestioning
obedience. First, this has a lot to do with the Cambodian concept of leadership discussed
earlier but which merits additional discussion. To Cambodians, leadership is mainly, if
not solely, about the leader. And the subordinates tend to consider their leader to be
always right, according to Ek Madra (2015), a former Reuters correspondent and a press
officer of the current Cambodian government. “The leader is never wrong,” stressed a
Vice Rector of the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) in one of its meeting on
administration in early 2016 that the author of this dissertation attended. The typical
Cambodian leader and the parent play very similar roles (Bit, 1991). Sihanouk was and is
still affectionately called “Samdech Euv” (Prince Papa or King Father) and he relished
and cherished the title. A subordinate’s participation is extremely limited if there is any.
“The proper role of a leader is to explain and to clarify what is expected of people… A
leader does not draw out suggestions or involvement by the followers in searching for
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alternatives,” according to Bit (1991, p. 70), who considers Cambodia’s administration
style to be “rigid top-to-bottom.” Besides his rhetorical skills, Pol Pot’s authority as a top
leader made him successful in mesmerizing a section of the population, especially
peasant youth, instigating them to a struggle first against the Americans and then the
Vietnamese (Norodom Sihanouk, 1986).
Second, as Cunha, Rego, and Clegg (2010, p. 294) point out, in DK –a total
institution based on “extreme obedienc” –it was not “authority per se” that was used to
induce obedienc; authority was combined with “power of force.” The Khmer Rouge
soldiers, a large majority of whom were young children (e.g. Procknow, 2010 & 2013;
Cunha et al., 2010 & Chandler, 1999a), exhibited “unwavering obedience to Angkar”
(Teng, 1997, quoted in Procknow, 2013, p. 16). The DK regime developed and employed
many sayings to help exact obedience among its ranks and ordinary citizens. For
example, for its ranks, they had “Let us all together commit ourselves to follow the way
of the Angkar” and “The Angkar orders, execute!” (quoted in Locard, 2004, p. 117). For
the prisoners at S-21, where only seven people survived when the regime fell, “10
security regulations”45 had been imposed and implemented. Regulation #1 reads “You
must answer accordingly [sic] to my questions. Don’t turn then away”; and Regulation
#10 says “If you disobey any point of my regulations, you will get either ten or five
electrical shocks” (quoted in Cunha et al., 2010, p. 296).
“Management by terror” was, therefore, used (Cunha et al., 2010, p. 295). Each of
these soldiers was urged to “kill tend friends rather than keep one enemy alive” (Yathay,

These security regulations in Khmer, which were also displayed in its courtyard during the DK period,
can still be seen there.
45
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1989, quoted in Cunha et al., 2010, p. 295). As the CPK warned of “enemies
everywhere” (Chandler, 1991, quoted in Cunha et al., 2010, p. 295), no one, not even
those within the DK ranks, was safe from the watchful “pineapple” eyes of the Angkar.
Once suspected by the Angkar, a person likely faced execution ordered and carried out by
it, which according to Short (2004, p. 368) “kills but does not explain.”
Terror was supplemented by hunger, which was an instrument to wipe out
“autonomous thinking and resistence” (Cunha et al., 2010, p. 295). “Hunger is the most
effective disease” was one of the sayings the regime used to raise full awareness among
its cadres that hunger was “the best way” to suppress rebellion and make its slave
workers “the most docile servants of the Angkar” (Locard, 2004, p. 289). A citizen
complained of hunger and s/he “could be expediently” turned into fertilizer, as this DK
saying states “If someone is very hungry, the Angkar will take him where he will be
stuffed with food” (Locard, p. 204). The Khmer Rouge soldiers invariably ate before
anyone else, although they pretended to be thrifty (Margolin, 2000). Food was used as an
incentive. “Everyone, by contrast, would kiss the hand that fed them, regardless of how
bloody it was,” suggested Margolin (2000, p. 601).
Exploitation of the prestige of popular figures
Pol Pot and his regime exploited the popularity and prestige of other public
figures, especially Prince Sihanouk. “From 1970-1975 he was their figurehead leader in
Peking. They exploited his name to rally peasant support, but never had the slightest
intention of allowing him real power,” wrote Shawcross (in Sihanouk, 1980, p. xxxviii).
“The majority of the Khmer people side with Sihanouk…,” read a captured Vietnamese
document (quoted in Kiernan, 2004, p. 317). According to a CIA report on May 2, 1973,
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“proselyting [sic]” Khmer Rouge cadre told people that overthrowing Lon Nol and
reinstating Prince Sihanouk was “the only way” to prevent Cambodia from being
destroyed by the US B-52 bombing (quoted in Kiernan, 2004, p. xxiv). Although Pol Pot
and Ieng Sary addressed Sihanouk as “Prince,” they called him the revolution’s enemy in
internal Party meetings, according to two Khmer Rouge defectors (cited in Kiernan,
2004, p. 318). The Prince was not allowed to visit Cambodia, in the Khmer Rouge’s
liberated zone, until late February 1973 and to return to Phnom Penh until September 10,
1975 –as a nominal head of state. His early return would have posed a major threat to
Angkar. “The Organization does not allow Sihanouk to return to Kampuchea at the
moment, because if Sihanouk comes back all the people will be united behind him and
we will have bare backsides,” wrote Ith Sarin46, a formerly staunch supporter of the Lon
Nol regime, quoting a Khmer Rouge cadre (quoted in Kiernan, 2004, p. 339).
Finally, the Prince was permitted by the Khmer Rouge to visit to Cambodia’s
liberated zones for three weeks in late February and early March 1973 (Shawcross, 1986)
as the US bombing operation intensified (Chandler, 1999a). He was “hypocritically
welcomed by CPK leaders,” who did not intend to grant him “any political power”
(Chandler, p. 193). The film and photographs of his visit became their valuable
propaganda weapon. In May of that year, Sihanouk told an Italian journalist of his
usefulness to the Khmer Rouge: “I am useful to them because without me they wouldn’t
have the peasants, and you can’t make the revolution in Cambodia without the

Ith Sarin, a primary school teacher, defected to the Khmer Rouge-controlled zones for nine months and
wrote of his experience in a report entitled “Regrets for the Khmer Soul” in the zone after his return to
Phnom Penh in January 1973 (Kiernan, 2004, p. 339).
46
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peasants…” (quoted in Chandler, 1991b, p. 229). Sihanouk rejected an accusation that he
had thrown his support for the Khmer Rouge after the 1970 coup, stating that “honest
observers will recognize that it was the ‘reds’ themselves who rallied to Sihanouk, not the
opposite” (Sihanouk, in Jeldres, p. 104).
On January 5, 1979, two days before Phnom Penh was taken by the Vietnamsebacked liberation forces, Pol Pot told Sihanouk: “It’s time for you to help us in the
diplomatic field. We are in great difficulty” (quoted in Becker, 1998a, p. 433). Pol Pot
asked Sihanouk to go the UN to make a case for Cambodia instead of his brother-in-law
Ieng Sary, who was always in charge of Foreign Affairs but had troubled relationship
with the Prince. The Prince agreed unhesitatingly to help, although he later stated that
“Before our meeting on [that day]…, I had no relations whatsoever with ‘Pol Pot’”
(quoted in Gravois, 2001, para. 3). It was only then were Prince Sihanouk and his retinue
freed from house arrest. “Sihanouk won the [UN] vote for Democratic Kampuchea…”
after a six-hour press conference (Becker, 1998a, p. 434).
In late 1978, Prince Sihanouk was relocated from the Royal Palace to a “more
secure residence,” “ostensibly” in order to prevent a Vietnamese kidnap attempt. “Pol
was keeping him in reserve, to be produced like a rabbit from a hat at a moment of his
own choosing” (Short, 2004, p. 388). Every month of that year, the Prince was driven
around the countryside to boost the morale of the peasants in preparation for the
upcoming Vietnamese invasion. “He was more popular than before the coup d’état,” said
his wife. “People were crying, the women were crying. One woman ran behind the car
crying out for Prince Sihanouk” (quoted in Becker, 1998a, p. 433).

348

Arguing that Pol Pot “betrayed the Cambodian revolution,” Hun Sen offered five
reasons for people’s participation in the resistence against the Americans and clinch
victory in April 1975. The first was that, as Hun Sen implied, Pol Pot manipulated the
popularity of his predecessors Tou Samouth and Son Ngoc Minh. “Although Pol Pot
snatched the Party’s leadership position, his clique did not reveal their identity until they
seized full power; therefore, most people were still mistaken that the Party was still
headed by old leaders like Tou Samouth and Son Ngoc Minh. The CPK did not reveal
itself until September 1977 in the Party’s 17th anniversary, two years after Pol Pot took
power” (Hun Sen, 1991, p. 163).
Politicization of the American bombing
“In fact, Kissinger’s actions in Cambodia, when the United States bombed that
country, overthrew Prince Sihanouk, created the instability for Pol Pot and the Khmer
Rouge to come in, who then butchered some 3 million innocent people—one of the worst
genocides in the history of the world” (quoted in Wright, 2016). This was what Senator
Bernie Sanders, a Democratic presidential hopeful, said in the most recent Democratic
presidential debate with his presidential rival, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in
Wisconsin. Although it may be argued that it is part of election campagain rhetoric and
Nate Thayer’s (2016) opined that it is an “ignorant, goofy, uninformed declaration,” this
is a serious comment that certainly contains some truth. Sanders’ comment is supported
by Phay Siphan, a Cambodian American spokesman for Cambodia’s Council of
Ministers. “I totally agree with Sanders… If there was no bombardment, if a solution was
found peacefully—not the use of violence against the Cambodian nation—the Khmer
Rouge would have not jumped into power. The Cambodian people supported the Khmer
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Rouge because of the bombardment, because of the violence, because of the policy of the
United States,” Phay Siphan said (quoted in Wright, 2016). Similarly, Sydney Schanberg
wrote that “The enlarged war gave the Khmer Rouge status and recruitment power”
(Schanberg, 2010, loc. 212).
As discussed earlier, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge movement benefited
significantly from the American bombing, which they politicized and perhaps
dramatized. “[Pol Pot] told [some 400 people at a big meeting] what we were doing to
liberate the country from American imperialism and to eliminate corruption…,” recalled
Seng Lytheng, Pol Pot’s nephew, who was the only official photographer of DK’s top
leadership (Thet Sambath, 2001, p. 12). The message had a good reception, Seng Lytheng
said. In late 1978, Pol Pot told two American journalists Elizabeth Becker and Richard
Dudman in a joint interview about ordinary Cambodians’ war to free their country from
foreign domination. “The roles of conducting the revolution and waging the war to
liberate the nation were played by the workers and farmers who accounted for the great
majority of the people,” Pol Pot said (quoted in Lemkin and Thet Sambath, 2009).
Developing others
As Table 6.17 shows, neither Lon Nol nor Pol Pot possessed the coaching style or
fared well in terms of developing others. Pol Pot consistently fared worse than Lon Nol.
Fewer than 38 per cent and fewer than 24 percent of the respondents respectively
considered Lon Nol and Pol Pot a coaching leader. Lon Nol and Pol Pot were given
scores of 4.48 and 3.38 respectively on the EI component of developing others. There is
no evidence available to the author that Lon Nol or Pol Pot was anyone’s mentor or
350

coach. How could coercive leaders like Lon Nol and Pol Pot develop others? The chance
to develop others for the more reclusive Lon Nol was more remote.
Table 6.17

Developing others
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP
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4.48

3.38

2.38

2.7

Change catalyst
The word “change47” (kar phlas phador in Khmer) as it relates to politics had
been used almost exclusively by the Cambodian opposition parties, especially the main
opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) until June 28, 2016 when Prime
Minister from the ruling CPP used the word in his keynote speech at the party’s
ceremony to mark the 65th anniversary of its founding which the author attended. To the
opposition, the word mainly means the replacement of the current government and
leadership. To Hun Sen, it means Cambodia’s rebirth and survival from the Pol Pot
genocidal regime and a change from a devastated society to a society with rapid growth
(Hun Sen, 2016a, p. 5).
As revolutionaries, Lon Nol and Pol Pot, were change catalysts despite the low
ratings they were given (5.73 for Lon Nol and 5.06 for Pol Pot) as Table 6.18 indicates.
The low ratings might have been caused by the fact that the changes they induced led to
disasters or were disasters in themselves (pseudotransformational change).

47

The word “change” in climate change has a different word in Khmer, namely bomré bomruol.
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Table 6.18

Change catalyst
Mean
(out of 10)

N

Std. D

LN

PP

LN

PP

LN

PP
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5.73

5.06

2.71

3.3

352

COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Overall, this dissertation has answered its central research question “Why and
how did these two revolutionary leaders, i.e. Lon Nol and Pol Pot, become
pseudotransformational leaders?” by looking at their personal factors, particularly their
levels of emotional intelligence (EI) and leadership styles, Cambodia’s domestic
circumstances, and foreign intervention/interference. The proposed proposition or theory
that revolutionary leaders in the public sector, particularly of undemocratic regimes, tend
to become pseudotransformational leaders when (a) they lack certain components of
emotional intelligence and/or (b) adopt certain leadership styles and use them
inappropriately is substantiated, to a considerable extent, by the quantitative data (with
their respective overall EI scores below 5 out of 10) and much more importantly by the
qualitative data in various forms and from diverse sources.
In the preceding chapters, the two leaders were compared and contrasted, where
possible, in terms of leadership styles and EI components.This chapter provides a
truncated summary of the differences and similiaries in their leadership styles and the
four EI domains/competencies –namely, self-awareness, self-management, social
awareness, and relationship management and highlights one or two components of each
domain. Secondly, contribution to, practical implications for or lessons learned about the
study of public policy and administration, public sector leadership, particularly
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pseudotransformational leadership in general and in the Cambodian context are
discussed. Finally, limitations of the study are raised and some directions/areas for future
research are suggested.
Leadership styles
Despite their diametrically different political ideologies and forms of government,
Lon Nol and Pol Pot were considered dictators or tyrants by most of this study’s
participants and other individuals (authors and commentators) who are not this study’s
participants. Therefore, both were coercive, or at least, authoritative leaders. One striking
similarity was their isolation from their subordinates, which was more so in the case of
Lon Nol. Lon Nol was confined to his own residence and mainly dependent upon his
younger brother Lon Non and his nephew for domestic and international news and upon
them and a few trusted monks for ways to deal with problems and future predictions.
Both leaders made most of the decisions about national and international affairs alone or,
in the case of Lon Nol, with those very few individuals.
Extreme and constant hunger for power was another striking similarity. Only
under unrelenting pressure from both his inner circle and his foreign allies did Lon Nol
decide to leave Cambodia merely exactly two weeks prior to his regime’s fall and Pol
Pot’s takeover. Until his death in 1985, he never resigned as President of the Khmer
Republic. Pol Pot was Brother Number One from 1963, when he became Secretary of the
Workers’ Party of Kampuchea, until 1997, when he was put on trial and convicted by his
own followers. Like his predecessor, Pol Pot never resigned, even 18 years after his DK
regime was toppled and driven to Cambodia’s western border regions and he had a stroke
in 1995 that impaired the left side of his body, including his left eye (Chandler, 1999a).
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“Pol Pot was the only person responsible and in charge of everything… I have no idea
why we let Pol Pot do whatever he wanted. I personally have no idea about what Pol Pot
was thinking. In my eyes, he is a dictator,” Ta Mok commented during Pol Pot’s
kangaroo court trial in 1997 (DC-Cam, 1998, quoted in Dy Khamboly & Dearing, 2014,
p. 114). This statement conveys considerable truth despite the fact that Ta Mok, Pol Pot’s
most feared erstwhile commander, attempted, although unsuccessfully, to whitewash and
distance himself from his former boss in order to be pardoned by King Sihanouk and to
be reintegrated into the Cambodian government.
The most substantial difference was that while Pol Pot was a pacesetting leader,
Lon Nol was not. The phrase of the pacesetting style “Do as I do, now” does not apply to
Lon Nol, who set no high standard for performance either for himself or his followers.
His far-feteched and grandiose dreams or plans do not count as performance standards
but illusions.
Emotional intelligence
Kate Frieson’s conclusion here about the failure of the Khmer Rouge’s revolution
during 1970-1975 is coincidentally applicable to its revolution during its 1975-1979 rule
as well as the Khmer Republic’s 1970-1975 revolution, albeit to a lesser extent: “… the
Khmer Rouge could lose the revolution while they were in the process of winning the
war. The revolution failed in no small measure due to people’s unwillingness to support a
movement that didn’t look after them” [emphasis added] (Frieson, 1993, p. 47). So is this
statement by Short (2004, p. 371) about the Khmer Rouge regime: “[B]y 1977, the
regime’s natural supporters were growing disillusioned. … In many areas, even the
poorest peasants, in whose name the revolution had been launched, felt they had been
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cheated. Instead of the three meals a day they had been promised, there was watery rice
soup.” This is a major commonality between the two regimes and it is related to
emotional intelligence of the regimes’ leaders, particularly the domain of social
awareness, which covers empathy. As has been discussed, they were stoic or
unsentimental.
Self-awareness
The penultimate paragraph of the concluding chapter of David Chandler’s
political biography of Pol Pot Brother Number One, which is relevant to self-awareness,
reads:
In the end, however, the man who died on the Cambodian frontier in 1998 must
be held responsible for what happened in Cambodia after April 1975. Perhaps, as
he sat at night in his clearing in the forest, he had a faint perception (or a bleak,
horrifying vision) of the sufferings he had inflicted. Perhaps he did not. He told
his body guard that from time to time he was depressed. Was this because of what
he had done, or because everything he’d done had failed? There is no way of
telling, although in his last interviews self-pity seemed to outweigh self-knowledge
[emphasis added]. The story of his life traced his submission to a vision of
history, of Cambodia, and of himself, where “personal responsibility,” like so
much else, was burnt away in the exigencies of revolutionary transformation and
holding on to power. (Chandler, 1999a, p.187)
Perhap, Pol Pot was “introspective,” as Chandler (1999a, p. 6) described him; but
he was not likely self-aware enough. It may well be that neither Pol Pot nor Lon Nol
looked into their own heart. As Carl Jung said, “Your vision will become clear only when
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you can look into your own heart. Who looks outside, dreams; who looks inside, awakes”
(quoted in Wedemeyer & Jue, 2002, p. 17).
Self-management
Both Lon Nol and Pol Pot were not good at managing themselves. In particular,
they apparently lacked transparency and adaptability. Had they been transparent and
changed course, the outcomes of their respective regimes could have been different.
Social awarenss
As loners, both Lon Nol and Pol Pot were not socially aware; they were
particularly unempathetic of the unimaginable sufferings that their people experienced.
Their failure to monitor their people’s satisfaction so as to ensure the fulfillment of the
people’s needs and to make themselves accessible when necessary were significant
contributing factors in their respective regimes’ and their own downfalls.
Relationship management
The domain of relationship management appears to be the antithesis of Lon Nol’s
“silent as a carp” (cited in Chandler, 1991a, p. 158) personality and Pol Pot’s “quiet,
introverted” (Drago Rancic48, quoted in Short, 2004, p. 444) personality. Besides
apparently their being change catalysts and and Pol Pot’s moderate influence, their other
EI components were lacking, especially conflict management and teamwork and
collaboration.

48

Rancic was a Yugoslav journalist who visted DK in 1978.
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Practical implications for/contribution to the study of public policy and
administration
Practical implicatins for public policy and administration (PPA), public
management, and leadership, especially in Cambodia, have been elaborated at length
under the subsection of the Significance of the Study. This current section highlights the
study’s contribution to the field and sub-field and several possible or proposed
implications or lessons learned from the study–which are naturally part of the
contribution.
The study’s contribution
Perhaps this study’s most important contribution to leadership is the support,
despite its exploratory nature, it provides for the trait approach to leadership and more
specifically for the emotional intelligence model developed by Goleman, Boyatzis, and
McKee, especially for leadership at the top level of hierarchical societies such as
Cambodia. While these authors argue that high EI is indispensible to stellar leadership
performance, the study proposes a slightly different theory that very low EI can lead to
bad leadership. Secondly, the study adds some support to the style approach to
leadership, specifically the model developed by the consulting firm Hay/McBer and
reported by Goleman (2001).
Practical implications or lessons learned
First of all, a leader’s aloofness, distance or isolation can undermine his/her
emotional intelligence and leadership effectiveness, especially if s/he is a top national
leader in a hierarchical society. Although his motive may be disputed and his resultant
leadership effectiveness remains to be seen, Prime Minister Hun Sen has recently done
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two activities to reach the masses and seemingly to appear empathetic or compassionate
and simultaneously to avoid being aloof or at least appearing so. Called the “undisputed
king of Facebook,” (Willemyns, 2016, para. 1) he has been highly active on his official
Facebook page since late 2014, when he launched it, and has preferred Facebook as a
public forum (Vachon, 2016b). On this social media, he not only posts and shares
decisions, policies, news, photos, audios, and videos but also has dialogues and
exchanges with invidual users. It might be said that he has governed to a considerable
extent via Facebook since then. He even has dealt with very specific issues. For instance,
he intervened via this social media in a dispute between a three-star general and traffic
police officer. During a period of 24 hours, he “fired, suspended, and then reinstated” the
general, who had been caught driving through a red light by the police officer (Khuon
Narim, 2016, para. 1).
In addition, since July 2016, Hun Sen has conducted provincial tours in order to
solve problems. “I will go to other places with the aim of inspecting the development that
has been accomplished and the continuing problems that have not been finished yet and
need to be solved,” he said (quoted in Lay Samean, 2016, para. 2). Sihanouk conducted
many local tours during his tenure before 1970, the opposition leader Sam Rainsy
conducted provincial tours during the 2013 national election campaign, and Hun Sen
himself had made provincial tours in the past. Yet, Hun Sen’s recent tours have been
unprecedentedly intensive. Having toured 18 of Cambodia’s 24 provinces as of 29
August 2016, he aims to cover all of the provinces well before the Commune/Sangkat
election in 2017. On his Facebok page, he often posts comments, updates and photos
and/or videos of his tours of markets that show him hugging or posing for group
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selfies/photos with vendors and customers and eating at food stalls. One of his most
recent posts (September 14, 2016) has 42 photos of his tour of a primary school in a
border province named after himself “Hun Sen Monorom” accompanied by this
comment: “Samdech Hun Sen visits pupils at Hun Sen Monorom Primary School…
Some of the school buildings here are dilapidated... Also, the school… needs more new
buildings because the student population keeps increasing annually… After his inspection
of school buildings and discussions with teachers and pupils, Samdech Hun Sen, together
with charitable people, decided to donate two new buildings… and one office
building…” (Hun Sen, 2016b).
Hun Sen “pushes a simple ‘man of the people’ image,” wrote Willemyns (para.
1). Hun Sen’s humble rural beginnings fit better with market life than the self-exiled
opposition leader Sam Rainsy’s “elite” background. “Hun Sen is very simple. He’s not
like an elite family like Sam Rainsy,” Council of Ministers spokesman Phay Siphan said
(quoted in Willemyns (para. 19). Similarly, Astrid Norén-Nilsson, author of a new book
Cambodia’s Second Kingdom, implied, the “everyday closeness [to the people] the CPPdominated local state enjoys” makes it easy for them to identify the people’s will; but this
is not the case for the CNRP leaders due to their “elite and transnational backgrounds”
(quoted in Vachon, 2016a).
Secondly, leaders, especially at the top echelon of government, sometimes need to
stay aloof in the sense of staying above the fray or not being party to a conflict. Joining
the fray, particularly bickering, as both Lon Nol and Pol Pot did, can undermine his/her
constituents’ trust in and respect for his/her authority and neutrality and/or deprive
him/her of the mediator or reconciliator role.
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Thirdly, national/public interest, however defined, should override national
leaders’ personal, familial, factional, and partisan interest and partisan politics whenever
they come into conflict. Fourthly, with this in mind, when their subordinates or they
themselves are involved in a conflict, the leaders should be willing to make one of these
hard choices: 1) manage it effectively or 2) resign. Both Lon Nol’s and Pol Pot’s failure
to make the choice contributed, to a considerable extent, to the Cambodian holocaust or
tragedy.
Fifthly, national leaders need to have in place their exit strategy and succession
plan for there to be a peaceful transfer of power and continuity of their country’s
development. The succession of Cambodian national leaders in the ancient times was
seldom “stable, assured” (Mabbett & Chandler, 1995, p. 162) and this has often been the
case since 1941, when the French colonizers decided to give the throne to the 18-year-old
Norodom Sihanouk rather than a prince from the Sisowath line of the Royal Family. In
the same vein, transfer of national power in Cambodia has rarely been smooth or
peaceful. It can be said that Cambodian national power has frequently been “seized”
rather than transferred from 1970 to 1997–in a coup by Lon Nol and his associates in
1970, in a war by Pol Pot in 1975, in another war by the CPP backed by the Vietnamese
Army in 1979, and in a controversial or alleged coup in Phnom Penh by Hun Sen in 1997
(or at least a bloody armed conflict between CPP and Funcinpec faithfuls), when
Norodom Ranariddh was replaced as the First Prime Minister by a member of his
[Ranariddh’s] own party. In addition, after every national election since 1993, Cambodia
has experienced a political problem, conflict or even crisis. Regardless of which party
won or lost, each was a contested or disputed election. However, Hun Sen has denied the
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existence of such a phenomenon under his party’s rule before or since the 1998 national
election. To him, it is a personal or private affair not a political issue and there has been
nothing but peace, political stability, and development. “At the same time, it must be
understood clearly that no political party, social organization, or individual regardless of
their position/rank may be outside the legal system. A perpetrator– be it a physical person
or legal entity –must be brought to justice because Cambodia is a state with rule of law
and full sovereignty. Therefore, the private affairs of individual perpetrators must not be
distorted as political issues…” remarked Hun Sen (2016a, p. 6). A political problem or
not, the so-called “culture of dialogue” between the CPP and CNRP to resolve
disagreements about the 2013 national election results collapsed. The Opposition Leader
Sam Rainsy has been in self-exil in France since November 2015 to “avoid a two-year
prison sentence, this time for defaming former Foreign Affairs Minister Hor Namhong”
(Vachon, 2016b) and Kem Sokha, his deputy, has been holed up in the CNRP’s
Headquarters for months for fear of a possible arrest for ignoring court summonses. He
“was sentenced on September 9 to five months in jail for refusing to appear in court over
a ‘prostitution’ case…” (Vachon, 2016b).
Sixthly, there may be a need for a prime ministerial term limit for the first time
ever in Cambodia. As implied by Bunchan Mol 43 years ago, a prime minister’s long
tenure was not conducive to progress. From February 1948 to March 1970, “… the same
people held the prime ministerial post multiple times. There seems to be addiction to
positions; but there does not seem to be any progress” (Bunchan Mol, 1973, p. 99).
Among these people were “power greedy, egoistic, addicted to positions (seats), and
dictatorial…” This observation appears a lot truer or at least to make more sense in the
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21st century. “One-man, one-party rule is intellectually unhealthy, usually brutal and
almost always unresponsive even to helpful criticism,” said the historian David Chandler
(quoted in Vachon, 2016b).
Seventhly, certain leadership styles (e.g. democratic or affiliative) are usually or
generally more desirable than others (e.g. coercive or authoritative) and leaders should
develop one or two of the desirable ones as their dominant style(s). Yet, each style, even
a less desirable or undesirable one, has its own merits and demerits and can thus be
effective if used properly. It takes a leader’s talent or skill to identify the right context,
situation, and frequency for each style. There is a danger or risk of using any style, let
alone a less desirable or generally undesirable style (e.g. coercive), too frequently.
Eightly, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, and corruption should be prevented or
minimized because they are not only undemocratic but also detrimental to good
governance and eventually destroy an organization or a nation. As shown above, both
regimes and leaders were guilty of these very social ills they had vowed to root out when
they took power.
Ninthly, a leadership team of friends or cronies is, more often than not, not
healthy for decision/policy making and administration because it tends to engender
groupthink. Similarly, a leader should not surround him/herself with yes-men or
sycophants because doing so likely undercuts his/her effective performance.
Finally, leaders who have a deep conviction in the notion of “the end justifies the
mean” may be more likely to lack EI than those who do not and/or to become bad (or
evil, more specifically) leaders either in the process or as a result of achiving their lofty
goals. These may be topics for future investigation.
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Limitations of the study and some directions/areas for future research
Partly because of its exploratory nature and the researcher’s resource constraints,
the study has a number of limitations. First, the author does not know French or another
foreign language, say Russian or Vietnamese. Literature or materials about the two
leaders must also be available in other languages, especially French and Vietnamese, that
might not be available in English. As a result, he included only the materials in any of
these languages that have been translated into English or Khmer. For instance, the 2013
revised edition in French of Laurence Picq’s 1989 memoir of her life under the Khmer
Rouge Beyond the Horizon was not included. Included was only a statement from the
revised memoir that had been quoted in Vachon (2014). Second, foreign participants in
and observers, interviewers, or authors of the two regimes or leaders–David Candler,
Philip Short, Elizabeth Becker, Nate Thayer, and Henry Kamm in particular–were not
included in the study’s survey and interviews. Third, the author had no access to any
individual who either had had direct access to one or both of the leaders or who had been
a direct superior or subordinate of theirs. As a result, most of the interview data did not
qualify as historical or factual accounts about the leaders and had to be discarded. Fourth,
obviously the two leaders were not participants in this study since they had died at least
14 years before the study started. Finally, despite the author’s strenuous and sustained
effort to find and include relevant data for each EI component and leadership style, the
data obtained varies widely in quantity and quality. Nonetheless, the negative impacts of
these limitations have been minimized by the incorporation of pertinent data from a wide
range of sources, including relevant comments, statements, and writings of most of the
above-mentioned individuals, Lon Nol and Pol Pot included.
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Future research can be a) quantitative or mixed-methods studies on the correlation
or causation between and among the leadership styles, emotional intelligence, and
pseudotransformational leadership of national, local, or organiazationl leaders across
nations and continents; b) qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods studies on the
correlation or causation between and among leaders’ non-personal factors like domestic
circumstances or conditions and foreign intervention/interference and their
pseudotransformational leadership; c) studies on correlation or causation between and
among leaders’religions/faiths and their EI and leadership styles; and d) quantitative
studies on the correlation between the four Buddhist Brahma Viharas, EI, and leadership
effectiveness. Ideally, these future studies should include leaders themselves as research
participants. For case studies, more cases should be included.
Mark Twain is said to have remarked “History does not repeat itself, but it often
rhymes” (quoted in Cowie, 2009). Thanks in part to the lessons learned from this
dissertation, it is hoped that Cambodia will not have bad or pseudotransformational
national leader. If this is true, Cambodia’s darkest history (or one of the darkest chapters
of world history) in the 1970s will less likely repeat itself or rhyme.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
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Leadership of Lon Nol and Pol Pot

Instructions: Please answer the following questions individually, clearly, and freely
and return this questionnaire in a sealed envelope to me, my research assistant, or this
address by August 3, 2012:

Hok Roth
Institute of Foreign Languages
(Next to the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training)
Russian Federation Boulevard
PO Box 416 OR Room 03
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: 012 82-37-14 or 023-885-419

I would like to express my sincere appreciation for your time and effort.

Hok Roth
Investigator
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Section I: Personal background
Check () ONLY ONE option for each item except for items 6, 7, and 9.
1. Gender:

A. Male

B. Female

2. Age group:
A. 30-39

B. 40-49

C. 50-59

D. 60-69

E. 70 or above

3. Highest level of education:
A. Lower secondary certificate
C. Bachelor‟s
E. Doctorate

B. Upper secondary certificate
D. Master‟s
F. Other (please specify): ______

4. Current employment status:
A. Employed
B. Unemployed (Skip Questions 5 & 6)
C. Retired
5. Sector of your current major employment or your last major employment before
retirement:
A. Public
B. Private
C. Non-profit
6. Area of your current major employment or your last major employment before
retirement (you may choose more than one area):
A. Education
B. Military/police
C. Industry
D. Health
E. Agriculture
F. Politics/public administration
G. Other (please specify): _______
7. Area of your major employment during the Pol Pot regime (you may choose more
than one area):
A. Education
C. Health
E. Politics/public administration
G. N/A

B. Military
D. Farming
F. Other (please specify): ______
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8. Sector of your major employment during the Lon Nol regime:
A. Public
B. Private
C. Non-profit
D. N/A (Skip Item 9)
9. Area of your major employment during the Lon Nol regime (you may choose more
than one area):
A. Education
B. Military/police
C. Industry
D. Health
E. Agriculture
F. Politics/public administration
G. Other (please specify): ______ H. N/A
10. Area/country of your permanent residence:
A.Phnom Penh
B. Province (please specify) _______________
C. Overseas (please specify the country): ______________

Section II: Questions about Lon Nol and Pol Pot
11. How would you classify the leadership of these two leaders? Please read the
definition of each type of leadership below and choose any type that you think fits
each leader. You may choose more than one type. Please give your reasons for your
choices.
A.Incompetent leadership–the leader lacks the will or
skill (or both) to sustain effective action. With regard to
at least one important leadership challenge, they do not
create positive change.
B.Rigid leadership–the leader is stiff and unyielding.
Although they may be competent, they are unable or
unwilling to adapt to new ideas, new information, or
changing times.
C.Intemperate leadership–the leader lacks self-control
and is aided and abetted by followers who are unwilling
or unable effectively to intervene.
D.Callous leadership–the leader is uncaring or unkind.
Ignored or discounted are the needs, wants, and whishes
of most members of the group or organization,
especially subordinates.
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Lon Nol

Pol Pot

















E.Corrupt leadership–the leader lies, cheats, or steals.
To a degree that exceeds the norm, they put self-interest
ahead of the public interest.
F.Insular leadership–the leader minimizes or
disregards the health and welfare of “the other” –that is,
those outside the group or organization for which they
are directly responsible.
G.Evil leadership–the leader commits atrocities. They
use pain as an instrument of power. The harm done to
men, women, and children can be physical,
psychological, or both.













H. Other type(s) (please specify):
Lon Nol:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
Pol Pot:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
Write your reasons for your choices for both leaders here:
Lon Nol:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
Pol Pot:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
12. In terms of leadership performance or effectiveness, what kinds of leader were Lon
Nol and Pol Pot? Please check only one box for each leader.
A. Successful leader (Skip Question 13)
B. Mediocre leader
C. Failed leader
396

Lon Nol




Pol Pot




13. If you think they were mediocre or failed leaders, what made them so? Rate the
following factors for their failed or mediocre leadership from 1 to 10, number 10
being the most important factor. Circle ONLY one number for each factor for each
leader.
A.

Foreign intervention/interference:
1
2
3
4
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
Pol Pot:

5
5

6
6

B.

Domestic circumstances:
1
2
Lon Nol:
1
2
Pol Pot:

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

9
9

10
10

C.

Their personal factors:
1
2
Lon Nol:
1
2
Pol Pot:

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

9
9

10
10

7
7

8
8

9
9

10
10

14. Please rate Lon Nol and Pol Pot in terms of the following skills, number 10 being the
highest score. Please choose one number only.
A.

Conceptual skills:
1
Lon Nol:
1
Pol Pot:

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

9
9

10
10

B.

Technical skills:
1
Lon Nol:
1
Pol Pot:

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

9
9

10
10

C.

Human skills:
Lon Nol:
Pol Pot:

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

9
9

10
10

1
1

15. Please read each component of emotional intelligence (EI) and its description and
then rate Lon Nol and Pol Pot in terms of each one from 1 to 10 (see the definition of
EI1 at the bottom of this page.) Number 10 is the highest score.
Cluster A: Self-awareness
Component and description
A1. Emotional self-awareness. “Leaders high in emotional self
awareness are attuned to their inner signals, recognizing how their
1

Emotional intelligence is “the capacity for recognizing our own feelings, and those of others, for
motivating ourselves and for managing emotions well in our relationships.”
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feelings affect them and their job performance. They are attuned to their
guiding values and can often intuit the best course of action, seeing the
big picture in a complex situation. Emotionally self-aware leaders can be
candid and authentic, able to speak openly about their emotions or with
conviction about their guiding vision.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
A2. Accurate self-assessment. “Leaders with high self-awareness
typically know their limitations and strengths, and exhibit a sense of
humor about themselves. They exhibit a gracefulness in learning where
they need to improve, and welcome constructive criticism and feedback.
Accurate self-assessment lets a leader know when to ask for help and
where to focus in cultivating new leadership strengths.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
A3. Self-confidence. “Knowing their abilities with accuracy allows
leaders to play to their strengths. Self-confident leaders can welcome a
difficult assignment. Such leaders often have a sense of presence, a selfassurance that lets them stand out in a group.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
Cluster B: Self-management
Component and description
B1. Self-control. “Leaders with emotional self-control find ways to
manage their disturbing emotions and impulses, and even to channel them
in useful ways. A hallmark of self-control is the leader who stays calm
and clear-headed under high stress or during a crisis–or who remains
unflappable even when confronted by a trying situation.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
B2. Transparency. “Leaders who are transparent live their values.
Transparency – an authentic openness to others about one‟s feelings,
beliefs, and actions – allows integrity. Such leaders openly admit mistakes
or faults, and confront unethical behavior in others rather than turn a blind
eye.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
B3. Adaptability. “Leaders who are adaptable can juggle multiple
demands without losing their focus or energy, and are comfortable with
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the inevitable ambiguities of organizational life. Such leaders can be
flexible in adapting to new challenges, nimble in adjusting to fluid
change, and limber in their thinking in the face of new data or realities.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
B4. Achievement. “Leaders with strength in achievement have high
personal standards that drive them to constantly seek performance
improvements–both for themselves and those they lead. They are
pragmatic, setting measurable but challenging goals, and are able to
calculate risk so that their goals are worthy but attainable. A hallmark of
achievement is in continually learning - and teaching ways to do better.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
B5. Initiative. “Leaders who have a sense of efficacy–that they have what
it takes to control their own destiny–excel in initiative. They seize
opportunities–or create them rather than simply waiting. Such a leader
does not hesitate to cut through red tape, or even bend the rules, when
necessary to create better possibilities for the future.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
B6. Optimism. “A leader who is optimistic can roll with the punches,
seeing an opportunity rather than a threat in a setback. Such leaders see
others positively, expecting the best of them. And their “glass half-full”
outlook leads them to expect that changes in the future will be for the
better.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
Cluster C: Social awareness
Component and description
C1. Empathy. “Leaders with empathy are able to attune to a wide range
of emotional signals, letting them sense the felt, but unspoken, emotions
in a person or group. Such leaders listen attentively and can grasp the
other person‟s perspective. Empathy makes a leader able to get along well
with people of diverse backgrounds or from other cultures.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
C2. Organizational awareness. “A leader with a keen social awareness
can be politically astute, able to detect crucial social networks and read
key power relationships. Such leaders can understand the political forces
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at work in an organization, as well as the guiding values and unspoken
rules that operate among people there.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
C3. Service. “Leaders high in the service competence foster an emotional
climate so that people directly in touch with the customer or client will
keep the relationship on the right track. Such leaders monitor customer or
client satisfaction carefully to ensure they are getting what they need.
They also make themselves available as needed.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
Cluster D: Relationship management
Component and description
D1. Inspiration. “Leaders who inspire both create resonance and move
people with a compelling vision or shared mission. Such leaders embody
what they ask of others, and are able to articulate a shared mission in a
way that inspires others to follow. They offer a sense of common purpose
beyond the day-to-day tasks, making work exciting.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
D2. Influence. “Indicators of a leader‟s powers of influence range from
finding just the right appeal for a given listener to knowing how to build
buy-in from key people and a network of support for an initiative.
Leaders adept in influence are persuasive and engaging when they
address a group.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
D3. Developing others. “Leaders who are adept at cultivating people‟s
abilities show a genuine interest in those they are helping along,
understanding their goals, strengths, and weaknesses. Such leaders can
give timely and constructive feedback and are natural mentors or
coaches.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
D4. Change catalyst. “Leaders who can catalyze change are able to
recognize the need for the change, challenge the status quo, and champion
the new order. They can be strong advocates for the change even in the
face of opposition, making the argument for it compellingly. They also
find practical ways to overcome barriers to change.”
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Lon Nol:
Pol Pot:

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

8
8

9
9

10
10

D5. Conflict management. “Leaders who manage conflicts best are able
to draw out all parties, understand the differing perspectives, and then
find a common ideal that everyone can endorse. They surface the conflict,
acknowledge the feelings and views of all sides, and then redirect the
energy toward a shared ideal.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
D6. Teamwork and collaboration. “Leaders who are able team players
generate an atmosphere of friendly collegiality and are themselves models
of respect, helpfulness, and cooperation. They draw others into active,
enthusiastic commitment to the collective effort, and build spirit and
identity. They spend time forging and cementing close relationships
beyond mere work obligations.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lon Nol:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pol Pot:
16. What do you think was/were Lon Nol and Pol Pot‟s leadership style(s)? Please
choose among the following styles. You may choose more than one style. Provide
reasons for your choices.
A.Coercive style, in which the leader demands immediate
compliance. The phrase to describe this style is “Do what
I tell you.”
B.Authoritative style, in which the leader mobilizes
people toward a vision. The phrase to describe this style
is “Come with me.”
C.Affiliative style, in which the leader creates harmony
and builds emotional bonds. The phrase to describe this
style is “People come first.”
D.Democratic style, in which the leader forges consensus
through participation. The phrase to describe this style is
“What do you think?”
E.Pacesetting style, in which the leader sets high
standards for performance. The phrase to describe this
style is “Do as I do, now.”
F.Coaching style, in which the leader develops people
for the future. The phrase to describe this style is “Try
this.”
G. Other style(s) (please specify):
Lon Nol:
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Lon Nol

Pol Pot

























……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
Pol Pot:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
Write your reasons for your choices for both leaders here:
Lon Nol:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
Pol Pot:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
17. Please list any other leadership characteristics and competencies these leaders did
NOT possess.
Lon Nol:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
Pol Pot:
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………………..

This is the end of the survey questionnaire.
Thank you again for your time and effort.
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APPENDIX B
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
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Time of interview: 30-45 minutes
Date:
Place:
Interviewer: Hok Roth
Interviewee‟s code: ____________

Central Research question: “Why and how did Lon Nol and Pol Pot become pseudotransformational, bad, or failed leaders?”

Interview questions:
1. Could you give (additional) reasons why you think these two leaders had these
leadership styles (specify the style(s) the participant chose)?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:

2. Why and how did these leaders develop or adopt these leadership styles?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:
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3. Why do think Lon Nol was this type of leader (failed, mediocre, or successful)? How
about Pol Pot? What made them so?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:

4. Why do think Lon Nol and Pol Pot failed mainly because of a) foreign
intervention/interference, b) domestic circumstances, or c) their personal factors?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:

5. Why do you think Lon Nol and Pol Pot lacked a) conceptual skills, b) technical skills,
and/or c) human skills?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:

405

6. In your view, why and how did these leaders develop or adopt these types of
leadership: a) incompetent, b) rigid, c) intemperate, d) callous, e) corrupt, f) insular,
and/or g) evil leadership?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:

7. You said/think Lon Nol and Pol Pot lacked these components of EI (read out each
component). Why do think so? How and why did each leader lack these components?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:

8. Why did they make their decisions the way they did?
Lon Nol:

Pol Pot:

(Note: Thank the interviewee for their time and participation)
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APPENDIX C
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH SURVEY
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MississippiStateUniversity
Informed Consent Form for Participation in Research Survey
Title of Research Study: Failed Leadership: A Comparative Case Study of Lon Nol and
Pol Pot, Cambodian National Leaders
Study Site: Phnom Penh and several provinces in Cambodia and a few places in the
US and Australia
Researcher: Hok Roth, Mississippi State University
We would like to ask you to participate in a research study.
If you participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a survey about the
leadership qualities of Lon Nol and Pol Pot that will take about 30 minutes to complete.
The survey will include questions such as How would you classify the leadership of
these two leaders: Lon Nol and Pol Pot? In terms of leadership performance or
effectiveness, what kinds of leader were Lon Nol and Pol Pot? Please rate Lon Nol and
Pol Pot in terms of the following skills: conceptual, technical, human.
Questions
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to call Mr. Hok
Roth at 662-617-9019 or Dr. Gerald Emison at 662-325-7865. You can also email Hok
Roth at hokroth@gmail.com.

Voluntary Participation
Please understand that your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to
participatewill involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. You may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of
benefits.

Anonymity and Confidentiality
Your responses in this survey will be recorded in a completely anonymous manner. In
other words, the information you give will be recorded in such a manner that you cannot
be identified.
Please take all the time you need to read through this document and decide
whether you would like to participate in this survey.
If you decide to participate, your completion of the survey questionnaire indicates your
consent. Please keep this form for your records.
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